

THE PAPACY

AND

THE CIVIL POWER.

BY
R. W. THOMPSON.

“Popery is a double thing to deal with, and claims a twofold power, ecclesiastical and political, both usurped, and the one supporting the other.” JOHN MILTON.

“There was no usurpation so great as that of the Romans, who usurped the Empire ; neither do I exempt from this rule the priesthood, whose violence is double, inasmuch as it is doubled in holding men under corporeal and under spiritual authority.” FRANCIS GUICCIABDINI.

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PREFACE.

IT has seemed to me, for a long time, that it was the duty of the people of the United States to make themselves familiar with the history of the papacy, its relations to the civil power, and its attempted encroachments upon the rights of existing governments. This conviction caused me to enter upon the investigations which have resulted in the preparation of this volume mainly for self-edification ; and if the conclusions I have reached are not satisfactory to others, I shall be content if they are stimulated to make like investigations for themselves.

Having begun and prosecuted my labors from the Protestant stand-point, I am aware that the partisan defenders of the papacy and its enormous pretensions will assign every thing I have stated, whether of fact or opinion, to the force of habit and prejudice of education. This prejudice is undoubtedly strong in all minds ; and, struggle against them as we may, we are all apt to be influenced, more or less, by the current opinions prevailing among those with whom we habitually associate. But as I have not undertaken to discuss mere points of religious doctrine, or to treat of the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church, except in so far as they have been employed to influence the civil policy and action of governments, I am unwilling to concede myself less able to discover and declare the truth in reference to them than is a Roman Catholic to understand and describe the true character and tendencies of Protestantism.

In the claim of impartiality and fairness in all such matters, the advantage is on the side of the Protestant. Roman Catholic writers are led, almost universally, by the very nature of their church organization, into intolerance and dogmatism. They are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has done or taught from the beginning is unerringly right and truth. They do not employ their individual reason or judgment to examine for themselves, but are content to accept whatsoever is announced by ecclesiastical authority. Since the recent decree of the pope's infallibility, this authority is all centered in him. He is made incapable of error in all that he has declared, or shall hereafter declare, in the domain of faith and morals; and every member of the Church wins equal infallibility for himself only by the acceptance and promulgation of this doctrine.

Not so with the Protestant. He appeals to reason; examines history for himself; weighs both evidence and argument; and exercises his own intelligent judgment in separating right from wrong, truth from falsehood. While the papacy demands implicit and passive obedience the entire submission of the whole man, by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality, Protestantism encourages and develops this sense by treating every individual as endowed with the faculty of reason, and as possessing the right to employ it for himself. Manifestly, he who does not do it is mere "clay in the hands of the potter."

I have endeavored to obtain the information upon which my conclusions are based, without concerning myself about matters of religious faith, any further than as I have found religion and politics mixed up together; and then only to the extent of ascertaining **how far the world has been influenced by the union of Church and State**, and what the probable effect upon mankind would be if that union should again become general and universal. My toleration toward even the most violent and vindictive assailants of Protestantism is such as forbids that I should challenge the integrity of their motives, or the sincerity of their convictions. I will not quarrel with them about their religious opinions. These are

to be judged of by an Authority far higher than any earthly tribunal at the final bar, where we shall all meet and by a Judge to whose sentence, whether of approval or condemnation, every one of us must submit. It is far more agreeable to me to concede, as I readily and cheerfully do, that there is much in the antiquity and history of the Roman Catholic Church to enlist our admiration — much that has benefited the world by the dissemination of good and benignant influences. But if I have found in Protestantism, as it exists in the United States under the shelter of our popular institutions, that which has disseminated these same influences in a far greater degree; that which has done more to improve, advance, and elevate the world ; and that which, on these accounts, is to be preferred, it will be found to be because papal imperialism, originating in worldly motives and founded upon temporal ambition, has led this grand old church, by means of an external ecclesiastical organization, far away from its original apostolic simplicity and purity.

Such are my habits of thought possibly from professional training that I have taken but little for granted; but, in order to exercise an intelligent judgment as far as possible, have examined and weighed all the evidence within my reach, as I would that bearing upon any controverted point about which I can have no personal information. It is no easy matter to separate the true from the false in history, either secular or ecclesiastical. It requires the most careful and searching examination of authorities, often in conflict with each other, and sometimes with themselves. **It is not safe to accept all that is recorded as true, or to reject it as false.** Nor should that degree of moral evidence which amounts to positive demonstration be required. **We should be satisfied with such proof as establishes the reasonable probability of any given statement of facts.** The degree of evidence necessary to establish a fact, is, in a great measure, influenced by the nature of the fact itself always involving the preliminary inquiry whether it is appropriate or inappropriate to it. Evidence is of but little value unless it satisfies the mind and conscience. A reasonable man will require nothing more, and should be satisfied with nothing less. The difficulties in relation to the rules of evidence are greater or less, according to the nature of our experience and observation of human affairs, and our comprehension of the motives of men and societies. **Our common sense is the best and safest guide,** because it is not likely to lead us into those obscure and difficult paths where men are so often and so unprofitably carried by mere scholastic learning, and from which they can not extricate themselves without the assistance of those who designedly conduct them there.

There are many things entitled to be recognized without proof. Every thing which partakes of the nature of a public act; general laws and customs; matters which concern a whole people, or the government of a country; and such things as would naturally happen in the ordinary course of events are all of this character. To reject these would be to remove all the foundations and landmarks of history.

It should not be forgotten that, in the investigation of events far removed from our own time, we are compelled to acquire information of them only through the perception of others, and not our own. In reference to such events, credulous minds are too apt to give implicit credit to whatsoever is recorded; incredulous minds, too apt to reject it. To avoid these extremes, we should keep our minds in an evenly balanced condition without inclining either to the side of belief or disbelief so that when all the evidence accessible to us shall be applied, we may allow the scale to preponderate on that side where

the most reasonable probability lies; that is, where the result is consistent with the knowledge of facts already known to us.

These are recognized and well-established rules of evidence. They govern us in our ordinary intercourse with the world. And as they have guided me throughout my investigations, I have deemed it proper to state them, that others may understand the process of my reasoning, and be able to test the accuracy of my conclusions. These investigations having been prosecuted when all the circumstances connected with the present demands of the papacy are calculated to impress my mind with their magnitude and importance, I have endeavored to divest myself of all undue and improper prejudice, and to conduct them in the spirit of toleration and with all reasonable impartiality. I hope I have succeeded in this, because I have no wish to convey to the minds of others any belief or impressions except such as may meet the approval of their own reason and judgment. That I may have erred in admitting or rejecting evidence, in giving too great or too little weight to it when received, or may have reached improper and unwarrantable conclusions, is altogether probable; for, unlike the supporters of the papacy, I lay no claim to infallibility, or even to exemption from ordinary frailty. This is all I claim: that I have endeavored to be candid, and to state the convictions of my mind as inoffensively as possible; being content that others shall decide for themselves how far they are right and how far wrong.

During the celebrated controversy between Dr. Breckenridge and Archbishop Hughes, some years ago, the former had occasion to make a quotation from the catechism of the Council of Trent; and not having the original before him, took it from the works of Archbishop Usher, one of the most learned and extensively known of the English divines. Making no immediate question about the correctness of the quotation, Archbishop Hughes thus, in a seemingly supercilious (arrogant) air, evaded the matter: "Who this Usher is," said he, "I am at a loss to conjecture. There is an author of that name; but he does not possess much authority with Catholics, for the reason that he happens to be a *Protestant* archbishop." Illiberality of this kind is calculated rather to mislead and deceive than to discover the truth; and I have not suffered myself to be betrayed into it. I should be slow to conclude that a Roman Catholic writer is to be discredited merely on account of his religious belief, or that what a Protestant says is to be accepted as unconditionally true merely because he is a Protestant.

At the risk of swelling this volume to an undesirable size, I have made extended quotations from different authors, and from the bulls, encyclicals, etc., of the popes. This is deemed preferable to briefer extracts and condensed statements, because it furnishes the means of testing the fairness and accuracy both of criticisms and arguments. When I have found an author manifestly a mere partisan on either side, I have endeavored not to be biased by his influence. Cormenin, although not a Protestant, seems to me to be too sweeping in his denunciations of many of the popes, and therefore, has excited in my mind such suspicion of his impartiality that I have adopted his personal opinions in but few instances. Some of his pictures of the general corruption and depravity prevailing at Rome must be too highly colored. I know of no reason, however, why he should be any more discredited than other historians upon general questions of fact.

As my inquiries have been prosecuted in the midst of active business occupations, with the assistance of only a very limited and self-acquired knowledge of classical learning, and with no access to a single authority or volume beyond my own private library, this book is not designed for the instruction of the

educated classes, who have the means of making like inquiries for themselves. It is intended for *the people*, who, in the main, are without these means, and who are the final arbiters upon all public questions. If their attention shall be arrested by it, and they shall be excited to additional diligence in guarding the civil and religious rights guaranteed to them by the Government of the United States, it will concern me very little to know that it has invited criticism, or that I, on account of it, have incurred the animosity and anathemas of such as pay for the protection our institutions give them by Jesuitical plottings to establish a “Holy Empire” upon their ruins.

R. W. T.

CHAPTER I. Introductory

Roman Catholics in the United States. Their Schools under Foreign Priests and Jesuits. They Accept the Pope's Infallibility. The Hierarchy and Laymen. The Government of the United States. It is Opposed as Usurpation, because not Founded on Religion. The Roman Catholic Church must Rule in both Spirituals and Temporals. The People Need a Master.— Their Whole Duty is Obedience.— Infallibility : the Old and New Doctrine. The Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX.

MANY persons now (in 1876) living will remember when there were very few Roman Catholics in the United States, compared with the bulk of the population; and none at all in some of the oldest and most densely populated parts of the country. With the exception of the descendants of the Maryland colonists, and of those who had settled in Louisiana before its purchase, they were to be found only upon the frontier, in the large cities, and with here and there a church in the interior. They were not sufficiently numerous to have attracted any especial attention, and were generally and generously accepted by Protestants as co-workers in the cause of Christianity. They were not disposed to invite any antagonism with the prevailing Protestant faith, and when such antagonism was known to exist, were prompt and emphatic in rebuking it. Their priests appeared to be humble and unpretending men, professing only the single object of serving their Divine Master, and seemingly ready, when stricken upon one cheek, to turn the other. Humility was one of their most prominent characteristics.

It is otherwise now. There are seven archbishops, fifty-three bishops, six vicars apostolic, priests whose numbers it is impossible to compute, and a membership variously estimated by the official organs of the Church at from six to eight millions or about one-sixth of our whole population. It is asserted that there are over four hundred educational institutions in the different States and Territories, besides many private schools, under the immediate and exclusive government of the papal hierarchy. In these schools, without any exception, it is made absolutely and indispensably necessary that the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church shall be taught to all the pupils, as the beginning and end of all necessary education; that it shall be fixed in their minds, as a sentiment of religious faith, that, since the decree of papal infallibility, they owe, within the domain of faith and morals, a higher allegiance to the Pope of Home than to the Government of the United States, or that of any State; and that any violation of this allegiance will bring upon them the severest censures of the Church, and inevitably lead to their eternal punishment in the world to come. There were recently eleven hundred and thirteen teachers in charge of these institutions. They have been selected for this particular duty, on account of their submissive obedience to the pope and his American hierarchs. And besides these, it is said that there are two thousand three hundred and eighty-three sisters of various orders, who have in their hands the training and education of the aggregate number of thirty -three thousand eight hundred and fifty-three female pupils. *

In a late work the following reference is made to the rapid growth of Romanism in the United States:

*" Catholic Family Almanac," 1872, p. 79.

"For the year 1875 the following estimate is made in Sadlier's 'Catholic Directory.' Archbishops and bishops the same as in 1872; priests, 4873; churches, chapels, and stations, 6920, of which 4800 are churches; theological seminaries, 18; studying for the priesthood, 1875; colleges, 68; academies, 511;

parish schools, 1444; asylums, homes, and refuges, 215; hospitals, 87; and the Roman Catholic population, exclusive of Baltimore, Charleston, Erie, and Brooklyn for which no estimates are given is placed at 5,701,242. By this same statement it appears that in 1814 there were only 85 priests in the United States; in 1834 the number had increased to 808; and in 1887 there were 1 archbishop, 14 bishops, 390 priests, 300 churches, and 148 stations.” —*New York Tablet*, January 2, 1875.

PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC STATISTICS.

“But it is in our own country, above every other, that the recent gains of Romanism upon Protestantism are the most remarkable. At the close of the two centuries and a half that elapsed from the first settlement of Virginia to the year 1859, the number of Catholics in the United States had run up to two millions and a half only; but at the end of the nine years that succeeded (namely, in 1868) that number had doubled. Twelve years ago they were but a twelfth part of our population; today they constitute, probably, more than a seventh.”

In the same work a compilation is made from a source considered entirely reliable, as follows:

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| Number of Protestants in the United States in 1859..... | 21,000,000 |
| Number of Catholics in the United States in 1859..... | 2,500,000 |
| Number of Protestants in the United States in 1868..... | 27,000,000 |
| Number of Catholics in the United States in 1868..... | 5,000,000 |

—Showing that the Catholics had increased, in the nine years from 1859 to 1868, one hundred percent, while the Protestants had increased in the same time less than twenty nine percent.”

Then, commenting upon these important and startling facts, the author continues :

“Those who will verify the calculation of future increase, supposing it to continue at the same relative ratio for four terms of nine years each, commencing with the year 1868, will find that in 1904, that is, in thirty-three years from today, there would be eighty millions of Catholics to less than seventy-five millions of Protestants in the American Union.”

While it is not by any means certain that the relative ratio of increase here assumed will be borne out by future developments, and exceedingly probable that it will not be, yet the facts stated show so great and rapid an increase of the Roman Catholic part of our population as to render it an important and necessary inquiry, whether or not there is any thing in the demands and teachings of the papacy which requires that so large a body of the citizens of this country shall put themselves, either now or hereafter, in opposition to the principles we are endeavoring, as a nation, to perpetuate by our civil institutions. No matter if there are thousands of them who would refuse to do so, if required even by the pope, this does not diminish the importance and necessity of the inquiry. Institutions of the popular form require, more than those of other forms, to be guarded by ceaseless and untiring vigilance.

There is no way of ascertaining with precision what proportion of the Roman Catholic educational institutions in this country are under *Jesuit* direction and management. That the number is large may be inferred from a boast made, not long ago, by the editor of a newspaper zealously devoted to the interests of that order. With extraordinary vehemence, and with some talent for the dogmatic and declamatory style of writing, he has industriously employed his columns to advance the cause of the

papacy in the United States; to bring about the destruction and overthrow of Protestantism; and to elevate the pope to an equality with God, in the government of all human affairs! With an air of self-satisfied pride and arrogance, he announced that these, followers of Loyola, who have, in the course of their history, been driven out of every Roman Catholic country on account of the enormity of their offenses against society, have now twelve colleges under their charge; and that “it is clear that the Catholic intellectuality of the land depends almost entirely on these institutions. Had they never been opened here, there had been a dense state of darkness over us all; were they closed tomorrow, an eclipse would set in which it would be impossible to dissipate; and if decay should attack them, the brightness of the Catholic name in the United States would be soon a dissolved glory.”

THE SOCIETY OF JESUS IN THE UNITED STATES.

In a subsequent number of this same paper, it is stated that “there are about three hundred Jesuit priests in the United States” that, in addition to the above colleges, there is “one immense scholasticate, or house of studies, for all North America,” located in Maryland, with “about one hundred and fifty young Jesuits within its walls;” and where “*at length the Jesuits of this country have commenced to educate their scholastics according to the time-honored rules of the society.* Hitherto,” it is said, “the demand for professors and priests has been so urgent that this could not have been easily done; but the long-wished-for beginning is now at last made, and nothing will be suffered to interfere with the scholastic in going to his studies at the proper time, and in completing them in all their extent, variety, and rigor. The result in a few years will be seen all over the land.”

We may reasonably expect that the numbers of this celebrated society in the United States will now be rapidly increased by emigration. Their suppression by the Prussian Government, their like fate in Italy, their difficulties in Bavaria and Switzerland growing out of their resistance to the public authorities, their expulsion from Guatemala, and their probable expulsion from all the countries where they have been longest and best known, and where the obnoxious principles of their order, and its insidious workings, are understood, will probably cause them to seek refuge in this country; where, under the license of our Protestant and tolerant institutions, they may hope to give new life to their organization and perpetuate its existence. The field is an inviting one rich in every thing that attracts and we must not suppose that they will be slow to occupy it; for even the Jesuit, when driven away from the Roman Catholic nations and covered by them with obloquy and reproach, can find shelter under our Constitution and laws. The only price he is expected to pay is fidelity to the fundamental principles upon which our Government has been founded. With less than this we have no right to be content; and must not be.

There are very few thoughtful minds that have not been impressed by the fact that these educational influences are, with only occasional and rare exceptions, under the immediate direction of foreigners of men educated and trained by the papacy for the express purpose. Why is this? Why is it that only those who are thus prepared for the work with all the peculiar opinions, prejudices, and habits of thought which grow out of and belong to the papal system, as understood at the Vatican in Rome are specially and almost exclusively chosen to teach Roman Catholicism in the United States? Unquestionably, there is some reason for it. And it would seem to be the only satisfactory explanation of such a fact, that, in the opinion of the ecclesiastical authorities of Rome, there is so direct an antagonism between the

papacy and a popular form of government like ours, that they do not suppose it possible for both systems to exist permanently together; and, therefore, have selected these foreigners as the most suitable and competent agents to carry on the work of substituting other institutions for ours institutions more congenial to them, and more in harmony with the papal views of government.

A SEVERE BLOW TO POLITICAL FREEDOM.

This precautionary measure of ecclesiastical policy, carefully designed for the achievement of future results, has borne some fruits already. We see this in the fact that the members of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States appear today to be more formidably and compactly united in supporting and defending all the pretensions of the papacy than are the Roman Catholic populations of any of the nations of Europe. Among the most intelligent of the latter those who have become familiar, from long observation and direct intercourse, with the papal system the foundations of that system have been destroyed, papal concordats have been indignantly and contemptuously revoked, papal bulls of anathema and excommunication have been defied, and the ecclesiastical right to proclaim and enforce the decree of papal infallibility has been courageously and successfully resisted. And yet, in this country, we are furnished almost daily with renewed evidences of the enormous increase of hierarchical power, and of a blind and humiliating submission to the medieval doctrines of the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pope Pius IX.; and the extreme demands of the Jesuit and Ultramontane royalists of Europe. Many thousands of the Roman Catholics of Europe, although living under monarchical institutions, have the intrepidity to disavow the tame utterance of Augustine: "*When Rome has spoken, that is the end of the matter*" and to assert their right to break loose from papal oppression and cling to the *old Church* of "the Fathers." But the bulk of those in the United States, while shielded and protected by free institutions, seem so trained in this passive and slavish school of Augustine, that they do not yet realize how surely and inevitably its tendency is to make them the mere tools of an imperious and exacting hierarchy, whose professions of moderation are both delusive and insincere. They seem either incompetent or unwilling to understand how completely their manhood is forfeited by a compliance with the requirements of this ecclesiastical system ; while, in other respects, they exhibit commendable intelligence and some of the best qualities of citizenship.

The decree of papal infallibility was a severe blow at the cause of personal as well as political freedom; and by now consenting to make it the chief corner-stone of their ecclesiastical polity, they avow their readiness beforehand to acquiesce in whatsoever shall be demanded of them, no matter how enormous it may be and to what degree of humiliation it may reduce them. There is no king now upon any throne who sets forth his pretensions in more imperious tones than Pope Pius IX.; yet they crouch at his feet as submissively as the slave at the feet of his task-master. When he insists as other popes have done before him that God has given him "full power over the whole world, both in ecclesiastical and civil affairs," and that to maintain the contrary is impious and heretical, they give their open assent, or tame acquiescence to this odious doctrine, though it may do violence to their most cherished and preconceived opinions.

It is wonderful that such men do not profit more by that experience which comes from intercourse with the world; that they do not realize that multitudes of their brethren, who once supported the cause of the papacy, have abandoned it, on account of the very things to which they submit; and that the

governments hitherto most obedient to the pope have passed out of his hands and from under his control. How is it possible for them to shut their eyes so completely as they seem to do to the movements of the modern nations?

Spain, formerly the most devoted of all of them to papal supremacy, has, within a few years, made her queen a fugitive, because she was the mere creature of an insolent priesthood; has weakened the power of that same priesthood, because it had been trained in the school of the infamous and despised Inquisition; and has advanced so far toward a higher national development as to excite the hope in all liberal minds that she may be ultimately able to throw off entirely the leaden weight of ultramontaniam (the clerical political conception within the Catholic Church that places strong emphasis on the prerogatives and powers of the Pope).

France withdrew her military support from the papal throne, in order to humiliate a rival Protestant power, and she and the papacy both went down into a common wreck; and if she rises again under the papal flag, it will be only to dig still deeper the grave into which all her aspirations of national glory will be buried.

Austria has set aside her concordat with the pope, and proclaimed entire freedom of religious belief, and has made herself the ally of the bitterest enemies of Pius IX.

Bavaria has refused to permit the dogma of infallibility to be proclaimed in her dominions, because it is opposed to the fundamental articles of her constitution, "and would place in jeopardy the rights of the non-Catholics of the country."

The open collision between Teutonic and Latin ideas has consolidated the Germanic states by the triumph of the former; and left no hope for the papacy throughout all Germany, unless reaction could be won by the impossible ascendancy of the odious principles of Jesuitism. Even Italy, at the very door of the Vatican, has snatched the scepter of temporal dominion from the hands of the pope, invited Protestant churches and schools to be opened in Rome, confiscated the property of the rich monastic orders, and appropriated the Quirinal and other papal palaces to the uses of the state.

PAPAL OPPOSITION TO POPULAR GOVERNMENT.

There is not left in all the earth a single government with either the inclination or the power to defend the papacy, nor a single square mile of territory over which its temporal scepter can be wielded. And while all these things are consummated facts in history, and others of kindred import are rapidly transpiring; while these Roman Catholic populations of Europe are beginning to breathe more like free men, and are preparing for higher degrees of progress than they have yet attained, the followers of the papacy in the United States, with creditable exceptions, are concentrating their exertions with wonderful unanimity, in order to reforge the discarded fetters of papal tyranny, and to manacle with them the limbs of the freest and happiest population upon earth! Do not these events teach a philosophy which it becomes the American people to understand? Manifestly, they will fail in duty to themselves, their country, and the age, if they do not endeavor to understand it.

(Note: This pretty much confirms in my mind why the USA has so many problems today. The Jesuits are behind the liberal woke leftist socialist agenda to lead the nation to accept a so called "Christian

Nationalism” or union of Church and State with Rome in control to stand against the evil. Perhaps in the beginning it will be not appear to be overt control with the Pope at the head. Christian J. Pinto of [Noise of Thunder Radio](#) has a lot to say about this subject.)

ENDEAVOR TO SUBVERT OUR INSTITUTIONS.

We should not fail to keep in mind the distinction, which undoubtedly exists, between the hierarchy and the laity. Among the latter there are, beyond all question, a large number of pious and sincere Christians, who follow the teachings of their Church with honest and pure intentions, and who are equally honest and sincere in their support of our republican and popular institutions, because they think they see nothing in either incompatible with the other. During the late rebellion (the American Civil War) many of these went into the national armies, willingly and promptly, and were as brave and zealous as any others in defending the nation’s life and the integrity of the Union. But it can not be honestly denied that the direct tendency, during that same crisis, of all that came from Rome was to give “aid and comfort” to those who were endeavoring to overthrow the Government. And it is equally true that the open avowals of the pope, in so far as they were designed to have political significance, had also the same effect. In no other way can the fact be accounted for, that so large a number of Roman Catholic priests in this country sympathized with all the measures which were designed to break up the Union and destroy our institutions. All their ecclesiastical training is so conducted as to prepare them for opposition to a popular form of government, and for giving preference to monarchical principles. They exhibit abundant proof of this at all times when collisions occur between the people and their monarchs who profess to govern by “divine right,” always opposing the former and taking sides with the latter. They could not pay obedience to the desires and commands of the pope in any other way. Nor would he consider their obedience to him complete, such as their ecclesiastical obligations impose upon them, unless they were always and everywhere ready to go to this extent. He measures their fidelity to him by the readiness with which they adopt and promulgate these sentiments.

Pius IX., since he threw himself into the arms of the Jesuits, has so frequently avowed his hatred of a government of the people, and his fondness for monarchy, as to leave no doubt upon any properly informed mind about the condition in which he would place the nations, if he possessed the power to regulate their affairs and construct their forms of government. He would “pluck up” and destroy every constitution or law which gives the people the right to frame their own institutions so as to reflect their own will, and would require the whole world to recognize and adopt the doctrine of the “divine right of kings” to govern all the nations in obedience to the pontifical mandates. He demands of his hierarchy and all the officers of the Roman Catholic Church, in every country and under all circumstances and conditions, not merely that they shall maintain these sentiments themselves, but shall carefully instruct all the faithful to do the same; conceding to them only such a degree of discretion as allows them to regulate their utterances by expediency.

From both these classes— both priests and laymen— the pope exacts implicit obedience, without inquiry or any appeal to their own reason. If it shall be yielded by the Roman Catholic population of the United States, and if it is really the design that the papal exactions shall be carried to the extent of interfering with their obligations as citizens, there is no difficulty in seeing that they may be ultimately led into an attitude of antagonism to our form of government.

At this point lies the danger most seriously to be apprehended by the people of the United States a danger which underlies many, if not all, of the questions by which the nation is periodically excited. While we may not now be able to anticipate the precise time or form of its appearing, we should not be unprepared to meet it, if, by any possibility, it shall be hereafter precipitated upon us.

By our form of government all the laws have their source, both theoretically and practically, in the will of the people ; and are, therefore, of human origin. The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established by the people,"in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." (Preamble to the Constitution of the United States) Considered collectively, these objects include every thing necessary to the happiness, prosperity, and elevation of a nation; and, with the supreme and sovereign authority of the American people to preserve them for nearly a century, they have, thus far, proved to be much more conducive to these ends than any of the forms of government where kings, or popes, or potentates of any name or rank, have been regarded as the only "fountains of justice." This belief can not be delusion, in view of the present condition of the world and of the practical results before us. If it is, it is a delusion which the people of the United States have cherished, and will, it is hoped, continue to cherish, with all the fervor of the intensest patriotism. It would be unjust to say that among the number of those who do cherish it there are not many Roman Catholic laymen, and now and then a priest, who have found shelter under our institutions from European misgovernment and monarchical oppression.

There are, undoubtedly, many of this class who do not believe, when told, that the papacy is now endeavoring, by the most active and persistent efforts, to substitute an ecclesiastical government for this government of the people a grand "Holy Empire" for this free and popular republic which it has cost so much blood and treasure to establish and maintain. Restrained by the sincerity of their own intentions from suspecting others, they never stop a moment to inquire to what probable or possible point they may be led by the uninquiring obedience to their hierarchy which is demanded of them. And the hierarchy, taking advantage of their silence, and construing it into acquiescence, let no opportunity escape to build up an ecclesiastical power, comprehensive enough to absorb all those powers of the Government and the people which the pope shall consider to be in opposition to the law of God!

These foreign-born ecclesiastics have moved forward in work with great caution and circumspection. Whenever they have been enabled to employ the pen of a native citizen, they have done so, in order that, while secure in their own reticence for the time being, they could observe the effect produced.

DR. BROWNSON'S INTOLERANCE

As early as 1849, Dr. O. A. Brownson— who had abandoned Protestantism under the pretense that it was necessary to human happiness that the whole world should be subjected to ecclesiastical government did not hesitate to utter, in behalf of the papacy, such doctrines as would, if established in this country, upheave the government of the United States, and that of every State in the Union, from their foundations. In an article on "Authority and Liberty," he pointed out the absolute and plenary authority of God over all things spiritual and temporal; and denied that any body or community of men, as men, "has any rightful authority either in spirituals or temporals." As a consequence, he insisted that "all merely human authorities are usurpations, and their acts are without obligation, null and void from

the beginning.” In other and more practical words, that the authority of the people of the United States over the Government is usurpation, and that all the constitutions and laws they have ordained and enacted by this authority “are without obligation, null and void from the beginning!” All “right to command,” whether of parent, pastor, prince, individuals, or communities, he centers in *the pope*, as “the vicar of God ” on earth, and in him alone. He insists that, through the pope and by virtue of his authority, “religion must found the state;” and that the only “absolute and unlimited freedom” consists in “absolute and unconditional subjection to God;” that is, to his vicar the pope, who alone is authorized to declare his will. Every thing contrary to this notwithstanding the Constitution of the United States and that of every State in the Union are contrary to it he pronounces to be “nonsense or blasphemy.”

This author is so much dissatisfied with the structure of the government under which he was born, and by which he is allowed the liberty of speech and of the press, even to the extent of assailing its most cherished provisions, as to insist that the papacy alone possesses the only Divine authority, ever conferred upon an earthly tribunal, to make laws for the government of mankind ; and that in submitting to it we submit to God, “*and are freed from all human authority;*” because whatsoever it teaches and commands, in reference to all spiritual and temporal things, must be and is infallibly true. Therefore, “in the *temporal* order,” according to him, the authority of the papacy “is nothing but the assertion over the state of the Divine sovereignty,” which it represents. And, hence, all the authority derived from the people which does not bring the state into this condition of obedience and subserviency to the papacy “is despotic, because it is authority without right, will unregulated by reason, power disjoined from justice.” And, further pursuing the same idea in opposition to the fundamental principle of all popular and representative government, he continues thus:

“Withdraw *the supremacy of the Church* from the *temporal* order, and you deprive the state of that sanction; by asserting that it does not hold from God, and is not amenable to his law, you give the state simply a human basis, and have in it only a *human authority*, which has *no right to govern*, and which it is *intolerable tyranny to compel me to obey*”

He then pursues another method of reasoning which, under color of a single concession, brings him to the same conclusions; the main object, that is, the absolute and universal power of the papacy, never being lost sight of. Agreeing that the state has some authority within the limits of the law of nature, he concedes to it the right to act “without ecclesiastical restraint or interference,” when and only so long as it confines itself within the scope of that law. But he puts such limitations upon even this restricted right as to render it of no avail for any of the purposes of an independent government, by insisting that as the papacy holds its authority directly from God, and exercises it under his revealed law, which includes the law of nature, it is, therefore, the only competent judge of infractions upon both the revealed and the natural law. Speaking of the Church—and since the decree of papal infallibility he, of course, means the pope, who represents and absorbs all the authority of the Church—he says:

“She is, under God, *the supreme judge of both laws*, which for her are but one law; and hence she takes cognizance, in her tribunals, of the breaches of the natural law as well as of the revealed, and has the right to take cognizance by nations as well as of its breaches *by individuals*, by the prince as well as the subject, *for it is the supreme law for both. The state is, therefore, only an inferior court, bound to receive the law from the Supreme Court, and liable to have its decrees reversed on appeal.*”

These sentiments were not uttered from mere impulse, or in the heat of animated discussion; they were carefully formed and elaborated in the closet, and sent forth, with full deliberation and hierarchical sanction, to prepare the minds of the Roman Catholic part of our population for events which have since transpired, and which were then, doubtless, anticipated. They had, undoubtedly, the full approval of the highest authorities of the Church in the United States; for so wonderfully perfect is the plan of papal organization, that their author would not have acquired the distinguished position he has since reached in the Church, if he had ventured to commit the papacy wrongfully upon questions of so much delicacy and importance. Dr. Brownson had prepared himself for the adoption of these views by previous study of the papal system, and was, therefore, as a native citizen, the most fit person to give them public utterance; it being very naturally supposed, no doubt, that the people of this country would silently submit to harsh criticism upon the principles of their government when made by a native, when the same criticism made by a foreigner would arouse their just indignation. An intelligent and educated mind like his could not fail to see that the principles he enunciated were diametrically opposed to the whole theory of American government, and that the logical consequence of their supremacy in the United States would be the end of popular government, by the substitution for it of one in the ecclesiastical form.

RELIGION WHICH IS “TO COMMAND.”

He had, but a few years ago, announced that “the Roman Catholic religion assumes, as its point of departure, that it is instituted, not to be taken care of by the people, but to take care of the people; not to be governed by them, but to govern them;” and from this stand -point of deadly hostility to the institutions under which he was born, and which allowed him the liberty he was so unpatriotically abusing, it was but a single step to such bold and audacious avowals as the following:

“The people need governing, and must be governed.They must have A MASTER.... The religion which is to answer our purpose must be *above the people, and able to COMMAND THEM....* The first lesson to the child is, *obey*; the first and last lesson to *the people, individually and collectively, is, OBEY* ; and there is no obedience where there is no authority to enjoin it.... The Roman Catholic religion, then, is necessary to sustain popular liberty, because popular liberty can be sustained only by a religion free from popular control, above the people, speaking from above and able to *command them* ; and such a religion is the Roman Catholic.... In this sense, we wish THIS COUNTRY TO COME UNDER THE POPE OF ROME. As the visible head of the Church, the spiritual authority which Almighty God has instituted to teach and govern the nations, we assert his supremacy, and tell our countrymen that we would have them submit to him. They may flare up at this as much as they please, and write as many alarming and abusive editorials as they choose, or can find time and space to do they will not move us, or relieve themselves from the obligation Almighty God has placed them under of *obeying the authority of the Catholic Church, pope and all.*”

When Pope Gregory XVI., some years ago, uttered the saying, “Out of the Roman States, there is no country where I am pope, *except the United States,*” he undoubtedly cherished the idea which filled the mind of Dr. Brownson when he penned these extraordinary sentiments; that is, that popular liberty, in its true sense, can only exist where the people are reduced to a condition of political vassalage, and where there is a power superior to them, with authority sufficient to command and govern them! With

both of them, as well as with many Roman Catholic writers who have similarly expressed themselves, such sentiments grew out of the existing condition of the nations, and the decaying fortunes of the papacy. In all the countries professedly Roman Catholic, the Church was restricted and hampered in what were asserted to be its rights, on account of its close alliance with despotism; while in this country, owing to the liberality of our institutions, it is “legally free,” and is left without the interference of the law, to the uninterrupted pursuit of its ecclesiastical policy. Manifestly, it is because the nations of Europe, hitherto Roman Catholic, have taken away from “the vicar of God” the power to subordinate the laws of the State to the canon laws of the Church, which have been constructed with sole reference to papal supremacy, that the hope of rebuilding this power in the United States has been excited.

Paralyzed by the defensive policy of the nations where the oppressive character of the papal system has been long observed and understood, and where its opposition to the rights of the people has been most keenly felt, all these representatives of the papacy cultivate the idea in their own minds, and are endeavoring to instill it into the minds of their followers, that they may avail themselves of the tolerance of our institutions to reconstruct their repudiated system of ecclesiastical absolutism in this country. The present pope, Pius IX., pressed much nearer to the wall than was Gregory XVI., and, doubtless, flattered at the thought that the bold utterances of Dr. Brownson and others have yet received no popular rebuke, has allowed the same hope to obtain possession of his mind.

When at his command, the defenders of the papacy speak of the Church as being “legally free” in the United States, he and they understand it to mean that it is free, under our form of government, to concentrate and vitalize all its efforts and the best faculties of its priesthood, to consummate the ends and objects they aim at. They do not mean that the people here are to be converted to the Roman Catholic faith by free discussion and appeals to reason — these are methods of procedure forbidden to them. But they do mean just what Dr. Brownson has averred; that the pope, without any human authority to challenge or arraign him, shall be at liberty to build up a hierarchy, irresponsible to the laws enacted by the people, with authority and powers above those of the National and State governments, and sufficient to compel passive obedience to all papal decrees and to the canon laws of the Roman Catholic Church, in such form as he, with the crown of the Caesars upon his brow, shall promulgate them from his papal and imperial city of Rome!

INSIDIOUSNESS OF A FOREIGN-BORN PRIESTHOOD.

These matters are of sufficient import to arrest public attention; and it is time that the people of the United States understood the manner in which a foreign-born priesthood, educated for the purpose, are employing the freedom granted them by our institutions what they mean when they write and talk about the freedom of their church and what the end may be if they shall quietly and unresistingly submit to have replanted here the papal imperialism which has been expelled from every enlightened nation in Europe. When a Protestant talks of freedom, he means the self-government of the people in all their civil affairs; when the papal hierarchy talk of it, they mean the freedom of the papacy to govern the world, through the pope and themselves, as his agents and auxiliaries. And when, in this country, we speak of the “liberty of conscience,” we mean that every man shall be permitted to worship God as his own personal convictions of duty shall dictate. But the papal hierarchy have no such meaning, and

intend nothing of this sort. With them “liberty of conscience” consists merely of “*the right to embrace, profess, and practice, the Catholic religion*” in a Protestant country; not the right to embrace, profess, and practice the Protestant religion in a Roman Catholic country! And why do they not concede this latter right, while demanding the former with such steady persistence? The answer with them is always at hand, when it is expedient to make it: because “*infidelity*” is “the last logical consequence of Protestantism;” and, therefore, Protestantism, being thus opposed to the law of God, can not be tolerated or compromised with without sin, and must be exterminated!

These ideas are so plainly and emphatically expressed by *The Catholic World* of New York, that the article in which they are found entitled “A Plea for Liberty of Conscience” is well worthy a careful examination and serious reflection. While it apologizes to those of its “Catholic readers” who may take offense at its defensive tone as if it were an act of indiscretion to defend the Roman Catholic Church otherwise than by the dogmatic assumption of its exclusiveness and supremacy it exhausts its ingenuity in the discussion of the question, “What constitutes a violation of just and rightful liberty of conscience?” To such of its readers as presuppose “the Catholic religion to be the true one,” it addresses this expressive and violent language:

“Of course, in the last analysis, we must come back upon the fundamental principle that the law of God is supreme, and must be obeyed at all hazards, let come what will. No matter what human law, what private interests, what dreadful penalties may stand in the way, God must be obeyed, conscience must be followed, duty must be done. *The authority of the state must be braved, human affections must be disregarded, life must be sacrificed*, when loyalty to truth and to the will of God requires it.”

PAPAL INFALLIBILITY NOT A NEW DOGMA.

These sentiments, when uttered, might have seemed comparatively harmless to the casual reader; and they were probably thus considered by many of the uninitiated laymen of the Roman Catholic Church. They are seemingly full of loyalty to the Christian faith, and yet that they were designed to have a covert and latent significance well understood by the priesthood, there can be no reasonable doubt, in view of what was then transpiring at Rome. Preparations were making for the decree of papal infallibility; and it was, doubtless, considered necessary, by such utterances as these, to put the minds of the faithful in a fit condition to accept, without murmur, this radical change in the doctrines of the Church. At that time, infallibility was no less a dogma of the Church than it is now; but it was differently deposited. It was the infallibility of the Church, when acting through and by means of the representative authorities it has recognized for centuries; that is, councils and popes conjointly. Whatever opinions contrary to this may have been expressed elsewhere, and have generally prevailed among the hierarchy, this was, undoubtedly, the belief of a very large majority of the lay members of the Church in the United States. They both felt and expressed for the pope a feeling bordering upon reverence, but had never yet been brought to the point of accepting him as possessed alone of all the infallibility they had been accustomed to assign to the Church; in other words, they had never consented to accept a church organization entirely deprived of all ordinary representative features. With them, the old faith was sanctified by centuries of time; and they associated all ideas of invasion upon it with heretical teachings. Feeling assured that a deposit thus sacred would be preserved with fidelity by its custodians, and having no dread of any antagonism to it from within, they exhibited their confidence

by the most deferential obedience. Whatsoever came to them with the stamp of authority was willingly accepted; but they had not yet learned to regard this authority, in so far as it affected the fundamentals of their faith, as lodged elsewhere than in the collective body of their bishops, acting conjointly with the pope, in the general councils of the whole Church. Any accusation that they did so usually excited their resentment; at all events, their unqualified denial. And when this is taken into account, when it is considered how few there were who pretended to believe the doctrine of papal infallibility, it may well be supposed that these avowals of the Catholic World passed unobserved by the ordinary reader, at the time. Although the article may have been read by many Roman Catholic laymen, it is not probable that they perceived its ultimate bearing or design; or, if they did, they did not suppose it possible that any harm could be done by it to the theory of popular government, so long as the faith and doctrines of their Church were subject to interpretation only by the whole body of the episcopate, gathered together in general council from all parts of the world, and representing the entire Church. This view of it would have naturally arisen in the minds of the honest and unsuspecting members of the Church of that large class who are made credulous by the excess of their fidelity, and who are no more inclined to suspect others of duplicity than they are to practice it themselves. Yet it can not now be seriously denied that the hierarchy of the Church, or those among them who occupied the most commanding and influential positions, fully understood the import and meaning of the principles of church polity so boldly proclaimed by the *Catholic World*. The prelates and priests knew that they were expressed in response to the pope's Encyclical and Syllabus of 1864, in order to prepare the whole membership of the Church, gradually but cautiously, for the decree of papal infallibility; for the ultimate concentration of all the authority of the church in the hands of the pope alone, at the expense of the representative feature in the church economy; and for the substitution of his orders, decrees, and commands, for such as heretofore for over eighteen hundred years except when papal usurpation made it otherwise have been considered the law of the Church when proceeding from the whole body of the Church. In no other sense can these principles be now interpreted.

Indeed, *The Catholic World* did not, at the time of their utterance, intend to leave much doubt about its meaning in the minds of the initiated. It intended to place itself in advance of others who were slower to move in the direction indicated by the pope. Therefore, with the Encyclical and Syllabus to dictate the sentiment, it was announced, in the next number, that the pope, "as the head and mouthpiece of the Catholic Church, administers its discipline and issues orders to which every Catholic, under pain of sin, must yield obedience."

THE CHURCH OF ROME TO INTERPRET OUR LAWS.

These are not loose and idle sayings; nor are they expressed by ignorant and irresponsible men. *The Catholic World* is edited with great ability, and possesses very high literary merit. It is issued from "The Catholic Publication House," in New York, manifestly with episcopal sanction. And when such a publication, with such high indorsement, solemnly and under all its responsibilities announces it as the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, that disobedience to the "orders" of the pope is "sin" against God, what should interest the American people more than to inquire whether it is contemplated, or is even possible, that any of these "orders" should be directed against, or shall threaten the existence of, any of the principles which enter into the structure of their government? As the prosecution of this

inquiry progresses, much will appear well calculated to startle those whose avocations lead them into other fields of thought and investigation.

In the light of the teachings thus far announced, and of the further fact that the pope's infallibility is now almost universally recognized in the United States, either by open approval or silent acquiescence, **there is no other logical conclusion than that the papal hierarchy in this country entertain the desire to make our government and laws conform to the laws of God, as they shall be interpreted and announced by the pope.** They profess to have been appointed to this mission by Almighty God, and, stimulated by the zeal engendered by this conviction (the honesty of which there is no occasion to impeach), are undoubtedly arming themselves for the work with all the weapons which can be drawn from the pontifical armory. And *The Catholic World*, in order to incite the courage of the assailants, and bring about this result with all possible expedition, declares in advance that all "human laws" must be resisted when they stand in the way of the grand achievement; that all "private interests" must be sacrificed; that the most dreadful "penalties" must be incurred ; and that "the authority of the state must be braved, human affections must be disregarded, life must be sacrificed, when loyalty to truth and to the will of God requires it" as the truth shall be declared, and the will of God shall be announced, by the infallible and unerring pope!

Chapter II. The Pope and Civil Affairs

The Pope and Civil Affairs.—Preparations to Make him Infallible.—The Bishop's Oath.—National Council of Baltimore.—Their Theory of Government.—Defense of the Ancient Rights of the Papacy.—Arraignment of Protestantism as Infidelity, and a Failure.—Popular and Monarchical Government.—Protestant Toleration Necessary to Popular Government.

It has come to be an axiom among all the advocates of free government, that “**error ceases to be dangerous when reason is left free to combat it.**” But those who support the cause of imperialism maintain the opposite of this that the public mind and conscience are enlightened only in proportion as they are submissive to some superior governing power, sufficiently strong to hold them in obedience.

The contest between these opposing theories is one between intelligence and ignorance. In the one case, society is recognized as being entitled to govern itself by laws of its own enacting founded upon its own will. In the other, this right is entirely denied, and it is regarded as being fitted only for that condition of inferiority which shall reduce it to an unconsciousness of its degradation. The civil institutions of the United States are constructed upon the former of these theories. Wheresoever civil institutions have existed in obedience to the dictation of the papacy, they have been constructed upon the latter. Protestantism, with all its elevating tendencies, is the legitimate offspring of the one. Decrepitude, decay, and disruption have been the natural fruits of the other. These considerations must be kept in mind, in examining the claims now set up in behalf of the papacy, in order that we may have a clear view of what we are required to surrender, and understand the character of the millennial feast to which we are invited.

EFFORT AT PAPAL OMNIPOTENCE

When Pope Pius IX., in 1867, convened all “the prelates of the Catholic world” in Rome, to witness the ceremony of canonizing saints to which their presence was not at all necessary — and assigned as one of the reasons for the convocation “the extreme peril which threatens *civil*, and, above all, sacred things, (Appletons’ “Annual Cyclopaedia,” 1866, p. 676.) “thoughtful men — as well Roman Catholic laymen as Protestants — wondered why so much expense should be incurred, and so much labor performed, for an object which could, of itself, confer no good upon Christianity or the Church. And when these same Roman Catholic laymen had their attention then called many of them for the first time to the now celebrated Encyclical and Syllabus of the pope, and saw their tendency to arrest the progress of the nations, and turn them back toward the Middle Ages, many of the most intelligent of them did not hesitate to express their surprise. Some of them put one construction, and some another, upon the language of the pope, while yet others, better informed of the motives of papal action, attempted, by imperfect translations and false construction, to give it a meaning wholly at variance with what is now conceded, on all hands, to have been his design. But when the late Vatican Council enacted the decree which made papal infallibility, for the first time, a dogma of religious faith, and threatened with anathema all who should refuse to recognize the pope as incapable of all error in matters of faith and morals, all further disguise was thrown aside, and the world was awakened to the fact that these measures were but the inauguration of a deliberately concerted effort to make the papacy a power so

absorbing and omnipotent that all nations and peoples should be held by it in abject, passive, and humiliating subjugation.

It would be an unjust reflection upon the acknowledged intelligence and sagacity of the papal hierarchy in the United States to suppose that they did not understand, from the beginning, the end the pope had in view, and the object he desired to accomplish. Their relations to him, and their dependence upon him for their official positions and dignity, require that there shall be no concealment between them. The kind of obedience they pay him renders it necessary that they shall furnish him with the most undoubted assurance that they are always ready to execute whatsoever he shall command, in the domain of faith and morals, without stopping to inquire what human laws or institutions are in the way, except so far as it may be necessary to contrive some method to evade or over-leap them. All this is required by the official oath taken by each of them. By it they create an allegiance to the pope considered higher and more binding than any earthly obligation. It obliges them to be “faithful and obedient” to him; to “defend and keep the Roman papacy and the *royalties* of St Peter;” to do whatsoever they can to “*increase*” the papal “privileges and authority,” and to “persecute and oppose” all “heretics, schismatics, and rebels” who shall stand in the way of making “the rules of the holy fathers, the apostolic decrees, ordinances, or disposals, reservations, provisions, and mandates,” the foundation upon which all human institutions shall rest. (For the “Bishop’s Oath,” See Appendix A.)

These American prelates took the earliest occasion, after the appearance of the Syllabus, to show, not only that they fully comprehended its meaning, but that the pope’s reliance upon their fidelity to him was not misplaced. In this extraordinary document it is asserted, with dogmatic brevity and terseness, that it does not appertain “to the civil power to define what are the rights and limits within which *the Church* may exercise authority;” that its authority must be decided upon by itself, that is, by the pope, and exercised “*without the permission and assent of the civil government;*” and that, “in the case of conflicting laws between the two powers,” the laws of *the Church* must prevail over those of *the State*. (“The Pope’s Syllabus,” Articles 19, 20, and 42. See Appendix D.)

Here, every thing is plain nothing equivocal. The subordination of the State to the Church, and the substitution of the papal hierarchy for the people in enacting and enforcing such laws as the pope may think necessary for the Church, are distinctly and emphatically asserted. There is no room for misconstruction of the language. And it must be observed that the pope is speaking alone of civil “rights and limits,” and the authority which “the Church may exercise” in reference to them; that is, over that class of *temporalities* holding the Church to be, in these respects, above the State, and having the right, as its superior, to command and enforce obedience. It requires but a moderate share of intelligence to see that the principle here asserted is in direct antagonism to the theory of American government, and that, if established, it would violate one of the cherished provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of every State in the Union. The American hierarchy understand this perfectly well. Whosoever else may shelter themselves behind the plea of ignorance, they can not. And yet this knowledge imposed no restraint whatever upon them, in the expression of their submissiveness and obedience to the pope. They considered themselves as owing their first and highest allegiance to him, as the representative of “the *royalties* of St. Peter,” and did not hesitate to avow it: of all this, they have themselves furnished the most satisfactory evidence.

THE SECOND NATIONAL COUNCIL.

The second National Council of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy of the United States met at Baltimore in October, 1866 nearly two years after the Encyclical and Syllabus were issued. It was composed of seven archbishops and forty bishops, besides a number of the superiors of religious orders, and was presided over by Archbishop Spalding, of Baltimore, as “apostolic delegate” representing the pope, and thus giving to the assembly as much weight and influence within its jurisdiction as if the pope had been personally present. In theory it represented the great body of the Roman Catholic laity in the United States; practically, it took no note of them or of their opinions. It was assembled for a special work to respond to the Encyclical and Syllabus; and it did it, to the “great comfort and consolation” of the pope. It would have been unnatural for him to have felt otherwise at thus seeing the ranks of the papal army closing up, and at knowing how well he had succeeded in inaugurating a conflict between the imperial dogmas of the papacy and the fundamental principles of American government.

CONFLICT WITH CIVIL INSTITUTIONS.

In the pastoral letter issued by this Council, the relation of the Roman Catholic Church to the government and laws of this country is discussed. There is a tone of ecclesiastical authority and command employed by its authors which tends to show an impression existing in their minds that they were addressing an auditory not accustomed to question their authority or controvert their propositions. Hence, they proceed, without indirection, to lay it down as an axiom in the science of all government, not to be disputed, that the civil power is never absolute or independent. Inasmuch as “all power is of God,” there must exist some delegated authority upon earth, which, representing God, must constitute the tribunal of last resort. Upon this tribunal alone all absolute power is conferred, no matter what the form of government. If it be a monarchy, the king must be held in subjection to it; and if a democracy, the people must be taught that it is above them. With this as the beginning point of their theory, substantially expressed, though not in these words, they declare that obedience to the *civil* power of government “is not a submission to force which may not be resisted, nor merely the compliance with a condition for peace and security; but a religious duty founded on obedience to God, by whose authority the civil magistrate exercises his power.” This power of the civil magistrate, being subordinate and delegated power, they insist, “must always be exercised *according to God’s law*.” And, therefore, “in prescribing any thing contrary to that law, *the civil power transcends its authority, and has no claim on the obedience of the citizen*” because it “never can be lawful to disobey God;” or, as a necessary and logical result, those to whom, as custodians of his power on earth, he has delegated the divine right to govern. Founding their theory of government upon this idea, they proceed to show how differently the principle operates in “the Catholic system” and in the Protestant system. In the latter, according to them, “the individual is the ultimate judge of what the law of God commands or forbids;” while in the former, “the Catholic has *a guide in the Church*, as a divine institution, which enables him to discriminate between what the law of God forbids or allows;” so that when the Church shall instruct him that any particular law of the State is contrary to God’s law, he is thereby forbidden to pay obedience to it.

According to the Protestant system, in their opinion, the State is exposed to disorder and anarchy, because the authority by which it is governed has no warrant for its character as divine. The reverse they insist to be the case in the “Catholic system ;” and, therefore, because it has this divine authority

in the Church and not in itself, “*the State is bound to recognize*” the Roman Catholic Church as the sole depository of the delegated power to “decide what laws shall be obeyed and what disobeyed; for the obvious reason that the world, in order to obey God, must recognize that Church that is, the pope and his hierarchy “as *supreme* in its sphere of morals, no less than dogmatic teaching.”

It requires no pause for reflection to see how directly a “Catholic system” of government, thus constructed, would conflict with the existing civil institutions of the United States. Nor do we need a prophet to tell us that the establishment of such a system here would be followed by their immediate destruction. To permit a church any church to decide upon the validity or invalidity of our laws after their enactment, or to dictate, beforehand, what laws should or should not be passed, would be to deprive the people of all the authority they have retained in their own hands, and to make such church the governing power, instead of them. Yet, understanding this perfectly well, and, evidently, contemplating the time when they might possibly be able to bring about this condition of affairs, these papal representatives directly assail a principle which has been universal in all our State governments, from their foundation; that which regulates by law the holding of real estate by churches and other corporations, and requires them to conform, in this temporal matter, to the statute-laws of the States. To this there could be no reasonable or just objection, had they invoked the rightful power to change, alter, amend, or even to abrogate the obnoxious laws, for this would have been only the exercise of the admitted right of free discussion, secured as well to them as others. But they, manifestly, had no such idea in view, inasmuch as, according to them, that method of procedure belongs to the Protestant and not the “Catholic system” of government.

To exclude the impression that they design to look to any other authority than that of the papacy for the relief they seek, they take especial pains to say that they “are not as yet permitted legally to make the arrangements for the security of church property which are *in accordance with the canons and discipline of the Catholic Church!*” that is, that the canons and discipline of their Church, issued from the Vatican at Rome, by the pope and Roman curia, are not permitted to override and nullify the laws of the States! The plain import of this is, that all the laws of the States concerning the rights of the Roman Catholic Church, and regulating the manner in which it shall hold and enjoy property, have “no claim on the obedience” of the Roman Catholic citizen, because they are not “in accordance with the canons and discipline of the Catholic Church” and the papal decrees. Such a system of government, put into practical operation, would amount to this, that conformity to the “canons and discipline” of that Church would be the test of all laws, and none would be binding except those pronounced obligatory by the pope. The “divine right” of the pope to govern the people, through his hierarchy, would be fully recognized, and the right of self-government would be at an end.

The right of holding real estate and accumulating large wealth, after the manner of the Roman Catholic Church and monastic orders of Europe, the American hierarchy regard as of so much importance to the success of their ecclesiastical organization, that this Baltimore Council declared that to withhold it is to deprive their Church “of a necessary means of promoting the end for which she has been established.” They declare that “she can not accept” the principles upon which the American laws are based “without departing from her practice from the beginning,” because “they are the expression of a distrust of ecclesiastical power.” And, to leave no doubt whatever about their meaning, they insist that the States have no more right to impose on their Church “a system of holding her temporalities, which is alien to

her principles,” than they have to “prescribe to her the doctrines she is to teach;” and they solemnly enter their “formal protest” against all such legislation, notwithstanding the laws they protest against in all the States, and embody a principle deliberately considered and approved by the American people.*

* Mr. Jefferson, in his opinion upon the constitutionality of the first bank of the United States, considered the principle of the English statutes of “mortmain” as among “the most ancient and fundamental laws of the several States.” But these statutes have not been adopted generally, in all their rigor, in this country. The States are content to limit ecclesiastical and other corporations in the amount of their estates, and to subject them, in the ownership and enjoyment of property, to their general laws.

PAPAL AUTHORITY PREFERRED.

It is incompatible, they say, “*with the full measure of ecclesiastical or religious liberty*” to deprive them of the right of holding whatsoever amount of real or other property they may acquire in the United States, by purchase, devise, or gift, and of *governing it by laws of the pope’s* or their own enacting, independently of the laws of the States, to which all Protestant churches and people pay cheerful obedience; thus showing that they would have each archbishop within his episcopate, and each bishop within his diocese, and each priest within his parish, a temporal prince, with the scepter of royalty in his hands, although he might not wear its crown upon his head.

One would expect to see, in a document of this kind, a statement of some serious grievance against which relief was sought, something that would at least excuse, if not justify, the attempt to introduce into our government a foreign element of authority above the people. But the only “practical results” complained of are, first, the taxation of their church property; and, second, an attempt made by the State of Missouri, after the end of the rebellion, “to make the exercise of the ecclesiastical ministry depend on a condition laid down by the *civil* power;” that is, by requiring them to conform to the laws of the State, in furnishing evidence of their loyalty to the Government. From the nature of these complaints, it would seem that they were only employed as a pretext, merely affording them an opportunity of making known to the pope how cheerfully they responded to the doctrines of his Encyclical and Syllabus, and with what confidence he might rely upon them in doing their share of the work necessary to arrest the progress and advancement upon which this country had entered. *

* The pastoral letter of this Baltimore Council is, so far as I have been able to ascertain, the first document of the kind ever issued in the United States. I have deemed it proper, therefore, to give the text of it in the Appendix, together with the letter of the pope expressing his gratification at the promise of the council to maintain the ancient rights of the papacy, so that the reader can judge for himself whether or not I have misconceived its true meaning. See Appendix B.

The intentions of men are frequently made known far more satisfactorily by their surroundings, the contemporaneous events with which they are identified, the parties to which they are attached, and their connection with other individuals, than by the language they use. By reference to these we are furnished with a rule of interpretation which does not often mislead, although it is not altogether

infallible. Therefore, when it is considered that these prelates who assembled at Baltimore recognize, to the fullest possible extent, their obligation of obedience to the pope; and when it is remembered that the pope had, but a little while before, announced his views of the relations which should exist between the Roman Catholic Church and civil governments, the conclusion is unavoidable that they desire the adoption, in this country, of their theory of government, based upon their ideas of the “Catholic system.” To assign to them any other motive, after the distinct and emphatic avowals they have made, would be an impeachment of their integrity and sincerity; which is not designed. It is supposed that they occupy ground cautiously and deliberately selected by them, and are fully prepared to take all the consequences which attach to their position. There is, at all events, no misunderstanding what they desire to accomplish. Nor should there be any misconception of the immense power they wield over multitudes of men in this country, in moving them backward or forward, to the right or left, as the pope shall direct.

DOCTRINE OF SUBMISSION

We are not left in any doubt about the nature of the terrible struggle now going on between the modern nations and the papacy. These hierarchs at Baltimore comprehended it fully, when they entered upon an explanation of the difference between the Protestant system of government, with the people as the source of civil power, and the “Catholic system,” with the pope as its only source. Having voluntarily yielded to the papal pressure by the frank avowal of their preference for the latter; and having no excuse, on the plea of ignorance, for not understanding what it has hitherto done for the world, **they must be considered as desiring to see the Christian nations, including the United States, carried back to the condition they were in when the papacy was at the zenith of its power;** when kings were ignoble enough to lay their crowns at the feet of the pope; when popes disposed of kingdoms at their pleasure, by imposing or releasing the obligation of allegiance, as the reward of fidelity to themselves, in the one case, or of disobedience, in the other; and when ignorant fanaticism and superstition were so universal that the Christian world dreaded nothing so much as the terrible thunders of excommunication. Why should anybody wonder that Pius IX. was gratified to see things going in that direction; and, especially, to see such flattering signs that the most liberal and advanced nations might become the first to turn back, and thus enable him to gain in them what he had lost where the “Catholic system” had been on trial for centuries? He would have possessed less sagacity than is assigned to him, had not the promise of these faithful subordinates to vindicate all his asserted prerogatives excited in his mind ardent hopes and flattering expectations of the future of the papacy. He could easily see that they were ready and willing to defend the theory which he considers the chiefest among all the fundamentals of government; for no matter what the form of government, whether monarchical or republican, it makes him its absolute and independent ruler in all things belonging to the domain of faith and morals.

The avowal is plainly made, in support of this theory, that submission to civil authority is founded *alone* upon obedience to God, and is not to be obeyed when otherwise! Therefore, it is proposed that the Roman Catholic citizen of the United States shall be carried along, step by step, in the following process of training for the duties of citizenship: he shall be brought to recognize his Church as the *only* custodian of God’s law; that the pope is infallible, and therefore, as the vicegerent of God, has plenary and sole power to interpret that law, and can not err in its interpretation; that he shall find his only

“guide in the Church” in deciding whether he shall obey or disobey the civil laws of the state; that the pope is the infallible representative of all truth in the world, and infallibly employs all the power and authority of the Church; that, as he can not err in any thing concerning faith and morals, he must, in their domain, be implicitly obeyed; that, as the pope is infallible, as the chief instructor in doctrine and duty, his prelates are also infallible as his subordinate workers; that the pope, as he shall speak through the mouths of these prelates, must be obeyed absolutely and uninquiringly—all his utterances being taken as the voice of God, coming directly from his throne in the heavens; and that infamy in this life and eternal damnation in that to come will be the inevitable doom of all who shall impiously reject these teachings.

A citizen thus trained, disciplined, and humiliated would become, necessarily, a mere machine in the hands of superiors, who would allow him to obey those laws only which the Church—that is, the pope—should decide to be consistent with the commands of God; and would require him to resist and oppose those which should be decided to be otherwise.

If the laws requiring the Roman Catholic Church to hold property in subordination to them, and in the same way that Protestant churches do, are forbidden by God’s law, as interpreted by the pope and placed in the canons and discipline of that Church—as the Baltimore Council declarers—they must be swept out of the way or violated with impunity, so that the Church itself, and all its monastic orders, and all its societies, may hold property to an unlimited amount, and make all the laws which shall govern its acquisition and enjoyment, without any regard whatever to the legislation of the States or to their rights and dignity! With this achieved, the hierarchy would be far along upon the road that would lead them to their **final triumph—the mastery over the people**. The pope, as the source of all authority in the Church, would put forth his royal edicts and decrees in regard to their church property in this country, prescribing how they should acquire, hold, and enjoy it, and these edicts and decrees would take the place of all our State statutes upon that subject! This would build up at Rome an imperialism that would reach out further over the world than did that of the Caesars, and might become far greater and more injurious to mankind.

THE POPE’S MEANING.

When the pope was informed of the assembling of this council, and the obedient spirit it exhibited, he caused his cardinal secretary to dispatch an answer expressive of his apostolic joy and satisfaction. He directed the facts to be published in the official journal of his court, “for the edification of his Roman people and the faithful at large;” so that they, who had been striving after a government founded upon their own consent, could realize how ready the people of the United States were to give up such a government, in exchange for one constructed upon the *paternal plan* which prevailed at Rome, under his pontifical auspices. And, seemingly aroused to the highest point of rejoicing at the work the Encyclical and Syllabus had thus far accomplished, . he declared that his mind was excited by the hope that, by means and through the influence of what the council at Baltimore had done, “*a new impulse* and continued increase to religion in the United States will result.”(See the pope’s dispatch; Appendix B.) What the pope meant by this may be derived from the fact that the cable dispatch sent to him by the archbishops and bishops who composed) the council, expressed only their wishes for his “long life,

with the preservation of *all the ancient and sacred rights of the Holy See.*”(Appletons’ “Annual Cyclopedia,” 1866, p. 678. See Appendix B.)

There was no reference to any of the ordinary dogmas of religious faith, as there could be no doubt about their fidelity to them. There was no agitation in the Church rendering such reference necessary. The issue made by the Encyclical and Syllabus between the papacy and the progressive modern nations was the only one which immediately concerned the pope and the Church. This involved the existence of his temporal power, which the Italian people were only then prevented by the presence of French troops from taking away from him. Consequently, when they declared their desire to see “all the ancient and sacred rights of the Holy See” preserved, the pope was at no loss to know what they meant. He understood them as endorsing all the claims he had set up in the Encyclical and Syllabus, including that of temporal and ecclesiastical sovereignty, and his right to require that the *civil* governments of the world should conform to “the canon laws and discipline” of the Church. Therefore, the idea he intended to convey was this: that the religion which had received a “new impulse” in the United States was that which taught the subordination of all civil governments to the Church and the papacy! It was not the true religion which was exemplified in the life and example of Christ, and which has its foundation in universal charity and love; but that which places the pope above all kingdoms and peoples, and requires every human being to pay him homage and fidelity.

The facts before him tended naturally to draw from him the rapturous’ expression of his hope. To see his followers in the United States stepping so hastily into the front rank of those who were ready to battle for the “*ancient*” rights of the Holy See—when kings, under the idea of “divine right,” received their crowns from the popes—must have excited in his mind the most profound gratification. One can readily suppose that, in his pontifical enthusiasm, he looked forward, exultingly, to the time when governments and constitutions and laws—would be reconstructed so as to conform to the papal model, and when there would be snatched from the hands of the people, wherever they possess it, the power to make their own laws, or to enforce any which he or his successors shall declare to be contrary to faith and good morals.

To an old man of kind heart and generous sympathies, it must be terribly crushing to see such bright hopes and flattering anticipations suddenly dashed to the ground, as were those of Pius IX. after they had been thus excited, when Rome, by the act of the Italian people, became their capital. Shall the tide of retrogression, thus arrested in Italy, by a Roman Catholic population, be permitted to set in again in the very heart of the Protestant nations?

ANTAGONISM OF THE TWO SYSTEMS.

The reason assigned for the preference of the “Catholic system” over the Protestant is the incapacity of the people to govern themselves, and to take care of their own civil affairs—an argument as old as tyranny. The Baltimore Council tell us that by recognizing, as we do in this country, “an authority” to govern, “which has no warrant for its character *as divine*, and no limits in its application,” the nation is exposed to “disorder and anarchy;” and the concession to the Roman Catholic hierarchy of the right to separate their property from the mass of that belonging to other churches and people, and to govern it by their own laws, or by the canon laws of Rome, is demanded upon that express ground.

With these prelates, Protestantism thus tends to the disruption of the whole social fabric, because it confers upon each individual the right to decide what shall be the form of his religious belief, or whether he shall have any; and conducts all civil affairs without referring it to the pope, or his ecclesiastics, or to any church authorities whatever, to decide what laws shall be obeyed and what resisted.

The issue is a plain one—easily perceptible to the most ordinary comprehension. The two systems stand in direct antagonism with each other. The Protestant has separated the State from the Church; the papal proposes to unite them again. The Protestant has founded its civil institutions upon the *will of the people*; the papal proposes to reconstruct and found them upon the *will of the pope*. The Protestant secures religious freedom; the papal requires that every man shall give up his conscience to the keeping of ecclesiastical superiors. The Protestant develops the faculties of the mind by inciting the spirit of personal independence and manhood; the papal crushes out all this spirit by its debasing doctrine of passive obedience and submission. The Protestant has put the world upon a career of progress and prosperity; the papal desires to arrest this career, and turn it back into those old grooves which have led so many nations to wreck and desolation.

The issue is made between these systems in so bold and manly a manner, that its authors are entitled to that consideration which the possession of high moral courage always excites in generous minds. They can, therefore, have no just cause to complain of either intolerance or persecution, if, finding ourselves in the possession of free and popular institutions, which we have solemnly declared to be inalienable, we shall employ like courage in their defense; or even if, in maintaining their integrity, it shall become necessary to point out the contrast between these opposing systems to the extent of showing that the Protestant and popular system was necessary to lift the world out of the corruption and degradation into which the papacy had plunged it.

If it is a species of hallucination to suppose that such institutions as we possess are better suited to our condition than any that the pope, as “King of Rome,” or any of his ecclesiastical subordinates, or any ecclesiastical tribunal whatever, would be likely to substitute for them, we are not yet quite prepared to see it dispelled. If we abhor kingly or papal imperialism, or imperialism in any of its variety of forms, and cling to institutions established in the face and in defiance of it, we should be unfaithful to our convictions, and unworthy our position among the nations, if we did not rebuke, in fit and indignant terms, any attempt, by whomsoever made, to fetter us with its chains, or to plant its iron heel upon our necks.

VIGILANCE NEEDFUL.

He must be stone-blind who does not see, in the light of these and other facts occurring almost daily, that Protestantism has been formally arraigned by its vindictive and unrelenting enemy; that it has been put upon its trial before the civilized world; that judgment of condemnation has already been pronounced against it; and that the arm of the executioner is only stayed until the limbs of the victim can be so tightly bound as to make its resistance unavailing. Its open adversary and accuser is the papacy, which, unwilling to submit to the necessity that has wrought out its own defeat among those who are most familiar with its enormities and oppression, now assails it courageously, but impudently, in the citadel of its greatest strength. The loss of his imperial crown in Rome has dispelled the joy of

Pius IX., and driven him into a frenzy of excitement and passion; and, availing himself of the license afforded by the tolerant spirit of American laws and institutions; he is rapidly transferring his best drilled and disciplined militia* to the United States; and, claiming to be clothed in the robes and with the authority of divinity, he demands, in the name of Deity, that we shall bow down before him in passive submission, and accept his commands as if uttered by a voice from heaven.

* When Pope Pius VII. re-established the *Jesuits*, after their suppression by Clement XIV., he called them the “*Sacred Militia*” of the Church.

We, who believe that Protestantism is sheltered by Divine care, must not remain unresisting under an attack so immediate and formidable, nor sit still while a judgment may be taken, by default, against us. A commanding sense of duty requires that we should look this haughty and imperious adversary full in the face, understand his machinations, strip him of his disguises, unravel his plots, and meet him at every point of attack. If we shall remain insensible to any of the obligations of this duty, now that the battle-cry is sounding in our ears, it may be too late after the storming-party has mounted the walls of our fortress, pulled down our flag, and planted that of papal and ecclesiastical absolutism upon the grave of popular institutions.

What does Protestantism mean? What necessity gave it birth? What has it done for mankind? What would be the condition of the world if it were destroyed? These are questions we should not fear to discuss, and which we are bound to discuss, now that it is denounced, in our very faces, as *heresy* and *infidelity*, and we are insolently told that duty to both God and man requires its total extermination, and the erection of a “Holy Empire” wheresoever its principles prevail and its institutions exist. We must not sink into indifference, nor, permit the fear of consequences to slacken our exertions in a cause of such transcendent importance to ourselves and our children. If our fathers had been easily intimidated, we should have had no such government as we now possess. If we shall prove less courageous than they, the heritage they have left us may not pass to many generations of our descendants. Some of the proudest governments of the earth have already fallen; there are none that may not fall.

This is not called a Protestant country because religion, in the Protestant sense, is established by law, or has any protection given to, it which is not equally extended to all other forms of religion—Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mohammedan, Brahminical, Greek, or Chinese. No such preference could be conferred by law under our system of government; for it would so essentially and flagrantly violate its fundamental principles that it would be instantaneously destroyed. By these principles, upon which the whole superstructure has been reared, every citizen—no matter whether native-born or naturalized—is fully and equally protected in the personal and individual right to maintain, in private or public, whatsoever religious faith, and to practice whatsoever form of religious worship, his own conscience shall approve, no matter what degree of absurdity it may involve. No reasonable man should desire a higher degree of religious liberty than this. It gives to our form of government a distinguishing characteristic, found nowhere else in so eminent a degree, until the people of the United States entered upon the experiment of self-government. It stamps our institutions with their Protestant character, and distinguishes them, in a conspicuous degree, from such as have existed in those countries known as Roman Catholic, where no such toleration and liberality have ever existed, and no such experiment has been tried.

OUR INSTITUTIONS PROTESTANT IN FORM.

No intelligent reader needs to be told that the religious controversies of Europe gave rise to the term “Protestant.” In its original application to those controversies it had a distinct religious meaning—as at the Diet of Spire, in 1529. But as they were of long continuance—through and subsequent to the great Reformation of the sixteenth century— and Protestants were compelled to concert some measures of escape from the oppression and persecutions which arose out of the union of Church and State, and the consequent claim of the “divine right” of kings to govern the world, it acquired, in the course of time, a different and more comprehensive signification. Protestant Christianity was understood to involve the right to protest against the corruptions and exactions of the Roman Catholic Church, to withdraw from communion with it, and to worship God in other forms than those prescribed by its discipline. It encountered, therefore, from that Church and its ecclesiastical authorities —then almost supreme over the Christian world—such position as it found itself without power to resist, unless it could find shelter, somewhere, under the protection of law. This was obtained, to some extent, after severe and protracted struggles, under the laws of Great Britain, Germany, and Holland; and yet, even in those comparatively free countries, it had many difficulties and impediments to overcome before it could acquire perfect freedom. **Its only formidable adversary, during all its struggles, was the papacy, which was ever ready to plunge the pontifical sword to the heart of its victims.**

The original emigrants to the United States brought with them from Europe the principles of Protestantism, mingled somewhat with the less liberalizing principles of Romanism; and, although for a while the effects of the habits of thought they had thus acquired were exhibited in the practice of religious intolerance, they united, in the end, in the creation of a government entirely freed from this taint. They gave up their intolerance in order to secure the perfect triumph of Protestantism, in its most comprehensive sense; and when our National and State governments were organized with the principle of toleration at their foundation, our civil institutions, became also, necessarily, Protestant in form; because they contain the amplest guarantees for both religions and civil freedom.

The idea conveyed by the common expression “*the Protestant religion*” is generally misunderstood. Religion signifies a “system of faith and worship;” true or false according to the stand-point from which it is considered. To us the Christian religion is true, while those of the Hindus, Chinese, and Turks are false. Nevertheless, the systems of faith and worship which prevail among the Hindus, Chinese, and Turks are only so many forms of religion. Protestantism is not a religion in this sense, for it recognizes no system of faith and worship to the exclusion of others. It is only another form of Christianity, distinct from those which existed in the world before its origin. It is altogether proper, when speaking of the Church of England, to say the “Protestant Episcopal Church,” because, at its organization, after the Reformation, it assumed an attitude of open antagonism to the Church of Rome by protesting against its errors, But neither that nor any of the other churches which have originated since the Reformation can justly demand to be known as “*the Protestant Church.*” There are a number of Protestant *churches*, each representing its own form of Protestantism. Taken as a whole, they “may be regarded as different developments of one and the same Protestant principle.” (Dr. Dormer, “History of Protestant Theology,” Introduction, p. 11.) Therefore Protestantism, in so far as it has a religious aspect, represents all these churches; that is, Protestant Christianity is liberal and comprehensive enough to embrace them all. It goes even further than this, and recognizes the Roman Catholic Church

as a Christian Church, and its religion as only a different form of Christianity from itself. (**Note:** I would not call the Roman Catholic Church a Christian Church. I call it Roman pagan religion with a Christian face.)

FREEDOM THE OUTGROWTH OF PROTESTANTISM.

But Protestantism does not alone include Christianity and religion in these senses; it has other aspects. In its proper signification it embraces “*the whole offspring of the Reformation;*” (*Ibid.*, p. 2.) that is, all the principles, civil as well as religious, to which the Reformation gave birth. These principles have been at work, upon both individuals and governments, ever since the Reformation, and such has been their influence, that “the countries of the Reformation are the theater of the greatest work of God which has taken place since the days of the apostles.” (*Ibid.*, p. 6.)

The leading cause of the Reformation was “a sudden effort made by the human mind to achieve its liberty, a great insurrection of human intelligence.” (Guizot, “History of Civilization,” vol. i., p. 257.) It had to contend, therefore, against every thing which put restraint upon liberty, whether found in Church or State; so that Protestantism, in taking its distinctive form, became the principle out of which all the existing guarantees of religious and civil freedom sprung. It saved religion by separating it from the corruptions of the papacy, and thus providing for the world a purer-and better form of Christianity; it saved society by breaking the scepters of kings and popes, and elevating the people to the point of asserting and maintaining their natural right to liberty. Consequently, Protestantism, by diffusing new thoughts, ideas, and principles, has so influenced individuals, societies, and governments, that now, in the nineteenth century, its results are seen in all the civil and religious institutions existing among Christian peoples. Wherever there are freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press, they are exclusively of Protestant origin and growth. These involve no religious sentiments, but are mere civil rights. Yet they are rights which are included in Protestantism; because if it were destroyed, they would be also.

And thus the term “Protestantism” has a twofold signification, embracing whatsoever has grown out of the Reformation, in both Church and State. So it is regarded by the most distinguished authors who have endeavored to point out the philosophy of the Reformation. Even the Roman Catholic Archbishop Spalding, who presided over the Baltimore Council, has entitled his greatest work “The History of the Protestant Reformation,” and has devoted it to the discussion of the influence of Protestantism on society, on civil liberty, on literature, and on civilization, as well as on doctrinal belief, morals, and religious worship. He who does not comprehend Protestantism in all these aspects fails to comprehend its real meaning, and will have poor conceptions of the differences between it and Romanism. If there were but a single difference—consisting merely in matters of religious faith—the field of controversy between them would be greatly narrowed, and would be occupied alone by the theologians. But they are, in fact, two opposing systems, as stated by the Baltimore Council; and this opposition is no less in government than religion.

In the formation of their National and State constitutions the American people designed to embody the means of preserving to themselves and their posterity all those fruits of the Reformation which are represented by Protestantism. They intended to give fuller development to its principles, and surer guarantees for their preservation, than they had before received. Hence, when we speak of this as a

Protestant country, of our institutions as Protestant, and of ourselves as a Protestant people, we should be understood as conveying the idea that, in the affairs of both Church and State, we have chosen to abandon the old papal system, and to establish one more in harmony with the genius of our people, because it gives the best guarantee ever yet afforded to the world for perpetuating those great principles of the Reformation, by means of which the minds of men became free, and the shackles of civil tyranny were stricken from their limbs.

Whether mankind have lost or gained, or whether the world has moved backward or forward, under the influence of the institutions we have thus formed, are questions which, with us, need no discussion. We, at all events, cherish the belief, and teach it to our children, that under no other form of civil institutions found in the world are mankind so well protected in every just and proper right, or made so capable of advancing their own happiness and prosperity, as they are under ours. We confidently, and somewhat proudly, assert for our Protestant principles of government a superiority over those of the monarchical form; and congratulate ourselves that mankind are gradually coming to the realization of the idea that only by means of them can civil and religious liberty be fully secured and preserved.

Are we right or wrong in cherishing these opinions? in supposing that freedom is preferable to bondage? in maintaining that a government of *the people* is better than that of an emperor, or a king, or a pope, or an ecclesiastical hierarchy? and that no privileged classes are born into the world ready “booted and spurred” to govern and debase mankind by “*divine right*?”

PIONEERS OF LIBERTY.

Other governments, besides ours, have been founded on the popular will-on the right of the people, as the source of civil power, to prescribe their own form of institutions. Before the Christian era, the Romans and the Spartans recognized the efficacy of the doctrine that “the safety of the people is the supreme law;” but they were unable to secure its establishment, as a distinctive and permanent feature of their governments, because they failed to cultivate that sense of personality out of which grow the virtue and intelligence necessary for the support of popular institutions. Unfortunate, however, as their failure was for the world, the avowal of the principle gave rise to influences which were never entirely destroyed. The idea of government upon which they unsuccessfully experimented struggled along through succeeding centuries-even through the Middle Ages- awaiting a favorable opportunity for ultimate and complete development. It has always had many able and zealous defenders in the countries considered the most enlightened; but they have been kept down by the governing classes, who employed the combined authority of State and Church to intimidate and subdue them. This combined influence was, for a long time, sufficient to hush almost every murmur of complaint against misgovernment, except among the few who dared to defy it, at the hazard of their lives. Now and then one of these intrepid spirits appeared, and flung his censures into the very teeth of royalty; and if he paid for his boldness by the forfeit of his life, others of like courage arose to take his place; and thus the line of patriotic succession was kept unbroken. They were few in number, but enough of them to keep the fires of liberty aflame, so that they might flash in the eyes of royalty. The world would, centuries ago, have been turned over entirely to cruel and exacting task-masters, and sunk into utter political darkness, but for the bravery of these defenders of popular freedom. Comprehending the true philosophy of government, they maintained that every man in a free state ought to be concerned in his

own government, and that the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people, (Montesquieu's "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., p. 154.) to be exercised by representatives responsible to them; and that, in order to support and preserve this theory of government, each individual should be allowed to speak his own thoughts, employ his own reason, and consult his own conscience in reference to all matters concerning his duty to God.

The great difficulty which so long lay in the way of impressing these sentiments and principles upon the governments of Europe, grew out of the compact and unbroken union of State and Church—a union which found its only means of preservation in the denial and in the violent and forcible suppression of every kind of popular and political freedom. The antagonism between these opposing principles was too irreconcilable for compromise, and the stronger party prevailed over the weaker, the kings and popes over the people. But the framers of our institutions escaped this antagonism only by the occupancy of a new and remote continent, and, therefore, were perfectly free, without any immediate fear of it, to make the principle so happily expressed by Montesquieu the basis of their political action and organization. In the Declaration of Independence they asserted it, by declaring that, in order to secure "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," it was necessary that governments should derive "their just powers from the *consent of the governed*; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the *right of the people* to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

SUPERIORITY OF REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS.

This act of independence is esteemed to be one of the great events in history, and has commanded the admiration of a very large portion of the civilized world. It did not create a government, but asserted the right of the people, as distinct from that of kings and princes—whether of State or Church, or of high or low degree—to establish and maintain one of such form and structure as, in their opinion, was most conducive to their own "safety and happiness." Those who assail this great principle—whether they be native born or adopted citizens—deny the wisdom and impeach the integrity of the founders of the Republic. They aim their blows at the central column upon which our national edifice has rested for nearly a century, in the face of opposition from all the allies of monarchy.

Has the time come when this edifice shall be permitted to fall, or these blows be continued with impunity? They know but little of the temper of our people who suppose that they may not be pressed too far upon a question of such vital importance. Within its proper sphere they have assigned to each department of their government its own appropriate functions in making, interpreting, and executing the laws. Above and beyond, and higher than all these, they have retained the sovereign power in their own hands. They will allow their reason to be appealed to in favor of new laws, and the change or abrogation of old ones, without any exhibition of intolerance on account of differences of opinion. They live, and their intelligence and patriotism are increased, in the atmosphere of free discussion. But when the effort is seriously made to snatch this sovereign power from them; to dwarf them into inferiority before a foreign potentate; to exact from them obedience to laws enacted without their consent; to erect an ecclesiastical tribunal in the midst of them, answerable only to laws of the Roman

curia; and to surrender up the inestimable privilege of self-government; then toleration ceases to be a virtue and becomes a crime.

If the people of the United States, in the progress of their history, have demonstrated any thing, it is that such institutions as require the least degree of force and coercion are best adapted to improve and elevate mankind. And they who pretend that the proper supremacy of law is inconsistent with such institutions are either ignorant or insincere, and unworthy, in either case, of being entrusted with their management. No political institutions can be safely given over to the care of those whose principles and sentiments are in antagonism to them. Monarchism can not mingle with the principles of a free republic. Liberty and slavery can not exist together. The people can not govern in their own right, where ecclesiasticism governs in the name of "divine right."

The science of government involves, necessarily, the proper administration of law, as well as the making of law; for so long as mankind remain under the dominion of selfishness and egotism, law, in some form of restraint, must continue to exist. Christianity and civilization, with all they have done for the world, and all their discoveries, improvements, and elevating influences, have not yet raised man so high, or made him so near the angels, that he can be safely left to the full dominion of his passions. Consequently, governments have no more important problem to solve than that involved in deciding how far to apply the restraints of law, and in what manner to apply them, consistently with a proper degree of individual and political liberty.

The supporters of those governments where the sovereignty of the people is denied, and where nothing but force is relied on to secure the administration of law, make a great and radical mistake. They seem incapable of realizing the fact that law can only constitute a just and proper rule of action when it is made responsive to a pre-existing public sentiment; in other words, when it is adapted to the condition of the society to be governed by it. In the absence of this, all laws must remain inoperative and ineffectual, unless force is invoked to compel their execution. When the fundamental laws of a country—that is, those embodied in its civil and political institutions—are thus framed, there must, necessarily, be an entire absence of popular liberty. Thus, in a monarchy where the principle of popular representation does not exist, and the people are not consulted about the laws, obedience to them is enforced by some superior power, and fear alone restrains resistance. But in a republic like ours, where virtue and intelligence are stimulated by the structure of both government and society, the fundamental laws are not only executed, but preserved, without force, because they have their foundation in the consent of the people. Therefore, under monarchical absolutism, the citizen feels but little sense of personality; while in the freedom of a republic he feels it in so high a degree as to develop his manhood, and cause him to realize the individual interest he has in continuing the institutions which secure to him both defense and protection.

IMPERFECTIONS OF MONARCHICAL LAW.

All mankind derive from nature the right to be free, and whatever restraints are put upon this right by law are only such as the interest and necessities of society require. Those who share in society consent, in return for its protection, to be governed by such laws. Hence, popular liberty does not proceed from law, is not the result of it. Wherever it is found in written statutes, it is there because the people have risen up to the point of asserting it against the antagonism of monarchy; of snatching it from the hands

of those who deny it to them, and would retain the means of withholding it, by defeating all its civil guarantees. It is the expression of their political faith, the avowal of their determination to exist as a society or a nation freed from all the restraints of arbitrary power. Hence, it is truthfully said that "liberty does not dwell in the palaces of kings." It is equally true that it exists in the heart and conscience of every free man. In this sense, it is a personal and inalienable right which each man must assert for himself. In a broader sense, it belongs to a whole community; and each individual of a community is under the same obligation to assert and maintain it for those who share it with him, as for himself. It thus becomes a political right, requiring combined action to continue its existence. When, as the result of this combined action, political institutions are formed, to provide for its preservation, as in the United States, they, necessarily, exclude all idea of force, and rest upon the "consent of the governed."

Sometimes-as in the granting of Magna Carta and other charters by the English crown-governments profess to have conferred liberty. But, viewed properly, this is an absurdity; for to assert that a government has the right to confer or withhold it as it pleases, is to deny its existence under the law of nature. All these are familiar truisms; but it is because they are true, and their truth is recognized in every heart, that they give birth to the "firm and resolute spirit with which the liberal mind is always prepared to resist indignities, and to refer its safety to itself:"

Where the form of government is an absolute monarchy, laws proceed from the sole and independent will of the ruler, whether he be called emperor, king, or pope, and rely wholly upon force for their execution. But where the form is republican, or democratic, as with us, no such force is required, because the obedience of the citizen springs from his own consent. Between these two opposing systems of government, our Revolutionary fathers were obliged to make a selection. That, in choosing the latter, they acted wisely and well, every man who is worthy of free citizenship will maintain. Their example has already shorn monarchy of much of its strength, and it is not the time now, when absolutism is trembling in the presence of popular representation, to abate our veneration for their memory, or our affection for their work.

Some of the leading nations exist in an intermediate state between these two forms. They have united the representative with the monarchical principle, but only so far as to make some unavoidable concessions to the popular sentiment of liberty, and not far enough to recognize its just and proper measure of influence upon society, or entirely to dispense with the presence of force. These governments have advanced somewhat from a condition of absolutism; some of them less readily and rapidly than others, accordingly as fear of the people has been weaker or stronger in the minds of their despotic rulers.

To trace out and observe the influences produced upon the world by these opposing systems of government, and to understand the nature and extent of their results, furnishes to the thoughtful mind a true conception of the philosophy of history. In the pursuit of such an inquiry, however, the friends of free popular government must not concede to the advocates of absolutism that the times in which we live are suited for additional experiments in the art of governing, in order to decide which form of political institutions is most conducive to human happiness. These experiments have been already and sufficiently made, and all of them combine to prove – what this philosophy of history teaches – that the freer and more popular the government, the happier and more prosperous are the people. In such governments, where civil institutions are established for themselves by an intelligent and virtuous

people, force is never required to secure the execution of the fundamental laws. Where there is a power superior to the people to prescribe the law, so much force is always necessary that liberty can not exist in its presence.

The people of the United States have nothing to fear or to lose by the closest scrutiny of their institutions, especially in the light of the lessons of history and past experiments in government. The unbiased judgment of the civilized world, in the absence of the fear of coercive authority, will agree with them in the opinion, that the form of government which gives the greatest elevation to society is that in which all the fundamental laws reflect an intelligent popular will. Therefore, we may well regard such a form as central among the governments of the earth, as the sun is the center of the planetary system. We may extend the figure one step further, without the exhibition of an undue degree of national vanity; for if the light which it sends out over the nations were obscured, it would inevitably lead to the complete triumph of imperialism, as all nature would be darkened if the light of the sun were extinguished.

PASSIVE OBEDIENCE AND MONARCHISM.

Accordingly as we are the advocates of absolutism or of popular government, we will condemn or approve the theory of American government. The absolutist insists that each step in the departure of nations from the monarchical form is receding that far from the true point of national elevation; that it is an abandonment of legitimate authority; that it is passion, vertigo, delirium, madness, the excess of unlicensed and destructive revolution- a blind exercise of the mere physical power to do wrong, in violation of the divine law. With him, the fewer who direct the destiny of a nation and control its government, the better, because, by keeping the multitude in subjection, they hold them to the steady line of duty. Unlimited dominion on the part of the ruler, and passive obedience on the part of the people, are, with all the supporters of absolutism, the *ne plus ultra* (the highest point) of government. Of those who reason thus, there are two class-the masters and the slaves. The latter are so disciplined into subjugation by the former, that they seem incapable of comprehending the nature and extent of their degradation, and suppose themselves to be relieved from the galling of their chains, or to be compensated for its endurance, by the belief that their servitude is the highest and noblest exhibition of fidelity and duty. The former maintain their superiority with an entire disregard of the humiliation they create, and cling to their ideas of human and national advancement, in the face of the present condition of the world, as if they regarded ambition the highest motive of the mind, and its gratification the greatest of all human achievements.

Socrates, probably, had both these classes in his mind when he said, "That every master should pray he may not meet with such a slave; and every such person, being unfit for liberty, should implore that he may meet with a merciful master." If all the world were divided into these two classes, monarchy, secure of its place upon the papal and other thrones, would have an easy time of it, for there then would be only the oppressor and the oppressed – "the oppressor who demands, and the oppressed who dare not resist."

Fortunately for us and the world, the framers of our institutions belonged to neither of these classes. By their training in the school of Protestantism they were endowed with the courage to defy both the authority and machinations of those who claimed the "divine right" to govern. Their careful study of

the history of nations enabled them to comprehend fully the necessities of their condition. They had realized how abject mankind had become in those countries where Church and State were united, and, with this experience to guide them, signalized their efforts to frame a new government by dissolving this union, as an unnatural and corrupting one. Ecclesiastical tyranny and intolerance were finally expelled, and Protestantism reached a degree of development for which it had been struggling for more than two hundred years.

Thomas Jefferson took an early opportunity to congratulate the people of the United States upon their “having banished from our land that *religious intolerance* under which mankind so long bled and suffered,” and, under the sanction of his official position, declared that among the great principles which “guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation” were those which inculcated “the diffusion of information, and *arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reason, freedom of religion, freedom of the press.*” And he addressed to us this admonition:

“The wisdom of our sages, and the blood of our heroes, have been devoted to their attainment: they should be the creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the touch-stone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error and alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps, and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.”

James Madison, when officially declaring the purposes for which our government was formed, enumerated among them the duty “to avoid the slightest interference with *the rights of conscience*, or the functions of religion, so wisely exempted from civil jurisdiction; to preserve, in their full energy, the other salutary provisions in behalf of private and personal rights, and of the freedom of the press.”

These sentiments were not alone expressed by these great statesmen. Words of like import were uttered by many of their compatriots. They were but the echo of those existing in the minds of the people, and were embodied in our national Constitution, in these words:

PRINCIPLES THAT MUST BE PRESERVED.

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

Upon such foundations as this, the superstructure of our government now rests. So long as these principles shall be preserved, the Government will stand: whenever they shall be abandoned, it will fall. They must, therefore, be guarded with the same ceaseless care as that with which we guard our lives. For we have no more right to lose by neglect, than we have to strike down with the sword of rebellion, the civil and religious institutions of a free people.

Chapter III. War against Protestantism

Roman Catholic Literature and Intolerance.—The Bible to be Closed.—The Spanish Inquisition Justified.—Freedom of Thought Denounced as Sin.—Tracts in Favor of the Pope's Infallibility, and Universal Supremacy in Faith and Morals.—Morals Involve Politics.—"The Index Expurgatorius."—Condemnation and Punishment of Galileo.—Spanish Inquisition.—The Middle Ages Preferred to the Present Times.

THERE is nothing better understood than that the Roman Catholic Church requires all its members to believe that the Church was established at Rome by the apostle Peter, in obedience to the express command of Christ, who gave him primacy over the other apostles for that purpose; that it has possessed, from the beginning, an external organization composed of the pope and his army of official dependents, who derive, directly from God, the authority of its exclusive government, and that all who desire eternal salvation must become subject to this authority, because there is not, and can not be, any other true Church. From the very nature of things, a church asserting such exclusiveness must be aggressive. This all-absorbing organization can not be maintained in any other way. And that it is aggressive and uncompromising is shown by its whole history, and by repeated and emphatic avowals of its supporters; especially of those who share its authority and are tireless in their exertions to maintain it.

Having found Protestantism the most formidable opponent it ever encountered to its system of exclusiveness, it has contrived to keep alive in the minds of multitudes of its members a stubborn hostility to every advance among the nations, and every improvement in their condition, calculated to drive it from the field, of which, before Protestantism became its rival, it had the undisputed possession. Having regarded the world for many centuries as entirely subject to its dominion, and deriving therefrom a conviction of its supremacy over mankind, it has been unwilling to recognize Protestantism as an equal, entitled to be conciliated, but has habitually considered it as an enemy, to be exterminated and destroyed. No matter what concessions it has obtained, or to what extent it has enjoyed the advantages of Protestant protection and toleration, there has never been any abatement of its imperious demands, or any softening of its aggressive character. In the United States, where it has enjoyed every possible degree of security which the laws and public sentiment can confer, its hostility to Protestantism has never been so open, active, and violent as it is to-day. The tolerance of our institutions has had the effect of awakening energies which seem to have been only slumbering. It has been, manifestly, awaiting a more effective concentration of its strength, so that whensoever it shall strike its blows they may be more powerful and dangerous.

A scrutinizing observer can not avoid the conviction that the moderation it has hitherto exhibited has been suggested by expediency and policy—not principle—and practiced, in order to gain, by degrees and unobserved, such a position that it may resume its accustomed attitude of defiance and intolerance, and assert for itself the "divine right" of sitting in judgment over our Constitution and laws.

It is worthy of frequent repetition, that there is no country in the world where the Roman Catholic Church and its hierarchy are better or more securely shielded, in all the just rights of religion, property, and person, than they are in the United States. They are nowhere deprived of any single religious or civil privilege which other churches and people enjoy. The Protestant communities in all the States have universally recognized them as entitled to the same protection they have secured to themselves. In

this they have been consistent with the Protestantism they profess, which is not aggressive, but tolerant and charitable; not malignant, but conciliatory. And this liberality has been shown them, notwithstanding Roman Catholicism has, at the same time, in countries where it has had the power, not only denied to Protestantism any equality of privileges or protection with itself, but has subjected it to continual persecution and indignities. Yet, in the face of all this, these same hierarchs who have enjoyed these advantages are now actively organizing themselves, and their followers, as far as they can influence them, into an ecclesiastical army, for the vigorous prosecution of a war which they avow their purpose to carry on unceasingly until Protestantism shall be driven from the field, entirely subdued and overthrown, and all that it has done shall be obliterated from history, so that the world shall be made to bow before the papal scepter.

We should not deceive ourselves or be deceived by others. It is frequently and properly said that we must, by all means, avoid a religious war; and all our best impulses admonish us to guard against so terrible a calamity. It should be the fervent prayer of every good man, that Providence may so direct the events before us that such a misfortune may never again befall the world, especially that it may never befall a country like ours, where so much pains has been taken to construct a government with the idea that Christians ought to dwell together in harmony and brotherly love, as one of its cardinal principles. Protestantism can make no such war, and can take no part in it, except when driven to that extremity by the absolute necessity of self-defense. It has, thus far, proved the only power sufficiently imbued with the spirit of toleration and the brotherhood of man, to discard entirely the engines of torture and persecution, and to substitute for them the mild and conciliatory precepts and doctrines of the Gospel. All such wars have hitherto been the work of those who claim to be the exclusive custodians of the true faith, and who, under the influence of this sentiment, are made exacting, aggressive, and uncompromising; and not the work of those whose liberalizing Christianity gives play to all the charities of life and all the best affections of the heart, and whose religion is founded on love.

But can we confidently promise ourselves that we shall escape a religious war? The danger lying before us, and possibly not far off, is, that such a war may be precipitated upon us in spite of ourselves—not necessarily a war of bloody battle—fields, but of aroused, excited, and angry passions, which, intensified by sectarian hatred and partisan violence, may, by possibility, lead to the same deplorable results which have followed similar conflicts elsewhere. The papacy, if history speaks truly, has, in its wonderful progress, made many such wars; and as it claims never to have had any change or “shadow of turning” in the pursuit of its objects, its power to inaugurate still another may not be altogether lost. Are there no evidences of a deeply seated and secretly cherished purpose to invite, in the United States, a fierce and fiery contest between the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, acting for the papacy, and those who profess the principles of Protestant Christianity? The answer to such a question as this can not be expected in any open and public avowals: the purposes of cunning and experienced adversaries are not usually revealed. But some light is thrown upon it by the literature which those who compose this hierarchy are now scattering broadcast over the land, contained in books, magazines, pamphlets, newspapers, and tracts; silent messengers, which convey words of authority and command to the faithful, which they are required not to disobey, under the penalty of committing an offense against God!

There appeared in France, only a few years ago, a small work, which has been translated into English, republished in this country, and is now sold by leading Roman Catholic book-sellers in our principal cities. Extraordinary pains have been taken to secure for it a large circulation, so that it may reach all the members of that Church, and be read by them. It has a suggestive title—"Plain Talk about the Protestantism of To-day"—and professes to be a talk "with Catholics rather than with Protestants," in order that they may be instructed as to their duty. It is written in a spirit peculiarly offensive and aggressive, and treats Protestantism as having "melted away in rationalism and infidelity," and as exhibiting nothing of a religious nature "but the ruins," which are only "a source of annoyance," because, "however dismal they appear, they still afford a refuge to the wicked who dare not show themselves on the highways," that is, that these Protestant ruins are only a shelter for such as dare not confront the indignation of those who serve the papacy! ("Plain Talk about the Protestantism of To-day," by Mgr. Segur, part i., prop. xv., p. 45. "God detests and curses" it.-Ibid., p. 12.)

It is an artful and cunningly contrived attack upon Protestantism throughout the world, and although designed especially to stimulate the Roman Catholics of France into antagonism against the Protestants of that country, yet its republication and circulation in the United States, under the immediate patronage of the hierarchy, furnishes undoubted evidence of their approval of its contents, and of their design to transfer the attack from Europe to this country. It is a bold and direct challenge to the contest it invites, and conclusively proves that the war will go on, whether Protestants take part in it or not.

Assuming, with the dogmatic air of superiority so common with all this class of writers, that the Protestant forms of religion are *no religion at all*, because they reject the authority and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, the author makes this announcement:

"After having rejected the Church, *Protestantism rejects Jesus Christ; after having rejected Jesus Christ, it must reject God himself, and thus it will have accomplished its work.*" ("Plain Talk about the Protestantism of To-day," by Mgr. Se'gur, part i., prop. xvi., p. 53.)

At another place, in further continuation of the same idea, he says,

"The Protestant, whether he believes it or not, is *an infidel in germ, and the infidel is a Protestant in full bloom.*

"*Infidelity exists in Protestantism as the oak exists in the acorn, as the consequence is in the premise.*" (Ibid., part iii., prop. xviii., p. 243.)

The unmistakable design in this formal arraignment of all Protestants as infidels—to say nothing of its want of truth and Christian charity—is to keep the papal followers in remembrance of what their Church dogmatically and imperiously teaches; that all other religion besides their own is false and heretical, and that it is their duty, both to God and the Church, to oppose and resist Protestantism to the extremity of total extermination. With this thought continually present in their minds, it is doubtless supposed that they can be kept in readiness at all times for any future emergency. And the difficulties in the way of bringing about this unity are much less than many suppose; although in this country they are gradually diminishing under the liberalizing influence of our institutions. They are sufficiently great, however, even here, to demand thoughtful attention.

The “profession of faith,” promulgated by Pope Pius IV. after the Council of Trent, and re-proclaimed by Pope Pius IX., declares that “no one can be saved” who believes otherwise than according to the faith of the Roman Catholic Church; and requires all thus believing to “promise *true obedience* to the Bishop of Rome,”* as an absolutely necessary and indispensable part of the true faith.

* The following pledge is required as a condition of membership: “I acknowledge the Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church for the mother and mistress of all churches, and I promise true obedience to the Bishop of Rome, successor to St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and Vicar of Jesus Christ.”—The Grounds of the Catholic Doctrine, Contained in the Profession of Faith published by Pope Pius IX., 1855, p. 6.

What are the nature and extent of this “*true obedience*” will sufficiently appear elsewhere. For the present, it is only necessary to observe with what unerring certainty each step in the papal system leads to this obedience, it being recognized everywhere as a necessary part of the true faith.

Inasmuch as the duty of obedience requires that there should exist somewhere a governing authority having the right to demand and exact it in case of refusal, this author proceeds to show what it is, and in whose hands it is lodged. He says, “The teaching of the Church is the true rule of faith;” a declaration with which liberal-minded Protestants would not be disposed to find any fault, if there had not been in its government so radical a departure from the practices of the apostolic times.

But, in order to exclude the idea that the Church, as a whole, has any right to participate in the declaration of the faith, or can have any authority through its representative bodies, he says that Christ appointed “twelve among his disciples, and sent them forth to the world to teach in his name, and with his authority, the Christian religion,” and that “the pastors of the Catholic Church, ascending through a legitimate and uninterrupted procession to St. Peter and the other apostles, have exercised, and do exercise, this ministry;” there being, of course, no teaching authority in the world besides what they possess. And for fear that some inquisitive mind might conclude that this teaching authority was not infallible, on account of the heretical tendencies of some and the personal unworthiness of others of these pastors, he proceeds still further to exclude all idea of church representation by concentrating the whole of it in the hands of the pope. With him, this official functionary of the Church is the Church itself. Whatsoever authority Christ gave to the Church, he gave to him alone. As the authority conferred by Christ was divine, therefore his authority is divine also. As whatsoever was spoken by Christ were the utterances of God himself, therefore when the pope commands in all the domain of faith and morals, it is God who commands. Thus he defines it:

“And in what does this ministry consist? That *power* which is derived from Jesus Christ himself, and by which fallible men *teach us infallibly*, and *infallibly* lead us in the path of salvation? It is the authority of the Church, to wit, *the authority of the sovereign pontiff*, successor of St. Peter, head of the Church, and *the authority of the bishops*, coadjutors to the pope in the grand work of the salvation of men.

This *divine authority*, entrusted as it is to the hands of men, is the true, the *only rule of faith*. It has been thus believed in all Christian ages; it has been thus taught by all doctors and fathers of the Church. *We have to believe ONLY what the pope and the bishops teach. We have to reject only that which the pope and the bishops condemn and reject.* Should a point of doctrine appear doubtful, we have only to address ourselves to the pope and to the bishops in order to know

what to believe. *Only* from that tribunal, forever living and forever assisted by God, emanates the judgment on religious belief, and particularly on the true sense of the Scriptures.”(Mgr. Segur, part iii., prop. ix., p. 105.)

Thus the personality of the believer is merged in the superior personality of the pope. All right of personal inquiry is taken away from him. Whatsoever the pope, through the bishop, shall command the believer to accept, that he shall accept; whatsoever to reject, that he shall reject; and whatsoever to do, that he shall do. If he obey, he shall be saved; if he refuse, he shall be damned. There is no middle ground, no room for hesitation or doubt. The authority is omnipotent, and the obedience must be thorough and complete.

Succeeding thus, as he supposes, in eradicating from the mind all sentiments of individuality, and any advantages to be derived from an intelligent private judgment, he directs his readers that they shall not look to the Bible as furnishing a proper and sufficient rule of Christian faith. He says:

“The Bible contains naught but what is the teaching of God. And yet the Bible is not, the Bible can not be, the rule of our faith, in the Protestant sense.

“Why?

“*First.* The Bible can not be the rule of our faith, because Jesus Christ has not said to his disciples, ‘Go and carry the Bible,’ but he said, ‘Go and teach all nations. He that heareth you heareth me.’” (Mgr. Seguir, part ii., prop. x., p. 107.)

The nature of our present inquiries does not require such a discussion here as is invited from the theologian by this extract; yet the passing remark may be indulged, that when Christ said, “Search the Scriptures, for in *them* ye have eternal life: and *they* are they which testify of me,”(John 5:39) He fixed no limitation upon the number who should do so, and was addressing the Jews who were persecuting Him for healing the impotent man on the Sabbath-day, and was not reproaching the Pharisees merely because they read the Scriptures, as is incorrectly asserted by the Roman Catholic Church, in furtherance of the doctrine that every thing must be taken from the pope and his coadjutors without any personal investigation of the Bible.*

* The following note is inserted in the Douay, or Roman Catholic, Bible, as explanatory of John v., 39; and is required to be taken as a part of the context, and as if uttered by Christ himself:

“It is not a command for all to read the Scriptures, but a reproach to the Pharisees, that, reading the Scriptures as they did, and thinking to find everlasting life in them, they would not receive Him to whom all those Scriptures gave testimony, and through whom alone they could have that true life.”

The Pharisees were a sect of the Jews, distinguished from the Sadducees because of their strictness in interpreting the law. When referred to in the Gospels, they are specially named. But when mention is made of the Jews, as such, all the Jews are included—both Pharisees and Sadducees. In the chapter from which the above text is taken John did not mention the Pharisees at all, but spoke of the “feast of the Jews” at Jerusalem. Therefore, he addressed himself to all the Jews, and not alone to the Pharisees.

By shutting up the Bible, or allowing it only to be read with accompanying explanations of certain passages—which explanations are to be taken as infallibly true—it is *designed to stifle all personal investigation of its contents*. Such has always been the invariable policy of the Church; the right to read

it at all, on the part of the laity, having been conceded only in obedience to the popular demand occasioned by the Reformation. And this policy is now persisted in without variation, except in so far as it is modified by circumstances. In Roman Catholic countries the laity know but little, and multitudes of them nothing, of the contents of the Bible. But when Roman Catholicism comes in direct contact with Protestantism, it allows the Bible to be read only upon the condition that he who reads it shall not employ his own reason in deciding what it teaches, but shall take the explanatory notes attached as of equal validity with the body of the book itself; that is, that “what the pope and the bishops teach” is as much the work of divine inspiration as what the apostles and the prophets taught.*

* Pope Pius VII. published a bull, June 29th, 1816, against Bible societies, declaring that they were a “most crafty device, by which the very foundations of religion are undermined,” and prescribing a “remedy” by which to “abolish this pestilence as far as possible.” He thus made known his remedy: “It is, therefore, necessary to adhere to the salutary decree of the Congregation of the Index (June 13th, 1757), that no versions of the Bible in the vulgar tongue be permitted, except such as are approved by the Apostolic See or published with annotations extracted from the writings of holy fathers of the Church.”-NILES’S Weekly Register, 1817, vol. xii., p. 206, where this bull is published as a part of the current history of those times.

Pope Gregory XVI. published another bull, May 8th, 1844, confirming and renewing the foregoing bull of Pius VII., also similar bulls issued by Leo XII. and Pius VIII., and especially one by Benedict XIV. Referring to the latter, he says: “It became necessary for Benedict XIV. to superadd the injunction that no versions whatever should be suffered to be read but those which should be approved of by the Holy See, accompanied by notes derived from the writings of the holy fathers, or other learned and Catholic authors.”-DOWLING’S History of Romanism, p. 622.

There is attached to the American edition of the Douay Bible, published in 1837, under the auspices of the Provincial Council of Baltimore, the following “admonition:”

“To prevent and remedy this abuse, and to guard against *error*, it was judged necessary to forbid the reading of the Scriptures in the vulgar language without the advice and permission of the pastors and spiritual guides whom God has appointed to govern his Church.” Both by the letter and spirit of this “admonition” the Roman Catholic in the United States is not permitted to read the Bible “without the advice and permission” of his priest!

Manifestly, the fear exists, that, in the present condition of the world, when the human mind is stimulated to extraordinary efforts to search out the truth in every department of thought, *if the laity are permitted to accept such impressions as the Bible itself will leave upon their minds, the papacy will, in the end, be driven from the field*, routed and discomfited. For fear, therefore, that this mode of thoughtful investigation should prevail, to weaken the authority of the pope and his bishops, Mgr. Segur lays down this rule for the government of the faithful:

“The first rule is, that we should receive both the *text* and the *interpretation* of the Scriptures from the legitimate *pastors of the Church, and from them alone.*”(Mgr. Segur, part ii., prop. xiv., p. 120.)

But he does not leave the object which prompts the suppression of the free circulation and perusal of the Scriptures to go unexplained; for, at another place, he says:

“The *Protestant Bible* is only a false skin, in which *infidelity and revolution* wrap themselves.” (*Ibid.*, part ii., prop. xv., p. 125.)

By these gradual approaches he, like a skillful commander, reaches his ultimate object, never absent from his mind, which is to show to those Roman Catholics to whom his book is specially addressed what the papacy expects of them in their conduct toward Protestantism. They are required to resist and oppose it, because it teaches “infidelity and revolution,” which are wrapped up in the Protestant Bible. Thus fixing his premise, and preparing his readers for the avowal, he ventures upon these bold and reckless assertions, which are made the more important by their repetition in the United States:

“Wherever Protestantism has a sway, it is intolerant and persecuting. Of course, not everywhere in the same degree; but why not? Because it does not possess everywhere the same degree of power. To persecute, one must have both will and power. Fortunately, Protestantism can not always act as it has a mind to. But let it be said boldly, in fact, of intolerance, Protestantism will always go as far as it will dare.” (Mgr. Segur, part iii., prop. v., p. 160.).

Artfully and Jesuitically injecting this poison of malignant falsehood into the minds of the passive subjects of the papacy, he would, of course, leave his work but half accomplished if he failed to suggest to them in what spirit and with what temper this hideous and deformed monster of Protestantism, as he paints it, is to be dealt with wheresoever it dares to set up its illegitimate authority against that of the “Holy See of Rome.” He is entitled to the credit of doing it without disguise, as follows:

“The Church is certainly intolerant in matters of doctrine. True; and we glory in it! Truth is of itself intolerant. In religion, as in mathematics, what is true is true, and what is false is false. No compromise between truth and error; truth can not compromise. Such concessions, however small, would prove an immediate destruction of truth. Two and two make four: it is a truth. Hence, whoever asserts the contrary, utters a falsehood. Let it be an error of a thousandth or of a millionth part, it will ever be false to assert that two and two do not make four.

“The Church proclaims and maintains truths as certain as the mathematical ones. She teaches and defends truths with as much intolerance as the science of mathematics defends hers. And what more logical? The Catholic Church alone, in the midst of so many different sects, avers the possession of absolute truth, out of which there can not be true Christianity. She alone has the right to be, she alone MUST be, intolerant. She alone will and must say, as she has said through all ages in her councils, ‘If any one saith or believeth contrary to what I teach, which is truth, let him be ANATHEMA.’” (Ibid., part iii., prop. vi., p. 183.)

What more distinct and emphatic avowal could be made of the intolerance and aggressiveness of the papacy, of its settled purpose to remove from its path every thing that blocks its progress toward universal dominion? It fixes its curse upon every adversary, and hounds on the slaves who do the bidding of its hierarchy, resolved upon no compromise, but only upon such a triumph as shall make its victory, if won, both final and complete. Therefore, this reverend libeler of Protestantism, as one of the generals of its great army, seemingly in anticipation of such a triumph, passes on one step further, that he may develop more minutely the contemplated plan of operations, and show some of the effective instrumentalities which are to be employed in the more practical exhibition of intolerance, so that the avowal may excite in the minds of the timid and cowardly a wholesome dread of papal authority. After stating that the *Spanish Inquisition was established by Roman Catholic governments, as an*

“ecclesiastical institution,” and thus agreeing that it had the sanction and approbation of the Church, he proceeds:

“That institution you may value as you choose; you are at liberty to condemn the abuses and the cruelties of which it has been guilty through the violence of political passions and the character of the Spaniard; yet one can not but acknowledge, *in the terrible part taken by the clergy in its trials*, THE MOST LEGITIMATE AND MOST NATURAL EXERCISE OF ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITY.” (Mgr. Segur, part iii., prop. vii., p. 186.)

This language is so plain and explicit that there is no room for doubt about its import. Its meaning is sufficiently seen without any straining of the most ordinary rules of interpretation. It was not designed for Protestant readers, but was avowedly and expressly addressed to those who were supposed to be ready and willing listeners to the words of authority, to such as tamely and submissively put their manhood into the keeping of ecclesiastical superiors. The Spanish Inquisition! Is there any reader so ignorant that he needs to be told what it was? Of all the institutions ever known to the world, or ever invented by human ingenuity, it was the most cruel, oppressive, and blood-thirsty. Its thousands of victims, whose bones were crushed with its accursed instruments of torture, and whose groans made its priestly officials laugh with a joy akin to that of the fiends of hell, still cry out from their tombs against it. *

* Jean Antoine Llorente was secretary of the Inquisition of Spain, and when the institution was suppressed in 1809, '10, '11, all the archives were placed at his disposal. These consisted of “unpublished manuscripts and papers, mentioned in the inventories of deceased inquisitors.” They were carefully examined, and furnished him much of the valuable information communicated in his published “History of the Inquisition.” He says that the “horrid conduct of this holy office weakened the power and diminished the population of Spain by arresting the progress of arts, sciences, industry, and commerce, and by compelling multitudes of families to abandon the kingdom; by instigating the expulsion of the Jews and the Moors, and by immolating on its flaming shambles more than three hundred thousand victims!!” He traces its history with great minuteness of detail, showing its introduction into Aragon, during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella; the punishment of the Albigenses and the Jews by its cruelties, its approval by Popes Sextus IV., Innocent VIII., and others, as the means of augmenting their power; and gives the harsh and unprecedented rules of procedure by which it was governed. One of those rules shows how necessary it was considered to the papacy, and that it was employed by the reverend (!) Inquisitors both as a religious and political institution. It required all witnesses to be asked, in general terms, “if they had ever seen or heard any thing which was, or appeared, contrary to the Catholic faith, or the rights of the Inquisition. “LLORENTE’s History of the Inquisition, preface, pp. xiii., xvi.; chap. v., p. 30; chap. vi., p. 39; chap. ix., p. 60.

Yet, in the nineteenth century, while humanity has not ceased to shudder at the thought of its possible revival, the press of an American publishing house (Patrick Donahoe, Boston) sends forth among the adherents of Roman Catholicism in the United States, with the sanction and approval of the Roman Catholic bishop of Boston,* the startling avowal that this horrible instrument of persecution is “*the most legitimate and most natural exercise of ecclesiastical authority!*” And more than one of the Roman Catholic journals in the United States have taken extraordinary pains to commend the book, in which this avowal is made, to their readers. The *Boston Pilot*, a paper of large circulation, thus advertises it, in its issue of February 20th, 1870: “*Plain Talk about the Protestantism of To-day*. Every body is buying it. Prices: neatly bound, 60 cents; in paper covers, 25 cents; by the hundred, for distribution, \$15. Send for copies to distribute among your neighbors.”

* This book is endorsed with the sign of the cross, thus, “Imprimatur, Joannes Josephus, Episcopus, Boston.”

The reader, however, should not be misled into the belief that this was the first attempt to recommend the Spanish Inquisition to the Roman Catholics of the United States. In 1815 the French Comte Le Maistre wrote half a dozen letters in defense of this institution. He said of it: “The Inquisition is, in its very nature, good, mild, and preservative. It is the universal, indelible character of every ecclesiastical institution; you see it in Rome, and you can see it **WHEREVER THE TRUE CHURCH HAS POWER.**”—LA MAISTRE’S Letters on the Spanish Inquisition, p. 22. Though he professed to treat it as “purely royal,” he admitted that it existed in Spain “by virtue of the bull of the sovereign pontiff.” He says that the grand inquisitor “is always either an archbishop or bishop.”—Ibid., p. 39. He justifies the infliction of “capital punishment” upon those who attempt to subvert the “established religion” of a nation; which means that the pope, as “the vicergerent of Christ,” would require a resort to this remedy, as the only means of obeying the divine law, wherever the Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the state, as he is now striving to make it in the United States.—Ibid., pp. 52, 53. He says: “A sense of duty obliges me to say that an heresiarch, an obstinate heretic, and a propagator of heresy, should indisputably be ranked among the greatest criminals.”—Ibid., p. 59. Again: “I by no means doubt that a tribunal of this description, adapted to the times, places, and characters of nations, would be highly useful in every country.”—Ibid., p. 84. He speaks of the “demoniac spirit of Puritanism” (p. 127) and of Protestantism, as “nicknamed piety, zeal, faith, reformation, and orthodoxy ” (p. 130), and reaches a result which he thus expresses:

“Theory and experience satisfactorily prove that there is not, that there can not be, a steady faith, or positive religion, properly so called, in a nation whose envoys take so much pains to abolish what they and others, through malice, call the detestable Inquisition” (p. 156), because it is “one of the mildest and wisest civil tribunals within the range of civilization” (p. 172).

Now, these letters of Le Maistre, with all their impious and un-American teachings, were translated into English by a Roman Catholic priest of Salem, Massachusetts, and published also by Patrick Donahoe, “Catholic bookseller,” of Boston, in 1843. In the preface of this translator, he says a great many silly and mendacious things about the “piratical, pharisaical reformation,” about the “base apostate Luther,” and the “libertinism” of Protestantism (pp. 9, 10); but, like all other writers of his class, he, too, reaches the only logical result which can follow such opinions as he expresses. For example, he says, in a “Catholic country, a man may entertain whatever religious or irreligious opinions he likes,” “but he must keep them to himself,” for if he speaks out what he thinks, “he is brought before the tribunal” of the Inquisition!—Ibid., preface, p. xvi.

Here the design in republishing this book in the United States is made evident; that it shall, incendiary-like, make its way over the land, by being brought within the reach and means of all the papal followers who can read it, so that they may be inoculated, insensibly, with the views and opinions of their ecclesiastical superiors, and be thereby fitted for whatsoever work they shall be called upon to do. *There are very few Protestants who observe these cautious and stealthy approaches of their vigilant and sleepless adversary.* Many of them, engaged in pursuits which invite them into other fields of inquiry, and always tolerant and unsuspecting, are unwilling to rest long enough from their active occupations to pay any attention whatever to these things; and very few, if they think of them at all, ever think of looking into Roman Catholic books or newspapers to see what they contain. And the papal hierarchy, fully informed of all this, and well knowing the advantage they derive from it, employ all their intellectual energies, and the most active and untiring industry, in prosecuting their attack upon the religion professed by Protestants, and upon all the liberalizing tendencies of the civil institutions which have grown out of Protestantism. In their numerous publications they display great learning and ingenuity; but there are very few of these publications characterized by that charity which the apostle

Paul has placed among the highest virtues, and which Christ, by his life and teachings, inculcated as one of the chief and most necessary duties of man.

Hence Mgr. Segur goes on to say, in the imagined supremacy and superiority of the hierarchy to which he belongs, and by whose inordinate ambition he is stimulated:

“It would be an *insult to the Catholic clergy* to compare with them the pastors of Protestant sects. As *Protestantism is no religion*, whatever they may say to the contrary, so its ministers have not the authority of the priesthood, no matter how hard they may try to have its appearance.”(Mgr. Segur, part ii., prop. xvii., p. 134.)

This denial of the priestly character to the Protestant clergy amounts, of itself, to but little, constituting, as it does, one of the most ordinary features of polemic controversy. But included within it is the denial of any religion to Protestants; and this accusation of heresy is designed, by its frequent repetition in the United States, as the foundation upon which to build the papal superstructure, to bring about the downfall of the Protestant system, and the erection of the “Catholic system” in its place, in all its exclusiveness and power. Yet those engaged in this undertaking do not fail to see that Protestantism, in this country, has a signal advantage over them in its advocacy of the freedom of thought, for which the most of mankind, in despite of tyranny, have a natural yearning. And seeing this, they are employing this little book of Mgr. Segur as the agent by which they hope to remove this difficulty out of the way, so as to secure a clear field for the future triumph and operations of the papacy. It is not proposed to do this by argument, or by any appeal to intelligent reason, for in such a field they would meet inevitable failure; but by employing that dogmatism which allows of no denial, and which has hitherto served them so well in other times and countries. Mgr. Segur cuts the thread with a single swoop of his ecclesiastical saber; thus:

“*The freedom of thinking is simply nonsense*. We are no more free to think without rule than we are to act without one. Unless we prefer to be disorderly and incur damnation, we are bound to have thoughts of truth and of truth alone, just as we are bound to do what is right, and only what is right.”(Mgr. Segur, part ii., prop. vii., p. 98.)

And at another place: “*Freedom of thought is the soul of Protestantism*; it is likewise the soul of modern rationalistic philosophy. It is one of those *impossibilities* which only the *levity of a superficial reason can regard as admissible*. But a sound mind, that does not feed on empty words, looks upon this freedom of thought only as simply absurd, and, what is worse, as SINFUL.”(Ibid., part ii., prop. vii., p. 100.)

Every reader accustomed to construe the simplest language can see from these extracts, at a single glance, their full import. Therefore, without stopping here to comment upon them, it is sufficient only to say that, besides assailing Protestant Christianity, they are an open and undisguised attack upon the chief cornerstone of our *political* institutions. These not merely secure to every citizen the right of free thought, but recognize it as inalienable. If this great principle had not been maintained, our institutions could not have existed, and the theory of self—government would have been a disastrous failure. But, by these papal teachings, and in direct opposition to this principle, the Roman Catholic citizens of the United States are commanded to regard it as “*absurd*” and “*sinful*,” and, therefore, in violation of God’s law!—as an odious and intolerable form of heresy, which is offensive to the papacy! They are thus

instructed that they may be prepared to perform the *religious duty* of uprooting and eradicating all the Constitutional guarantees designed for the protection of this principle, because “freedom of thought is the soul of Protestantism,” and Protestantism has an open Bible “in which infidelity and revolution wrap themselves!” There should, after this, be no further denial of the fact that the papacy does assert for itself, and that its devotees maintain for it, the *divine* power to teach *political* as well as religious truth.

We shall see hereafter many evidences of this, of the most convincing character; but this author does not leave us any room for doubt upon the subject, understanding perfectly well, as he does, that its ultimate ends can be reached in no other way. After asserting that “such freedom” as Protestantism confers will lead “*to perdition*,” unless “controlled by the divine teachings of Christ, and of his Church”—that is, of the pope, through his bishops and clergy—he continues thus:

“The authority of the Church is a guard over human understanding in whatever directly or indirectly affects religion, which means in every kind of doctrines— religious, philosophical, scientific, POLITICAL, etc.”(Mgr. Segur, part ii., prop. vii., p. 100.)

No apology is offered for these numerous extracts from this book of Mgr. Segur, since it is supposed that the opinions of the author can be better made known by means of them than by briefer quotations, and because, in order to convey a proper idea of what constitutes Roman Catholic literature in the United States, equally liberal quotations must be made from other papal authors. This book is introduced here on account of the great exertions made to secure it a large circulation, and of the most significant fact that it is considered worthy of the special endorsement of the Bishop of Boston, which gives to it the sanction of official authority. But it is by no means sent out alone. A crusade requires a large army, composed of many and disciplined soldiers, and supplied with the necessary weapons of warfare.

The press is an ever—active engine of power; and being free, in this country, without regard to what it teaches, that part of it which moves or halts at the bidding of ecclesiastical authority continues its ceaseless efforts, by day and night, to erect upon the ruins of Protestantism the imperial throne of papal power and absolutism, by keeping up the supply of these necessary weapons.

There is in the city of New York a publication society which sends out thousands, and perhaps millions, of little tracts, of only a few pages, all devoted to the same object—the defense of the papacy—and stamped with this badge of authority: “Printed for *The Catholic Publication Society*— office, 9 Warren Street, New York. Price, 50 cents per hundred; and sold at all Catholic booksellers at the same price.”

A package of these tracts, easily procured, was found to contain one numbered *forty—six*, on the subject of “*The Pope’s Temporal Power*,” defining what it is, and what the faithful are required to believe in reference to it. It goes out in this modest and unobtrusive way that it may perform its allotted task silently and unseen, unless accidentally, by a single Protestant eye. Explaining what this power has hitherto been at Rome, it says that all the members of the Church are “*bound* to believe that the Holy Father should enjoy that *political independence* which is necessary for the free exercise of his spiritual authority *throughout the entire world*,” conveying thereby the idea that, as “political independence” is necessary to “the free exercise” of the pope’s authority at Rome, it is, therefore equally necessary, wherever, “*throughout the entire world*,” that authority shall be recognized; in other words, that the

degree of this independence must be the same everywhere; and as the pope can not maintain his full authority at Rome without it, so he can not in the United States. It then proceeds, in the form of questions and answers, to present the matter practically, as follows:

“How can this independence be secured?

“Only in one way. The pope must be a *sovereign* himself. *No temporal prince, whether emperor, or king, or president, or ANY LEGISLATIVE BODY, can have any lawful jurisdiction over the pope.*

“What right has the pope to be *independent of every civil ruler*?

“He has it in virtue of his dignity as the vicar of Christ. Christ himself is “King of kings.” But the pope governs the Church in the name of Christ, and as his representative. His divine office, therefore, makes him superior to EVERY POLITICAL, TEMPORAL, AND HUMAN GOVERNMENT.

“But could not the pope exercise his spiritual supremacy, and yet be the subject of some temporal prince; for instance, the King of Italy?

“Most certainly not. For, as the representative of God, the pope is compelled to denounce whatever injustice and iniquity he finds in the world, *including the acts of grasping and unjust civil governments.*”

Let the reader observe how carefully this language is arranged so as to convey this obvious meaning—nothing more, nothing less—that, as the pope’s “spiritual authority” can not be exercised in the papal states without “*political independence*,” and as he must be “*superior to every political, temporal, and human government*,” so that he may “denounce whatever injustice and iniquity he finds in the world,” accordingly as *he* shall consider it unjust and iniquitous, therefore he must have the same degree of “political independence” in the United States that he has at Rome, so that his commands shall be as much the law here as there; and that, as he has already denounced Protestantism as heresy, infidelity, and no religion—as “injustice and iniquity,” he should have full authority to command that its institutions, both civil and religious, when not approved by him, shall be plucked up by the roots, and all the power necessary to enforce obedience to such a decree!

If any doubt should be entertained on this subject, it will be removed by the perusal of another of the tracts contained in this same package, and numbered *forty—three*, upon “*the duty of obeying the pope.*” Here “the duty of all Catholics to obey the pope” is laid down as the starting—point. All his “laws” are represented as “confirmed by a *divine sanction, and are obligatory upon the conscience in the same manner as the laws of Moses were binding on the Jews.*” He is called the “*sovereign judge and lawgiver, from whose decisions and judgments there is no appeal.*” Being “the head of the whole Church, and the father and teacher of all Christians,” he requires, therefore, obedience to his doctrinal decisions *and to his laws*; in certain cases, under the penalty of excommunication. All this having been announced, this little tract proceeds to define this extraordinary authority, thus:

“The authority of the pope *to teach and command* the faithful in regard to all things relating to the doctrines which they are to hold or reject, and in regard to *all things relating to religious and moral acts which they are to do or avoid*, has been given him by Jesus Christ.”

Thereupon, the faithful are instructed that the popes, exercising the divine “power of the keys,” have “forbidden *certain opinions* to be maintained, and *certain acts* to be done;” and that these commands are “ratified in heaven, and are therefore to be respected and obeyed as *really emanating from Jesus Christ himself!*” Then, passing from this blasphemous comparison of the pope with Christ, it condemns *Freemasonry* as already under the curse of several popes before the present one; denies the right of “*a private person to judge the rulers of the Church,*” thus asserting full official impunity for every member of the hierarchy; endeavors, with an exceedingly thin veil of sophistry, to evade the charge of ecclesiastical interference with political opinions; and defines, with the utmost precision, the comprehensiveness of the papal authority. It would be hard to find more explicit language. It says:

“The authority of the Church extends over *all things relating to morality, over all questions of right and wrong, duty and transgression of duty, justice and injustice, lawfulness and unlawfulness.* As well might one talk of our Lord Jesus Christ interfering with human rights as his vicar or his Church. Man is responsible to God in all his relations, as a child or parent, a subject, citizen, artisan, merchant, lawyer, legislator, or governor. The moral law, the rule of right and wrong, runs through the state, society, the family, and every relation or institution in which man is a free agent, having rights and duties. *The Church is supreme in deciding all moral questions, and the pope is the sovereign minister of God, with power to punish by his spiritual censures all infractions of the divine law.*”

When it shall become necessary, further along, to examine the doctrines of the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pope Pius IX., and other instructions to his subjects, this extract will furnish a key to his meaning. In the mean time, it should be observed how distinctly and emphatically it is announced, in this American tract, that the authority and jurisdiction of the Church, and of the pope as its supreme head, and of the clergy, as the instruments he employs in the execution of his power, is so full, comprehensive, and all—absorbing, as to embrace the entire man, in all his relations of life, in all the duties he owes to himself, to his family, to society, to the *state* of which he is a citizen, and to the *government* to which he owes allegiance. Every thought, word, and act; every impulse and passion of the mind; all the affections and hatreds of the heart—must be subordinated to the will of the pope, who, as sovereign lord of the universe—as “*God on earth*”—must acquire a dominion so complete that every society, community, and *government* in the world shall be constructed, regulated, and managed according to the law of God as he shall declare and announce it! If Protestantism is infidelity and heresy, it must be exterminated! If free thought is “*sinful,*” it must be suppressed! If a free press opens the door to revolution or licentiousness, it must be destroyed! If free speech is offensive to pontifical or hierarchical ears, there must be no more of it! If a republican and popular government secures all these privileges and provides for their continuance, it must be overthrown! If the Constitution of the United States prohibits “an establishment of religion,” or any impairment of the right of its “free exercise,” it must be put out of the way, and papal imperialism take the place of the will of the people which it expresses! If any man, supposing himself to be free, shall dare to consult his own conscience in matters of religious belief or moral duty, or to interpret the Bible for himself, he must be stricken down by the sword of pontifical wrath, and the papal anathema rest upon his name forever! And then, when all this is accomplished; when mankind shall be compelled to recognize true religion as consisting only in passive obedience to the “*laws*” of the “*King of Rome,*” the pope, and his bishops, and his priests all stand ready to plunge the world once more into medieval bondage! When Rome was “mistress of the world,” none of her despots wore a diadem so imperial as this.

This is not the place for a philosophical disquisition upon the varied qualities of the mind, or its tendency to be impressed by surrounding circumstances. We all know that it may be educated to adopt almost any class of opinions, especially when its higher capacities are left unimproved. The papacy, well understanding this, has been always accustomed to determine and regulate the kind of instruction to be given to the members of the Roman Catholic Church, prescribing the particular books they shall read, and prohibiting the reading of others, under penalty of the pontifical curse. There is at Rome, as an essential department of the papal court, what is called the “Congregation of the Index.” To this tribunal are submitted all publications that are, in any degree, under the suspicion of heresy; and if, upon examination, they are found to teach what the pope does not desire to be taught, they are condemned and placed upon the “*Index expurgatorius*,” so that thereafter it shall be regarded as an offense against the Church and against God for any person to read them. Examples of this are abundant; that in reference to the books of Galileo being a prominent one. Galileo taught the Copernican theory of the revolution of the earth upon its axis; and as the Roman Catholic Church taught the contrary—that is, that the earth was stationary, and the sun revolved around it—Pope Paul V. caused his writings to be condemned, and prohibited the reading of them; and Pope Urban VIII. not only repeated this prohibition, but caused the great astronomer to be tried, convicted, and imprisoned during life for having dared to teach such heresy!*

* Much ingenuity has been recently displayed by papal writers in the attempt to show that Galileo was not condemned by the Church for teaching the doctrine of Copernicus, that the sun is the center of the universe, and does not move, but that the earth moves with a diurnal motion. To do this it has been found necessary to pervert many important facts of history, and to deny others which have been accepted as true by the most learned Protestant and Roman Catholic historians for nearly two hundred and fifty years. Those who have the curiosity to examine this question will find it fully discussed in a late work, entitled “The Private Life of Galileo; compiled principally from his correspondence and that of his eldest daughter, Sister Maria Celeste, nun in the Franciscan convent of St. Matthew, in Arcetri;” published by Nichols & Noyes, Boston. All “the pontifical decrees against the motion of the earth” have also been published in London. From these it is shown to be true, that the Copernican theory was condemned both by the pope and the sacred Congregation of the Index, “as absurd and false in philosophy,” and as “*erroneous in faith*.”

There are very few popes who have not added to the number of books upon the “Index.” The present pope has adopted a more comprehensive method while still adhering to that of his predecessors—by frequent and general denunciation of all of that class of books which advocate liberalism, Protestantism, republicanism, free thought, free speech, and a free press. Therefore, while such works as are called forth by the progressive and advancing spirit of the present age are condemned as impious and heretical, because their tendency is to weaken and destroy the “*divine right*” of kings to govern mankind, and are kept out of the hands of the faithful, wherever it can, by possibility be done, the hierarchy actively employ their learning and ingenuity in preparing and circulating such books, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, and tracts as those from which the foregoing extracts are taken, and in the inculcation of the sentiments they contain. They calculate largely upon the indifference of the great body of the people of the United States to such subjects; well understanding, at the same time, that whatever they shall thus circulate in support of papal omnipotence will be impressed upon the minds of their superstitious followers—especially the ignorant portion of them—by the numerous foreign and Jesuit priests who are scattered over the country. These priests are specially prepared for this purpose by previous training at Rome and elsewhere, and are quite ready, at all times, to lay these

doctrines before their congregations, and to instruct them that unless they believe and practice them they will assuredly fall under the anathemas of the Church.

As between the institutions of the United States and the papal institutions that existed at Rome before the temporal power of the pope was taken away by the Italian people, these priests prefer the latter; insisting that they are founded upon the law of God, while the former are heretical. Therefore, they work hard to bring about the time when the pope shall “*command*” the people of the United States, they acting as his captains and lieutenants!

It has already been shown how readily Dr. Brownson entered into this scheme to enslave his native country, by devoting his talents to the service of this *foreign priesthood*. Ever on the alert to employ his fertile brain in this inglorious work, he has lately published another book, which was considered of so much importance by the hierarchy, that it appeared simultaneously in New York, Boston, and Montreal. In this book, entitled “Conversations on Liberalism and the Church,” he falsely represents himself as an American Protestant who carries on a conversation with a Roman Catholic priest, and allows himself to be converted by him to Romanism! He calls it “purely imaginary,” but this scarcely relieves him from the charge of disingenuously impersonating a Protestant, and putting only such arguments into his mouth as he supposes necessary to secure an unfair advantage to his own Church and to the papacy.

He defends and justifies the *Spanish Inquisition* as an institution necessary “to ferret out and bring to trial” those who engage in “secret conspiracies” against “the Church and the State.” (Brownson’s “Liberalism and the Church,” chap. viii., p. 105.) He advocates a union between Church and State. (*Ibid.*, p. 110.) He calls liberty a “spiritual right,” not a natural right, or a “civil grant;” and insists, therefore, that it can have no proper foundation except “*on the supremacy of the spiritual order*, which the Church has always asserted and defended.” (Brownson’s “Liberalism and the Church,” pp. 115, 116.) Then, after expressing his regret that, in this country, the “sovereignty of the people” has been resolved into the “sovereignty of popular opinion,” he makes his priest address the American Protestant thus:

“You are losing the sense of the great principles on which your fathers built, and no longer see or understand the deep significance of the providential Constitution of your republic. You are *perverting the Christian to the pagan republic*. Hence your great need of the Church to recall your minds to the first principles of your institutions, and to enable you to inherit the glory of being the first nation that ever fully asserted spiritual freedom.” (*Ibid.*)

This sounds well enough, in so far as it pretends to speak favorably of our institutions; but the language of compliment is employed merely to disguise the real object. The whole context of the book shows that it was written under the influence of a single controlling idea; that is, that the Roman Catholic Church, as represented by the papacy, should obtain supremacy over the people of the United States, in order that they may be held to the line of duty to God and the world, as the pope shall understand and declare it. This idea is not altogether concealed in the above extract, but it is more distinctly expressed elsewhere. It is not a little surprising that, with his mind thus impressed, it did not occur to him to inquire, how it has happened that the papacy did not establish the freedom of which he writes, when it had the world at its feet?—and why civil freedom was not fully established, until it grew up, without

the aid and against the protestations of the papacy, as one of the legitimate and necessary fruits of the Protestant Reformation?

But it must be conceded to him that his ideas of “spiritual freedom” are very different from those which prevail among the Protestants of the United States. What he means by it—as we shall presently see—is the freedom of the Church—that is, of the pope—to govern the world, to dictate the law of God to all nations and peoples, and to punish disobedience to her edicts. For example: he says that the “dogmas of the Church are, if any thing, *above reason*,” (Brownson’s “Liberalism and the Church,” p. 128.) and, being “matters within the spiritual order,” individuals have “*nothing to do*” with them. (*Ibid.*, p. 131.) He gives the reason elsewhere, by insisting that the word of the Church “is as high authority for what God has revealed *as is the Bible itself*,” (*Ibid.*, p. 163.) and, therefore that “human laws derive all their vigor as laws from the law of God,” as proclaimed by the Church, or by the pope as its lawful and divine head.

Under the dominion of such sentiments as these, he undertakes to show wherein consists the necessity of subverting our Protestant institutions, and substituting for them such as the Church, or the pope, shall consider consistent with the law of God. As they do not tend to elevate and advance mankind, and are, in these respects, greatly *behind the Roman Catholic nations*, the latter are, in his opinion, entitled to a decided preference! He says:

“Christian nations alone are living and progressive nations. And never have Christian nations advanced in all that makes the true glory of civilization so rapidly as they did *from the downfall of Rome to the rise of what you call the Reformation*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 170.)

Pursuing this train of thought, he insists that, with the exception of the “discovery by Catholics of this Western hemisphere,” and the practical adoption of some papal principles, there has been “no real progress of civilization since the epoch of the Reformation.” (*Ibid.*, p. 176.) Such sentiments would, of course, lead him to give the preference to Roman Catholic governments over those arising out of Protestant liberality and toleration, and to see, in the Roman Catholic populations, a higher degree of elevation and advancement than is to be found among those of Protestant nations. And to indicate this preference, he applauds the “moral elevation and personal dignity of the Catholic peasantry,” which he considers due to the fact that their religion “attaches merit to voluntary poverty,” and “regards the poor as blessed and a blessing!” With this estimate of the sweets and blessings of poverty, he denounced the poor—houses which Protestantism has caused to be erected, wherever it prevails, as “*modern Bastiles*,” insisting that the poor had better be left in their happy condition of poverty than be “shut up as criminals.” He then sums up his conclusions thus:

“You will look ill vain among your non-Catholic contemporaries for that clearness and vigor of intellect, and that moral elevation, force, and independence of individual character, which you meet everywhere in medieval society. If there were great crimes in those ages, they were followed, as the historian of the monks of the West justly remarks, by great expiations. If there was great pride, there was deeper humility, and *always will the period from the sixth to the end of the fifteenth century stand out as the most glorious in the annals of the race*.” (Brownson’s “Liberalism and the Church,” pp. 181, 182.)

How wonderfully perverted must be the best faculties of an American mind, when it is brought to see in the condition of the world during the Middle Ages, from the sixth to the sixteenth century, that which is preferable to the present state of affairs among the Protestant nations, especially in the United States! Such an effect could only be produced by the unexampled influence which the papacy has been able to exercise over some of the brightest intellects of the world—a strange and mysterious influence, which has brought them in subjection to its ambition, and appropriated all their best energies to itself. But we are concerned now only with the existence of such a fact, rather than with an inquiry into the causes of it.

Dr. Brownson is a distinguished instance of this perverted intellect. His service of the papacy, and his quick defense of all its extravagant claims, have acquired for him a reputation among the papal hierarchy, which may flatter but can not console him. When he recurs to the principles and influences under which his mind was developed into its brilliant maturity, and by means of which it acquired its freedom, the remembrance must be to him like the yearning after a lost treasure. But whether he derives regret or rejoicing from his present position, he must be regarded as expressing, not merely his own, but the sentiments and opinions of the hierarchy of the United States, when he gives the preference to *the condition of Europe during the Middle Ages—when ignorance, superstition, and degradation were almost universal among the populations*—over that in which the people of this country now are. Blind and passive submission to the priesthood then prevailed throughout all the ranks of society; therefore, the people were abundantly happy! They were so ignorant as not to know that they were in bondage; therefore, they were models of contentment! The masses were in the lowest poverty, while the nobility reveled in wealth and luxury; therefore, they were in a state of blissful humility! They left the popes and their myriads of priestly dependents to do as they pleased, and to bid defiance to all human laws; therefore, they had reached the point of the highest “moral elevation!”

Who can account for such strange hallucination of thought as this? How is it possible for a man to persuade himself, or be persuaded by others, to believe that this country would be improved, and the people carried to higher moral and political elevation, if the existing condition of our affairs were destroyed, and that which existed in the Middle Ages substituted? Certainly, no such thought can dwell long in the minds of any but those whose blind devotion shuts out the light from their reason. And yet, to bring about precisely that result, all the energies of the Roman Catholic Church, in so far as the papacy can direct them, are now assiduously and untiringly directed. Possibly, those who are aiding in this work in the United States are merely laboring under honest delusion, in the conviction that it may be done by peaceful means, or that the people can be persuaded to give up to *foreign dictation* those national blessings which have always constituted their highest pride. But this they must and do know—that what they labor for with so much diligence can only be accomplished by overthrowing our Protestant institutions, destroying our Protestant Christianity, and upheaving, from its foundation, our Protestant form of government.

Chapter IV. Papal Hopes of Success in the United States

The Jesuits.—Their Character.—Their —Expulsion by Roman Catholic Governments.—Their Suppression by Clement XIV.—Causes of it.—His Bull.—Expelled from Russia.—Causes of it.—Their Restoration by Pius VII.—Their Support of Monarchy.—The Order not Religious.—Its Constitution.—Its Authors.—They Denounce Protestantism as Infidelity.—They Threaten the Inquisition. Movements during the Rebellion.—Napoleon III. and Pius IX.—Intolerance of the Latter.—Precedents of Kings Humiliated by the Popes.

GREGORY XVI., whose pontificate commenced in 1831, was the first pope who seemed encouraged by the idea that the papacy would ultimately establish itself in the United States. His chief reliance, as the means of realizing this hope, was upon the *Jesuits*, upon whose entire devotion to the principles of absolutism he could confidently rely. Prepared at all times to labor for the suppression of freedom, and trained in a faith which allows to the individual no personal right of thought or action, they were both ready and willing agents in the work of assailing our popular institutions. With them no form of government has the divine approval unless founded upon the principles of monarchy. They especially abhor that form which confers equality of civil and political rights, which denies the authority of privileged classes, and forbids the establishment of ecclesiasticism.

This wonderful society—the most wonderful the world has ever known—had been suppressed in 1773 by Pope Clement XIV., after a tedious and thorough personal investigation of all the accusations against it. By this act of condemnation, which was made at the instance of the leading Roman Catholic powers, such a degree of odium was stamped upon its character that the people everywhere held it in execration. Its despotic principles and immoral teachings were alike condemned, except by those who, like Gregory XVI., saw that, in the compactness of its organization and the unity of its purpose, it possessed important elements of strength, which it was always willing to employ in building up the papal structure.

There is no more instructive chapter in history than that which records the events connected with its suppression by the pope. The expulsion of the [Jesuit] Order from France, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily—all Roman Catholic governments—the hesitation of Clement, his careful and deliberate investigation of the charges made against it, and the overwhelming proofs which forced him to conclusions he had manifestly endeavored to avoid, all go to show an amount of turpitude which is without parallel elsewhere.

The pope was reluctant to fix the pontifical censure upon it, because it had received the sanction of a number of his predecessors; but as an honest and sincere Christian—which is not denied, except by the Jesuits—he felt himself constrained, by a sense of duty to the Church and the world, to declare its unworthiness. And, in doing so, he satisfied the Roman Catholic governments against which treason had been plotted by its members, and restored quiet, for a time, to the Church.

In his pontifical brief, Clement XIV. averred that the Jesuit “maxims” were “scandalous, and manifestly contrary to good morals;” that the society had bred “revolts and intestine (internal) troubles in some of the Catholic states;” that, by means of its practices, “complaints and quarrels were multiplied on every side; in some places dangerous seditions arose, tumults, discords, dissensions, scandals, which, weakening or entirely breaking the bonds of Christian charity, excited the faithful to all the rage of

party hatreds and animosities;” that the kings most devoted to the Church—to wit, those of France, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily—had “found themselves reduced to the necessity of expelling and driving from their states, kingdoms, and provinces these very Companions of Jesus,” which they were compelled to do as a step “necessary in order to prevent the Christians from rising one against another, and from massacring each other in the very bosom of our common mother, the Holy Church;” and that, as the Church could never “recover a firm and durable peace so long as the said society subsisted,” he, therefore, was constrained to annul and extinguish it “*forever*,” to “abrogate all the prerogatives which had been granted to them by their general and other superiors in virtue of the privileges obtained from the sovereign pontiffs,” and to announce to the Christian world that his pontifical act of suppression “should *forever and to all eternity* be valid, permanent, and efficacious,” and be “inviolably observed” by all the faithful everywhere. *

* “History of the Jesuits,” by Nicolini, pp. 387 to 406, where the brief of the pope is published at length; “History of the Jesuits,” by Steinmetz, p. 612; “History of the Popes,” by Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 397.

This celebrated bull of the pope is called “Dominus ac Redemptor,” and that Clement was exceedingly reluctant to issue it is beyond all question. In a letter written by him in 1768, before he became pope, and while he was Cardinal Ganganelli, he expressed the opinion that if the Jesuits had not been so “obstinate” as to refuse any reformation, the differences with them “might have been brought to a happy issue.”—Letters of Pope Clement XIV. (Ganganelli). To which are affixed anecdotes of his life, translated from the French of Lottin Le Jeune, vol. ii., p. 201. After he became pope, and when it became his duty to investigate the complaints against the Society, he wrote to a Portuguese lord, saying: “I shall do nothing until I have examined, weighed, and judged according to the laws of justice and truth. May God forbid that any human consideration should influence my decision! I have already a sufficiently severe account to render to God, without charging my conscience with the addition of a new crime; and it would be an enormous one to proscribe a religious order upon rumors and prejudices, or even upon suspicions. I shall not forget that, in rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, I ought to render to God the things that are God’s.”—Ibid., pp. 224, 225.

The Jesuits, by the immoral tendency of their doctrines and the many enormities perpetrated by them against governments, society, and individuals, had become so unpopular throughout Europe that their suppression gave great and almost universal satisfaction. It was especially approved by all sincere Christians, because they saw that it removed from the Church a load which was surely dragging it down. And those who, without belonging to the Order, had been educated by it, were constrained to approve the act, because it was done by an *infallible* pope, who could not err! This sentiment of approval became stronger in proportion as the practices and policy of the order became better known. The public were then enabled to see how entirely at variance its practices were with its professions. Although one of the articles of their constitution forbade the members of the Order from the acceptance of any dignity, and another recommended holy poverty as the bulwark of religion, yet there were among them 24 cardinals, 6 electors of the empire, 19 princes, 21 archbishops, and 121 titular bishops; and their aggregate wealth amounted to 40,000,000 pounds sterling the enormous sum of \$200,000,000!

Their general, Lorenzo Ricci, was arrested, and thrown into prison in the castle of St. Angelo at Rome, charged with all attempt to stir up a revolt against the papal authority—with plotting treason against the Church and the pope within the consecrated walls of the Vatican. Besides his confession that he had

been in secret correspondence with the Prussian monarch, the other evidences of his guilt were so convincing that his imprisonment lasted until 1775, when he was relieved from it only by death.

(**Note:** According to *Rulers of Evil* by F. Tuppper Saussy, Lorenzo Ricci's death may have been faked so he could go to America and be the top adviser to General George Washington during the American Revolution.)

The passions of the order were, of course, aroused to exceeding violence—even to such an excess that the pope himself, although the *infallible* “vicar of Christ,” did not escape their vengeance. They published malicious libels against him, charging that he had been guilty of simony in procuring his election, and calling him by the opprobrious name of *Antichrist*! They became so impassioned in their attacks upon him, that, when his death occurred, during the next year, under very suspicious circumstances, they were charged with having procured it by poison!*

* The question whether or not Pope Clement XIV. was poisoned by the Jesuits has given rise to much acrimonious discussion. On one side it is confidently asserted that he was; while, on the other, it is stoutly denied. It is said that, after his death, “his body turned instantly black, and appeared in a state of putrefaction, which induced the people present to impute his death to the effect of poison; and it was very generally reported that he had fallen a sacrifice to the resentment of the Jesuits.”—*Letters of Pope Clement XIV., etc., by Le Jeune, vol. i., p. 45.* St. Priest says that “the scientific men who were called in to embalm his body found the features livid, the lips black, the abdomen inflated, the limbs emaciated, and covered with violet spots; the size of the heart was much diminished, and all the muscles detached and decomposed in the spine. They filled the body with perfumes and aromatic substances; but nothing would dispel the mephitic (tending to destroy life, poisonous, noxious) exhalations. The entrails burst the vessels in which they were deposited; and when his pontifical robes were taken from his body, a great portion of the skin adhered to them. The hair of his head remained entire upon the velvet pillows upon which he rested, and with the slightest friction his nails fell off.”—*Apud Nicolini, pp. 417, 418.* Cardinal De Bernis, who had been minister of Louis XV. of France, was convinced that his death was not from natural causes, and, soon after the occurrence, wrote thus:

“When others shall come to know as much as I do, from certain documents which the late pope communicated to me, the suppression [of the Jesuits] will be deemed very just and very necessary. The circumstances which have preceded, accompanied, and followed the death of the late pope excite equal horror and compassion.”

And speaking of Pope Pius VI., who was the immediate successor of Clement XIV., he said:

“The pope has certain moments of frankness, in which his true sentiments show themselves. I shall never forget three or four effusions of his heart which he betrayed when with me, by which I can judge that he was well aware of the unhappy end of his predecessor, and that he was anxious not to run the same risks.”—*Apud Nicolini, pp. 419, 420.*

Gioberti produced the statement of a Dr. Bonelli, “famous for learning and probity (uprightness), almost an ocular witness of the facts,” to the effect that the pope was poisoned.—*Ibid., p. 418.*

The Jesuits, in defense of their order, rely upon a statement made some months after the death of the pope by the apostolic physician and the pope's “ordinary doctor.” They declared the charge that the pope had been poisoned to be false, but offered no proofs to sustain the opinion. And the reasons they gave were said to be so “strange and suspicious as rather to strengthen than diminish the opinion of those who thought differently.”*Ibid.*

Cormenin has no doubt upon the subject, after having examined all the evidence. He says, “The dispatch of the ambassador of Spain relates, in its fullest details, the examination of the dead body, which was made the day succeeding *his death, and adds to the irrefutable proofs of the poisoning of the pontiff, and the guilt of the Jesuits.*”—*CORMENIN, vol. ii., p. 398.*

The consequence was, that, on account of the extreme contempt in which they were held in all the Roman Catholic states, they were compelled to seek refuge elsewhere. Their iniquities were so great, and were so well understood, that there was not a single Roman Catholic government in Europe that would tolerate them. They found shelter only within the dominions of Frederick the Great of Prussia, and Catherine of Russia—the former a Protestant prince, and the latter the ecclesiastical head of the Greek Church.

There is some difficulty in discovering the reasons which influenced these monarchs in consenting to receive the fugitives, but they were, probably, twofold: to cultivate the principles of monarchy, upon which the Jesuit constitution was based; and to reconcile the Roman Catholic citizens of Poland to the partition of that unfortunate country. Whatever the motive was, however, they were subsequently expelled also from Russia by an imperial decree of Alexander, wherein he declared:

“It has been, however, proved that they have not realized the duties imposed on them by gratitude, and that humility commanded by the Christian religion. Instead of remaining peaceable inhabitants of a foreign land, they have endeavored to disturb the Greek religion, which, from time immemorial, has been the predominant religion in this country. They began by abusing the confidence they had obtained, and have turned away from our religion young men who had been entrusted to them, and some weak and ignorant women whom they have converted to their own Church. To induce a man to abjure his faith, the faith of his ancestors, to extinguish in him the love of those who profess the same belief; to render him a stranger to his country, to sow tares and animosity among families, to tear the son from the father, the daughter from the mother, to stir up division among the children of the same Church—is that the voice and the will of God, and of his holy son Jesus Christ?.... After such actions, we are no more surprised that these monks are expelled from all countries, and nowhere tolerated. Where, in fact, is the state that would tolerate in its bosom those who sow in it hatred and discord?”(Nicolini, p. 434.)

The marvelous influence of the Jesuits was not entirely destroyed, even in the Roman Catholic states, although greatly weakened, by the suppression of the order, notwithstanding the bull by which they were suppressed was issued *ex cathedra*, and was, therefore, the official act of an *infallible* pope! Since their pontifical incorporation by the bull *Regimini Militantis Ecclesie*, issued by Pope Paul III. in 1540, it had so thoroughly permeated all orders of society that it was still visible, more or less, in every direction. By subverting the morality of the Gospel, and substituting their immoral maxims for religion, and by endeavoring to destroy all the “fundamental laws which form the basis of all states and governments,” they “brought the Encyclopedists into existence; the most conspicuous of whom, in fact, as Voltaire, Diderot, Helvetius, Marmontel, St. Lambert, Lamettrie, and many others, had issued from Jesuitical colleges, or had had Jesuits as their tutors.”(Gioberti, *apud* Nicolini, p. 437.)

And when, after the French Revolution, it had been demonstrated to the sovereigns of Europe that it was not impossible for the people to attempt the destruction of monarchy and the establishment of republican institutions, and it became necessary for them to counteract and, if possible, to destroy, the influence of this sentiment, *the reestablishment of the Jesuits was considered*, by many of them, *as the most certain and effective means of accomplishing that object*. (Note: Now we know why the Jesuits were allowed back into the nations that kicked them out! It sure makes sense.)

On the part of these sovereigns, the motive was entirely political; but they had no difficulty in enlisting the assistance of the pope, who had as ardent attachment as any of them to the principles of monarchy, especially to that part of the Jesuit constitution which teaches implicit and unquestioning obedience to superiors. Pius VII. was then pope. The complications in which he had become involved with Napoleon I., who had re-annexed the states of the Church to the empire of France, declared himself King of Italy, and forbidden the pope to hold communication with any church in France, made it necessary for him to resort to some measure of relief against the threatened destruction of papal authority. The Jesuits seemed to him to be the most fit auxiliaries in the work of regaining power, inasmuch as the superiority of a single individual as the governing authority over the inferior masses of the people constituted the central idea of their system; and he, accordingly, reestablished the order in 1814, after they had been under the pontifical ban for thirty—seven years.

Besides the political motive which influenced the sovereigns who favored the restoration, he had, also, a religious one, which was to counteract the influence of Protestantism, then rapidly gaining ground in all the states of Christendom. By his memorable bull for the purpose—*Sollicitudo Omnium*—he referred to the “abundant fruits” which had been produced in Russia and Sicily by the workings of the Order, and declared that, in the then dangerous condition of “the Christian republic,” it would be “a great crime” if he did not reestablish it—if, said he, “placed in the bark of Peter, tossed and assailed by continual storms, we refused to employ the *vigorous and experienced rowers*, who volunteer their services, in order to break the waves of a sea which threatens every moment shipwreck and death.”(Nicolini, p. 442; Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 423.)

Therefore, with an utter disregard of the character and authority of Clement XIV., he abrogated his “apostolic letters” of suppression; [Pope Pius VII.] restored the Society to all its powers; declared that it should be consolidated “more and more, to render it stronger;” counseled its members to “exactly observe the rule prescribed by their founder;” and announced that, notwithstanding all that Clement, an infallible pope, had said and done, it would hence forth be considered an act of “audacious temerity” for anyone to “oppose” *his infallible* decree; “and that, should anyone take upon him to attempt it, let him know,” said he, “that he will thereby incur the *indignation of Almighty God, and of the holy apostles, Peter and Paul*” (Nicolini, p. 447.)—that is, that the curse of God would rest upon whomsoever should believe what his predecessor, Clement XIV., had said about the immoral maxims and dangerous teachings of the Jesuits, or should dare to obey his pontifical brief! In such a contest of authority, the last pope always has the advantage. He can make his pontifical power, as one of the chief elements of his infallibility, more immediately and sensibly felt.

This act of restoration was done with cool audacity, and with the especial object of arresting the progress of the modern and advancing nations. It should excite no surprise, therefore, that the Jesuits, when, seventeen years afterward, Gregory XVI. became pope, availed themselves of their renewed strength and partially revived popularity in the Roman Catholic states to convert the papacy into a machine for the advancement of their ambitious projects. Under such favorable auspices, they were soon enabled to get control of and shape the whole policy of the papal court.

Gregory XVI., yielding to their influence as well as his own inclination, became a despot, and the supporter of despotism in its most odious and oppressive forms. The severity of his pontifical government soon excited the people of Italy to assert their independence, and to inaugurate an effort to

deprive him of his temporal crown; and, to defend himself against them, he threw himself completely into the arms of the ultramontane or Jesuit party. As the chief object of this party was to check the popular progress toward freedom in the papal states, as well as elsewhere, the pope soon identified himself with such measures and principles as rendered him extremely odious to a large part of his Roman Catholic subjects, who were tired of papal bondage. And this feeling against him was, doubtless, increased on account of his supposed want of private virtue. Whatever was the cause of his unpopularity, however, he not only realized it, but had sagacity enough to know that the corruption prevailing at Rome, before the eyes of the people, would, if he lost his temporal power, cause him to be driven away from that city, and lead, in all probability, to excesses similar to those which had attended the French Revolution; for at Rome, as well as in France, the people had witnessed so much impiety that they were driven almost to the conviction that religion was a mere disguise, worn for selfish and iniquitous purposes. And he also knew that the habitual intolerance of the papacy, and its despotic management of civil affairs, would incite the enraged population to deal harshly with him and his ecclesiastical advisers; and that he would not be likely to find a safe or desirable asylum among the similarly enraged populations of any of the Roman Catholic states. And it was on this account that his attention was directed toward the United States, and the hope was excited in his mind that the tolerance of our institutions would enable him, through the agency of his Jesuit allies, to build up a papal party here, sufficiently strong and powerful to regain the authority which the papacy was destined to lose among the Roman Catholic populations of Europe. The thought was creditable enough to him as a politician, but it is one against which the people of this country should not be slow to protest whenever they are informed of its existence in the papal mind, and of any attempt to effectuate such an object.

Apart from the kind of service which Pope Gregory XVI. expected of the Jesuits, it is exceedingly difficult to tell why they have been suffered to acquire such unbounded influence as they possess over all the affairs of the papacy, and why they are considered so necessary to the prosperity of the Roman Catholic Church. They call their society a *religious* association, but it is scarcely entitled to that designation. The Church existed until near the middle of the sixteenth century without it. Eighteen of its ecumenical councils had been held before its formation. By these—commencing with that of Nice, in 325, and ending with that of the Fifth Lateran, in 1512—the religious faith of the Church was well established. The bishops who composed these councils needed no aid from Ignatius Loyola and his followers to take care of the affairs of the Church, either to declare its doctrines or to regulate its discipline. The “Society of Jesus,” therefore, when it was established by Pope Paul III., not only did not do any thing to add to or improve the doctrines of the Church, but, like all others who belonged to the Church, its members professed no other religion than that already established by the ecumenical councils. Its organization was entirely *outside the Church*.

Wherefore, then, the necessity of establishing this, the most secret society in the world, when the popes at all times have declared that God’s curse is resting upon all secret societies? Manifestly, the object was to build up an association capable of exercising external power, not necessary to religion, but as the means of training and educating those who were brought under its influence, by means of schools and the confessional, to that submissive obedience upon which the Papacy is founded. Paul III. avows as much in his bull establishing the Order. He says that it is designed “expressly for the instruction of boys and other ignorant people in Christianity, and, above all, for the spiritual consolation of the faithful in Christ by *hearing confessions*.”(Nicolini, p. 28.) And, as if the Church did not already

possess the means of giving instruction and hearing confessions, he empowers “some among them,” meaning Loyola, to “draw up such constitutions as they shall judge” necessary. They have no power to add to or take from any of the articles of faith. Their religion is prescribed by the Church; their constitution is their own, and to it alone must we look for the nature and character of their organization.

Now, let any reader take the pains to examine the provisions of the constitution of the “Society of Jesus” and he will not find one word in it essential to religious faith, nothing to show what Christ, or the apostles, or the fathers, taught in reference to any of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. On the other hand, he will find provisions for the initiation of novices, for scholars, coadjutors, the professed, provincials, rectors, superiors, and administrators; the duties of each being minutely defined. Much pertains to the working of the machinery; but there are certain principles running through the whole organization which sufficiently show how little claim it has to be known as a religious society. Each member is required to take a vow that he will understand “all things according to the constitution of the society;” that he will regard the general of the society as “holding the place of God;” that he will go wherever “the pope *pro tempore* chooses to send him;” that he will consider the general as “absolute master of persons and things;” that “there should be no will, no opinion but the general’s,” and no opposing, no contradicting, nor showing an opinion, in any case, opposed to his; that he “must regard the superior as Christ the Lord, and must strive to acquire perfect resignation and denial of his own will and judgment, in all things conforming his will and judgment to that which the superior wills and judges;” that this virtue of obedience “must be perfect in every point—in execution, in will, in intellect; doing what is enjoined with all celerity, spiritual joy, and perseverance; persuading oneself that everything is just; suppressing every repugnant thought and judgment of one’s own, in a certain obedience....and let everyone persuade himself that he who lives under obedience should be moved and directed, under Divine Providence, by his superior, just as if he were a corpse, which allows itself to be moved and led in any direction;” that no earthly authority “can involve an obligation to commit sin, mortal or venial, *unless the superior command it in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ*; or in virtue of holy obedience;” and that each member must “concentrate all his desires and affections upon the Society,” even to the extent of putting away “all strong affection for his parents.”*

* Nicolini, pp. 30-56; Steinmetz, vol. i., p. 251, and note 1; “History of the Society of Jesus,” by Daurignac, vol. i., p. 14; “History of the Popes,” by Ranke, p. 78; “Encyclopedia Britannica,” 4th Edinburgh ed., vol. xi., p. 132; Maclaine’s “Mosheim’s Church History,” vol. ii., p. 45, and note; Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 208, 209; “Encyclopedia Americana,” vol. vii., p. 198. In the last work there is an article in defense of the order, written by a Jesuit, wherein it is said that “a chief object of the Jesuits was the defense of the Church against Protestantism. “—Ibid., p. 208.

It is stated by Maclaine, in a note to “Mosheim’s Ecclesiastical History,” that when Loyola first laid before Pope Paul III. the plan for the organization of his society, and desired his approval of it, there was a provision which restricted somewhat the promised obedience to the pope. This having given rise to objection, it was so changed as to bind the order “by a solemn vow of implicit, blind, and unlimited submission and obedience to the Roman pontiff;”(Maclaine’s “Mosheim,” vol. ii., p. 45, note.) which removed every obstacle. Herein lies the true secret of the papal attachment for this mysterious organization. It accounts for its re-establishment during the present century (18th.) by Pope Pius VII., and the readiness with which Pope Gregory XVI. subsequently permitted the Jesuits to direct his pontificate. They were “vigorous and experienced rowers;” and in consideration for the privilege of shaping the policy of the papacy, they were always ready to obey the papal commands, although, in

doing so, they should be required to put themselves in secret and insidious conflict with all existing governments. Undoubtedly, Pope Gregory XVI. understood this, when, finding the people of Italy and other European states struggling hard for republican forms of government, and seeing the temporal scepter slipping from his hands, he declared that he was not pope anywhere else in the world except in the United States!

It should excite no surprise that the present pope, Pius IX., in the midst of still greater embarrassments, should suffer similar thoughts to obtain possession of his mind; inasmuch as, by the same attachment to the Jesuits, he has equally secured their services and devotion. When, at the beginning of his pontificate, he was supposed to be influenced by other motives, and gave assurances that many of the abuses in the civil government of Rome should be reformed, he felt himself secure in his position without their aid. But after he has lived to realize, what Gregory XVI. so much feared, the loss of his temporal power, he, like him, trusts the papal bark to the same “vigorous and experienced rowers,” hoping that it may find safe mooring in the United States; realizing, as he does, that it is only under the shelter of Protestant toleration that the members of this proscribed society can now find a resting—place. Therefore, in June, 1871, on the 25th anniversary of his coronation as pope, when he addressed a deputation of Roman Catholics from the United States, he was led on by the earnestness of his zeal to speak of this country as if he considered it the last and only hope for the papacy. The number of this deputation was only twenty—six; but the imaginative pontiff became so enthused that he exclaimed, “*Look at all America!*” evidently considering them as representing the whole nation. After one of the priests—the Rev. Mr. Leray, of the Natchez diocese—had delivered to him an address on behalf of the bishops, clergy, and laity of that diocese, the “Holy Father” made a response in which the following sentences occur:

“I have heard of what has been doing in America in favor of the Vicar of Jesus Christ—of the meetings that have been held there. I have continually received testimonials of attachment and proofs of devotion from the Catholics of the United States—devotion not only of the mind and heart, but of the hand too..... The bearing of the Catholics of the United States fills me with hope *for the future of the Church*. You are a numerous people, and I know you have all kinds of men among you. There is a *party of opposition*, who teach everything *contrary to law and order*; men who have *gone among you to disseminate every kind of evil*, who have *no reverence for God or his law*; but, still, the progress of Catholicity is such as to fill us with *well—grounded confidence for the future*..... There was a cardinal once who was a prefect of the congregation..... He was wont to prophesy about America. It was a prophecy in a broad sense..... He used to say so earnestly that *the salvation of the Church would come from America*, that it made a deep impression on me, and *I hold to it*. I believe great blessings will come to the faith from America, and I pray for you always that God may spread his truths among you, and that they may take deep root, flourish, and bear fruit.” (Freeman’s Journal and Catholic Register, New York, June 22d, 1871.)

This language is not difficult of interpretation; its import can be easily perceived. Manifestly, the amiable old pontiff has suffered himself to be persuaded into the belief that the Roman Catholics *alone* are the lawful possessors of the United States, and that the Protestants, composing “a party of opposition” of “all kinds of men,” have “gone among ” them, teaching “everything contrary to law and order,” and “every kind of evil,” without any “reverence for God or his law.” He seems to think that

this state of things can not last always, because “the Catholics of the United States” are devoting “the mind and heart,” and “the hand, too,” to the removal of the evil of Protestantism out of the way. He is not censurable, either for this belief, or the words in which he expresses it, having no knowledge of the temper of our people, or of the nature and spirit of our institutions, in any other wise than as he esteems them to be in antagonism to the papacy. His followers mislead him by their intemperate zeal and wild prophecies of success.*

* After Victor Emmanuel occupied Rome, numerous indignation meetings were held in the United States. At one, in Binghamton, New York, after high mass, it was resolved, “that we will freely, if necessary, devote our worldly goods and our lives in defense of its [the Church’s] doctrines, and in the restoration of the temporal power of the visible head of the Church.” At another, in Jackson, Mississippi, it was said: “As American citizens, we feel that we are entitled to the protection of our Government in our vested rights, which have been violated by the Piedmontese Government,” etc. At another, at Los Angeles, California, the pope is spoken of as “the pontiff—king of more than two hundred millions of ‘every tribe and tongue and nation.’” And protests like these were gathered into a single sheet, and sent to the pope. In reference to another great demonstration, in Minnesota, where an immense multitude pledged “their lives, if need be, to restore the sovereign pontiff to his rightful throne,” and drive “from the sacred city the hirelings of the tyrant robber,” it was said, in the same paper, “Those resolutions may seem to some to sound like bombast; and, indeed, there is reason to think so now, when the rights of Catholic American citizens can be outraged in Rome without incurring the displeasure of our present rulers. But the day may not be far distant when we may have again, as we had before, a President in Washington who will protect those rights. And then we will show those people that we mean something more than simply putting resolutions on paper. “—New York Freeman’s Journal, February 4th, 1871.

Nevertheless, he has information enough to know that his hope and expectations are chiefly based upon the fact that there is no other place in the world, except under the protection of Protestant toleration, where the papal defenders possess the freedom necessary to avow the principles of the papacy without molestation, and without incurring such opposition from governments and peoples as has already dealt it a deathblow in every Roman Catholic country in Europe. Undoubtedly, he relies upon this toleration, as opening a broad field for papal operations; and hence the exceeding activity of his hierarchy in the United States in executing the task he has assigned them.

Pius IX. has none of the private vices of Gregory XVI. and many other popes to answer for, his purity of life being freely admitted on all hands; but he is none the less ambitious on that account, none the less under Jesuit control, and none the less resolved upon employing all his pontifical power to strike down every thing, and to abrogate every constitution and law, which stands in the way of the complete triumph of papal absolutism over the world. Evidences of this abound in all the history of his pontificate since his first flight from Rome to escape the vengeance of his Roman Catholic subjects.

While assigning these purposes to the pope and his hierarchs, however, we should not fail to keep in mind the distinction between Roman Catholicism, as a system of religion, and the papacy, as an all—absorbing religio—political power, founded upon human ambition. Nor should we forget that distinction which exists to a great extent, especially in the United States, between intelligent Roman Catholic *laymen* and the priesthood. There are thousands of these laymen who do not and can not, in their consciences, approve of all that is done and said in behalf of papal supremacy in this country, in any other sense than as they suppose it to involve the mere triumph of their religious belief over all opposing forms of faith. They believe Protestantism to be error, and all its forms of religion to be false; and yet, in return for its toleration to them, would be perfectly willing to extend like toleration to it,

even where they had the power to withhold it. But these men, good and faithful citizens in all respects, suffer themselves to occupy a false position, by allowing their acquiescence in that to which their judgment does not assent, to be inferred from the silence which the papacy imposes upon them.

But the priesthood, especially the Jesuit part of them, compose an entirely distinct and different class. They are educated, instructed, drilled, and set apart for the special work in which they are engaged, with no other thoughts to occupy their minds and no other earthly objects to accomplish. They are the servants of the papacy, in the same sense in which a slave is the servant of his master, and are indebted to the pope for all the enormous power they employ. They swear obedience and submission to him as the infallible “Vicar of Christ;” and perfectly well understand that if they failed to render this obedience and submission to the full extent demanded by him, their official robes would be instantaneously stripped off. They are simply a band of ecclesiastical office—holders, held together by the “cohesive power” of a common ambition, as compactly as an army of soldiers; and are governed by a commander—in—chief whose brow they would adorn forever with a *kingly* crown, and who wields the papal lash over them with imperial threatening.

All these, with exceptions, if any, too few to be observed, are laboring, with wonderful assiduity, to educate the whole membership of their Church up to the point of accepting, without hesitation or inquiry, all the Jesuit teachings in reference to the papacy, as a necessary and indispensable part of their religious faith; so that whensoever the papal order shall be issued, they may march their columns, unbroken, into the papal army. These are they who write books, pamphlets, and tracts, and fill the columns of their newspapers with fulsome and blasphemous adulation of the pope, applying to him terms which are due only to God, all devoted to the object of exterminating Protestantism, civil and religious, and extending the scepter of the papacy over the world. They manufacture, to order, the literature of Romanism, and tax their ingenuity to the utmost to make it, in all its variations, center in these grand designs. Examples are innumerable, and almost any one of them, selected from the multitude, is an index to the remainder.

In 1862, a Jesuit priest, the Rev. F. X. Weninger, made what he chose to designate “an appeal to candid Americans,” on the subject of “Protestantism and Infidelity,” which is the offensive title to his book. He represented himself as having been engaged for thirteen years “as a Catholic missionary throughout the United States,” and, consequently, as having had extraordinary opportunities of observing the character and habits of our Protestant population, as well as having become familiar with the working of our institutions. These facts were stated, of course, to give weight and authority to his opinions; for while he professed to be addressing Protestants, but few of whom would see his book, he was, with true Jesuit cunning, really addressing the members of his own Church, with the design of convincing them that Protestantism is already a failure, so as to stimulate them to renewed activity in their exertions to repress and exterminate it.

He scarcely enters upon his subject before announcing that “*Protestantism is ending in the desolation of heathenism;*” that is, that we, in this country, are fast becoming paganized, as the result of our total want of religion or of any religious convictions. Then, in contrast to this alarming condition into which we have been plunged by our infidelity, he points us to Roman Catholicism as furnishing the only means of making us acquainted, personally, with Christ. He says: “The real presence of Jesus Christ makes a heaven of every Catholic Church on the whole earth,” for there he can be conversed with “face

to face,” every day and every hour. (“Protestantism and Infidelity,” by Weninger, pp. 38, 39.) He blasphemously insists that “in holy communion *Jesus enters our interior*, really and substantially, *body and soul*,” (*Ibid.*, p. 47.) and that Protestantism, having robbed us of all this consolation, has left us “no better off than infidels and Jews.” (*Ibid.*, p. 49.) Hence he found no difficulty in concluding that “the only consolation Protestantism as such has to offer, is a wicked one—sin, but believe;” (“Protestantism and Infidelity,” by Weninger, p. 11.15) his over-anxiety to assail Protestantism rendering him oblivious to the fact that his own Church, and the order to which he belongs, both teach that popes and priests may sin, and yet remain the infallible representatives of God; and may be guilty of all the impurities of life, and yet administer, infallibly, all the sacraments of the Church! (“Catechism of the Council of Trent,” pp. 73,74.)

As if he were an oracle whose opinions were not to be questioned, he says, “Protestantism leads to despair, because it denies free—will.” (“Protestantism and Infidelity,” by Weninger, P. 85.) That it is “a religion of *immorality*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 90.) That it is “a religion of *disorder and despotism*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 93.) That it is “a religion of *blasphemy*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 96.) That it “came from *licentious, apostate priests and monks, and from despotic, licentious sovereigns*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 102.) That it “*is dead*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 150.) That it cherishes “a *reckless disposition to calumniate*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 213.) That “*modern civilization does not spring from Protestantism*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 252.) And that *infidelity* is the “*last logical consequence of Protestantism*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 278.)

All the counts in this formidable indictment are so drawn as to display the skill and ingenuity of a criminal prosecutor; of one who has had experience in all the formalities of arraignment. They were designed, undoubtedly, to stimulate the ardor of the papal followers, in their efforts to remove all this irreligion out of the way; and, possibly, to cause all timid—minded Protestants to shudder at the thought of the rapidity with which they were hastening to destruction. He rolled these terrible accusations, like a sweet morsel, under his tongue, and, at every repetition of them, sharpened the point of his pen, that he might give them irresistible and convincing force. He made his real object, however, more apparent as he proceeded; and, in the midst of an enumeration of “Protestant prejudices,” which he felt it his duty to overcome, he expressed his pent—up feelings in these words:

“One of the most glorious enterprises for the Catholic Church to engage in at this day is *the conversion of the United States to the Catholic faith*.” (“Protestantism and Infidelity,” by Weninger, p. 270.)

Now, if the consummation of this object were sought for in the field of fair discussion, without any dogmatic assumption of superiority on the part of either adversary, each remaining the equal of the other, according to the spirit of our institutions, all Protestant Christians would, in true charity, hail Roman Catholicism as a desirable auxiliary in the work and duty of evangelizing, not merely the United States, but the world. The Roman Catholic Church, stripped of the influence of Jesuitism and brought back to its early purity, would possess the capacity to perform a most glorious part in such an achievement. But no such liberal idea as this finds any place in the mind of this author, or of any other Jesuit, or of any of those who submit to their dictation. From such men liberalism finds no quarter. They exhibit nothing higher or nobler than that supercilious air of imagined superiority, which roots out every generous faculty of the mind, and leaves its possessor an object of mingled pity and contempt. Thus impressed, and fearing that he would fail in rallying the militia of the Church to the support of the

papacy if he—did not speak plainly in defense of the temporal sovereignty of the pope over the whole world, this infatuated Jesuit thus declares:

“In the ceremonies for the installation of a new pope, he is addressed in these words: ‘Noveris te urbis et orbis constitutum esse rectorum. Remember that thou art placed on the throne of Peter as the RULER of Rome and the world.’ (*Ibid.*, p. 259.)

In order, however, to make his Roman Catholic readers familiar with the manner in which the pope would rule the world, when the power to do so was secured to him, he had, a little while before, addressed a threat of vengeance to the Protestants of the United States, in order that they might experience a wholesome dread of their approaching doom in time to avoid it by penitence and submission. After defending the *Roman Inquisition* as a necessary part of ecclesiastical organization, and coupling his reference to it with the Protestant complaint of the unmerited persecution of Galileo, he says:

“Protestants would *do better* never to mention Galileo, in order that *we may not, in our turn, be forced to inquire into their own excesses of religious hatred.*”(“Protestantism and Infidelity,” by Weninger, p. 249.)

This is such an exhibition of cool audacity as we seldom meet with. Here is a foreign priest, sheltered by our laws, who clinches his fist, and shakes it in our faces, daring to tell us that we will “do better” to let the car of the papacy, with Jesuit conductors, roll unresistingly over us; for if we do not, we shall be punished, after the manner of Galileo, for our “excesses of religious hatred!” He writes in admiring contemplation of Roman ecclesiasticism, which recognizes external power as necessary to a perfect plan of church organization—the power to *coerce* obedience when other means are unavailing, to resort to force whenever the pope shall decree its necessity. Pope Pius IX. had already committed himself to this system of policy, in submitting to the domination of the Jesuits; and they, in their turn, were preparing the faithful for the bold avowals of the Syllabus, which, only two years afterward, startled all the civilized nations. And the time selected by this author to do his part of this work in the United States displayed admirable sagacity and tact.

When his book made its appearance, our country was laboring in the travail of a fearful civil war. Immense armies were in the field, marshaled against each other in the most deadly conflict. It seemed doubtful which of the contending parties would win the final victory—whether the defenders of the Government would win or lose it. The doubtful nature of the contest; the apparent difference of opinion in reference to its result, even in the States supporting the Union; and other combinations of circumstances too recent to have been forgotten—all conspired to excite in the minds of European imperialists the hope, and, possibly, the belief, that the days of our civil institutions were numbered, and could not be lengthened out much longer.

Foremost among these royalists was “the favorite son of the Church”—the corrupt and false-hearted Emperor of the French—who, with one hand, ruled his subjects with unmitigated severity; while, with the other, he held the pope upon his temporal throne, from which, but for him, he would have been hurled by the outraged Italians after the battle of Solferino. With this perfidious monarch, it was a fixed habit to profess one thing, while doing, or trying to do, another. At the moment he announced that “the empire is at peace,” he was engaged in corrupting schemes designed to give perpetuity to absolutism.

With him and the pope the thought was a common one that kings govern by divine right, and, therefore, that the choice of their own mode of civil government by the people is in violation of God's law. Neither of them stopped to inquire what popular right would be trampled down by the re—establishment of this principle among those who had resisted and repudiated it; nor how much it would block up the way in which the car of progress was so triumphantly moving. These were matters they considered fit only for revolutionists and heretics, who, for daring to assert the right of mankind to self-government, were denounced as Protestants and infidels, and cut off, by bulls of excommunication, from all the sacraments and protection of the Church.

This unity of purpose and principle on the part of Napoleon and the pope led, without difficulty, to the adoption of a common plan of operations, which required no formal concordat to define its terms, whereby it was intended to secure the triumph of imperialism, and to plant the flag of the “*Latin race*” in every nation of the earth, especially in the United States, where, under the tolerance of Protestantism, Jesuitism was growing bolder every day. The plans of operation were, doubtless, well understood by the army of the hierarchy, which was first put in motion. They constituted the skirmish—line, the advance—guard, of the strong columns held in reserve. The special duty assigned them was akin to that performed by this Jesuit author of “Protestantism and Infidelity”—the arraignment of Protestantism as a fraud and a cheat, as infidelity and heresy, and, therefore, with the curse of God resting upon it—and thus to prepare the Roman Catholic mind throughout the world for that fatal blow which the imperial conspirators expected to strike.

To Napoleon III. was assigned the more dangerous and exposed, but not the more active, duty of augmenting the strength of despotism when the fall of our institutions should clear the chief obstruction out of the way. Accordingly, he intrigued with England and Spain to unite their armies with that of France, and send the combined force to Mexico, under the false pretense of protecting their mutual pecuniary interests, but with the real design, as subsequent events abundantly proved, of subjugating that country, already Roman Catholic, of placing its crown upon the head of an alien prince, and thus to prepare, upon the fall of our Government, to move up the papal armies from Mexico to the United States, and turn over this country to the “*Latin race*,” so that Rome should again become “the mistress of the world,” and its pope—king the ruler over the whole earth!*

* What Pius IX. expected to gain for the papacy will be seen by a letter, subsequently written by him to Maximilian, instructing him as to his duty. He said:

“Your majesty is well aware that, in order effectually to repair the evils occasioned by the revolution, and to bring back as soon as possible happy days for the Church, the Catholic religion must, above all things, continue to be the glory and the main—stay of the Mexican nation, to the exclusion of every other dissenting worship; that the bishops must be perfectly free in the exercise of their pastoral ministry; that the religious orders should be re-established, or reorganized, conformably with the instructions and the powers which we have given; that the patrimony of the Church, and the rights which attach to it, may be maintained and protected; that no person may obtain the faculty of teaching and publishing false and subversive tenets; that instruction, whether public or private, should be directed and watched over by the ecclesiastical authority; and that, in short, the chains may be broken which, up to the present time, have held down the Church in a state of dependence, and subject to the arbitrary rule of the civil government. “*Appletons’ Annual Cyclopedia*, 1865, p. 749.

The enterprise was of grand proportions; but it so happens that God disposes of the schemes of men as is most suited to his own providential government. Protestant England, discovering how she had been

deceived and duped by the intrigue, withdrew her army in disgust. Roman Catholic Spain, becoming sensible of the inferiority into which the papacy had reduced her, and beginning to feel newly invigorated by the principles which prevail among the Protestant nations, followed the example of England, expelled her profligate Roman Catholic queen, and advanced herself so far toward Protestantism as to establish freedom of religious thought, in the face of papal remonstrances and protests. Napoleon, left alone, floundered for a while like a drowning man. He suffered poor Maximilian, his royal dupe, to be cut off in his young manhood, and caused his beautiful wife to pine away in insanity; and at last his army was driven out of Mexico, he himself was compelled to flee from France, his sword was broken, his diadem lost, and his name held in such universal execration by the French people that he dared not, for months before his death, leave his Protestant asylum to brave their indignation. Even the proud and gallant nation over which he ruled was betrayed into the burial of its national glory in a grave dug by a Protestant rival.

The Latin race, so lately entering, with high hopes, upon the conquest of the world, was humbled and humiliated before its Teutonic enemy. The kingly crown has been snatched from the brow of the pope by Roman Catholic hands, and he is now sending forth his piteous clamors for revenge, hoping to arrest the march of the world's progress by rousing up some modern "Peter the Hermit," who will lead another crusade and sacrifice millions more of human lives to win his royalty again. And the Protestant institutions of the United States yet exist. The foundation—stones remain solidly planted. The flag of the nation floats over all its territory. No star is missing from its folds.

Does it not seem that God is on our side? —that, if our Protestantism is infidelity and heresy, and Roman Catholicism the only true religion, instead of Protestantism advancing and the papacy going down into the grave, the very reverse order of things would have transpired? With these evidences of Providential guardianship, we may confidently hope for protection from papal and imperial aggression, unless we shall become indifferent to our destiny, forget our manhood, and fail in our duty to the institutions with which we have been blessed.

But although these enemies of our civil institutions have been thus discomfited, the pope is not disposed to abandon the contest. He struggles on like a brave man. Notwithstanding he is deprived of the support of such princely allies as gave victory to so many of his predecessors, he carries on the war with his ecclesiastical troops, upon whose devotion and blind submission he knows he can always rely, because they must become the sharers with him in whatsoever temporal power their combined exertions may win. At his summons of them by the Encyclical and Syllabus, he announced the extent to which he expected them to go in opposing all liberalism and progress; and the sentiments and opinions thus avowed by him have entered into all the literature of the hierarchy, and compose one of its leading and most important features. The war carried on by this means is not the less dangerous because it is covert and insidious.

The book from which the last quotations were made was written before the Encyclical and Syllabus, and when the French army was in Mexico, with the Roman Catholic priesthood of that country in full concert with it. But the author evidently considered that he had thereby but partly performed his task. Consequently, he has since made another effort to instruct the Roman Catholic conscience in reference to the duty of obedience to the pope, who is now expected to achieve by ecclesiasticism what Napoleon

could not win by arms. His first work should be considered as merely a preface to the last, the two being required to fully develop the papal and imperial system.

In 1869, after the Encyclical and Syllabus, and in preparation for the Ecumenical Council, he published his second book, with this imposing title, "On the Apostolic and Infallible Authority of the Pope, when teaching the Faithful, and on his Relation to a General Council." As a Jesuit, he could not, of course, do otherwise than assert the infallibility of the pope; and hence there are scattered about, at numerous places throughout his book, and in the midst of flagrant perversions of history, such avowals of his object as leave no doubt about it.

In the introduction he characterizes Protestantism and Roman Catholicism as "*the armies of truth and error*," and says that these armies "are drawn up in the sight of the whole world, and prepared to meet in a decisive combat, for the very life of Christianity. It is time to define our position more accurately, and to let our enemies *feel our strength, and the utter impossibility of engaging us in any compromise*." ("The Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope," etc., by Weninger, p. 11.)

These are brave words, bravely delivered. They are like the utterances of one who feels that his feet rest upon solid ground, and who knows the power in reserve behind him. Designed, primarily, to stimulate the courage of those to whom they were specially addressed, it may have been hoped, at the same time, that some timid Protestants might be startled by them. But for fear of failure in the first of these objects, he proceeds, soon after, to instruct the faithful upon the duty of obedience. He says:

"The pope teaches and defines, without previously convoking a council, or asking the formal consent of any body; and *the clergy of every order*, as well as *laymen of every condition*, are OBLIGED TO CONFORM, and *do conform*, precisely as Pius IX., in his capacity of head of the Church, so teaches and defines." (*Ibid.*, p. 14.)

One, and far the most important, of his methods of establishing this papal sovereignty, is by showing what the popes themselves have said and done in reference to it. On the assumed ground of their infallibility and incapacity to err, he lays down the foregoing, as the law of the Church, to which every Roman Catholic is "obliged to conform," no matter what shall be required of him, under the penalty of excommunication and eternal punishment. He looks no farther than Rome, and looks there for everything. With him, God has established no other mode of making his will known to mankind than through the mouth of the pope. When he speaks, God speaks. And when he comes to notice the dealings of the popes with emperors, kings, and princes—that is, with governments foreign to the papal states—he gives prominence only to such examples as tend to show their supremacy over mankind; cautiously passing by such as show its frequent and spirited denial. All these examples he regards as having entered into, and as now constituting, an essential part of the law of the Church, which is to be observed, in our day, with implicit obedience. They are so nearly alike that a few of them will enable us to understand sufficiently the nature and foundation of this extraordinary claim of authority, to which we are so kindly invited to become subject.

Pope Boniface IV. wrote to King Athelbert of England as follows:

“If any king succeeding, or any bishop, clergyman, or laic, shall essay to infringe the decrees of the popes, he should incur the anathema of Peter and of all his successors. (“The Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope,” etc., by Weninger, p. 226.)

Louis the Pious, son of Charlemagne, submitted the division of his empire to the confirmation of the pope; and, says this author, “from that time it became the usage and practice that the Franco—Roman and German emperors became such *only with the consent of the Roman pontiff*, and on being crowned by him. Nor was this the case with the emperors of the West alone, for the kings of England, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Sweden, and Denmark loved to receive their crowns at his hands, and *to place their dominions under the especial guarantee and protection of the Holy See.*”(Ibid., pp. 228, 229.)

Somebody has said that the doctrine of the common—law lawyers, that precedent makes the law, is a very dangerous one, because, by means of it, error may often obtain sanction. This is undoubtedly the case with these papal precedents; for if they are to be recognized now as conferring rights which are not to be called in question, then all dispute is at an end, for “Rome has spoken!” It is alone by these precedents that this comprehensive authority of the popes is maintained, and it is for this purpose alone that these references are made by this author. True, he avoids any direct discussion of “the question of political right,” yet takes care to let the papal followers understand that these examples prove it also to belong to the pope, because, in the instances cited, all “the peoples and princes” regarded him “as the vicar of Christ and the *supreme arbiter of all on earth*, according to the saying, ‘He who is competent to the *greater* is also competent to the less;’”(Ibid., p. 229.) that is, he who derives his right to govern in *spiritual* things directly from God, must govern also in temporal things, because the spiritual are greater and higher than the temporal. He shows this to be his meaning by telling us what Count de Maistre teaches on this subject in his “Essai sur les Maeurs,” where he says that all the Christian princes considered the pope “*to be a judge between them and their people;*” and also by quoting, with approbation, what the same author says in his “Essai sur l’Histoire Generale,” as follows:

“The interests of mankind demand *a bridle* by which princes may be restrained and the people saved. This bridle might by common consent be placed in the hands of the Roman pontiff. Such a high-priest, mingling in worldly conflicts only to silence them, admonishing alike the sovereign and his people of their duties, condemning their crimes, and visiting his excommunication on great wrongs, would be looked upon as the *living representative and likeness of God upon the earth.*”(“The Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope,” etc., by Weninger, p. 230.)

In support of this theory of the pope’s temporal right to exercise dominion over the world, so as to mingle “in worldly conflicts,” and keep mankind to the line “of their duties,” accordingly as he shall decide what is right and what is wrong, he also cites numerous instances to show that, for many years, emperors and kings recognized it in relation to themselves and their subjects, and gloried in their humiliation. He gives special prominence to the case of Henry II. of England, who was “obliged” to prostrate himself before the pontifical throne, and submit to the decrees of the pope. And also to that of Frederick Barbarossa, who was forced “by the heavy hand of God to bow his head and sue for pardon.”(Ibid., pp. 235, 236.) And to enforce his views still more strongly, as well as to give the utmost influence to the precedents by which he endeavors to establish the temporal authority of the pope, he quotes from an address to him by the “Queen mother of Richard the Lion-hearted,” wherein she said:

“Did not the Lord confer plenitude of power on Peter, and on you through him? Blessed be the Lord who gave such power to men, that *no king, no emperor, no duke can withdraw himself from its jurisdiction*. The prince of the apostles still governs in his see, and a judicial power is constituted in our midst. *Draw, then, the sword of Peter. The Cross of Christ takes precedence of the Imperial Eagles, and the Sword of Peter goes before that of Constantine.*” (“The Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope,” etc., by Weninger, p. 236.)

He also considers it important to show that this doctrine, so earnestly recommended for adoption in this country, and by which all the world would be necessarily and unavoidably placed under the rule of the papacy, had the sanction of other emperors and kings, including Philip and Frederick II., of Germany; Philip II., St. Louis, Louis XI., Charles VIII., Henry IV., Louis XIII., and Louis XIV., of France; and Henry VII., Henry VIII., and Mary, of England. (*Ibid.* pp. 237-245.)

How faithfully he follows the course of a lawyer in a common-law court, who lays down his premises and supports them by showing that numerous judges have made decisions of the like character. And yet it seems not to have occurred to him that he is attempting a task of difficult achievement; that is, to make the people of the United States, including numbers of Roman Catholics, believe that imperialism, even in its mildest form, is preferable to the political liberty they now enjoy. In every instance he has referred to, including popes, emperors, kings, and princes, the parties were united in their exertions to establish the “divine right” of kings to rule the world, in opposition to the right of the people to govern themselves, and solely with the selfish motive of continuing their own power. None of them had the slightest regard for the rights of the people, and all supposed, as the defenders of the papacy now do, that the people were made to be governed, not to govern, and that they required, as Dr. Brownson says, a *master*! They were all personally interested in doing exactly what they did, in order to keep their crowns safely upon their heads; and, considered unitedly, they were conspirators against human freedom. If now we are to recognize what they did and said, as establishing a law for our government, we might, with like propriety and by the same process of reasoning, justify the most abominable and demoralizing vices, by showing, what it would be easy to show, that they were all, including some of the popes, adepts in almost every form of corruption.

At the times when these examples were set, the bulk of the European people were in a state of profound ignorance, and it was essential to the “divine right” of absolutism that they should be kept so; for, in their ignorance, they were taught by ambitious, cunning, and corrupt priests to believe that the pope *was equal to God*. While this delusion existed, they dared not resist a king or prince, however tyrannical, who had the pope’s endorsement; for that would have been considered a violation of God’s commands, and punished by excommunication and anathema. Hence, these kings and princes were careful to obtain this endorsement, and the popes were equally careful to see that the light of intelligence was shut out from the popular mind, so that, by a continuance of the delusion, they could share between themselves the government of the whole civilized world.

They must be bold and presumptuous men who ask us, as these Jesuit missionaries do, to exchange the present condition of our affairs for that they so fondly picture—to undo what the people, acting for themselves, have so nobly done in resistance to misgovernment and tyranny, and plunge, in blind submission, and at a single bound, back again into medieval times.

When Luther, at the Diet of Worms, demanded to debate his thesis with the emissaries of the pope, he struck a terrible blow at the doctrine of passive obedience; which it is now sought, with so much earnestness, to revive. Whatever may have been his religious belief—and no Protestants of this day are responsible for it—he then became the champion of free thought, and, as such, courageously planted himself on the side of the people, and between them and their oppressors. On that simple basis, he laid the foundation upon which a magnificent fabric has since been reared, and he who now attempts to pull it down should be treated as a public enemy by all free people. By his example, he taught the people to think, and reason, and investigate for themselves. The scales fell gradually from their eyes, and they came to realize the character and nature of the popish and princely tricks by which they had been cheated out of their liberty; and at last roused themselves up into a vigorous and robust manhood. They snapped asunder the chains of their servitude, and asserted, in the face of their rulers, those great liberties which were never firmly established as legal rights until the Government of the United States was formed, and Protestantism was thereby enabled to achieve a full development.

Protestantism has, therefore, become the special guardian of these liberties; while the papacy remains, as ever, their deadly and malignant foe. The former clings to them with undiminished affection; the latter aims at them its most deadly blows. The Roman Catholic hierarchy of the United States join in with this insatiate hostility, and are leaving no stone unturned in their efforts to persuade their adherents to return to the old order of things. Their greatest and strongest argument is that repeated by Dr. Weninger—because these iniquitous compacts between popes and kings, in past centuries, have made it the *law of the Roman Catholic Church* that every human being should be governed by “*the King of Rome*,” as God’s representative; therefore, the modern and progressive idea that *the people* shall make their own governments and laws is infidelity and heresy, and deserves the anathema of the Church and the curse of God!

And presuming upon either the submissiveness or ignorance, or both, of those who are called “the faithful,” they assert their authority to command in the name of the pope, with a supercilious air which can only arise from an imagined superiority to the remainder of mankind. Dr. Weninger is a distinguished and conspicuous member of this class, and, with seeming assurance of obedience, he exclaims:

“Yes, the Catholic world at large, *without any difference of nationality, hemisphere, or zone*, acknowledges also in our times, by an interior conviction of faith, the apostolic see as the highest tribunal on earth in matters of faith, and the Roman pontiff to be the infallible teacher of the faithful peoples on the globe.” (“The Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope,” etc., by Weninger, p. 247.)

It can not fail to arrest attention that, in whatsoever mode the writers of this class speak of the pope, they all reach the same result—the omnipotent power of the papacy, and its absolute incapacity to do any thing wrong. When they speak of “matters of faith,” as this author does, they intend to include the temporalities of government, and such civil and political rights as American Protestantism has guaranteed. This has already partially appeared, but it will be seen more undeniably hereafter. It has also been demonstrated that the papacy teaches that Protestantism is heresy and infidelity, no religion at all, a mockery of God; and, therefore, this Jesuit author teaches that all Roman Catholics are bound, by duty to “the highest tribunal on earth,” to exterminate it, and to plant Roman Catholicism in its place;

so that the pope, as the only “infallible teacher,” shall prescribe the laws and institutions we are to obey, and appoint his ecclesiastical officers and agents to see that they are executed, to reward the faithful and punish the refractory and disobedient.

Why are books containing these and other kindred teachings published and circulated in the United States? Why is it necessary to fix such principles in the minds of the Roman Catholic part of our population? What have they, as citizens of the United States, to do with such royal examples as these books set before them? with the claims of authority asserted, centuries ago, by emperors, kings, princes, and popes? Protestantism tried hard to exist among these tyrants, but could not, except in a modified and imperfect form, because it could not reach its consummation where political bondage existed; and these imperial despots could, none of them, live in the atmosphere of freedom. Each required congenial nourishment suited to its nature; Protestantism demanding liberty, and imperialism bondage. And, therefore, Protestantism sought a new world, and left the absolutism of popes and kings in possession of the old, to oppress, persecute, and tyrannize, under the plea of “divine right.” It occupied a field which Providence had preserved for it, wherein it could work out its own results without fear of a rival. But now, when in the full tide of successful progress, it finds itself confronted by its old enemy, who has grown up here under its protection; and who, just as imperialism is threatened with destruction in all Southern and Western Europe, is endeavoring, with unbounded impudence, to destroy it, at the risk of all angry and deadly conflict between the principles of democracy and those of monarchy. And with no less unbounded effrontery, it points us to the combinations of—despots, to their impious claims of divine sanction for all the wrongs and outrages they have inflicted on mankind, and to the approbation given them by crowned popes, to prove that precedents thus furnished have ripened into rights which the world must recognize as sanctioned of God, and which have thereby become the law for the government of mankind.

For such a work as this the hierarchy of the United States seem well and peculiarly prepared by education and inclination. It remains to be seen, hereafter, how many submissive followers they can enlist under the papal banner, with mottoes like these upon it. In the mean time, those who have the heritage of Protestantism to guard and defend should not be unmindful of the triumphs it has already won, the brilliant future lying before it, if preserved; and the ignominious grave into which it must sink, if lost.

Chapter V. The Pope

The Pope's Infallibility makes him a Domestic Prince in all Nations.—The Popes never Exceeded the Limits of their Authority.—The Temporal Power Divinely Conferred as Part of the Spiritual.—The Pope to be King everywhere.—No Right of Complaint against Him.—First Dogmatic Constitution of the Late Council.—Decree of the Pope's Infallibility.—Archbishop Manning's Definition of It.—It gives the Pope whatever Authority he Claims.—It is a Personal Privilege.—It confers Coercive Power upon the Pope.—The Present Governments are Dissolving.— The Syllabus alone will save them.

Note: When you consider all the demands of the Pope, just think of all the demands the god of the world, Satan, must want over every person on earth.

Isaiah 14:13,14 For thou hast said in thine heart, I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God: I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation, in the sides of the north: I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the most High.

Is there any difference between the Devil and the Pope? They both are trying to usurp God's authority over mankind!

IT is not probable that any candid man, whatever his attachment to particular creeds or church organizations, will be disposed to deny that the Roman Catholic profession of faith, even as settled by the anti—reform Council of Trent, contains much that is satisfactory to the Christian mind. In so far as it lays down the fundamentals of Christian faith, it is unexceptionable, even to the most extreme and rigid Protestants. But when it goes beyond these and gathers up different dogmas of the post—Nicene period, which have been put forward from time to time for the purpose of getting away from the teachings of the apostolic fathers, and building up the papal system, its defenders can not reasonably expect that, in this age, it will escape the investigation of Protestant communities, compelled, as they now are, to defend themselves against papal aggression. But even these might have been left to the exclusive domain of theology, had not the introduction of the new doctrine of the pope's infallibility exposed conspicuously to the surface that political feature of the papal system which, although known to have long existed, has been both concealed and denied in all Protestant countries.

The last chapter pointed out the extent and comprehensiveness of this infallibility, as it was claimed by the Jesuits to exist, before the decree of the late Lateran Council. Even if the investigation of it were to stop at this point, it would sufficiently appear to any thoughtful mind that it sets up for the pope full authority to deal with the temporalities of the world, to dictate the policy and regulate the affairs of governments, and to step in between the citizen and the civil institutions to which he owes allegiance. But the subject is so fruitful of inquiry, that it would require many volumes to exhaust it, each step making the design more apparent.

A work was, not long ago, republished and circulated in the United States, which is stamped with "the approbation of the Lord Bishop of Beverly," in England, by way of giving it ecclesiastical authority. The American hierarchy manifestly consider this book an important auxiliary in propagating the true faith. It has this imposing and attractive title, "His Holiness Pope Pius IX. and the Temporal Rights of the Holy See, as involving Religious, Social, and Political Interests of the Whole World." The perusal

of it will not only show with what intense earnestness the cause of the papacy is defended, but explain the grounds upon which that defense is rested. Its avowals are so clearly and frankly made as to entitle the author to our respect on account of his candor, however much we may disagree with and resist his theory.

Not content with treating of the temporal power of the pope, merely in its religious and social aspects, the author asserts that it is “most intimately connected” also with the political interests and affairs of mankind.* With his mind fully impressed by this idea, he declares that “our *first duty*, however, is toward our most holy Pope Pius IX., who at present so nobly fills the chair of St. Peter.” (*Ibid.*)

* “His Holiness Pope Pius IX.,” etc. By M. I. Rhodes, p. 11. This book is published by D. and I. Sadlier & Co., New York, and is deemed of so much importance that it has also been published in Boston and Montreal.

Accepting this proposition as true, he leaves us to the logical inference that we owe a *secondary* duty to government and society, in all those matters in which the pope has the right to exact obedience of us. And to show that he so regards it, he adopts the definition of papal supremacy given by Pope Paul VII., in 1806, when, in answer to a summons by Napoleon I. to surrender the *political* government of Rome, he said: “It is not our will, it is the will of God, *whose place we occupy on earth!*” (“His Holiness Pope Pius IX.,” etc., by M. I. Rhodes, p. 28.) And thus the example of this pope, who blasphemously claimed equality with God and put himself in his place on earth, furnishes this author with apology for maintaining “it to be the general duty of all Catholics, *whatever their country may be*,” and “of all men, if they did but know it, to protect the rights of the Holy See;” (*Ibid.*, pp. 47, 48.) including, of course, his temporal and political rights; that is, his rights as a sovereign. Anticipating that, possibly, this idea of allegiance to a *foreign* prince might excite in the minds of some honest people the apprehension of treachery and bad faith toward their governments, especially in Protestant countries, he endeavors to quiet all their scruples of conscience by this artful and insidious argument:

“Suppose it be said, ‘I acknowledge the spiritual authority of the Holy Father; but why am I, an Englishman [or American, we may add], to come forward in a *political* way, and use all my exertions to protect the temporal rights of a *foreign prince*?’ My answer at once is plain. *The pope is not a foreign prince to any Christian, to any human being.*” (*Ibid.*, p. 48.)

The reader should not pass this by too quickly; it is worthy of much reflection. The last proposition is stated negatively, but it has an affirmative meaning; which is, that the pope is *prince* and governor over all Roman Catholics—over every human being — no matter where or under what government they live! Although he resides in Rome, and is crowned there as a “*foreign prince*,” he is, nevertheless, a *domestic* one in every country, especially where there are Roman Catholics, because God’s authority is universal, and he is in the place of God on earth! As the *spiritual* governor of the world, he is also its *political* governor, in so far as political teachings are necessary to the Church, because the greater includes the lesser; therefore, when he finds the faithful living under a government which denies this, and is consequently infidel, he has the right to require that they shall “come forward in a *political* way,” and compel such dissenting and heretical government to obey the law of God by recognizing his supremacy, or that they shall disobey the government when it refuses to do so! For this purpose he is not a *foreign*, but a *domestic* prince, having authority from God to step in between the citizen and his

government, and to require of him so to act and vote that the universality of his power in all “religious, social, and *political*” matters shall be established, according to the canons of the Church!

But it must not be supposed that this author is alone in setting forth this extraordinary defense of papal sovereignty. It has the direct and positive sanction of Pope Pius IX., whose voice is claimed to be as potent as that of God. To put an end to a recent controversy between the Church at Rome and the Armenian Christians of Cilicia, the pope addressed to them an encyclical letter, on the 6th day of January, 1873. — These “Oriental dissidents,” as he calls them, had insisted that, in his attempt to control the appointment of their bishops, and to prescribe the rules for the management and sale of their church property, he had acted “as a *foreign* power interfering in the exterior affairs of states and the governments of the peoples.” This, he insists, is “calumnious,” and thus defends his sovereignty:

“It is easy to understand how false and contrary to good sense and to the divine economy of the Catholic Church are all such suppositions. First, it is *false that the Roman pontiffs have ever exceeded the limits of their power*, and interfered in the civil administration of states, and that they have usurped the rights of princes. If the Roman pontiffs are exposed to this calumny because they make regulations for the election of bishops and the sacred ministers of the Church, and about *the causes or other affairs which concern the ecclesiastical discipline called exterior*, then, of two things, one: either men ignore, or else they resist, the divine and immutable organization of the Catholic Church. It has ever been, and ever will remain, stable, and can not be subject to change, especially in those countries where the *proper liberty* and security of the Catholic Church have been assured by the decrees of the head of the state. In fact, as it is *of faith* that the Church is one, and that the Roman pontiff is her head, and the father and teacher of all Christians, *he can not be called a foreigner to any Christians or to any of the particular churches of Christians*; at least unless it be asserted that the head is foreign to the limbs, the father to the son, the master to the scholars, the shepherd to the flock.

“Moreover, those who hesitate not to call the Apostolic See a *foreign power* rend the unity of the Church by that mode of speech, or furnish a pretext for schism, since they thereby deny to the successor of blessed Peter *the rights of universal pastor*, and by consequence *fail in the faith* due to the Catholic Church if they are of the number of her sons, or they assail *the liberty that is her due* if they do not belong to her. For our Lord Jesus Christ has manifestly made it a duty for the sheep to know and hear the voice of the shepherd and to follow it, and, on the contrary, to fly (*sic*, John 10:5 says flee) from ‘the stranger, for—they know not the voice of strangers.’ If, then, the sovereign pontiff be reputed *extern*, that is, a stranger, to any particular churches, that church will also be a stranger to the Apostolic See, and, consequently, to the Catholic Church, which is founded on the words of the Lord to Peter. They that separate from that foundation do not retain the divine and Catholic Church, but they are striving to make a human church; which being held together only by the human tie of nationality, as they say, is not any longer bound together by means of its *priests firmly attached to the see of Peter*, and can not share in its solidity, nor be any longer in the universally formed and indissoluble unity of the Catholic Church.”*

* The Encyclical of Pius IX. from which the above extract is taken will be found at length in The New York Freeman’s Journal and Catholic Register of April 19th, 1873, where it is published on account of its alleged “permanent importance.” In a previous number of the same paper, that of April 5th, 1873, this same extract, with some verbal differences in translation, was inserted, accompanied by the following editorial remarks:

“It seems hard to believe that men of sense will get frightened at the charge that we Catholics, and our bishops, are bound to believe and to do what the vicar of Christ commands, because this head of the Church on earth resides not here, but in Rome! The vicar of Christ has himself, continually, declared that he can not change the doctrines, nor the morals of the Church. If what he commands is but the truth that has been from the beginning, what difference is it whether he resides in Rome or in Washington? But, if another answer is wanted, the Bishop of Rome is not a foreigner. He belongs to us, as we belong to him. Rome is not a foreign city! It does not belong to Italy; it belongs to all Christendom. And the pope, residing in Rome, is not an alien from any of his Catholic flock!”

It is deemed just to those who are now endeavoring to convert the power of a “*foreign prince*” into a *domestic* power in the United States, to give the precise language of the pope, as furnished by a translation which, it is said, has the approval of Archbishop Manning. The reader will thereby be enabled to see the process by which this conversion is to take place, and the grounds of its justification. What does Pius IX. mean when he says that no “Roman pontiffs have ever exceeded the limits of their power, and interfered in the civil administration of states?” This, and nothing less: that when they have dictated to governments, denounced, excommunicated, and dethroned kings, resisted constitutions and laws, and released peoples from their oaths of allegiance, they have simply exercised their *divine* authority; because, in every instance, they were condemning *heresy*. For this purpose, his power extends over the whole world, and is not *foreign* to any government on earth. Whatsoever, therefore, he may find it necessary to do, in order to advance the welfare of the Church, extend its borders, and provide for his own dominion as the “vicar of Christ,” he has the rightful power to do; and, in doing it, becomes a *domestic* governor in all the states. As such domestic governor, he has also the right to require of the faithful that they shall resist and put out of the way every thing, every constitution and law, in conflict with his ideas of the divine purpose. And in case of refusal the refractory dissenter is to be visited with the curses of the Church, with excommunication and anathema. All this, says the pope, is necessary to the “*proper liberty and security of the Catholic Church*,” and, therefore, those who do not yield to him these extraordinary prerogatives “*fail in the faith*,” and become heretics and unbelievers. Hence we have the distinct announcement, made ex cathedra by the “vicar of Christ” himself, that it is a part of the religious faith of the Church that these prerogatives shall be conceded to him; in other words, that he is a *domestic* governor throughout all the United States, that all the faithful are bound to obey him in whatsoever shall concern the Church, and that if there be any thing in our constitutions or laws adverse to the Church, in his opinion, he has the *divine* right to require them to resist it by their *votes* or otherwise, they being bound to implicit and uninquiring obedience!

We have already seen in how many things the principles of our Protestant institutions are in conflict with the teachings of the papacy, and shall hereafter have occasion to see what the popes have done in other governments in order to establish harmony between their civil polity and the canon laws of the Church. We can scarcely claim exemption from the charge of ignorance if, these lessons of history do not teach us wisdom.

It will be observed that the pope does not speak alone of “the election of bishops and the sacred ministers of the Church.” If this were the only matter of controversy, all fair-minded men would be disposed to leave it to Roman Catholics themselves to settle the question whether this power should belong alone to the pope, or be shared in by them. But he goes further, and talks about “*other affairs*” which concern the ecclesiastical discipline called *exterior*,” by which he, undoubtedly, means all those

matters, of whatsoever nature, whether “religious, social, or political,” which are involved in the papal policy of making every body “firmly attached to the see of Peter.” These “other affairs” will more distinctly appear when the nature and scope of the doctrine of papal infallibility are understood.

Let there be no difficulty, however, at this point, about the source of this tremendous power of the pope; a matter which will be the subject of more minute inquiry hereafter. The pope himself considers it as having divine sanction, not as derived from any concessions made by human powers. The author last quoted says the pope’s temporal power “is the natural consequence of his spiritual power, (“His Holiness Pope Pius IX.,” etc., by M. I. Rhodes, p. 49.) which means that wherever the pope has spiritual power he must have political power also, because the latter is necessarily consequent upon the former, and can not legitimately exist independent of it. And he supports this extraordinary claim, which is also made by Pius IX. himself, by publishing at length another papal bull issued by him in 1860 “against the despoilers of the Church,” wherein he insists that his temporal power is derived alone from God, and is absolutely necessary to the Church, inasmuch as it is indispensable to him that he shall “possess such an amount of freedom as to be subject, in the discharge of its sacred ministry, to *no civil power*; (His Holiness Pope Pius IX.,” etc., by M. I. Rhodes, p. 139.) that is, that he must be *above* all governments and *independent* of them all, and have that “amount of freedom” and irresponsibility to constitutions and laws which shall enable him to do as he pleases!

There is no difficulty whatever in deciding what all this means. The author of this book and the pope mean the same thing, and agree in tracing the temporal power to the spiritual alone. The pope says, it is necessary for the universal Church that he, as a prince, shall be subject to “*no civil power*” on earth. Without this absolute independence the Church can not, in his opinion, exist consistently with God’s decrees. The logical consequence, therefore, is this: that wherever this Church is to be maintained, this same *political independence* must exist; for if in Rome this political necessity is an essential part of religious faith, it is equally so elsewhere. If the Church can not maintain itself in Rome, as God requires, without having all its children submit to this combined influence of the pope, it can not do so in the United States without a like submission. Whatever is a necessary part of its faith at one place, is equally so at all other places. And can it be doubted that if this doctrine were let alone to work out its legitimate results in this country, it would subject our institutions to perpetual assaults on the part of the subjects of this “foreign prince,” who owe their “first duty” to him? They would do, or not do, as he should command; obey the laws, or not obey them, as he should decide the welfare of the Church to require. It would erect a *papal government within that of the United States*, with rival and antagonistic powers to this extent: that whatsoever the Government of the United States should decide to do, not agreeable or acceptable to the pope, would be opposed by his obedient subjects here; who would put their obedience to him upon the ground that he is in the place of God, and, therefore, his word is God’s law!

This author demonstrates the character of the papal theory still further, by showing that the pope is a “king;” not because he was ever made so by the people anywhere, even in the papal states, but because he is pope, and, as the “head of the Church,” holds the papal states” for the good of the Church.” Therefore, he says again, “he is not a foreign power in that sense of the word;”(“His Holiness Pope Pius IX.,” etc., by M. I. Rhodes, p. 51) still holding fast to the idea that the *kingship of the pope* is necessary wherever he is the “head of the Church.” The meaning is still the same as before: that he can

not be pope without being a king also; that although he is a “foreign prince” in so far as he wears the crown of a foreign country, yet he is not so in any country to his followers, who owe him the obedience of a domestic king; that as the Roman Catholic Church can not exist without a pope, it can not exist without a king; and that, wherever there are Roman Catholics, no matter under what government, they must obey this pope—king, even at the hazard of disobedience to the laws that protect their persons and property, when he shall consider it necessary to the welfare of the Church to remove these out of the way!

Hence, to illustrate the principle practically, if it were possible for a Roman Catholic government to invade the United States, in order to carry on a crusade for the destruction of the infidelity and heresy of Protestantism, and the pope should command all his followers here to take up arms against the Government to aid the crusade, and thus to serve God and the Church, as he would undoubtedly do if he acted according to his professed convictions, it would be their “first duty” to obey him, because, for such a purpose, he is not a “foreign prince,” but a *domestic* one, by virtue of his being “in the place of God” on earth, and possessing the same universality of authority!

It is scarcely necessary to say that, in this supposed case, there are many thousands of Roman Catholic laymen in the United States who would refuse to obey such a command, were it ever issued by the pope; for then they would realize how insensibly and unsuspectingly they had been drawn along after the papal car, toward the edge of a precipice over which they could not plunge without destruction. They would then, as the Roman Catholic people of Italy have done, begin to see that wherever absolutism has had its own way, under the claim of “divine right,” it has been oppressive and tyrannical. They would also realize that their “first duty” was to the Government that had protected them in all their religious, social, and political rights, which the papacy has never done. But while there are thousands such as these, both native and foreign—born, it can not be disguised that the bulk, if not all, of the hierarchy, and every single Jesuit, would obey the papal command; or, if there should be one refusing, he would be denounced, anathematized, and excommunicated by the pope.

See how this author clings to his favorite idea when, elsewhere, he thus expresses himself:

“If we take a glance at the history of the popes, we shall see plainly how *God has made temporal sovereignty a necessary accompaniment* (I use the word “necessary” not in its absolute, but its ordinary, sense) *of their spiritual sovereignty, so that it grows out of it, and belongs to it, as its natural right.* In the early ages of the Church, God was pleased to give a manifest testimony of her divine origin, by miraculously supporting her, and extending her limits without any human power, and in spite of superhuman obstacles. Her very existence, and, much more, her growth under such circumstances, was a miracle; it ceased with her infancy. *When she reached maturity, God supplied her with temporal sovereignty*, which, though no part of her essence, is nevertheless her natural and proper *mode of action*, and, as such, her *right*.” (“His Holiness Pope Pius IX.,” etc., by M. I. Rhodes, pp. 52, 53.)

What an admirable specimen of consistent and methodical reasoning is this! The idea that, when the Church was weak and feeble, compelled to struggle against the powerful pagan governments which had obtained the mastery over the world, God left it to make its way “without any human power;” but that, after it “reached maturity” and became strong, it could not exist without having “temporal sovereignty” conferred upon its popes, is, to say the least of it, a wonderful exhibition of sagacity and originality.

The truth is, and history abundantly proves it, apart from this confession, that, throughout the early ages of Christianity, when Christians at Rome and elsewhere were known by the purity of their lives, and not by mere professions, there was no such thing as the temporal sovereignty of the popes. Each bishop had jurisdiction over his own church, at Rome, as well as at Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Corinth, and other places. But when Constantine set the example of uniting Church and State by supporting the Church at Rome upon the condition that it would sustain his claim to dominion over the Italian people, then the bishops of Rome began to arrogate to themselves this temporal sovereignty now asserted so earnestly. They acquired it in the end, without regard to the number of people who were crushed to the earth, and succeeded in placing both the spiritual and temporal sword in their hands. For hundreds of years these swords rested but little in their scabbards, until mankind were awakened to a sense of duty and manhood by the great Protestant Reformation. From that time to the present, the nations have gradually thrown off the thralldom of the papacy, and bounded into new life. Yet, with all this experience before us, the American hierarchy are now striving to bind the limbs of the American people with the rusty chains which have been so nobly broken.

This author finds himself supported by other high authority—the Roman Catholic Bishop of Orleans, in France. He represents this prelate, when speaking of the pope, and as a monarchist, of course, to have said: “In fact, it is necessary that his *action*, his *will*, his *decrees*, his *word*, and his sacred person, should enjoy the full and free exercise of authority, rising above all influences, all interests, all human passions; so that neither discontented interests nor irritated passions should have even *the shadow of a right to raise complaints against him*.” (“His Holiness Pope Pius IX.,” etc., by M. I. Rhodes, p. 98.)

The Bishop of Orleans might as well have added that the pope should rise above all governments too; for this is involved in what he says. This author so understands him, or he would not have spoken of the papacy as he does, when he says:

“The papacy is the soul of the world. It is the papacy which preserves it from moral decay and death.”
“The papacy is the very key—stone of Christian society; it is the salt of the earth; the city on a hill; the candle upon a candle stick, shining before the whole world.” (His Holiness Pope Pius IX.,” etc., by M. I. Rhodes, pp. 128, 129.)

Nor would he have republished the following from the London *Tablet*, a leading papal organ in England, to show that the destruction of the temporal power of the pope is a “crime which merits the sentence of excommunication.” The *Tablet*, speaking of the loss of his kingship by the pope, says:

“It is, in other words, to dethrone *the only authority upon earth* to which the Catholic can look for guidance in doubt; to oust of his jurisdiction *the only judge* whose decisions are framed *in the presence of God*; to place the world above the Church, which God has placed above the world; and to renew under a pseudo—Christianity the desolation of paganism.” (*Ibid.*, p. 132.)

In all this we have it plainly and distinctly avowed that the authority which the pope acquires by virtue of his possession of temporal power is absolutely necessary to his government of the Church; and that this is the foundation of his claim to obedience. The temporal power arising out of the spiritual is, no less than the spiritual, of divine origin; and as it is this which makes the pope a king, therefore the obedience of the faithful to him is the obedience of the subject to a monarch. It must follow, consequently, that wheresoever the pope does not possess this temporal power he is not free to govern

the Church as he pleases, and the Church is not free to obey his commands. When, therefore, the papal advocates in this country talk about the freedom of the pope, the freedom of the Church, and all that sort of thing, they mean that the pope should have the unquestioned right to command as a temporal prince, and that they should have the unquestioned right to obey him, no matter what stood in the way. His temporal power, says the London *Tablet*, makes him “the only judge whose decisions are framed in the presence of God;” otherwise the abolition of it would be merely a political offense, and not a crime against God, worthy of excommunication. If, then, it requires this temporal power to raise the Church above the world, so that the papacy may preserve it from “decay and death,” the pope must judge of temporals as well as spirituals all over the world. Such was the doctrine of the Jesuits before the Lateran decree of papal infallibility was passed; and the papacy is now struggling, with wonderful energy, to make it the doctrine of the whole Roman Catholic world.

Nobody will deny that to concede the pope’s infallibility is equivalent to recognizing the obligation to do, within the entire circle of faith and morals, whatsoever he shall command to be done. All the important acts of individuals and of society are necessarily within this circle; so that the whole man, in all that he does and thinks, as a social being and a citizen, becomes, by this doctrine, subject to this obedience. Whatever position he may fill in any of the relations of life, if he be a Christian, he acknowledges his responsibility to God, and his obligation to obey his law. That law, therefore, must regulate all his intercourse with the world, and encompass the whole field of his duty. Hence, as the devotee of infallibility looks to the pope alone for the interpretation of the law of God, he consents to obey him in whatsoever he shall declare it to be. He looks no farther. He debates nothing. The pope, with him, possesses the concentration in his own hands of all the power of heaven and earth, and sits upon so lofty a throne that no human being dares to challenge the integrity of his motives or the propriety and expediency of his decrees. He considers him as occupying a judgment—seat before which all mankind must pass in review. He therefore accepts what the pope does and says as infallibly right and true. He makes no inquiry about it. But, closing his mind to all investigation and thought, he passively submits to think and to do everything the pope shall decree, and pronounces all to be heretics and disbelievers in Christianity who doubt or deny the virtue and propriety of his submission. No matter what the doctrine he is required to believe, or the thing he is required to do, his obedience must be complete. *The Catholic World* thus states it:

“Each individual must receive the *faith and law* from the Church [that is, the pope] of which he is a member by baptism, *with unquestioning submission and obedience of the intellect and the will*.*....

* It would seem, from the recent letter of Pope Pius IX. to the Emperor of Prussia, that all baptized Protestant Christians are, in some mysterious way, also bound to this obedience; a claim which may or may not be hereafter set up, according to circumstances. He says: “I speak in order to fulfill one of my duties, which consists in telling the truth to all, even to those who are not Catholics, for every one who has been baptized belongs in some way or other—which to define more precisely would be here out of place—belongs, I say, to the pope.”—Cincinnati Commercial, October 30th, 1873.

Authority and obligation are correlative in nature and extent.... We have no right to ask reasons of the Church [the pope], any more than of Almighty God, as a preliminary to our submission. We are to take with *unquestioning docility* whatever instruction the Church [the pope] gives us.” (*The Catholic World*, August, 1871, vol. xiii., pp. 580-589.)

God beneficently endowed man with the faculty of reason, not merely to fit him for dominion over the animal creation, but that he might be enabled to distinguish good from evil—right from wrong. We do not discuss the question whether, as it regards each individual, God foreknew which of these he would prefer to follow—that belongs to the theologians; but he has sufficiently shown by the whole course of His Providences that each one of us will be dealt with at the final judgment as we shall have personally acted in this life. This sense of personal responsibility every man feels within himself; and there should be no authority upon earth sufficient to deaden the consciousness of it in his mind. If he allows such authority to step in between him and God, so as to close his mind to the investigation of truth, he necessarily surrenders his conscience into its keeping, forfeits his right to think, and suffers himself to be drifted along, like a log floating insensibly upon the water, either by chance; blind necessity, or by rules prescribed by those who know nothing of his personal convictions or relations, and are influenced by motives he cannot understand. The most ignorant and unlettered man knows, without the aid of instruction, that the laws of God require of him personal obedience; and that he can not shield himself, for their violation, behind what others have thought or commanded. He knows that it is *God* who commands, and that his conscience has been given him as a monitor to approve the right and condemn the wrong; a duty which, blunt it as he may, it never fails to discharge. If, then, he surrenders his “intellect and will” into the keeping of another, no matter who, and yields “unquestioning submission and obedience” to whatever that other shall command, his conscience becomes of no use to him, and he is reduced to the condition of a mere machine; like the locomotive which moves or stops as the engineer shall open or close the valve of the engine, so he acts or ceases to act, as he shall be directed.

Paul “*reasoned*” with the Jews at Thessalonica, Corinth, and Ephesus, and with Felix, “out of the Scriptures,” and “*persuaded*” them to hearken to the divine command. But such a man does not expect to be reasoned with or persuaded; he awaits only the *order* of some superior, and then forthwith renders “unquestioning submission and obedience!” He humbles and humiliates himself into the low attitude of one who knows *his master*, and realizes no necessity for further knowledge. And such is the condition into which the papacy proposes to reduce all the members of the Roman Catholic Church, whatever degree of intelligence they may otherwise possess, by the doctrine of papal infallibility.

And not only is this obedience to be rendered in what concerns faith and morals, but also in what concerns the government and discipline of the Church, in everything necessary to bring the individual into complete “*hierarchical subordination and true obedience.*” In the “first dogmatic constitution,” passed by the late Lateran Council, it is said:

“Hence we teach and declare that, by the appointment of our Lord, the Roman Church possesses a superiority of ordinary power over all other churches, and that this power of jurisdiction of the Roman pontiff, which is truly episcopal, is immediate, to which all, of whatever right and dignity, both pastors and faithful, both individually and collectively, are bound, by their duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, to submit, not only in matters which belong to *faith and morals*, but also in those that appertain to the *discipline and government* of the Church *throughout the world*, so that the Church of Christ may be one flock *under one supreme pastor*, through the preservation of unity both of communion and of profession of the same faith with the Roman pontiff. This is the teaching of Catholic truth, from which *no one can deviate without loss of faith and of salvation.*” (“The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” by Manning, pp. 234, 235.)

In order to make this “hierarchical subordination” complete, it is further decreed in this same constitution that the pope must have “*free communication* with the pastors of the whole Church, and with their flocks, that they may be *taught and ruled by him* in the way of salvation,” and that his right of communication for this purpose must not be “*subject to the secular power*,” because it is higher than all governments, and cannot be appealed from, which is precisely equivalent to saying that no government has the right to stand in the way between the pope and his followers to prevent them from obeying what he shall command, or to require of them to do what he shall forbid. This is called “the *prerogative* which the only begotten Son of God vouchsafed to join *with the supreme pontifical office*,” wherefore the pope “remains *ever free from all blemish of error*.” And upon this broad and comprehensive foundation the decree of infallibility is announced with as much solemnity as if it had been really sent down, with the voice of ten thousand trumpets, from the heavens, thus:

“We teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed, that the Roman pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*—that is, when, in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding *faith or morals* to be held by the Universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter—is possessed of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that his Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding *faith or morals*; and that, therefore, such definitions of the Roman pontiff are *irreformable* of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.

“But if any one—which may God avert!—presume to contradict this our definition, *let him be anathema*.” (“The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” by Manning, p. 240.)

The full extent and scope of all this is not generally understood; indeed, it is not accurately comprehended by many intelligent Roman Catholics in this country, who, imitating some of their bishops, have accepted it without inquiry. Such intelligence as they employ in ordinary matters would enable them to realize this, if they had the courage to enter upon the investigation. But having yielded this acquiescence—many of them from honest convictions of duty to the Church—they are expected still further to submit, passively and unresistingly, to all its consequences, whatever they may be. Whether they shall continue to remain in this condition or not, however, we, who choose to act otherwise, and look into these things for ourselves, are not released from the obligation of ascertaining, if possible, what these consequences may be, so far, at least, as our civil institutions are likely to be involved by them.

It can not be reasonably objected if, in making this inquiry, we shall take Archbishop Manning, of England, who was a member of the Lateran Council, and is one of the most distinguished prelates of the Church, as furnishing the correct papal interpretation; for it will not be said by anyone that he is not the very highest authority. His “Pastoral to the Clergy” of England has been republished in the United States in book form, entitled “The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” thus giving it hierarchical endorsement here.

This great and learned divine does not hesitate to come boldly up to the question of pontifical power. He displays the generalship of the old marshals of France, who dashed against the heaviest columns of the enemy, not doubting that their courage would be rewarded by victory. Doubtless, like them, he hopes that his intrepidity will intimidate all adversaries. In the true spirit of imperial dogmatism, as if

no earthly power dare question what he says, he tells us that the “plenitude of power” which belongs to the pope is so great and overshadowing “that *no power under God* may come between the chief pastor and the Church, and any, from the highest to the humblest, member of the flock of Christ on earth!” (“The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” by Manning, p. 61.)

Now, if it shall appear that, in the domain of *faith and morals*, everything that a man may do in his relations with society and government is included, there will be no difficulty whatever in understanding what he means by denying to any human power the right of intervention between the pope and the individual members of the Roman Catholic Church. If these terms are thus comprehensive, then his language is equivalent to saying that if the pope shall command disobedience to any law of any government, touching *faith or morals*, and should declare that such law is opposed to the welfare of the Church, the Roman Catholic is bound to obey the pope, and disobey the government, which would have no right, in such a case, to interfere for its own protection! Upon a question of so much delicacy he should be allowed to explain his own meaning.

He quotes from the councils and the fathers to show what is signified by the phrase “faith and morals.” The Council of Trent defines it to embrace things “pertaining to the edification of the Christian doctrine.” Bellarmine extends it to those things “which are in themselves good or evil;” and Gregory of Valentia to “any controverted matter of religion:” (*Ibid.*, pp. 66, 67.) as, for example, the controversy between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism; which this last named father also includes in his definition, by embracing those things proposed by the pope, “*in deciding doctrinal controversies and exterminating errors.*” (*Ibid.*, p. 70.)

Archbishop Manning goes further than this, and gives his own definition. He declares that the infallible guidance of the Church—that is, of the pope—extends to “all matters which are opposed to revelation;” for, says he, “the Church could not discharge its office as a teacher of all nations, unless it were able with infallible certainty to proscribe doctrines at variance with the word of God.” (“The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” by Manning, p. 72.)

To make himself better understood he assigns to infallibility two objects; one *direct*, the other *indirect*. The first is the revelation or word of God; the second *whatever is necessary for its exposition or defense*, or is contrary to faith and morals. As the pope can condemn errors in all these things, both direct and indirect, so, according to him, he is infallible “in proscribing false philosophers and false science;” (*Ibid.*, p. 73.) which enables him to reach out far beyond the commonly recognized domain of the Church. He extends his authority so as to make it embrace also “positive truths which are not revealed, whensoever the doctrinal authority of the Church can not be *duly exercised in the promulgation, explanation, and defense of revelation without judging and pronouncing on such matters and truths;*” (*Ibid.*, p. 73.) which means that the pope, as the exclusive judge of the faith, has full jurisdiction to pronounce against whatsoever is opposed to revelation, and that when his judgment is pronounced it is infallibly right, and must not only be recognized as a necessary part of the faith, but obeyed as such.

He makes it extend also to “the universal practice of the Church in commending the writings of orthodox, and of condemning those of heterodox authors.” (*Ibid.*, p. 79.) Also, to “condemning heretical propositions;” (*Ibid.*, p. 79.) and the “ethical character of propositions;” (*Ibid.*, p. 80.) and propositions

“less than heresy,” or “erroneous propositions,” (*Ibid.*, p. 81.) that is, such as are “scandalous, offensive, schismatical, injurious.” (*Ibid.*, p. 83.) And, more important and comprehensive than all, so that there may be no further cavil or controversy about it, this great archbishop declares that “it belongs to the Church alone to determine the limits of its own infallibility;” (*Ibid.*, p. 84.) which makes the whole matter rest upon the sole *discretion of the pope*, so that upon whatsoever occasion or subject he shall claim to be infallible, then he is so! That there may be no misunderstanding upon a matter of so much importance, he expresses the same idea, elsewhere, in these words:

“*The Church itself* [and by the Church he means the pope] *is the divine witness, teacher, judge, of the revelation entrusted to it.* There exists no other. There is no tribunal to which appeal from the Church can lie. There is no coordinate witness, teacher, or judge, who can revise, or criticize, or test, the teaching of the Church. It is sole and alone in the world.” (“The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” by Manning, pp. 128, 129.)

By the decree of infallibility it is distinctly declared that the pope, in making “definitions” in regard to “faith or morals,” derives nothing “from the consent of the Church,” as an organized body of Christians. *He is the Church*, because all its power and authority are centered in him alone. And so the late Lateran Council deliberately decided. Notwithstanding the third Council of Constantinople anathematized the *infallible* (!) pope Honorius for *heresy*, and the Council of Constance deposed John XXIII. for the most infamous crimes, and other councils have maintained the claim of the French or Gallican Church, that infallibility did not belong to the pope alone, but to an ecumenical council and the pope combined, this submissive body of prelates surrendered themselves into the hands of the Jesuits or ultramontanes, and conceded to the pope alone full power to exercise the entire authority of the Church in all things. Pius IX. made this claim of universal sovereignty, on account of the dangers besetting his temporal dominion; and the obedient cardinals and bishops shouted *amen* to the demand, with only a few dissenting voices, which, at the time, were drowned in the general rejoicing, and afterward silenced into humiliating acquiescence.

In the Encyclical of 1864, he condemned the “audacity of those persons” who ventured to insist that they had the right to withhold their “assent and obedience” to his decrees, when they did “*not touch dogmas of faith and morals;*” and declared that all such were “entirely opposed” to “the Catholic dogma of the full power divinely given to the Roman pontiff,” etc.; (Appendix C.) that is to say, that, although the pope shall deem it his duty to issue a decree relating to matters other than those touching faith and morals, and command obedience to it, all the faithful must implicitly obey it. This was then a mere claim of authority, unsupported by the decree of anyone of the many ecumenical councils which have been held, and was, therefore, resisted by many thousands of honest Roman Catholics, who thought they saw in its establishment the triumph of absolutism. Now it is the *law* of the Church; and the voices of these thousands are hushed into the silence of the tomb. Whether their silence shall ever hereafter be broken or not, all who believe in infallibility, or accept it, must be held to recognize this claim of papal supremacy, in all its scope, and to any extent to which the pope shall think proper to carry it. It is impossible to imagine how it can be otherwise; for if the pope can not err, and can decide for himself what the extent of his infallibility is, then, whatsoever he claims as belonging to his pontifical authority must be granted to him, upon the ground that, being infallible, it is impossible for him to assert anything that is not true, or to demand anything that is not consistent with the law of God.

If infallibility does not go thus far, there is nothing in it. If it stops short of full, complete, and entire power, it is not infallibility. And so it is understood by those who are the official and authorized interpreters of its meaning.

In *The Catholic World* for May, 1871, there is an ably written article, reviewing Archbishop Manning's pastoral letter, under the significant title, "The Church Accredits Herself." (The Catholic World, May, 1871, vol. xiii., p. 145.) The argument there is that the Word of God must be true, because God declares it to be so; that the Roman Catholic Church is the only authority on earth commissioned by God to declare what that word is; that she is the witness for herself, and is "competent and sufficient authority for that fact;" that "she can not err in declaring what God has revealed and commanded;" and that, therefore, she is "*what she affirms herself to be*;" or, in more apt language, what the pope affirms her to be, in reference to both jurisdiction and authority! No Oriental monarch ever had more absolute power than this.

Many good and intelligent laymen of the Roman Catholic Church have been deluded into the belief that the pope's infallibility is limited to questions of faith alone, in the ordinary acceptance of that term. But this theory of Pius IX., of Archbishop Manning, and of *The Catholic World*, explodes that idea entirely. It includes not only morals, but everything pertaining to the domain of morals—everything, in fact, which the pope himself shall declare to be embraced by it, within or without that domain. The Church speaks alone through him, having surrendered up every other mode of utterance. Consequently, if he shall declare that any particular government or form of government, any constitution or law, is inconsistent with the divine law, prejudicial to the increase of faith or to the growth or liberty of the Church, the believer in infallibility is bound to regard the declaration as infallibly made, as an essential part of the faith of the Church, and that disbelief in it is *heresy*, and sinful in the sight of God! Archbishop Manning makes this avowal, substantially, in these words:

"First, that the infallibility of the Church extends, as we have seen, directly to the whole matter of revealed truth, and *indirectly* to all truths which, *though not revealed*, are in such *contact with* revelation that the deposit of faith and morals can not be guarded, expounded, and defended without an infallible discernment of such unrevealed truths." ("The Vatican Council, and its Definitions," by Manning, p. 84.)

Here it is asserted, without equivocation, that infallibility extends, *indirectly*, to all matters and things which stand in the way of the progress of the Church, no matter what their nature or character. The Church must be "*guarded*," its faith must be "*expounded*," and its supreme authority over all opposing secular power must be "*defended*" and maintained, at every hazard! Whatever government, or constitution, or law shall impede the consummation of these ends must be resisted! Whatsoever the pope shall direct to be done to secure their triumph must be done, because "*the Church accredits herself*," and he is her infallible head, standing "*in the place of God!*"

The Catholic World, in the article referred to, is somewhat more specific than Archbishop Manning in defining the indirect authority of the pope in matters concerning morals. Seeming to foresee the ultimate point to which the doctrine of infallibility logically and necessarily leads, and not disposed to be behind others in defending it, the author of this article, with commendable frankness, says:

“The principles of ethics, and, therefore, of *politics* as a branch of ethics, *all lie in the theological order*; and *without theology* there is and can be no science of ethics or *politics*; and hence we see that *both*, with those who reject theology, are purely *empirical*, without any scientific basis.”*

Here it is emphatically announced that ethics and politics—the latter as a branch of the former—are both within the domain embraced by the pope’s infallibility, and are *both* under the guidance and direction of the pope, because they *both* “lie in the theological order,” and because all governments not based upon “*theology*” are “*purely empirical!*”

* The Catholic World, May, 1871, vol. xiii., p. 155. Several well-written articles have appeared in the New York Freeman’s Journal, wherein the author has treated of “the future of Europe.” In one of them, when speaking of the establishment of theocracy in the nineteenth century, he says that “theocracy, when properly understood, should be the end of every reasonable man.” He then insists that the union of Church and State “does not consist in the absorption of the Church by the State, or of the State by the Church,” but in leaving each to its separate sphere, with the Church as “the directress of conscience” and “the mistress of truth,” not by intervening in the affairs of State, but by giving “the signals.” To do this, he insists that she must have liberty, and that the State must receive her warnings with respect: “in other words,” says he, “the Church does not directly enter into the governments of states, for such is not her mission, but indirectly, inasmuch as political questions are connected with morals. Such is her duty, for, mistress of truth, guardian of morals, she is bound to condemn evil.” In his view, all those who govern should be “the lieutenants of Jesus Christ;” and as society can be saved from ruin in no other way, he thinks that “the future belongs to the principles of the Syllabus.”

In commending these articles to the readers of the Freeman’s Journal, the editor says: “This is the kind of reading that men, in every condition of society, ought to accustom themselves to and to love. There is not a Catholic man in America that is so fully instructed that he will not find a pleasure in reading this exposition. Those less read ought to seek in such writings the basis of right political appreciations. We heartily commend these papers in our Journal to all our readers as sound and good reading.”—New York Freeman’s Journal and Catholic Register, April 6th, 1872.

Political affairs are reached *indirectly*, inasmuch as they are not revealed; but being included in morals, which are revealed, a papal decree in reference to them is just as infallibly true and obligatory as if it were confined to revealed faith alone. Hence if the pope shall declare that any *political* opinions are wrong, unjust, or immoral, in the sight of God, the declaration must be held by all obedient children of the Church to be unerringly and indisputably true; and to save themselves from excommunication for heresy, they must make exterminating war upon all such opinions. Hence, also, if he shall declare that any existing government is opposed to the welfare of the Church, and, therefore, to the law of God, the same result must follow.

And hence, again, if he shall declare that the Government of the United States is unjust, oppressive, and an act of usurpation, because it gives license to the heresy of Protestantism; because it repudiates the doctrine of the “divine right” of kings; because it allows *the people* to make their own laws; because it requires the Roman Catholic hierarchy to obey the laws thus made; because it does not recognize the Roman Catholic religion as the only true religion; because it recognizes the right of each individual to interpret the Scriptures for himself, and to entertain whatsoever religious belief his own conscience and reason shall approve, or none at all, if he shall think fit; because it has separated Church and State, and denies the right of the Church to subordinate the State to any of its laws; because it not only tolerates, but fosters and protects, free thought, free speech,

and a free press; and because it is, on account of any or all of these things, in open violation of the divine law, and therefore *heretical*—does not every man of common sense see that the papal followers must select between conformity to his opinions and excommunication? between obedience to him and the forfeiture of eternal salvation? between resistance to the Government and his pontifical curse? between treason and hierarchical denunciation?

Archbishop Manning reasons thus: “The primacy is a personal privilege in Peter and his successors;” (“The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” by Manning, p. 101.) and therefore “the Roman pontiff needs the help and society of no other;” (*Ibid.*, p. 102.) and therefore, also, the “doctrinal authority” of the pope is “*personal*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 103.) And the conclusion he reaches is, that, in order to the “proper exercise” of infallibility, it is the duty of the pope to bring the whole world into “unity with the Catholic faith;” employing, of course, in the faithful discharge of this duty, whatsoever means he may deem necessary to that end. Upon this question he is explicit. He quotes, with approbation, from the doctrines maintained by Bellerini, the following propositions laid down by that author:

“Unity with the Roman faith is *absolutely necessary*, and therefore *the prerogative of absolute infallibility* is to be ascribed to it, and a COERCIVE POWER to CONSTRAIN *to unity of faith*, in like manner, *absolute*; as also the infallibility and *coercive power* of the Catholic Church itself, which is bound to adhere to the faith, are absolute.” (*Ibid.*, p. 103.)

Bellerini, it will be observed, places this “*coercive power*,” which is simply the power to employ *force*, in *the Church*, as pertaining to its plan of organization. Pius IX. does the same thing in the Syllabus. But as, according to the decree of infallibility, the pope absorbs in himself alone all the authority of the Church, as a “personal privilege,” Archbishop Manning reconciles the apparent difficulty by declaring, “This infallibility and coercive power are to be ascribed to him [the pope], and are *personal*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 104.) Hence we have this logical and inevitable result, that, when the pope alone, without any aid from councils, cardinals, or bishops, shall decree that a resort to force is necessary to secure “unity with the Catholic faith,” or to get rid of any thing, or any government, constitution, or law, which prevents or retards that unity, he acts infallibly—in the place of God—and all the faithful are bound to obedience; in the language of *The Catholic World*, to “unquestioning submission and obedience of the intellect and will!”

And it is only by rendering this obedience that the body of the Church becomes as infallible as the head, for it seems to be possessed of such diffusive qualities that it may be made to permeate the entire membership. “*Both* are infallible,” that is, the head and body, says Archbishop Manning, “the one *actively*, in teaching, the other personally in believing.” (“The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” by Manning, p. 113.) He gives the reasons, “Because its head can never err, it, as a body, can never err.” (*Ibid.*) And because the pope can not exercise “an infallible office fallibly,” therefore he can not err “*in the selection of the means of its exercise*;” (*Ibid.*, p. 114.) no matter what those means may be, whether peaceful or coercive.

Hence the same result as before is reached, that whenever he shall determine that the best “means” of bringing about “unity with the Catholic faith” throughout the world or in any part of it is by employing “*coercive power*,” such a decision becomes absolute truth, about which no doubt can or will be allowed. The act of deciding, on his part, is infallible; and the body of the Church, by passive

obedience, becomes also infallible! To deny his infallibility “*after* the definition, is *heresy*,” to deny it *before*, is “proximate to heresy.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119.)

Of course, such infallibility as this must be absolute. It is declared to be so, “inasmuch as it can be circumscribed by *no human or ecclesiastical law*.” (*Ibid.*) Therefore it is above all law or constitutions, so that when exercised by the pope all these may be trampled underfoot, if he shall so decree. It will not allow any appeal to history, in order that it may be inquired whether it is or is not consistent with the teachings of Christ, or of his immediate disciples, or of the apostolic fathers of the early Church. History is a wilderness into which it will allow none to wander without a guide of its own appointment; and it denies to every man the right to exercise his own “reason or common sense” in separating the true from the false. “If any one say,” continues the learned archbishop, “that there is no judge but right reason or common sense, he is only reproducing in history what Luther applied to the Bible.” (*Ibid.*, p. 121.) Again, “In Catholics such a theory is simple *heresy*.” Why? He answers thus: “The only source of revealed truth is God, the only channel of his revelation is the Church. No human history can declare what is contained in that revelation. The Church [the pope] alone can determine *its limits*, and therefore *its contents*.” And when the pope, acting for the Church, does determine what are its limits and contents, “no difficulties of *human history* can prevail against it.” The Church is “the city seated on a hill;” it “is *its own evidence*, anterior to its history, and independent of it. *Its history is to be learned of itself*.” (The Vatican Council, and its Definitions,” by Manning, p. 125.)

Thus the pope is made the last, final, and only judge *in everything*. He is the tribunal of last resort upon every question he shall undertake to decide. He is infallible whenever he shall decide, and whenever he declares himself to be so. Whatsoever he commands, in the vast domain embraced by his jurisdiction, has infallibility instantaneously attached to it. Whatsoever he shall announce in reference to the Church, its history, its faith, its discipline, its rules of ethics, its requirements of its members, its demands upon the world, its rights, its authority, his own power and that of his hierarchy in all the nations—all this becomes *absolute truth*, and must be accepted and obeyed as such! There must be no doubting, no hesitation, no inquiry, no resort to reason; for either to doubt, or to hesitate, or to inquire, or to appeal to reason, is heresy! The most accredited books of history must be closed. The mind must be shut up so that not a ray of light can penetrate it. The reason must be stifled by closing every avenue of access to it. The whole man must be subjugated. Everything must be surrendered to the pope, because it is impossible for him to err; because “the Church itself is the divine witness, teacher, and judge of the revelation entrusted to it;” (*Ibid.*, p. 128.) because no human power “can revise, or criticize, or test” her teachings; (*Ibid.*, p. 129.) because “the *pastors of the Church with their head* are a witness divinely sustained and guided to guard and to declare the faith;” because these obtain their testimony, “not in human history, but in apostolical tradition, in Scripture, in creeds, in the Liturgy, in the public worship and law of the Church, in councils, and *in the interpretation of all these things by the supreme authority of the Church itself*” (*Ibid.*, p. 129.)—that is, the pope—and because the Church, through the pope, “*can alone determine the extent of its own infallibility!*” (*Ibid.*, p. 135.)

Archbishop Manning is, beyond all question, a man of eminent ability; far too sagacious not to see the results which must logically follow these papal doctrines, this absorption of all power, within the illimitable domain of faith and morals, by an infallible pope. And, therefore, observing the present condition of the Christian world, and seeing the nations, hitherto Roman Catholic, gradually conceding

to *the people* more political rights than they ever enjoyed before, and witnessing the fact that the Roman Catholic people of Italy have solemnly decided, with wonderful unanimity, that the pope shall be “King of Rome” no longer, but a mere bishop of the Church, he breaks out in these doleful words:

“But what security has the Christian world? Without helm, chart, or light, it has launched itself into the *falls of revolution*. *There is not a monarchy that is not threatened*. In Spain and France *monarchy is already overthrown*. The *hated SYLLABUS* will have its justification. The SYLLABUS, which condemned atheism and revolution, *would have saved society*. But men would not. They are dissolving the temporal power of the vicar of Christ. And why do they dissolve it? Because *governments are no longer Christian*.”(*Ibid.*, p. 165.)

With Archbishop Manning and all who maintain, as he does, the enormous powers and prerogatives of the pope, all governments not monarchical are revolutionary, and “atheism and revolution” are twin sisters. The pope, as “King of Rome,” was a temporal monarch, and wore a crown like any other king. The loss of it by him, and the like loss in France and Spain, contributed at least to one practical result: the advancement of *the people* toward that condition in which they may have some voice in making the laws under which they are to live, and the creation of a hope that the time may come when they shall get along with their public affairs without the assistance of monarchs. While this is the cause of exultation and gladness to all the advocates of popular government, to the papist it is the cause of sadness and grief, because he sees in the loss of monarchy the certain death of the papacy—the sure downfall of the whole superstructure of the papal temporal dominion.

And he exclaims, as Archbishop Manning does, that “governments are no longer Christian,” because they are no longer Roman Catholic! There is, with him, no other Christianity than that professed by the Roman Catholic Church, under papal dictation! Every man who does not believe as that Church teaches, through the pope, is worse than a heathen—he is an infidel! Protestantism embodies no religion at all; it is infidelity and the most odious form of heresy! Under its pernicious influence the world is rapidly drifting toward a fearful precipice, “without helm, chart, or light,” and must soon, if not arrested by the papal arm, plunge into the terrible abyss below! When it shall have done this, and darkness and despair shall have settled over the fair places of the earth, and the groans of suffering humanity shall have reached the heavens, then “*the hated SYLLABUS will have its justification*,” because it pointed out the method of escape! The SYLLABUS “*would have saved society!*”

Having thus ascertained what the infallibility of the pope means, according to the definition of its ablest advocates, who are themselves infallible; how it raises up the papacy above all human governments and all the nations and peoples of earth; how it likens the pope to God in all the essential attributes of sovereignty; how it enables him to decide for himself, and without any human restraint, the extent and nature of his own personal power and authority over mankind; how completely it demands the closing of all investigation, the shutting—up of all minds, and the passive and humiliating obedience of both “intellect and will” to all papal decrees; and how it possesses *coercive* power to *enforce* this obedience when it is refused—our investigations would be incomplete if we did not hereafter carry them to the point of ascertaining how the ills with which society is now afflicted are to be remedied; how, when all mankind shall come to obey the pope, they are to be governed, if that millennial period shall ever arrive.

We have the means of discovering something about the past, and know what the present is; but what kind of future there is in store for us when the papacy shall triumph, as its devotees pretend to believe it will, can only be learned from its authoritative teachings and from its past history. Whatever its history has been, and whatever its present teachings are, the whole is accepted as infallible truth, by those who submit to the dogma of infallibility. Whatever they may be to—morrow, or next day, or next year, or at any time in the immediate or remote future, they will be accepted in like manner; for the papacy, under the guidance of the crafty followers of Loyola, demands submission, not merely to all the past and present decrees of the popes, but to all that any *future* pope, or the present one, shall *hereafter* promulgate! Thus *The Catholic World* instructs us. In an article upon “Infallibility,” published in the number for August, 1871, this doctrine is set forth in these words:

“A Catholic must not only believe what the Church now proposes to his belief, but *be ready to believe whatever she may hereafter propose*. And he must, therefore, *be ready to give up any or all of his probable opinions* so soon as they are condemned and proscribed by a competent authority.” (*The Catholic World*, August, 1871, vol. xiii., p. 586.)

And this he must do, as this same authority instructs us, “with unquestioning submission and obedience of the intellect and will,” by the forfeiture of his manhood and the debasement of his nature, and with no more “right to ask reasons” of either pope or priest, than he has to ask them of Almighty God! The servitude of negro slavery was not more humiliating, the difference being only the substitution of the lash of excommunication for that of the slave-driver.

Thus, by the wonderful perfectness of this ecclesiastical organization, we find it in possession of authority over the minds, consciences, thoughts, and actions of so large a portion of our population as to assure us, with reasonable certainty, that many of them will attempt to do, directly or indirectly, whatsoever the pope shall require of them. That he would reconstruct our Government so as to make it conform to his own views in all those things which concern the Church, its welfare, and its faith, by subordinating all our constitutions and laws, in each of these particulars, to his sovereign will, no fair-minded and sensible man will deny. That he would take from *the people* the right to make any laws except such as he shall consider consonant to the divine law, there is not the least doubt. That he would subject the State to the domination of the Church in the entire domain of faith and morals, everybody knows. That he would give entire independence to his hierarchy in the United States, so that they should not be answerable to the civil law, even for crimes of the greatest magnitude, there is abundant and convincing proof. That he would abolish every other form of religious belief but that of his own Church, and secure to it the prerogative of exclusiveness by intolerant penal laws, and abolish free speech and a free press, he has himself avowed in almost every form of utterance.

Therefore, we have the greatest possible interest in knowing to what extent he is likely to obtain obedience from his followers in this country upon each and all of these great and vital questions; what kind of institutions he would erect in the place of those we have; and how he proposes, in his unbounded pontifical benevolence, to better our condition. The field of such an inquiry is exceedingly broad, and we may do but little more than enter within its borders, taking care to keep in mind the fact that, in this country of Protestant freedom, we have nothing to do with the religious convictions of any man, or his want of them, except in so far as they may be made a pretext for assaulting the Constitution

and laws of the country. To an attack upon these, by either a foreign or domestic foe, we are not yet prepared for tame submission.

Chapter VI. Claim of Divine Power

Claim of Divine Power over Temporals by Pius IX.—Its Extent.—He alone Defines its Limits.—Effect of this in the United States.—Principles of the Constitution within the Jurisdiction of the Papacy. —Germany, Italy, etc. —The Pope stirs up Insurrection there.—The Jesuits Expelled.—Papists in the United States Justify Resistance to the Law of Germany.—Same Laws in the United States.—Effect upon Allegiance.—Bavarian Protest. —Abuse of the Confessional.—Power of Absolution.—The Immoral Bearings of the Confessional.

SINCE the formation of our Government, there has been, among the people of the United States, much discussion and some of it angry and exciting—involving the extent and distribution of civil power, and the relations between the National Government and the States; yet no portion of them have been disposed to assail the fundamental principles upon which our institutions are founded. Their differences, although often radical and threatening, have hitherto failed to eradicate from their minds the strong attachment they have always borne to that form of popular freedom and sovereignty which constitutes one of the most distinctive features in our plan of government. Even sectional jealousies and civil war, with all their terrible and deplorable consequences, and with the bad passions they invariably engender, have failed to destroy or weaken this attachment; and to-day there is no single State in the Union which, if it were remodeling its domestic government, would not preserve with the most sedulous care the separation of the Church from the State, so that *the people* should remain the primary source of all civil power. If there is a single sentiment which has universality among all the lovers of our free institutions, it is this. They cling to it with affection like that with which the mother hugs her offspring to her bosom. And it is something of a tax upon their patience when they see this great principle assailed at the bidding of a *foreign* power, no matter whether that power is clothed in the robes of ecclesiastical or temporal royalty, or both combined.

Pope Pius IX. has been, of late years, exceedingly fruitful of encyclical and apostolic letters, intended for the double purpose of warning the nations and advising the faithful. He deemed it necessary to issue one when he rejected the guarantees for his spiritual freedom offered him by the Italian Government, so as to notify the world of the reasons which prompted his refusal. It was dated May 15th, 1871; and while less comprehensive than that which accompanied the Syllabus in 1864, it is equally explicit in the claim that the “*civil principality*” of the pope was conferred upon him, not by any human concessions, but by “*divine Providence.*” He declares that “all the prerogatives, and all the rights of authority, necessary to governing the *Universal Church* have been received by us [the pope], in the person of the most blessed Peter, *directly from God himself.*” Hence he cannot consent to “be subjected to the rule of *another prince;*” for such deference to human authority would be violative of the divine decree.

His reference here was directly to Victor Emmanuel, who, by seizing upon his royal crown, had, in his eyes, been guilty of an impious and sacrilegious act, punishable by excommunication. But he looked further than this. Realizing the necessity of stirring up the faithful all over the world to a defense of his temporal sovereignty, and, possibly, to a crusade for its restoration, he availed himself of the occasion to notify them that the wrongs inflicted upon him “have redounded on *the whole Christian commonwealth;*” that is, that as it is a part of God’s irreversible law that he should remain a *temporal sovereign*, the belief to that effect has become an essential part of the religious faith of the Church,

which must be maintained by all who desire to escape the papal malediction in this life, and secure heaven in the next.

He looked, also, to the consequences of this doctrine, which, logically, give precisely the same universality to both his spiritual and temporal power, so that where one is, the other must also be. If God gave “civil principality” to Peter in order that he might *establish* the Church, then the conclusion is inevitable that the same *civil* power which Peter possessed is necessary to *govern* the Church, not only at Rome, but elsewhere. And it must be possessed in the same degree in all parts of the world; for whatever is necessary to preserve and advance Christianity at one place is equally so, for the same purposes, at all other places.

The faith and the Church, as papists insist, must both be unchanging. The whole “Christian commonwealth” must be so wedded together as to become a perfect unity. This “commonwealth” must be presided over by the same prince—the representative of Peter—governed by the same laws, and held responsible to the same tribunal, in the entire domain of faith and morals. There must be no discordance anywhere, from center to circumference. As Peter had a universal primacy, and governed all Christians as the royal head of the Church, he could not be a *foreign* prince in any part of the “Christian commonwealth,” but, by virtue of his divine appointment and God’s unerring will, was a *domestic* prince throughout its whole extent! If, therefore, the pope could not, without violating the Providential decree, consent to be governed by “another prince” at Rome, he could not consent to be governed by another prince, or government, or any earthly power whatsoever, in any other part of the world; or, if he did, he would forfeit his claim to universality of dominion, such as he alleges Peter to have possessed, and destroy the unity of the Church, which would be offensive to God. With his mind persuaded by this process of reasoning, the pope announces his independence of all human authority, and his supremacy over all governments and peoples, in this strong language:

“Thinking and meditating on all these matters, we are bound anew to enforce and to profess, what we have oftentimes declared, with your unanimous consent, that the civil sovereignty of the Holy See has been given to the Roman pontiff by a singular counsel of Divine Providence; and that it is of *necessity*, in order that the Roman pontiff may exercise the *supreme power and authority*, divinely given to him by the Lord Christ himself, of feeding and *ruling the entire flock of the Lord with fullest liberty*, and may consult for the greater good of the Church, and its interests and needs, that he shall *never be subject to any prince or civil power*.” (Appletons’ “Annual Cyclopaedia,” 1871, pp. 689, 690.)

This not only asserts the “civil sovereignty” of the pope as a matter of “necessity,” but explains that necessity by the assumed fact that it is conferred by Divine Providence, with supremacy everywhere, so that by means of it he may rule “the entire flock” of Christians with the “fullest liberty,” that is, without the interference of any “civil power” on earth! To this point, everything is settled without room for cavil or controversy. Beyond it there lies this great question, full of interest to the world, and especially to the Protestant portion of it, What degree of “civil power” must the pope possess—how far shall he control the management of civil affairs—in order that he may rule nations and peoples, and keep them in the line of duty to God and the papacy?

When it is said that the pope desires to absorb in his own hands *all* the powers of civil government elsewhere than in Rome, the accusation is probably too broad. In so far as the laws and institutions of

any of the nations regulate and direct the ordinary practical working of government, he could have no special motive for interference with them. As it regards these, it could make but little difference to the papacy whether they provided for one thing or another; or whether the machinery was in the hands of many or few. Or whether they are such as commonly belong to a monarchy or a republic, would, perhaps, not concern him in the least. Judicial, revenue, postal, land, and other systems concerning local affairs alone, and the ministerial duties pertaining to them, are all matters which the pope might be quite willing to leave undisturbed. It is to these, undoubtedly, that he and his followers refer when they talk about the affairs which legitimately belong to human governments. It should be conceded to them, inasmuch as the declaration is made so frequently and with such apparent sincerity, that with these they do not desire the pope to interfere.

But the question assumes an entirely different aspect, when the policy of a government, or its constitutions and laws, touch upon, or in any way affect, religion, or the Church, or the papacy, either directly or indirectly. All these involve inquiries which, by the papal theory, are exclusively within the spiritual jurisdiction of the pope. They are within the domain of faith and morals; and as God has forbidden any human governments to enter upon this domain, everything that concerns religion, or the Church, or the papacy is subject to the sovereign authority of the pope, as the successor of Peter! He alone possesses legitimate power to decide all questions of this nature; and, therefore, human governments cannot take cognizance of them in any form. Whenever they do, the State is placed above the Church, because it undertakes to interfere with the faith. And as God designed, in all such matters, that the Church should be above the State, all papists insist that whatever pertains to them shall be separated from human governments and given in charge to the Church, or to the pope, who is its infallible head. But inasmuch as the State must necessarily take jurisdiction of many things within the domain of morals, though not of faith, in order to keep society together and provide for the protection of person and property, the papal theory goes to the extent of requiring that, in so far as these are concerned, the spiritual authority of the pope shall include temporal authority, to the extent of enabling him to prevent any infringement upon religion, or the rights of the Church, or of the papacy. To this end it is necessary that the Church and the State should be united, so that whenever the State invades the jurisdiction of the Church, it may be brought back, peaceably, if possible, but by coercion, if necessary, within its own legitimate sphere.

Hence, the point at which the pope's interference with the temporal affairs of the State begins, is that at which, according to his theory, the spiritual and temporal jurisdictions unite in him. So long as the State stops short of this point, he does not seek to impair its functions; but when it reaches it and seeks to go beyond it, then it comes in contact with the sovereignty which, by divine right, belongs to him, and must yield submission to it at the peril of violating the law of God! This sovereignty is conferred upon him, as it was upon Peter, that he may prevent either State or people from violating this law.

When the papal authorities are pressed to the wall, they concede that "the State is supreme *in its own order*, and there is no power in *temporals* above it." But for fear the concession will weaken the cause of the papacy, they insist that there is an order above the State, and to which it is subordinate; that is, "the spiritual order or kingdom of God on earth, or the order represented by the Catholic Church." With them, "the Church is the guardian on earth of the rights of God," and belongs to a *higher* order than that of the State. Therefore, the State lies in the "subordinate" order, and the Church in the "supreme." She

sets up, they say, no claim of authority, in this lower order in which the State lies, but “as the rights of God are, or should be, held to be above the alleged rights of the empire,” she cannot surrender any thing which belongs to her, as the custodian of these rights, to the civil power& “To deny this,” says a leading and able periodical, “is to assert political atheism. We must obey God rather than man.”(*New York Tablet*, November 23d, 1872, p. 8.)

This leaves us to discover the line of partition between the two orders, that we may separate the higher from the lower, and thereby leave each to its proper jurisdiction. The Church represents the whole “kingdom of God on earth,” and, therefore, all “the rights of God” belong to her. Whatever these rights are, they pertain to the order in which the Church lies. The papist does not hesitate an instant in defining them; the pope has so frequently done it for him as to leave his mind in no doubt about them. They necessarily embrace, in his view, whatever pertains to faith and morals; in other words, all that concerns the Church, its discipline, its government, its welfare, and its progress toward the final conquest of the world. They include also all questions of faith, everything relating to morals, and the whole multitude of duties which men owe to God, to the Church, and to society. As all these are within the sphere of the “spiritual order” and the guardianship of the pope, as the “vicar of Christ,” it belongs to him alone to define what they are. In doing so, he exercises his infallibility, and whatsoever he decides must be accepted as absolutely true. As he has no other witness but himself, stands alone in the world, and settles all questions concerning the extent and nature of his own spiritual jurisdiction, so it depends upon him to declare what belongs to the superior or spiritual, and what to the inferior or temporal, order; what to the Church, and what to the State. The papist accepts him as standing in the place of God on earth. Therefore, when he makes an announcement of what is within the sphere of the spiritual order, that must be accepted by him as belonging to that order, and as being removed entirely from the jurisdiction of the temporal order.

When he announces, as he has done, that the law of God does not allow freedom of religious faith and worship; or that the Church cannot tolerate any opinions contrary to its teaching; or that free speech, free thought, and a free press are leading the world to perdition; or that Church and State should be united; or that his hierarchy throughout the world should constitute a privileged class, not subject to the laws which govern others; or any of those other innumerable things about which he has written so frequently and so much; then all these matters are removed from the temporal jurisdiction, and the State must not dare to lay her unhallowed hands upon them. They belong to the “supreme.” order, in which the Church stands alone! They pertain to the “rights of God,” of which the pope is the only earthly guardian! Therefore, upon all questions of this nature, according to the papal theory, the Church—that is, the pope—must be superior to and above the State, so that the State may be kept within its own inferior order, or if permitted to go beyond it, then that whatsoever it does shall be done under the supervision of the spiritual order, and in conformity with its commands. And this is what the pope and the defenders of his personal infallibility mean when they talk about keeping the Church in its “*supreme*” and the State in its “*subordinate*” order. Whenever the State infringes upon the jurisdiction of the Church, it must be taught that it has wandered out of its legitimate sphere. And when warned of its transgression, if it continues to lay its impious hands upon holy things, the papal lash is applied without mercy.

History is crowded with instances where interdicts, excommunications, the releasing of citizens from their natural allegiance, and pontifical anathemas, in every variety of form, have been visited upon the heads of such offenders. We shall become familiar with some of these at the proper time, as they rise up before us in that marvelous order of events which mark the progress of the papacy.

Now, when we come to make a practical application of this papal theory to our own national and state policy, so as to see what the pope meant in his Encyclical of 1871, when he said that he must have the “fullest liberty” to rule “the entire flock of the Lord,” and that, in doing so, he must not be subject to any “civil power,” there is no difficulty in seeing where, in his view, we have gone beyond the limits of the temporal order, and offended against the Church and the true faith. All our constitutions, national and state, have forbidden a religious establishment; have separated the affairs of the State from those of the Church, by breaking the old bond of union between them; have left every man’s conscience entirely free, so that he may entertain whatsoever form of religious faith it shall dictate, or none, if that shall seem to him consistent with duty; have provided for the utmost freedom of speech and of the press; have made all the laws dependent upon the consent of the people, and every citizen, no matter what his condition, obedient to them; and have guarded against any possible encroachment other great principles which we consider as belonging to the very fundamentals of civil government. Is any man so ignorant as not to know that all these have been denounced, not only by Pope Pius IX., but by many of his predecessors? In his view, they involve matters which do not legitimately belong to civil government in the narrow and contracted sphere in which he would confine it. They pertain to the spiritual order, and are, therefore, within the circle of the spiritual jurisdiction! They affect the true faith, infringe upon the rights of the Church, limit the authority of the papacy, curtail the rightful powers of the hierarchy, give encouragement to heresy and infidelity, and for these and other reason are defiant to the laws of God; therefore, God has imposed upon him, as the successor of Peter, the obligation of declaring that they are impious in his sight, and of employing all the weapons in the pontifical armory for their extermination! And thus, to the extent of being enabled to regulate all these matters according to the command of God and the requirements of the Church, by striking them from our constitutions, and repealing all the statutes passed for their preservation, he considers that God has united both spiritual and temporal authority in his hands, and that the “civil power” of this country has no just right to place the slightest impediment in his way! The nation must bow in humiliation and disgrace before him, so that as the papal car rides in triumph over it, the last remembrance of the work of our fathers shall be crushed out!

Already the censures of the pope rest upon whatsoever he finds in the civil policy of all the nations violative of the lights of the Church, or of God’s law, as he interprets it. The governments of Italy, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and Brazil have deemed it expedient for their own domestic peace and protection to adopt certain measures, which are designed, among other things, to require every citizen to obey the law of the state, and thereby to prevent sedition. It cannot be denied that they had the right to pass these laws, by all the principles which nations recognize. They have relation to questions which concern their own domestic economy questions which each nation has the exclusive right to decide for itself. The laws have been enacted in proper form, and with the usual solemnity, so that they should be considered as expressing, in each case, the will of the nation. Yet, because they affect the interest of the Church, have taken from some of its favorite orders a portion of their temporal wealth, have prohibited the prelates from teaching sedition, and have required them to conform to the law, the pope has

fulminated against these states the most terrible anathemas. They have invaded his spiritual jurisdiction, because the laws they have enacted, although in reference to temporalities, affect the affairs of the papacy and weaken its power.

Therefore, Pius IX., professedly speaking “in the name of Jesus Christ” and “by the authority of the holy apostles, Peter and Paul,” admonishes the authors of these measures that they should “take pity on their souls,” and not continue “to treasure up for themselves wrath against the day of wrath, and of the revelation of the just judgment of God.” And not only does he thus assume jurisdiction to denounce and condemn the authors of these measures of civil policy, and the measures themselves, but he compliments and applauds his adherents for their disobedience to the laws, although subjects of and owing allegiance to the governments enacting them! Speaking more particularly of the German empire, he says:

“Nay, adding calumny and insult to their wrong, they are not ashamed to charge their raging persecution as the fault of Catholics, because the prelates and clergy, together with the faithful, *refuse to prefer the laws and orders of the civil empire to the most holy laws of their God, and of the Church*; and so will not leave off their religious duty.”

And then he goes on to talk about these subjects who have refused to obey the laws of their states as exhibiting “admirable firmness,” as having “their loins girt about with truth,” as wearing “the breastplate of justice,” as “dismayed by no dangers, discouraged by no hardships,” as carrying on a “combat for the Church,” for the papacy, “and for its sacred rights valiantly and earnestly,” and as presenting “the power of a compact unity.”*

* This “Allocution” of Pope Pius IX. is dated December 23d, 1872, and will be found at length in the *New York Freeman’s Journal and Catholic Register* for January 18th, 1873. Also in Appletons’ “Annual Cyclopaedia,” 1872, p. 714.

Thus he gives his pontifical sanction and approval to what every nation on earth considers disloyalty; but what he considers right and justifiable, because the obnoxious laws, although in reference to temporal affairs, impair his pontifical rights, and, consequently, violate the law of God. He insists that his spiritual scepter extends over all these nations, and that he has a right to release their citizens from their proper allegiance to their domestic laws, whenever, in his opinion, those laws shall encroach upon his own personal rights, or the rights of the Church, as he shall declare them! And he thereby furnishes a practical application of his theory of the spiritual power, which is neither more nor less than a denial to the state of any jurisdiction over even temporal matters, when, in his judgment, they concern religion, the Church, the papacy, or any thing within the unlimited domain of faith and morals!

These papal censures rest, of course, most heavily upon such nations and peoples as have declared, by the forms of their civil institutions, that the Church shall have no share whatever in matters pertaining to the civil jurisdiction, or in the government of temporalities. All such nations have, according to him, committed the sin of infidelity, which they aggravate when they require his hierarchy to obey all the laws, and refuse them permission, as in Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Brazil, to set up an ecclesiastic empire within the state, with a “*foreign prince*” to rule it. Among these nations the United States occupies the most prominent position. Our Government has always persevered in maintaining

measures which the popes have considered prejudicial to the interests and welfare of the Church; and has always denied the authority which they claim to belong to them by divine right.

By means of these and kindred matters, we have, in the eyes of the papacy, become egregious offenders. We have made our institutions infidel and heretical. We have refused to accept the papal policy of government in preference to our own. We have kept the State above the Church in all matters concerning temporalities. We have failed to give any form of ecclesiasticism the support of law, or to confer any exclusive privileges upon the hierarchy. Hence, the followers of the pope are availing themselves of our Protestant toleration, in order to assure him, by assailing such principles of our government as he has condemned, how completely they have submitted their intellects and wills to his dictation.

Not having been permitted, thus far, to restore the temporal power of the pope at Rome, and maddened by his downfall to an extreme degree of violence, they have converted a large portion of their Church literature into denunciatory assaults upon our constitution and laws, possibly with the hope that when their work of exterminating Protestantism has ended, a “*holy empire*,” with the pope as its sovereign, may rise upon the ruins of our free institutions. While with one breath they tell us that it is false to say they desire the pope to interfere with our civil affairs, with the next they assail our Constitution, and insolently declare that we do not ourselves understand what its fundamental principles are. They actively employ their untiring energies and acute intellects in the work of reconstructing our Government, so as to turn over to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction the very matters which our fathers intentionally removed from it, notwithstanding that removal has, thus far in our history, contributed, in an eminent degree, to our strength and progress as a nation.

Examples of this are far more numerous than is generally supposed. The relations between the pope and his hierarchical adherents are so intimate and direct, that he has but to give the word of command, and they become immediately emulous (competitive) of each other in the exhibition of their obedience and submission. His voice they consider to be the voice of God, and wheresoever he requires them to strike, there they direct their blows. They rest neither night nor day; for the vigilance of the Jesuit never sleeps, and nothing can extinguish his hatred of religious liberty.

The Catholic World, in the number for September, 1871, contains a leading article, entitled “The Reformation not Conservative.” It appeared so soon after the pope’s Encyclical of that year that it must have been intended as a response to his fervid anticipations of ultimate sovereignty over the world. The author professes to accept the Constitution of the United States “as originally understood and intended;” that is, as he interprets it, in a sense which denies *the sovereignty of the people*, or that the Government holds from them, or is responsible to them! He repudiates entirely, and with indignation, “*the Protestant principle*,” from which this popular sovereignty is derived, because he considers it to be *Jacobinism*! And from these premises he reaches the following disloyal conclusions in reference to the Constitution:

“...but as it is interpreted by the liberal and sectarian journals that are doing their best to revolutionize it, and is beginning to be interpreted by no small portion of the American people, or is interpreted by the Protestant principle, so widely diffused among us, and in the sense of European liberalism and Jacobinism, WE DO NOT ACCEPT IT, or hold it to be ANY GOVERNMENT AT ALL, or as *capable*

of performing any of the proper functions of government; and if it continues to be interpreted by the revolutionary principle of Protestantism, it is sure to fail—to lose itself either in the supremacy of the mob or in military despotism; and doom us, like unhappy France, to alternate between them, with the mob uppermost to— day, and the despot to—morrow. Protestantism, like the heathen barbarisms which Catholicity subdued, lacks the element of order, because it rejects authority [the authority of the pope], and is necessarily incompetent to maintain real liberty or civilized society. Hence it is we so often say that if the American Republic is to be sustained and preserved at all, it must be by the rejection of the principle of the Reformation, and the acceptance of the Catholic principle by the American people. Protestantism can preserve neither liberty from running into license and lawlessness, nor authority from running into despotism.” (*The Catholic World*, September, 1871, vol. xiii., p. 736.)

What is here meant by such expressions as the “*Protestant principle*,” the “*revolutionary principle of Protestantism*,” and the “*principles of the Reformation*?” Manifestly, they are used as equivalent terms to express the same idea that our Government derives its powers from the people, who, in the revolutionary contests with monarchy which followed the Reformation, successfully resisted the divine right of kings, and entered upon the experiment of governing themselves. Until this revolution began they had no voice in the management of public affairs, and were not consulted about the laws. Kings governed by divine right, and the papacy, under the same claim of right, was one of the great, if not the greatest, controlling powers in the world. But new light was shed by the Reformation, and new forms of government began to arise. Protestantism being its natural fruit, had its influence in their formation; and inasmuch as all its teachings and tendencies inculcate the elevation of individuals and the progress of society, this divine right of government was denied, and the right of self— government established. The authority of kings was dispensed with, and the authority of the people substituted for it. No institutions in the world guard and guarantee this great principle better than ours. The constitution declares it in its preamble, and protects it in all its parts.

The most efficient means of protection afforded by it are found especially in those provisions which prohibit an establishment of religion, creation of privileged classes, and provide for equality of citizenship and rights, the universality of law, the freedom of conscience, of speech, and of the press. These are the “*Protestant*” and “*revolutionary*” principles to which this author refers. They are the former, because they are opposed to the principles of the papacy; the latter, because they place the authority of government in the hands of the people, rather than in those of a monarch. By our fathers, who established the Government; by all those who have been entrusted with its management from the beginning; and by the great body of the people of the United States, our constitution has been always and invariably interpreted in the light of these principles and facts. We have differed among ourselves about many things, but not about these great principles. And we now cherish them none the less because it required revolution to establish them.

This papal writer is not so ignorant as to be uninformed about our history. He tells us, however, that, as we understand and interpret our constitution, he, though professedly an American citizen, *will not “accept it,”* that it is no “*government at all*”—a mere rope of sand, and not “*capable of performing any of the proper functions of government.*” If he took the oath of allegiance to it in the Protestant sense, he must have cherished treason in his heart against it at the time. If he took it in any other sense, he committed perjury in the eye of the law. Be this as it may, he stands now before the country as the

confessed enemy of the great fundamental principles which the Constitution was designed to perpetuate. And what are the avowed grounds of his opposition? These, and nothing less: That the right of self—government in the people is only the “*supremacy of the mob*,” that a government founded upon that right “*lacks the element of order*,” and cannot maintain liberty or society “because it rejects *authority*.” What authority? The authority of kings—of those who govern by divine right.

The people, said Dr. Brownson, were born to be governed, not to govern; they need a master! And this writer instructs us where we may find such a master; “by the rejection of the principle of the Reformation, and the acceptance of the Catholic principle!” Then authority will triumph, the right of self—government will be gone, the divine right be re—established, the fundamental principles of our Government will be lost forever; we shall have an established Church and a privileged hierarchy, and no more freedom of conscience, of speech, and of the press; the papacy will win its grand triumph, and the pope become our master!

But the questions we are discussing do not involve the necessity of dwelling upon these consequences, which are not likely to be visited upon us, unless some power shall arise sufficiently overwhelming to arrest the career of national progress. They have to do, rather, with the position of the papal defenders in this country, the motives which influence them, and the principles upon which they justify their combined assault upon institutions to which, in their present form, the greater part of them have taken oaths of allegiance.

Wherein does the difference consist, in principle, between them and those citizens of Germany who have been so highly extolled for their resistance to the laws of their Government? The particular measures of civil policy which have invited the resistance are not alike, but the principle is the same in all the cases. It is neither more nor less than opposition to law, because it affects the Church, by denying that the pope has any right, either divine or human, to interfere with the domestic and temporal policy of the government. The pope claims that, by virtue of authority conferred upon him by Divine Providence, he has the spiritual right to release these disobedient citizens of Germany from their allegiance to their own Government, and that any resistance to this by that Government is a violation of God’s law. He teaches that their “first duty” is to him, because he represents God; and that if, in paying this duty, they violate the laws of their state, they stand justified before God, because the spiritual order is above the temporal. And thus he erects an ecclesiastical government within the temporal, demanding obedience upon the ground that God did not design that the pope should be subject to any “*civil power*” on earth! He holds out the same justification to his followers in the United States, encouraging their opposition to principles of our Government far more fundamental than any assailed in Europe, and rests it upon the same claim of divine power.

As “vicar of Christ” he dispenses the obligation of allegiance, and turns loose his ecclesiastical army upon every government on earth which dares to establish any constitution, or pass any law, or do any act that shall curtail his authority or that of his hierarchy, or shall prevent the papacy from becoming, what he claims for it, the universal governing power. And writers like the author of the foregoing article in *The Catholic World*, perfectly obedient and submissive to him, enter with alacrity upon the task of assailing the very fundamental principles of our Government, as if the American people were either insensible to their perfidy, or ready to become the impassive dupes of their intrigues.

That these papal followers in the United States occupy a position substantially analogous to that of those in Germany, who are justified by the pope for resistance to the civil power, is easily demonstrable. Take, for example, the relations between them and the Government of the empire. Before the unification of Germany, Prussia was a Protestant nation. Like all other Protestant nations, its laws gave equal protection to every denomination of Christians. In so far as they protected the rights of conscience, they recognized no difference between the Lutheran and other Protestant churches, and the Roman Catholic Church. Perfect freedom of faith and worship was not only conferred, but guaranteed to all. Education was compulsory, but each of the churches was permitted, in addition to the education required by the state, to impress the principles of its own faith upon the minds of the young who were under its charge. In the Roman Catholic schools the religion of that Church was taught, without any prohibition by the state. Papal infallibility had not then been decreed, and, consequently, was not a necessary part of that religion. It was, undoubtedly, maintained by the Jesuit or Ultramontane party, but this constituted so small a portion of the great body of the Church in Prussia, that the Government was not disposed to hold it responsible, as a whole, for the doctrines of this party. It was well understood that it would elevate the pope to a condition of superiority over the state, if the power to do so were given it; but it made so little progress in that direction, on account of the natural tendency of the German mind toward freedom of thought, as to excite no serious apprehensions on the part of the Government. And, consequently, under the Prussian kingdom there was no attempt to interfere with the Roman Catholic schools, or with the Church, or with the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of its hierarchy.

This harmony was disturbed by two of the most important events of the present period: the decree of infallibility, and the war between Prussia and France. These two events occurred so nearly together that there would seem to have been some intimate relationship between them. The war was designed on the part of Napoleon III. to settle the superiority of the Latin over the Teutonic race, and the decree to make the papacy supreme over all the nations. So far from the former of these objects having been accomplished, the contest resulted in German unification; in not only converting the kingdom of Prussia into the German empire, but in making it one of the strongest and most compact military powers in the world.

Whether, during the struggle, there was any effort on the part of the ultramontane prelates and clergy to convert it into a religious war, by persuading the Roman Catholics of Germany into the belief that the triumph of the true faith would inevitably follow the destruction of the Protestant Government of Prussia, does not bear especially upon our present inquiry. It is, however, the fact, that, after the close of the war, when the civil authorities entered upon the duty of consolidating the empire, they found that the effect of the decree of infallibility was to make the Roman Catholic religion in the empire a very different thing from what it had previously been in the kingdom. A considerable number of the German prelates had voted "non placet," that is, against the decree, in the Lateran Council, but they were unable to resist the power and pressure of the papacy, and yielded their assent under ultramontane dictation and threats. The necessary effect was that the Roman Catholic Church in Germany became subject to this same dictation; or, perhaps, it is more proper to say, that the ultramontanes immediately inaugurated measures to put it under the dominion of the papacy.

One of the most efficient of these was the assertion of the right to teach the doctrine of papal infallibility in the public schools of the state, and thereby impress the minds of the Roman Catholic

youth with the idea that, instead of owing their “first duty” to Germany, they owed it to the pope; from whom, notwithstanding any law of the state, they were bound to accept every thing concerning religion and the Church as absolutely and infallibly true. They put themselves, accordingly, in direct hostility to the civil authorities of the empire, and, by doing so, forced large numbers of their Church who desired to remain obedient to the laws, and who were opposed to the doctrine of infallibility, to separate themselves from the papal organization under the name of “Old Catholics.” Among these were some of the most distinguished and learned professors of the German universities, who were followed by many of their pupils, and by others, who were convinced by the force of their arguments that if they put themselves in the power of the ultramontanes, and accepted the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility, they would occupy, necessarily, a position of antagonism to the Government. All these were excommunicated by the pope, and one of the questions which the Government had to meet was to decide upon the effect of this act. The pope and the ultramontanes insisted that it cut off all the excommunicated from Christian intercourse, and from the right to perform any church functions whatever. The public authorities thought and decided otherwise, and gave them the full protection of the law in maintaining their organization; which they claimed to be precisely in accordance with that which prevailed in the Church in the ages before it was corrupted by the papacy.

Other events contributed to make the breach still wider. There is a military church at Cologne, where a priest, who refused to accept infallibility, and was under the ban of excommunication, offered the sacrifice of the mass. For this the church was placed under interdict by the ultramontane chaplain general of the army, who claimed that, by virtue of his episcopal office, he had the right to prohibit the use of the building for any other worship than that which had the approval of the pope. For this he was tried by a military court for a violation of the articles of war, and his episcopal functions suspended.

The Bishop of Ermeland excommunicated two professors of theology as apostates, and the minister of worship denied to him the right to cut them off from Christian communion without the consent of the state. The bishop, still defying the authorities, was deprived of his government salary. The Emperor William sent Cardinal Hohenlohe as an ambassador to the court of the pope, and the pope refused to receive him. The excitement became more and more intensified every day, until the Government, convinced that the Jesuits were the prime movers in all the acts of resistance to its authority, issued a proclamation, July 4th, 1872, expelling all foreign Jesuits from the empire, and providing that those who were natives should have their places of residence prescribed to them. This was done pursuant to a law passed by the German Reichstag, which was ultimately interpreted to embrace other monastic orders and congregations which had yielded to the pressure of ultramontane influence, such as the Redemptorists, the Lazarists, the Trappists, the Christian Brothers, etc.

All this was called persecution, of course, and yet these acts of the Government were domestic remedies against disloyalty. They were adopted in defense of the laws of the state, and it is in that view alone that they are now considered. Whether they were politic or not was exclusively for the German Government to decide. But the pope and the ultramontanes did not so regard them. In their view they were an invasion of the pope’s jurisdiction. They demanded that, as the pope represented God, and the Emperor William represented the state, the latter should permit the former to enter his dominions as a domestic prince, and dictate what laws concerning the Church, its faith, and its priesthood should be executed, and what should be disobeyed! That was, and is to—day, the sole question of controversy

between the German empire and the papacy, just as it is between the papacy and all other governments, the United States included.

Although the issue grows out of different measures of government policy, it is substantially the same everywhere. And, therefore, when the pope accompanied his claim of “*secular principedom*” with the sentiments already quoted from his Encyclical of December 23d, 1872, he intended that the encouragement he thereby gave the violations of the law in Germany should equally apply to all other governments where the rights of the papacy, as he has announced them, are either denied or violated. Governments have no more important question to deal with than this: their existence may depend upon it. Whatever, or however varied, their domestic policy may be, they should decide it for themselves. The moment they allow a *foreign* power to dictate it, in any essential particular, that moment they lose their independence and sink into imbecility.

While the American people have no just right to concern themselves about the internal policy of the German empire (it being fully competent to manage its own affairs), it is important that they should know how far the Roman Catholic mind in this country is likely to be affected by the teachings of the pope in reference to those who have so offensively violated its laws. If his power over the sentiments and opinions of his followers in the United States is as great as it is there—and there is no reason to suppose it is not—then, although there may be no immediate open resistance to the principles of our Government which he has condemned, the fact exists that there is a cherished purpose to make it whenever there is a reasonable promise of success.

We may not fear resistance, but are always better prepared to meet it when aware that it is contemplated. The seeds of disease are more easily removed before they have become diffused throughout the system. One of the fathers of the Republic gave us this admonition:

“Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure you to believe me, fellow—citizens, the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.”(Washington’s Farewell Address.)

And one of the great men of our own times, contemplating the possible dangers which might result from even the foreign ownership of stock in our moneyed institutions, said:

“Of the course which would be pursued by a bank almost wholly owned by the subjects of a foreign power, and managed by those whose interests, if not affections, would run in the same direction, there can be no doubt. All its operations within would be in aid of hostile fleets and armies without. Controlling our currency, receiving our public moneys, and *holding thousands of our citizens in dependence*, it would be more formidable and dangerous than the naval and military power of the enemy.”(Jackson’s Veto of the Bank of the United States.)

The nation did not stand in the immediate presence of any danger from foreign influence when these sentiments were uttered. Their distinguished authors looked to precautionary measures alone. And how much more “formidable and dangerous” than a few stockholders in a moneyed corporation are a multitude of men, moved by a single impulse, compacted together by a common sentiment, and ready, at the dictation of a “foreign prince,” to aim their blows, openly or secretly, at such principles of our

Government as he may condemn, upon the plea that they belong to the spiritual order, over which God has placed the pope as the sole, sovereign, and infallible judge?

On the 25th day of March, 1873, “a very large meeting” of “the Catholic Germans of Philadelphia” was held in that city. Its avowed object was “for the purpose of placing upon record their sympathy with their oppressed and persecuted fellow—Catholics of Germany, and to *congratulate them and their noble hierarchy upon the heroic stand they have taken in the face of the persecuting Government;*” that is, upon their resistance to laws regularly and legally enacted. The Bishops of Philadelphia, Scranton, and Harrisburg were all present at this meeting, accompanied by “a large number of the reverend clergy.” Clapping of hands, hearty cheers, and strains of music enlivened the occasion. Eloquent addresses were delivered; but one, by the “pastor of St. Bonifacius,” produced a “sweeping effect” and great enthusiasm, because of its castigation of “Bismarck, Garibaldi, and Co.,” its praise of the Jesuits, and its adulation of Pope Pius IX., whom he called “the fearless Hildebrand of the nineteenth century!”

When the proper degree of excitement had been produced, resolutions, with an explanatory preamble, were adopted. They enumerate the terrible persecutions which had been visited upon their “fellow—Catholics” in Germany, as follows:

1. The expulsion of the Jesuits.
2. The encroachment on the constitutional rights of the “German Catholic hierarchy” by retaining “in their positions and dignities” the “Old Catholics,” whom they denounce as “faithless sons of the Church.”
3. The encroachment upon the rights of conscience by keeping those who had abandoned the faith in charge of the public schools.
4. The “unchristianizing the schools.”

In view of these arbitrary and tyrannical measures, they express their sympathy for their German brethren as “Germany’s truest sons and most faithful citizens!” because they obey the pope rather than the Government. They “admire the bearing of the German episcopacy” for their open hostility to their Government, and commend to them “the sublime example” of the pope, whom they are so nobly following. They declare their “inexpressible joy” at the “constancy of endurance shown by the whole German clergy” in opposing the laws, and their consequent “*beautiful submission to the Church.*” And then they express their conviction that the “Catholics of Germany will continue to value their faith above all other blessings” that is, above the empire—and that they will be always ready “to sacrifice life and all things for its dear sake.”(*New York Tablet*, April 12th, 1873, pp. 3-11.)

Whether the great bulk of those who composed this large meeting understood the import of all this is somewhat problematical. But of one thing there can be no reasonable doubt: that the three bishops and the “reverend clergy” understood it fully. As the mere means of preserving unity among their followers nobody has any right, and probably very few have any inclination, to object to it. It is only of consequence in view of the principles enunciated, and the attitude in which the papal training places those who are entirely submissive to the hierarchy, and who, in other respects, are good and peaceable citizens. These latter are not responsible, for their Church does not allow them to reason about her affairs. The hierarchy command—they obey.

What did the hierarchical manipulators of this meeting mean? This only: to teach their followers that the measures of the German empire, which they called persecution, belonged to the Church—were of the faith; were outside the temporal jurisdiction of human governments; pertained only to the spiritual order; and, therefore, could only be decided upon by the pope! Now, with the single exception of the expulsion of the Jesuits, all the enumerated grievances of which they complain in Germany exist in the United States. Our Government gives protection to every Church and every religious order. It confides the public schools to men of every faith, and of none. It maintains “unchristian,” or, as they choose to call them, “godless schools.” And all these things, and others of like import, it considers as belonging to temporal affairs, the regulation of which is under the exclusive cognizance of laws passed by the state. Hence, when they recognize the pope as having authority over these temporal matters in Germany on account of his spiritual supremacy, they must be understood as meaning that he has like authority in the United States. As the fundamentals of our Government, heretofore indicated, belong to the same class of temporals, so, in their view, the pope has the same power to release them from the obligation of obedience to them, as he has to release their “fellow—Catholics” in Germany from their obligation of obedience to the laws of their own country! This logical conclusion cannot be escaped, in reference to all these fundamentals condemned by the pope. But there is even more than this to show that he would have them go one step farther, and substitute the “*divine right*” of *kings* to govern for that now possessed by the people.

If he considers that God has established this right, then it must be a necessary part of the faith, for whatever he declares to be the law of God must be so, if he is infallible. And if it is of the faith that kings govern by “divine right,” it must be maintained as well in the United States as at Rome; for otherwise the Church does not possess a uniform faith, and forfeits her claim to universality. One might suppose that the anxiety exhibited by Roman Catholics in the United States for the success of De Chambord in France and Don Carlos in Spain would leave but little doubt upon this subject. But this is not sufficient of itself to settle the question. The pope interprets the law of God, and establishes the faith. “When Rome has spoken, that is the end of the matter.”

Some time ago, Mgr. Segur—from whom we quoted in a former chapter—prepared a pamphlet with the title “Vive le Roi,” which he presented to the Count De Chambord, who claims that he is the legitimate heir, by divine right, to the throne of France. The object of this pamphlet was to demonstrate the nature and existence of this right. An American review of it, from the pen of a Roman Catholic—probably a Jesuit—thus states his proposition:

“Henry V. presents himself to France *in the name of Him from whom emanates all right and all legitimate sovereignty*. He is King of France, not in virtue of the capricious will of the people, but *in virtue of the order established by God*; he is King of France by *divine right*.”

The nature of this right is defined to be “the right of God,” and “a true right of property,” which cannot be taken away without robbery. And it is said:

....though it results from human facts, it is no less *divine*; and hence it may be said that *by divine right he possesses the crown*. On these matters there exists a great confusion of ideas, owing to the *vulgar notions put afloat by revolutionists*.”

But for fear of possible collision between claimants, and differences of opinion as to the particular individual so favored by Providence, and so as not to oust the pope from his lofty position of supremacy over the world, he makes him the infallible arbiter. His final decision, rendered from whatever motive, is conclusive as to who shall be and who shall not be king! He alone knows what the will of God is! And when he has decided, the nation must obey! There is no appeal! The people have no will in the matter! They are slaves—he is their master! This writer, pointing out the mode of knowing “with certitude upon whom rests the divine right,” and insisting that when this is ascertained “*he is the depository of the rights of God* for the good of his country,” says:

“And if, moreover, the Church [that is, the pope] should take in hands his rights, protecting him with her sympathies and with *her divine authority*, the *certitude*, at least for Christians, becomes such that doubt would seem no longer *permitted*.”

Now, if these were only the individual opinions of Mgr. Segur, he should be left undisturbed, as an avowed supporter of monarchy, to enjoy them or to preach them, if he deemed it his duty, to the French people. They would, undoubtedly, be most acceptable to the ears of many hearers, and especially to all the hierarchy of France, who are at this time acting upon them as of the faith, with the hope that they may persuade the Roman Catholic people of that country to place Count De Chambord upon the throne, and destroy the republic; because, as we are told by this American reviewer,” he has given the solemn promise that, once on the throne of France, *he will take up the cause of the pope*,” and “then the sword of Charlemagne shall spring from the scabbard, and convoke, as of old, the *Catholic peoples* to the rescue of Rome from the miserable and despicable Italian apostates.” But high as the author of these sentiments is in the estimation of the hierarchy, he has secured to them a higher endorsement than his own, so that all who shall unite for these objects may be assured that they are serving God and the Church. He laid his pamphlet before Pope Pius IX., who, in expressing his approval of it, thus addressed him:

“Pius IX., Pope, to his Beloved Son, Greeting and Apostolic Benediction: We have received your new pamphlet, and we wish, from the bottom of our hearts, that it may *dispel from others the errors* which you, enlightened by the misfortunes of your country, have had *the happiness of rejecting*. In fact, it is not the *impious sects* alone that conspire against the Church and against society; it is also those men who, even should we suppose them of the most perfect good faith, and the most straightforward intentions, *caress the liberal doctrines* which the Holy See has *many times disapproved of*; doctrines which favor *principles whence all revolutions take their birth*, and more pernicious, perhaps, as at first sight they have a show of generosity. Principles evidently impious can only affect, in fact, minds already corrupted; but principles that veil themselves with patriotism and the zeal of religion, principles that put forward the aspirations of honest men, easily seduce good people, and turn them away, unconsciously, from true doctrine to errors, which, speedily taking larger developments, and translating into acts their ultimate consequences, *shake all social order and ruin peoples*.”

“Certainly, beloved son, if you shall have by this pamphlet the happiness of *bringing round many up to this time in error*, it will be a great reward.”

When does the pope speak *ex cathedra*? When he declares the faith, say his followers. What is the faith? It is the law of God, or whatsoever is founded upon it, or is the necessary consequence of it.

Therefore, when the pope thus gives his approval to the doctrine that it is a part of the law of God that kings govern by “divine right,” it is necessarily a part of the faith, and must be believed as such by all the faithful. To reject it would be heresy. Evidently, it is regarded in this light by some of the papists in the United States? If not, wherefore the necessity of republishing in this country, and giving prominence, in a leading journal, to these anti—American opinions of Mgr. Segur, with the pope’s brief of approval attached? (*The New York Freeman’s Journal and Catholic Register*, March 9th, 1872.) And why should the reviewer of his pamphlet venture to declare “the identity of opinion between the Catholics of France and America with regard to the form of government to be adopted in the former country, and the good wishes of the Americans for the success of the Count De Chambord,” unless this unity of opinion grows out of the teachings of the pope?

The reviewer substantially admits this when, immediately after avowing this unity, he says that the success of De Chambord “will *consolidate the union of Catholics*, and facilitate, at a later period, a more thorough co—operation, not only for the restoration, but also for the *consolidation and maintenance, of the sovereignty of the sovereign pontiff*.”

How “consolidate the union of Catholics” in Europe and America? Manifestly upon the principles avowed by Mgr. Segur and sent forth with the sanction of the pope. And how consolidate and maintain “the sovereignty of the sovereign pontiff,” if not by means of this “union of Catholics,” based upon these expressed principles of “divine right?” With what vivid imagination does he look forward to the time when this grand consummation shall be achieved! Then the pope “will be restored to the plenitude of his power; and,” says he, “with the elder son of the Church as our leader, *we shall all hasten* to expel from the Eternal City the miscreants that are now despoiling it!”—which means this: that when the doctrine of “divine right” shall become established as a part of the faith, and the throne of France shall be held by virtue of it, then the Roman Catholics of the United States will unite with their brethren in France under the royal banner of Henry V., and make war upon Italy! Trained in such a school, and imbibing such principles as a part of their religion, how can these men help hating, with an intense hatred, all republican and popular institutions? And how hard they struggle to impress the laymen of their Church with kindred principles!

They are commanded in the name of a Church which asserts that its unity never has been and never can be broken, and which tolerates no disagreement among its members. Each one of them is educated to believe, under the penalty of excommunication, in an unchanging and unchangeable pope—the same yesterday, to—day, and forever. “All that he [the pope] knows now as revealed, and all that he shall know, and all that there is to know, he embraces ALL in his intention by one act of faith!”* If faithful, he believes in whatsoever all the popes have said and done regarding faith and morals— whatsoever Pope Pius IX. is now saying and doing, and whatsoever he and all his successors shall do and say in the future!

* “Grammar of Faith,” by Rev. John Henry Newman, p. 146. This author was a distinguished convert from the Church of England to Roman Catholicism. He has replied to Mr. Gladstone’s pamphlet.

We are not without advice from European Roman Catholics, who have repudiated the doctrine of infallibility and the opposition to liberalism which grows out of it, which admonishes us that these

things are worthy of our most serious deliberation. After the decree of infallibility was announced, *over twelve thousand* of the citizens of Munich, in Bavaria, presented to the Government, through the minister of public worship, an address, wherein they protested against it on the ground of the danger it threatened to their civil and social institutions. A brief extract from it will show how Roman Catholics themselves look upon the impious pretense that the pope stands in the place of God on earth—a doctrine equally inculcated here as there; how they shrink, with honest apprehensions, from the usurpations which must follow infallibility, if it shall become the universally recognized doctrine of their Church, and to what extent it has already given insolence and impunity to an ambitious and dangerous priesthood. It concludes thus:

“The doctrine which the Government of your royal majesty has declared *dangerous to the political and social foundations of the state*, is sought to be inculcated, with more and more urgency, publicly from the pulpit, and in pastorals and clerical newspapers, as well as *privately* through letters and the *abuse of the confessional*.

“*In criminal defiance of the Government*, the hearts of women are poisoned against their husbands, the father is cursed to the face of his child. And it is not only in the confessional that the weaker minds of women are sought to be gained. Importunate epistles and importunate visits are brought into requisition. We see especial danger in the abuse which many of the clergy have already begun to introduce *into the religious instruction of the schools*. The child is justly accustomed to look upon its religious preceptor as an authority; it believes him, and obeys him without suspicion or reflection. And these artless and unsuspecting minds are now taught this *dangerous new doctrine*. The child is told at school that his father who does not believe is damned and accursed. The priests denounce infamy and disgrace against those who refuse to submit—solemn anathematism, and, what is most hurtful, ignominious interment. The refractoriness of the clergy has gone so far—on the Rhine, for instance—that a soldier returned from the war, who was about to lead his affianced bride to the altar, was not allowed to marry her because his name had appeared on the protest against this dangerous innovation.”

Here are distinctly shown, not only the apprehensions existing in the minds of Roman Catholics in reference to the effect of this “dangerous new doctrine” upon the faith as they have been taught it, and its threatening aspects toward the political and social foundations of the state; but how that extraordinary instrument of ecclesiastical despotism, the confessional, is employed in fixing this doctrine of the pope’s infallibility in the minds of the young and unsuspecting, in the very faces of all the governments, and in defiance of parental authority. This same marvelous power is at work in this country, to enforce, at the sacred altar, the politico—religious opinions already pointed out as so dangerous to the state, so at war with the whole genius and spirit of our institutions. Protestants have not duly considered what a tremendous engine of power this is—how far, as an element of absolutism, it transcends any other ever invented by human ingenuity. They should understand it better.

The ecclesiastical historians, Sozomen and Socrates, both inform us that, in the fourth century, when they wrote, confessions were made *in public*; thus showing in what light they were regarded by the primitive Christians who lived near the apostolic age. Sozomen says this was the custom of “the Western churches, *particularly at Rome*, where there is a place appropriated to the reception of penitents, where they stand and mourn until the completion of the solemn services from which they are excluded; then they cast themselves, with groans and lamentations, prostrate on the ground. The bishop

conducts the ceremony, sheds tears, and prostrates himself in like manner, and all the people burst into tears, and groan aloud.” Penance was then imposed, and after the performance of it, the penitent was “permitted to resume his place in the assemblies of the Church.” He continues: “The *Roman* priests have carefully observed this custom *from the beginning to this time*,” while at Constantinople it had been the custom to appoint a presbyter “to preside over the penitents.”* This early custom, simple and impressive in its form of procedure, recognized the priest only as an intercessor for the penitent, by his prayers; but gave him no power to impose “alms—giving,” at his discretion, as a satisfaction for sin. He had no right to excommunicate and cut off any Christian from fellowship with the Church without trial by the Church, and conviction upon competent evidence; and this practice, in so far as it involved the power of the priesthood, prevailed universally in the Western, or Roman, Church for many centuries after Christ.

* “Sozomen’s Ecclesiastical History,” book vii., chap. 16 (Bohn’s ed.), pp. 334-336; “Socrates’ Ecclesiastical History,” book v., chap. 19 (Bohn’s ed.), pp. 281, 282. See the question discussed in Bingham’s “Antiquities of the Christian Church,” book xviii., chap. 3, vol. ii., p. 1064; also “The History of the Confessional,” by Bishop Hopkins, published in 1850 by Harper & Brothers.

Within that period, however, the practice of giving publicity to confessions was changed. The ambitious Leo I., who became pope in 440, inaugurated a new system, in order to increase the authority of the clergy, and, consequently, of the pope. He directed that “*secret* confession” should be substituted for that which before had been public, and should be made “*to the priest only*,” and not to the church. (The History of the Confessional,” by Bishop Hopkins, pp. 142, 143.)

But the power of absolution was not extended, even by him, beyond the petition and prayer of the priest that God would extend his mercy to the penitent, and pardon and absolve him from his sins. Thus Gregory I., who did not become pope till 590, wrote as follows to the proconsul, Marcellus:

“And since you have asked that our *absolution* may be given you, it is fitting that you should *satisfy our Redeemer* with tears and the whole intention of your mind for these thing, as duty requires; because, if he be not satisfied, *what can our indulgence or pardon confer?*” *

* “The History of the Confessional,” by Bishop Hopkins, p. 147. Bishop Hopkins says that the third Council of Carthage prohibited secret confession by “widows and virgins,” even to “bishops or presbyters,” unless “the clergy” or “some serious Christians” were present (p. 166). I do not think he is sustained in this, or, if he is, that it established the dissoluteness of the clergy at Rome. The third Council of Carthage was a provincial council only. It was called by the Bishop of Carthage, and was attended only by the African prelates. And, besides, it was held in the year 397, when confession, in all the Western Church, was made in public. It was about half a century before the practice of secret confession was introduced by Pope Leo I. Nor do I think that the canons of this council make any reference to confession. They rather, it seems to me, refer to the dissolute habits of some of the *African* clergy. The seventeenth “forbids them to cohabit with strange women, and permits them only to live with their mothers, their grandmothers, their aunts, their sisters, their nieces, and those of their domestics who dwelt in the house with them before their ordination.” And the twenty—fifth provides that “clergymen, and those who make profession of chastity, shall not go to see widows or virgins without the permission of the bishop or some priests; that they shall not be with them alone, but with other ecclesiastics, or such persons as the bishops or the priests shall appoint them; that bishops and priests also shall not visit them alone, but in company with other ecclesiastics or Christians of known probity. —Du PIN’s *Ecclesiastical History*, vol. ii., p. 278.

As the clergy had not, by this early practice, the power to pardon penitents, and thus to acquire the desired dominion over them, so as to regulate their thoughts and actions, the system of *compounding sins* was gradually introduced. It at first, however, made slow progress, even in the Middle Ages. In the ecclesiastical laws drawn up in England by Dunstan, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 967—when that kingdom was under papal rule—“*alms—giving*” was substituted for the ancient custom of performing penance. The rich were to “build churches,” and, if able, to “add manors,” build “roads and bridges,” distribute their property, abandon their lands, their country, and “all the desirable things of this world.” A fast of a day could be redeemed by one penny,” and of a year by “thirty shillings,” and so on. (The History of the Confessional,” by Bishop Hopkins, p. 171.)

From this principle of making atonement for sin by the payment of money as “alms,” it was easy to advance another step, and give to the priests the same power over sins that God possesses—that is, to absolve the penitent. This step, however, was not finally taken until the thirteenth century, when the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas obtained ascendancy. He insisted that penitence is a sacrament, like baptism, and that, as the priest in the latter says, “I baptize thee,” therefore, in the former, he should say, “*I absolve thee;*” (“The History of the Confessional,” by Bishop Hopkins, p. 187.) thus conferring upon the priest the power of absolution.

The argument was convincing to those who desired to possess the power, and they soon began the construction of that system of rules for the government of the confessional which cannot be read without bringing a blush to the hardest cheek, and which are too immodest for review or repetition. *

* Upon this subject Bishop Hopkins says: “It is, indeed, a point of no small difficulty to ascertain how far it is consistent with propriety to proceed with such documents; for it is certain that they are an inseparable part of the subject; that they form the staple of the Roman confessional at the present day, and are a true but very brief index to the sort of questions which more than a hundred millions of our fellow—creatures, male and female, are obliged to answer whenever it pleases the priests to interrogate them; while over the whole of what takes place in the confessional an impenetrable veil of mystery is thrown. Moreover, these things are not only to be found in the authentic and public councils of the Church of Rome herself—being, in fact, the official acts of her highest dignitaries—but the same, in substance, are now *published in our own language and country*, for the use of the laity, as an essential guide to those who come to the confessional. And yet, so abhorrent are the feelings of our age toward the open discussion of such topics, that no writer can transfer the mere records of Romanism to his pages without incurring the reproach of indecency.”—HOPKINS, pp. 193, 194.

“The Garden of the Soul: a Manual of Spiritual Exercises and Instructions for Christians, who, living in the World, aspire to Devotion,” is the title of a work published under the auspices of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States. It has the special approbation of the Archbishop of New York, and may be readily procured. It is extensively circulated among the laity, with the object, as declared in the preface, “to instruct the members of the Roman Catholic Church on the nature of the most solemn act of their religion.” And yet, in the “instructions and devotions for confession,” in order that “a good confession” may be made, there is language employed which, if it were found in any public newspaper in the United States, would cause the filthy sheet to be cast out from every fireside. See p. 213.

The celebrated work of Peter Dens, “Theologia Moralis et Dogmatica,” contains several numbers, in vol. iv., upon this subject, with which I am unwilling to soil these pages, even by the insertion of the Latin. Several years ago, in the city where I reside, a gentleman read and translated these before an audience where there were no ladies, and an honest young Roman Catholic layman present was so shocked that he caused him to be arrested and carried before the mayor upon a charge of *public indecency*!

The reader must examine for himself to see how completely every thought, sentiment, intent, and faculty of the mind is confided to the priest by the practice of auricular confession; and how every action of life, even to the invasion of the domestic sanctuary, is mapped out before him, in order that he may possess entire control over the penitent. In this connection it is only necessary to say further, that the Council of Trent, in 1551, established the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas as a part of the faith, by giving the power of absolution to the priests, and continuing the system of allowing them, at their discretion, to compound for sin by imposing pecuniary penalties. The doctrine declared by this celebrated Ecumenical Council is, that God never gave “*to creatures*” the power to grant remission of sin until the coming of Christ, when “he became *man*, in order to bestow on man this forgiveness of sins,” when “he communicated this power to bishops and priests in the Church,” having delegated to them his authority for that purpose;* thus showing that, by the act of the priest in prescribing penance or receiving “alms” in satisfaction for sin, the sinner is forgiven!

* “Catechism of the Council of Trent,” p. 83. This is a work of standard authority in the Roman Catholic Church in the United States.

And this, although the priest himself may be covered all over with the filth of his own personal corruption! *

* *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 74. Referring to such as are excluded from the pale of the Church, it is here said, “Were even the lives of her ministers debased by crime, they are still within her pale, and, therefore, lose none of the power with which her ministry invests them.”

When we consider what enormous power is thus acquired by the Roman Catholic priesthood, and the requirements of them by the doctrine of papal infallibility, it is not surprising that they should have employed it in resistance to the law in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, or that the Bavarian Roman Catholics should have protested against it. And when it is considered that this same power is now employed in this country, every day and almost every hour, by the same class of priests and for the same object, it is sufficient to excite both inquiry and reflection. The influence of the confessional does not vary with degrees of latitude and longitude. It is the same everywhere—putting the penitent completely in the hands of his confessor, to be molded, in his character and in all his thoughts and sentiments, by him.

While the bulk of the people of the United States are actively engaged in their daily occupations, unsuspecting and tolerant, the whole papal priesthood are devoting themselves, morning, noon, and night, to the employment of this enormous engine of power, in order to bring our Roman Catholic citizens—themselves unsuspecting, also—by persuasion, if possible, but by threats of excommunication, if necessary—to the point of recognizing the infallibility of the pope, and the universal sovereignty which it establishes, knowing, as they do, the conflict they are inaugurating with some of the most cherished principles of our civil institutions.

Is there no danger from all this? There may not be, and will not, if we heed the admonitions coining to us from other nations with every flash of lightning through the sea. Let us begin in time to guard our national heritage, and, while we are not required to do any thing in violation of the tolerant principles of our Government, we can so shield them from the assaults of foreign imperialism, that the blows aimed at them by their assailants will rebound upon their own heads.

Chapter VII. The Encyclical of Pius IX.

The Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX.—The Doctrines of the Encyclical. —It includes Bulls of other Popes.—The Doctrines of the Syllabus.—Opposed to Modern Progress.—Doctrines of Boniface VIII.—Council of Trent on Crimes of Clergy.—The Bull “Unam Sanctam” uniting the Spiritual and Temporal Swords.

THE present pope has practiced no disguise in exhibiting his opposition to the liberal and progressive spirit of these times. Disavowing all purpose of compromise, he courageously confronts its advocates, and grapples with them. He presses his followers forward into the battle, which he and they carry on with exceeding fierceness—showing no quarter and asking none. No victory has been won by them thus far, but only discomfiture and defeat. Yet all this—even the terrible blow that has been struck at the papacy by the Roman Catholic people of Italy—has only converted their ardor into passion, and their courage into desperation. Every step they take makes it more and more a death—struggle.

If liberalism and progress shall be overthrown, the papacy may rise up again out of the wreck; if they survive the contest, no human power will be able to breathe new life into it. Left to mingle with the debris of fallen nationalities, it will be known only by the history which shall record its wonderful triumphs in the past, and point out the cruel bondage in which it held mankind for centuries. The pope understands all this, and, with all his pontifical energies aroused to the utmost, is preparing for the grand and final contest. He throws into it all the weight of his private virtues—which no adversary has assailed—and the pledge of his personal honor which none have impeached. As the space between the combatants is narrowing, he claims the power of omnipotence, that he may mold all his followers into compact and unbroken columns, with but a single impulse in every heart, and but a single thought in every mind. He invokes the aid of the Almighty arm, but the voice of his invocation dies away amidst the desolation of imperial Rome. He tries to shake the earth with the thunder of excommunication, but its terrors have departed among thousands who once shrunk from it as from the wrath of God.

As a last resort, he is endeavoring to break down the lines of separation between all the nations, and to resolve the world into one great “Christian commonwealth”—a grand “holy, empire”—subject to his single will, and bowing before his single scepter! He claims authority, by virtue of the divine appointment, to enter every nation, to defy every government, to break the allegiance of every people, and to pluck up by the roots whatsoever he shall find that bars his progress to universal dominion. He sends forth his summons to all the faithful throughout the world, and commands them to rally under the papal flag, to turn their backs upon all other banners, and to prepare for a grand crusade that shall rescue Rome from the apostate spoiler. And if the honor, the glory, or even the lives of their own nations shall stand in the way, all these must not be of a feather’s weight compared with the mighty triumph which is to be won in God’s name, when the imperial crown shall once more sit upon the papal brow.

We have seen enough already to satisfy observing minds in reference to all these things, but they have too intimate relation with the present condition of the world to be passed by without more detail. Pope Pius IX., however much we may resist his efforts to restore the papacy, is, on account both of his official and private character, entitled to our respect in such a degree that, if we have misjudged his purposes and designs, a full and frank statement of them should be made, so that whatever error shall

exist may be corrected. To this end, therefore, it is necessary that an analysis of the Encyclical and Syllabus of 1864 should be made, as these celebrated official documents were issued ex cathedra, and undoubtedly contain the most authoritative exposition of the papal policy.*

* The Encyclical and Syllabus of 1864 are both now accepted, without further disguise or question, as ex cathedra. A recent work, discussing this subject, enumerates the various modes in which the pope addresses the faithful in such a way as to command their assent on the score of his infallibility. The author says, "An example of this is furnished by the Syllabus of Errors put forth by Pius IX. in 1864." Then, after quoting from the Encyclical, he says: "Now, surely, an encyclical containing passages like these, which are even stronger in their context than as extracts, has every mark about it of an ex cathedra or infallible procurement."—*When Does the Church Speak Infallibly?* by Thomas Francis Knox, of the London Oratory. London ed., pp. 94-97.

This examination may be premised, however, by the remark, that there is a wonderful discrepancy between the doctrines set forth in these papers and those which the pope was generally supposed to entertain at the beginning of his pontificate. He did then, undoubtedly, express some liberal sentiments, and indicate a purpose to make some important concessions to the people of the papal states. But then it was understood that he was not under the control of the Jesuit or ultramontane clergy, and was disposed to deal kindly, or, at least, in moderation, with the liberal sentiments then prevailing among the Roman Catholics of Europe, especially in Italy, and under the influence of which they were gradually moving toward the establishment of republican governments.

Some of his enemies accused him of insincerity in making these concessions, and insisted that they were the result of his fears of personal violence. However this may have been, he was soon turned from his liberal course by events which seem to have thrown him into the arms of the Jesuits, and to have placed him in direct antagonism to the European liberals of his own Church. This cunning and compact order has succeeded in indoctrinating his mind so thoroughly with their ideas of ecclesiastical and civil policy, that the remembrance of what he was once disposed to do in behalf of popular representation seems, under their teaching, to have driven him to the other extreme. His assumed infallibility, brought about by them, has not exempted him from either ambition or passion. He has taken especial pains, not only to condemn and anathematize the Italian people, because they have established their national unity and fixed their capital at Rome, but, attributing these political changes to the motive, on their part, of ultimately creating liberal and popular institutions, he has so frequently and strongly expressed himself on these subjects, that it is not at all difficult to demonstrate his hostility to such a government as ours.

Nowhere, however, has he done this more strongly than in the Encyclical and Syllabus of 1864, which renders it necessary for us to examine their principles minutely, in order to see what he requires of his followers in this country, what particular principles of our Government have excited his hatred, and what other principles he and his adherents propose to substitute for them. The reader should keep in mind, however, that, both in the condemnation of one class of principles and in the avowal of the other, the pope is acting within what he considers the spiritual order. Thereby he may see what temporals he includes in that order, and over what and how many principles of our Government he claims jurisdiction on account of his divine commission. And this will enable him to understand what the papal writers mean when they talk about the spiritual and the temporal orders; that is, that those matters only which do not concern the Church are temporals, that all matters which do concern it, either

directly or indirectly, are involved in spirituals, and that the pope has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over these.

The Encyclical sets out by denouncing “the nefarious attempts of unjust men,” who promise “liberty while they are the slaves of corruption,” and who are endeavoring, “by their false opinions and most pernicious writings, to overthrow the foundations of the Catholic religion and of civil society,” assuming that the superstructure of good government can rest upon no other foundation than the Church of which he is the head. These defenders of political liberty have stirred up a “horrible tempest” by their “erroneous opinions,” which has compelled him to raise his pontifical voice and condemn “*the most prominent, most grievous errors of the age,*” and to “*exhort all the sons of the Catholic Church,*” in whatsoever part of the world they may reside, that “*they should abhor and shun all the said errors as they would the contagion of a fatal pestilence.*”

Proceeding to show what he understands to be the object of these “unjust men,” he declares that their chief desire is “to hinder and banish that salutary influence which the Catholic Church, by the institution and command of her Divine Author, *ought freely to exercise,* even to the consummation of the world, not only over individuals, but *nations, peoples, and sovereigns.*”

After thus generalizing, he advances to specific allegations. He considers it “*impious and absurd*” that “society should be constituted and *governed irrespective of religion,*” and that no real difference should be recognized “between true and false religion;” that is, that the separation of Church and State, and the protection of all forms of religion, as in this country, are “impious,” because they violate God’s law, and “absurd,” because they take away from the papacy the power to govern the country and control the consciences of all the people.

He denounces those who insist that governments should not inflict penalties upon those who violate “*the Catholic religion;*” thus claiming that governments should be constructed so as to inflict these penalties when the laws of the Roman Catholic Church are violated. The withholding this power of punishment, to protect “the Catholic religion,” but no other, he calls a totally false notion of social government, “because it leads to other *erroneous opinions most pernicious to the Catholic Church,* and to the salvation of souls,” and which indicate *insanity* on the part of those who maintain them manifestly meaning that it is the duty of the papacy to exterminate them wherever it can do so.

They are as follows: first, the assertion of the principle “that liberty of conscience and of worship is the right of every man!” second, that this liberty of conscience and of worship should be “*proclaimed and asserted by the law!*” third, that the citizens shall have the right “*to publish and put forward openly all their ideas whatsoever, either by speaking, in print, or by any other method!*”

All these principles are essentially fundamentals in our form of government, and they could not be destroyed without the immediate overthrow of all our civil institutions. Yet the pope declares that they are “*pernicious to the Catholic Church;*” that is, in conflict with its principles and the plan of its organization; that we are *insane*, because we maintain them; and, considering them worthy of special denunciation and anathema, he declares that those who do maintain them, as all do who are worthy of American citizenship, “*preach the liberty of perdition!*”

What do the followers of this imperious despot mean by telling us that it is alone by a religion which has such principles and doctrines as these grafted into its profession of faith that our Government is to be saved from destruction? We understand well enough what *the pope* means; it is to declare that in no Roman Catholic government could such “pernicious” principles exist; that the anathemas of the Church are resting heavily upon them; that they are, therefore, sinful in the eye of God, and accursed in his sight; and that it is the imperative duty of all Roman Catholics in the United States and elsewhere to make immediate war upon these principles, and to continue it until all of them are destroyed. Will the priests obey? Undoubtedly they will. Will the *laymen* also? That is the question. Time alone will decide it.

But Pius IX. shows his design still more fully by going a step further, and striking more directly at the question of popular sovereignty, without which no popular form of government can stand. This he does by enumerating two other *errors*, in which he mingles religion and *politics* together, showing that he promulgates a *politico—religious* faith: first, he denounces the idea that “*the will of the people, manifested by public opinion,*” can ever become *the law* of a country, independent of the “divine and human right”—that is, independent of the divine sanction which God has conferred upon him the right to give or withhold as he pleases!—Second, he denounces also the doctrine that, in *political affairs*, accomplished or consummated facts can have the force of right by the fact of accomplishment; meaning thereby that no government which HE, as God’s vicegerent, considers unjust can become legitimated, by the fact of its existence, for any length of time; and, consequently, that the Government of the United States, being founded upon principles “pernicious to the Catholic Church and to the salvation of souls,” has not yet become legitimate, and would not become so, though it should exist a thousand years!

We shall hereafter see how this same doctrine is put forth, by the highest authorities of the Church in this country, in a more argumentative, but not less dogmatically, manner, when we shall come to consider the modes contrived by the papacy to release the Roman Catholic citizen of the United States from his oath of allegiance to our National Constitution.

Considering his task yet unfinished, the pope continues. Referring to the religious orders—to the right of the Church to acquire and hold property without limitation—and to socialism and communism—with which he has invariably classed all struggles of the people for self—government—he hurls his most fearful and terrible anathemas at the heads of all who require *the Church to obey the laws of the State!* and those who deny the authority of the Church and his own authority over secular affairs! These, he says—and let the reader, keeping in mind the character of our civil institutions, mark well his words—these “*presume, with extraordinary impudence, to subordinate the authority of the Church and of this Apostolic See, conferred upon it by Christ our Lord, to the judgment of the civil authority, and to deny all the rights of the same Church and this see with regard to those things which appertain to the secular order.*”

He re—affirms the constitutions, as they are called—because they are considered as having all the solemnity of law—of his predecessors, Clement XII., Benedict XIV., Pius VII., and Leo XII., which, among other things, condemn all secret societies, and especially *freemasonry*, and brand, with their heaviest curses, their followers and partisans. He denounces those who deny to the Church the right to “bind the consciences of the faithful in the *temporal* order of things;” and also those who say “that the

right of the Church is not competent to *restrain*, with *temporal penalties*, the violators of *her laws*.” He declares it to be heresy to say “that the ecclesiastical power is not, by the law of God, made distinct from, and independent of; civil power,” and insists that it is not usurpation, but consistent with the divine plan, to maintain that it is both distinct and independent. He characterizes those as audacious who assert that his judgments and decrees, concerning the welfare of the Church, its rights, and discipline, “do not claim acquiescence and obedience under *pain of sin* and loss of the Catholic profession if they *do not* treat of the dogmas of faith and morals;” whereby he means that his judgments and decrees, concerning the welfare, rights, and discipline of the Church, are binding upon all the faithful, whether confined to faith and morals or not; in other words, that his infallibility is absolute upon all subjects which he may think proper to embrace within it!

The Church, says Archbishop Manning, “*is its own evidence!*” *The Catholic World* immediately repeats the idea—“*the Church accredits herself!*” The pope, therefore, as the infallible head of the Church, is alone competent to declare the limits and character of his own power! This, again, says Manning, “*is a personal privilege*” which all the combined authority of the Church cannot take from him or diminish! There is not a Roman Catholic priest in the United States who does not know that, if he dared to utter publicly a sentiment contrary to this, his clerical robes would be stripped off instantaneously, and he be denounced as fit for the tortures of eternal punishment.

The numerous counts in this indictment, which the pope has drawn up against all liberal ideas, all liberal-minded people, and all liberal institutions, display no less the malignity of the prosecutor than the skill of a professional adept. He takes care that there shall be no misconception of either the principles or the persons arraigned by it. Therefore, he sweepingly embraces all such as “dare” to disagree with the Roman Catholic faith, by proclaiming, that all their teachings and principles are “contrary to the Catholic dogma of the plenary power divinely conferred on the sovereign pontiff by our Lord Jesus Christ, to guide, to supervise, and govern the universal Church.” And then, folded in his pontifical robes, with his ecclesiastical sword in one hand and his temporal sword in the other, and with the crown of a king yet resting upon his royal brow, he thus hurls at all these impudent and audacious adversaries his fearful curses, in one breath, and his stern command to the faithful, in the next:

“Therefore do we, by our apostolic authority, reprobate, denounce, and condemn, generally and particularly, all the evil opinions and doctrines specially mentioned in this letter, and we wish that they may be held as reprobated, denounced, and condemned by all the children of the Catholic Church.”

But the pope is not yet content—his work is not yet accomplished. He next turns his attention to the free discussion of the press, to the “*pestilent books, pamphlets, and journals*, which, distributed over the earth, deceive the people, and wickedly lie;” and directs his clergy to instruct “the faithful that all true happiness for mankind proceeds from our august religion, from its doctrines, and practice.” He commands them to inculcate the doctrine “*that kingdoms rest upon the foundation of the Catholic faith;*” and “not to omit to teach that the royal power has been established not only to exercise the government of the world, but, above all, for the protection of the Church, and that there is nothing more profitable and more glorious, for the sovereigns of states and kings, than to leave the Catholic Church to exercise its laws, and not to permit any to curtail its liberty;” herein adopting the language of Pope St. Felix, in a letter written to the Emperor Zeno. And he quotes approvingly from an encyclical letter of Pius VII., in 1800, this sentence: “It is certain that it is advantageous for sovereigns to submit their

royal will, according to his ordinance, to the priests of Jesus Christ, and not to prefer it before *them*.” (See Appendix C.)

And here our analysis of this extraordinary encyclical letter of Pope Pius IX. might end, if it did not possess additional significance, which is concealed from the ordinary reader, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant. The hierarchy understand it perfectly well: if they were addressed by the pope in cabalistic words (having secret or hidden meaning), they would be furnished with a key to their interpretation. It is far better that an unreasonable space should be devoted to it, than that what is hidden within should remain undisclosed, and its true meaning unknown.

It embodies, but without quoting, several of the previous encyclical letters of Pius IX.—one in 1846, one in 1854, and another in 1862. In that of 1846 he denounces private judgment in the interpretation of the Scriptures, and condemns those who “dare rashly to interpret, when God himself has appointed a *living authority* to teach the true and legitimate sense of his heavenly revelation” infallibly. Besides secret societies, he especially condemns *Bible societies*, which he calls “*these insidious Bible societies*,” because they translate the Bible “against the holiest rules of the Church into various vulgar tongues,” thereby enabling it to be read in all the spoken languages, and giving to every man the opportunity to “interpret the revelations of the Almighty according to his own private judgment,” which God, in his opinion, never designed. He reaffirms the apostolic letter of Pope Gregory XVI., condemning these societies also, and proceeds to lament the “*most foul plague of books and pamphlets*” with which the world is cursed. From “*the unbridled license of thinking, speaking, and writing*,” he declares many bad consequences have ensued; among others, the diminution of his own power, opposition to the authority of the Church, and the melting—away of the influence of all power; that is, of all royal power, which is alone legitimate. He enjoins due obedience to princes and powers, except in cases where “the thing commanded be opposed to the laws of God and the Church;” in which event this obedience is not due! And he counsels the Roman Catholic princes to remember that the “*regal power* was given them, not only for the government of the world, but especially for the defense of the Church;” wherefore he beseeches them to “defend the liberty and prosperity of the Church, in order that the right hand of the Church may defend their empires;” that is, that each may maintain the power and authority of the other, and thus subject the whole world to their united government; with the State, however, obedient to the Church, and the Church obedient to the pope!

Thus we have one key to the Encyclical of December 8th, 1864. But still within this there is another; that is, the apostolic letter of Pope Gregory XVI. He issued two pontifical bulls—one in 1832, and another in 1844 —reaffirming what had been said of Bible societies by Pius VII., in 1816;—by Leo XII., in 1824; and by Pius VIII, in 1829. This is what Gregory XVI. says in his bull of 1844:

“We confirm and renew the decrees recited above, delivered in former times by apostolic authority, *against the publication, distribution, reading, and possession of books of the Holy Scriptures, translated into the vulgar tongue.*”(Dowling’s “History of Romanism,” p. 623.)

This, it will be noticed, is not an inhibition against a *false* translation of the Bible, but against *any* translation “into the vulgar tongue “—that is, into the spoken language of any people. To the papist his were the utterances of infallibility, as binding upon him as if God himself had spoken them. And, therefore, the Church itself, in attempting to escape the censures of the present age, by translating the

Scriptures “into the vulgar tongue,” has disobeyed this prohibitory injunction of its own pope. But as this was only to answer a demand made necessary by the increasing intelligence of the world, and to resist the encroachments made upon the papacy by the open Bible of Protestantism, obedience is so far paid to that part of the injunction which prohibits “the publication, distribution, reading, and possession of books of the Holy Scriptures,” that there are millions of Roman Catholics in Europe, in Mexico, and in the South American states, who are not allowed to possess a Bible, and thousands in the United States who know of its contents only what their priests choose to communicate.

But the bull of Gregory XVI., of 1832—referred to and endorsed by Pope Pius IX., and now to be enforced by the faithful in the United States and elsewhere, so soon as the power to enforce it shall be acquired—besides its special condemnation of Bible societies, denounces and anathematizes “liberty of conscience” as a “most pestiferous error,” from which spring revolutions, corruption, contempt of sacred things, holy institutions, and laws, and, “in one word, that *pest, of all others most to be dreaded in a state, unbridled liberty of opinion!*”

That also, of 1844, is most expressive and suggestive, especially in its condemnation of “religious liberty,” which it denounces, because it makes “the people disobedient to their princes,” and because, if it should be conceded to the Italians of the papal states, they “will naturally soon acquire political liberty!” (Dowling’s “History of Romanism,” pp. 619, 620.) like the people of the United States—result which the papacy will never tolerate, and to prevent which Pius IX. was always ready to turn the bayonets of his “papal zouaves” (soldiers) against his subjects, until they fled before the artillery of Victor Emmanuel.

But this is not all that is secretly embodied in this Encyclical. It has already been seen that it refers to, and approves, the bulls of Clement XII., Benedict XIV., Pius VII., and Leo XII. All these have to be understood, in order to learn its full import.

Clement XII. was a most bitter and unrelenting enemy of all republican and democratic ideas. Thus speaks a Roman Catholic historian: “As soon as he was seated on the throne of the apostle, like his predecessor [Benedict XIII.], he declared himself to be an enemy of the democratic ideas which were filtering, through all classes of society, announced his pretensions to omnipotence, and set himself up as a pontiff of the Middle Ages.” (“History of the Popes,” by Cermenin, vol. ii., p. 376.) This same historian, alluding to the bull which he issued against the Freemasons, now approved by Pope Pius IX., says:

“His holiness prohibited his subjects, under penalty of DEATH, from becoming affiliated with, or from assisting at, an assembly of Freemasons, or even from inducing anyone to enter the proscribed society, or only from *rendering aid, succor, counsel, or a retreat to one of its members*. He also enjoined on the faithful, under penalty of the most severe corporal punishment, to denounce those whom they suspected of being connected with them, and to reveal all they could learn touching this *heretical and seditious* association.”*

“History of the Popes,” by Cermenin, p.379. Pope Clement XII. was so avaricious, and had so few scruples of conscience to restrain him, that he did not hesitate to commit sacrilege to obtain money. Cermenin says: “At the instigation of his nephews, he sold, to Philip V. of Spain, for his son, Don Luis, who was scarcely eight years old, the

briefs which raised a child in his jacket to the dignity of Archbishop of Toledo and Seville, and which conferred on him the title of cardinal.”—*Ibid.*, p. 380.

Benedict XIV. was the immediate successor of Clement XII. Although he professed opposition to the Jesuits, who were, at that time, held in almost universal execration, he, at first secretly, and afterward openly, aided them in arresting the intellectual progress of the people, and in their opposition to the enlightenment advocated and excited by the philosophers and encyclopedists of France, under the lead of Rousseau, Montesquieu, d’Alembert, and others. Among other means of doing this, he renewed the bull of Clement XII. against the Freemasons and other secret societies.

Pius VII. was pope nearly as long as Pius IX. has been—from 1800 to 1823. His pontificate was chiefly distinguished by his excommunication of Napoleon Bonaparte, and his subsequent recantation, under terror of threats, when he called Napoleon his “most dear son,” and by his restoration of the Jesuits to pontifical favor—as “vigorous and experienced rowers” to *guide the papacy* and save it from “shipwreck and death.” (“History of the Popes,” by Cermenin, vol. ii., p. 423.) But his condemnation of Bible societies, which Pius IX. has specially approved, is expressed in his encyclical letter of 1816, addressed to the primate of Poland, in these words:

“We have been truly shocked at this most crafty device (Bible societies), by which the very foundations of religion are undermined. We have deliberated upon the measures proper to be adopted, by our pontifical authority, in order to remedy and abolish this pestilence, as far as possible, this defilement of the faith so imminently dangerous to souls. It becomes episcopal duty that you first of all expose the wickedness of this nefarious scheme. It is evident, from experience, *that the Holy Scriptures, when circulated in the vulgar tongue, have, through the temerity of men, produced more harm than benefit.* Warn the people entrusted to your care, that they fall not into the snares prepared for their everlasting ruin.”*

*This bull will be found at length in Niles’s Weekly Register, vol. xii., pp. 206, 207—1817. The translation there is in a somewhat different arrangement of language, but it is substantially the same as the above.

Leo XII. succeeded Pius VII., and Cermenin says: “He was not long in raising himself to the highest dignity, by means of *his intrigues with the Roman courtesans, and his liaisons with the bastards of the incestuous Pius VI.*”(Cermenin, vol. ii., p. 426.)

He promulgated the bull “*Quod hoc ineunte saeculo*,” which fixed a universal jubilee for the year 1825, in order to “revive the trade in dispensations, indulgences, benefices, and absolutions.” (*Ibid.*) That which meets the special approbation of Pius IX. in his Encyclical is the attack of Leo XII. upon the philosophical and liberal schools, his charge that they “rekindled from their ashes the dispersed phalanxes of errors,” and his denunciation of them and their teachings, in the following words:

“This sect, covered externally by the flattering appearance of piety and liberality, professes toleration, or rather indifference, and interferes not only with civil affairs, but even with those of religion; *teaching that God has given entire freedom to every man*, so that each one can, without endangering his safety, *embrace and adopt the sect or opinion which suits his private judgment*..... This doctrine,

though seducing and sensible in appearance, is *profoundly absurd*; and I cannot warn you too much against the impiety of these maniacs.” (*Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 427.)

Passing then to the “deluge of pernicious books” which had obtained circulation, Pope Leo XII. exhibits also his uncompromising animosity to Bible societies, which, he said, were spreading “audaciously over the whole earth,” and to the publication of translations of the Bible in “the languages of the world, which, he declared, was “in contempt of the traditions of the holy fathers,” and “in opposition to the celebrated decree of the Council of Trent, *which prohibits the holy Scriptures from being made common.*” Thus expressing the fear, almost universal among the popes, that the free circulation of the Bible would do the Church more harm than all other causes combined, he continues:

“Several of our predecessors have made laws to *turn aside this scourge*; and we also, in order to acquit ourselves of our pastoral duty, urge the shepherds to remove their flocks carefully from these *mortal pasturages*..... *Let God arise: let him repress, confound, annihilate this unbridled license of speaking, writing, and publishing.*” *

* Cormenin. Pope Leo XII. distinguished himself also by proposing to put in operation the system of “taxes of the apostolic chancery for the *redemption of crimes*;” and when remonstrated with by some of the cardinals, on the ground that it would give just cause of complaint to the enemies of the papacy, he replied, “Bah! fear nothing; we will bring all the writers to reason. *I act today with money for religion, in order to act tomorrow for religion with money.*”—*Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 427.

By this means alone, though the process is tedious and circuitous, do we reach the real meaning of the encyclical letter of Pius IX. The initiated see it at once; but to those who have neither the means nor time for investigation, this explanation is necessary, that they may the more readily realize wherein the papal principles, thus enunciated, are in conflict with the public sentiment of this country, and with our social, religious, and political institutions. Nothing is plainer than that, if these principles should prevail here, our institutions would necessarily fall. The two cannot exist together. They are in open and direct antagonism with the fundamental theory of our Government, and of all popular government everywhere. The Constitution of the United States repudiates the idea of an established religion: yet the pope tells us that this is in violation of God’s law, and that, by that law, the Roman Catholic religion should be made exclusive, and the Roman Catholic Church, acting alone through him, should have sovereign authority “not only over individuals, but nations, peoples, and sovereigns,” so that the whole world may be brought under its dominion, and be made to obey all the laws that he and his hierarchy shall choose to promulgate! and that this same Church shall have power also to inflict whatever penalties he shall prescribe upon all those who dare to violate any of these laws!

The Constitution secures the right to every man of worshipping God according to the convictions of his own conscience: yet the pope calls this insanity, and declares it to be “most pernicious to the Catholic Church.”

The Constitution guarantees liberty of speech and of the press: yet the pope says that this is “the liberty of perdition,” and should not be tolerated.

The Constitution provides for its own perpetuity by making its principles “the supreme law of the land:” yet the pope says that if he shall find, as he has already done, any of its provisions against the

law of God, as he interprets it, they do not acquire the “force of right” from the fact of its existence, as the fundamental law of the nation.

The Constitution requires that all the people, and all the churches, shall obey the laws of the United States: yet the pope anathematizes this provision, because it requires the Roman Catholic Church to pay the same measure of obedience to law that is paid by the Protestant churches; and claims that the government shall obey him in all religious affairs, and in all “*secular affairs*” which pertain to religion and the Church, so that his will, in all these matters, shall become the law of the land.

The Constitution subordinates all churches to the civil power, except in matters of faith and discipline: yet the pope declares this to be heresy, because God has commanded that the Government of the United States, and all other governments, shall be subordinate to the Roman Catholic Church!

The Constitution is based upon the principle that the people of the United States are the primary source of all civil power: yet the pope insists that this is heretical and unjust, because God has ordained that all governments shall “rest upon the foundation of the Catholic faith,” with himself alone as the source and interpreter of law.

The Constitution repudiates all “royal power:” yet the pope condemns this, and proclaims that the world must be governed by “royal power,” in order that it may protect the Roman Catholic Church to the exclusion of all other churches!

The Constitution allows the free circulation of the Bible, and the right of private judgment in interpreting it: yet the pope denounces this, and says that the Roman Catholic Church is the only “living authority” which has the right to interpret it, and that its interpretation should be the only one allowed, and should be protected by law, while all others should be condemned and disallowed.

In all these respects, and upon each of these important and fundamental ideas of government, there is an irreconcilable difference between the Constitution of the United States and the papal principles announced by this encyclical letter. The two classes of principles cannot both exist, anywhere, at the same time. Where one is, there it is impossible for the other to be.

By this analysis of the Encyclical, we are enabled to sum up, in a few words, the meaning and purposes of the pope. He would not only suppress all “liberty of conscience,” but would muzzle the press, suppress all Bible societies, prohibit the “*publication, distribution, reading, and possession* of the Holy Scriptures translated into the vulgar tongue,” forbid the “unbridled liberty of opinion,” and compel all the people to be obedient to princes, and all princes obedient to *him*! He would exterminate freemasonry by making “corporal punishment” the penalty of any association or fellowship with its members, and death the penalty of uniting with the order! He would “repress, confound, annihilate the unbridled license of speaking, writing, and publishing!” And last, but by no means the least, he would protect, encourage, and strengthen the corrupt society of Jesuits, with all their impious and immoral practices and principles, as the “sacred militia” of the Church, in order that, by their aid, as “vigorous and experienced rowers,” the world may be carried back to the Middle Ages, with himself as the independent and infallible sovereign of a grand ” Holy Empire!”

With this explanation of the Encyclical, we are better prepared to comprehend the doctrines of the Syllabus—its sequel and logical consequence. Before proceeding, however, to analyze this most

remarkable paper, it should be observed that it was put forth by the pope expressly as a judgment against all the progressive nations—against all existing civil and religious institutions not in compatibility with the papacy. This purpose, if denied, could not be concealed; but the Jesuits, whatever others may have done, neither sought to deny nor conceal it. The pope, under their guidance, intended it as an arraignment of the whole non—Catholic world. To say that he meant to condemn Christian institutions would be, in this unqualified form, unjust to him. But it is precisely true to say that his immediate object was to condemn all institutions which he does not consider to be Christian. With him Roman Catholicism and Christianity mean the same thing. Institutions not Roman Catholic are not Christian; and all people who are not Roman Catholic are heretics.

All these are aimed at in this official paper—this papal manifesto. At the time it was issued Pius IX. was “King of Rome;” and if he had confined it to the papal States—merely to the denunciation of the means his own subjects were then employing to take from him his crown and temporal royalty—it would have had far less significance than it now has. But witnessing, as he was compelled to do, the encroachments of the people upon the royal power all over Christendom, the gradual substitution of constitutional and representative government in place of the absolute monarchies which had so long held Europe in bondage, the general diffusion of liberal sentiments, such as favored the erection of popular governments, the growing intelligence of the masses; seeing all this, and finding his throne in a tottering condition—gradually moving from under him—he issued this pronunciamento, from mere desperation, as the only supposed means of preserving his imperialism. Inasmuch, therefore, as the Syllabus must be considered as attacking all progress and liberalism, everything which has tended to carry the nations away from the papacy, its censures were designed, manifestly, to fall most heavily upon those who had contributed, in the greatest degree, to this result, upon the United States especially, for nowhere else have the principles it anathematizes been carried so far.

As a Protestant people, we built our civil institutions upon the popular plan, because that is the most direct road to political and religious freedom, and because Protestantism and freedom are synonymous terms, especially in our national vocabulary. As a Roman Catholic prince, the pope designed to strike directly at this plan, wheresoever it existed, understanding perfectly well that the “divine right of kings” to govern must be maintained, or the papacy would fall.

We call ourselves a Christian people, and, in doing so, include both Protestants and Roman Catholics. We think we have a Christian government also; that is, a government which, although the name of God does not appear in the Constitution, is based upon the essential principles of true Christianity, and shelters, protects, and defends the worship of God, in a manner acceptable to Him, and according to the teachings of the Gospel.

But the pope concedes nothing of this. All the Christians we have in this country, according to him, are the Roman Catholics; all else are heretics and infidels, and, therefore, not Christians. We are classed, by him and his hierarchy, along with the infidels, socialists, and Communists of Europe. And because Protestantism, under the lead of Luther and other reformers of the sixteenth century, divided the Roman Catholic Church, and because the adversary influences then excited are still at work, mostly from the effect of our example, and because whenever they lead to the establishment of a new form of government, the people become the source of all the civil laws, the Syllabus was aimed, as an exterminating blow, at the Protestantism and Government of the United States!

There is no escape for its advocates from this conclusion. It arraigns, tries, and pronounces judgment upon our institutions; and commands the defenders of the papacy everywhere to unite in executing the judgment. It is, consequently, in plain but true words, an insolent attempt of a foreign despot to excite, among the Roman Catholic part of our population, sedition against the Government, in order that he, if success can thus be won, may become our royal master! It urges them, by strong and irresistible implication, to plot together for the destruction of the great principles for which our fathers sacrificed so much, and which we have prized more highly than our lives. And it stimulates them to untiring activity in this work of demolition, by announcing that all progress and liberalism such as we boast of, all “recent civilization,” is accursed of God; and that heaven can be reached only by resistance to such impiety! It recognizes no form of Christianity but the Roman Catholic—no civilization but Roman Catholic civilization; whatever does not lean upon the papacy for support is infidelity, atheism, or, at best, materialism, which, in order to serve God truly, must be exterminated! It points out no source of authority but the royal and papal power, and proposes to substitute this power for that of the people in the enactment of public laws. It denounces revolution, and is itself revolutionary, inciting rebellion against the just authority of our National Constitution. It is a flagrant act of aggression, unparalleled, except in the conduct of former popes—such an act as cannot pass unnoticed and unrebuked by the people of the United States, unless they are ready to give up their freedom and to become slaves.

The Syllabus is put forth under an imposing title, which must be taken as a key to its proper interpretation: like the preamble to a law, it indicates the purpose of the law. It is called “The Syllabus of the *principal errors of our time*, which are stigmatized in the consistorial allocutions, Encyclical, and other apostolic letters of our most holy father, Pope Pius IX.” Each proposition which it contains, therefore, is merely stated to be condemned—to show what a large proportion of the principles now prevalent in the world are considered to be errors, and the subjects of papal censure. It contains eighty propositions, arranged in ten sections, each section constituting a distinct class of errors. That the reader may see that what has just been said is not undeservedly harsh, a few of its leading propositions will be stated, with brief explanations of their meaning, to aid him in the examination of the document for himself. (Appendix D.)

Under the head of “Indifferentism, Latitudinarianism,” Proposition XV. condemns the principle that “*every man is free to embrace and profess the religion he shall believe true, guided by the light of reason.*” He must know but little who does not know that this is a direct condemnation of the principle upon which all our American constitutions are based. It makes all these constitutions heretical; and as all the supporters of the papacy consider it their bounden duty, in the proper service of God, to oppose *heresy*, it is a command to them that they shall oppose the American idea that a man has the right to worship God accordingly as his own conscience shall dictate. When this idea is destroyed, the pope would have substituted for it the opposite one, that, as we are not free to select our own religion, or to consult our own consciences upon the subject, we must be compelled to take his—that is, to become Roman Catholics; for the absence of freedom implies, necessarily, that there is a power to command.

As belonging to the same class, Proposition XVIII. condemns the principle that “Protestantism is nothing more than another form of the same true Christian religion, in which it is possible to be equally pleasing to God as in the Catholic Church.” This denies that Protestants have any Christian faith. Hence

it is the duty of all Roman Catholics to destroy it—which, in this country, can only be done by destroying our Protestant institutions.

Under the class entitled “Errors concerning the Church and her Rights,” Proposition XX. condemns the principle, that “the ecclesiastical power must not exercise its authority without the permission and assent of the civil government.” This denies the authority of the Government of the United States, or of any State in the Union, to make laws governing everybody alike—both clergy and laymen. It asserts that the “ecclesiastical power”—that is, the pope and his clergy—has the right to do what and as it pleases, without the “permission or assent” of the State; that it shall be independent of the State, and above all the laws which the State may enact for the government of its citizens. It favors the erection of a privileged class, superior to all other classes, and, therefore, having the right to govern them all.

Proposition XXIII., in the same class, denies that “the Roman pontiff and ecumenical councils have exceeded the limits of their power, have usurped the rights of princes, and have even committed errors in defining matters of faith and morals.” This justifies and endorses all that any of the popes have done in reference to dethroning kings, releasing their subjects from their allegiance, and bestowing heretical governments upon Roman Catholic princes. It claims also that all the popes, from the beginning, have been infallible in defining faith and morals.

Proposition XXIV., of the same class, condemns those who assert that “the Church has not the power of availing herself of *force*, or any direct or indirect *temporal* power.” This necessarily affirms the opposite of the condemned error, and means that the Roman Catholic Church, and himself as its sovereign head, has the authority to employ force and the temporal power to compel obedience to its decrees.

Proposition XXX., same class, condemns those who say that “the immunity of the Church and of *ecclesiastical persons* derives its origin from civil law.” Here it is distinctly claimed that the Roman Catholic clergy, wherever they may be, possess immunity above the law, which elevates them into a privileged and exclusive class, above all other citizens; makes them superior to all others; and, therefore, renders it a positive duty that all others shall obey them.

Proposition XXXI., same class, condemns the principle that “ecclesiastical courts, for the *temporal* causes of the clergy, whether civil or *criminal*, ought by all means to be abolished, even without the concurrence, and against the protest, of the Holy See.” This is equivalent to the direct assertion that the clergy, for all civil and criminal acts, no matter how flagrant, should be tried by ecclesiastical courts alone, and not by the civil courts, where other people are tried; in other words, that they should try themselves! This principle, so diametrically opposed to our political institutions, is well understood by the priesthood and all their initiated followers in this country. The *New York Tablet*, one of their most prominent organs, says:

“*We do not acknowledge that, in a State in which the proper relations between Church and State exist, the clergy are amenable, for their conduct, to the civil courts, or come under their jurisdiction. If guilty of offenses or crimes punishable by the civil courts, they can be tried and punished, not in the civil courts, but in the ecclesiastical courts.*” (*New York Tablet*, April 8th, 1871.)

Following up the same idea, so as to show what extent of authority these ecclesiastical or church courts would have, and how completely they would be above the State and the people, this same paper says:

“The State has *not* supreme legislative authority; and civil laws which contravene the law of God do not bind the conscience; and whether they do or not contravene that law,

the Church, not the State or its courts, is the SUPREME JUDGE.” *

* *New York Tablet*, April 8th, 1871. The Tablet has recently become more bold in announcing this doctrine of State dependence. The Rev. Henry Astén, in a sermon preached in New York, spoke of a gradual tendency to ward a union of Church and State in this country in consequence of the papal teachings; and the *New York Herald*, referring to what he said, made this remark: “There are thousands of Catholics in this land who do not place Rome above the United States, and whose patriotism cannot be measured by fealty to religious dogmas and creeds.”—*Herald*, November 4th, 1872. To this the Tablet replied:

“The Herald is behind the times, and appears not yet to have learned that the ‘thousands of Catholics’ it speaks of are simply no Catholics at all, if it does not misrepresent them. Gallicanism is a heresy, and he who denies the papal supremacy in the government of the Universal Church is as far from being a Catholic as he is who denies the Incarnation, or the Real Presence. The Church is more than country, and fealty to the creed God teaches and enjoins through her is more than patriotism. We must obey God rather than man.”

Referring then to the questions raised by Mr. Astén,

it says: “For ourselves, we answer no such questions, for our Church is God’s Church, and not accountable either to State or country.” — *New York Tablet*, November 16th, 1872, vol. xvi., No. 25.

The Tablet and the Herald have continued this controversy until the former, unable otherwise to extricate itself, has been compelled to insist that the basis of its whole argument is the fact that the power of the Church over temporals is derived from the divine law. It says:

“But the power of the pope over temporal sovereigns never originated in or depended on his temporal sovereignty of the States of the Church, but was included in his spiritual authority as vicar of Christ, and was always a purely spiritual, and in no sense a temporal authority. “—*New York Tablet*, November 23d, 1872, vol. xvi., No. 26.

Thus the State would become, in every sense, subordinated to the Roman Catholic Church, and every one of its laws which the pope should, either by himself or through his hierarchy, decide to be contrary to the law of God, would fall, because not binding on the conscience. And thus the law making all citizens equal, that giving freedom of religious belief to all, that which authorizes every man to embrace what religious belief his own conscience shall approve, that which tolerates different churches, that which separates the State from the Church, that which secures free thought, free speech, and a free press—in fine, all the great principles which lie at the very basis of our Government, would be destroyed, because not binding upon the Roman Catholic conscience! The pope understands this. All the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States understand it. And it is quite time that all our Protestant people were beginning to realize the necessity of resisting such arrogant and audacious pretensions.

In the class entitled “Errors about Civil Society, considered both in itself and in its relation to the Church,” Proposition XXXIX. condemns the principle that “the Republic is the origin and source of all

rights which are not circumscribed by any limits;" which means, simply, that we must not look to the State to ascertain what our rights are, but *to the Church and the pope!*

Proposition XLII., in same class, condemns that theory of government which provides that "in the case of conflicting laws between the two powers [Church and State] the civil law ought to prevail;" which means neither more nor less than this: that the laws prescribed by the pope and his hierarchy shall override the laws of the United States and all the States, that whenever they are in conflict the latter shall give way, and that the pope shall become the lawmaking power of this country, and govern it and all its citizens just as he pleases!

Proposition LV., same class, condemns that principle of government which provides that "*the Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church.*" This separation constitutes one of the leading features of our Government — one of its most boasted characteristics. To denounce it is to denounce the Government. The pope does denounce it, not only here, by necessary implication, but in many other places, directly and immediately. He requires his hierarchy to denounce it, and they obey him. He and they would have the Church and the State united, the Church governing the State. And thus they would put an end to our Government, which should be held to be the object of every man, priest or layman, who advocates the doctrines of this extraordinary document.

In the class entitled "Errors concerning Natural and Christian Ethics," Proposition LXIII. condemns the principle that "it is allowable to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, nay, more, to rise in insurrection against them." Our Declaration of Independence asserts this right of resistance to unjust princes, and, but for the maintenance of it, we should have had a monarchical government in this country, instead of a popular one. Here, then, the principle asserted by our fathers is repudiated and condemned by the pope, and it would follow, if his teachings should prevail, that, as our Revolution was against God's law, therefore all the rights we have acquired by it are void, and it will be his duty, if he can, to remit us back again to our original state of dependence, and compel us to admit the divine right of kings to govern all mankind, and of the pope to govern the kings!

In the class entitled "Errors regarding the Civil Power of the Sovereign Pontiff," Proposition LXXVI. condemns the principle which asserts that "the abolition of the temporal power, of which the Apostolic See is [was] possessed, would contribute in the greatest degree to the liberty and prosperity of the Church." The possession of the temporal power by the pope made him a king. Therefore, this is the same as to say that it is necessary for the Roman Catholic religion that the Church should have a king; and as all the world should be governed by it in order to fulfill the divine command, hence, all the world should be governed by a king. This makes the Church a monarchy at Rome, and if it is necessary that it should be a monarchy at Rome, it must, of the same necessity, be so elsewhere, both in Europe and the United States. All Roman Catholics insist that what the Church is at one place it is at all other places—that it has perfect unity.

The last and concluding class of condemned errors are those "having reference to modern liberalism." Among these, Proposition LXXVII. condemns the principle which asserts that "in the present day it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion shall be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other modes of worship." What he means is this: that it is both proper and expedient that the Roman Catholic religion shall be the *only* religion, and that it shall be made by law the religion

of the State, to the exclusion of every other. Now, he who cannot see that this would require the destruction of Protestantism and the overthrow of our Government is blind, and he who would deny it is worse than blind.

Proposition LXXVIII., of the same class, condemns this principle of toleration which follows the recognition of other religions besides the Roman Catholic: "Whence it has been wisely provided by law, in some countries called Catholic, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own religion." Thus is all religious toleration stigmatized as an error, as against the divine command, and as inconsistent with the interests of the Roman Catholic Church. By this teaching the pope requires that those Protestants who go to Roman Catholic countries shall not be permitted to exercise their religion publicly. What a fitting response this is to the constant cry against Protestant intolerance in this country, made by those who are obliged to believe that religious toleration is offensive to God!

The last proposition, LXXX., is the summing—up of the whole—the final conclusion of the papal mind. It is a general and wholesale denunciation of all the progress and liberalism of the age, and shows, conclusively, that the pope would, if he had the power, turn the world back into the Egyptian darkness of the medieval times. He condemns the principle which asserts that "*the Roman pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself to, and agree with, PROGRESS, LIBERALISM, and CIVILIZATION, as lately introduced.*" Thus the avowal is emphatic that the infallible pope must not become reconciled to, or agree with, any of these things! Standing alone in the world, as God's representative, he plants his feet upon them all. As the sovereign lord of the universe, he repudiates, denounces, and scorns them. The world must not go forward, but backward—backward, toward that "Holy Empire" which his predecessors struggled so hard to erect, in which he would make himself the source of all authority, and plunge all mankind into the degradation of ignorance and superstition.

It must be observed that the pope is stating all these condemned propositions as "the principal errors" which he designs to stigmatize. All of them are heretical, and must be so accepted by the faithful, at the peril of their souls. Will they be so accepted? is the question which comes up in all intelligent minds. Thousands of Roman Catholics in Europe have rejected them already, and thousands more will do so. In this country the body of the laymen have not learned their import and bearing, but have drifted along, in passive submission, under the guidance of a priesthood who have tortured their ignorant acquiescence into intelligent assent, and have thus flattered both the pope and themselves into the belief that their final victory over Protestantism and popular institutions is near at hand. Will this submission continue? If it does, there is not a virtuous or patriotic heart in the land that does not sigh at the contemplation of the consequences which may follow.

The contents of the Encyclical and Syllabus are unknown to the most of these laymen. They have appeared together in few, if any, of their papers or periodicals. A leading Jesuit journal of New York (*Saint Peter*, June 24th, 1871.) has published the Syllabus, but without note or comment. It has taken care, however, to accompany it, in the same paper, with documents of kindred import, so that such of the faithful as should peruse it would be furnished with a key to its proper interpretation—especially upon those points of it which refer to civil and political affairs. One of these is "a great pastoral for Easter—Sunday," from Archbishop Manning, wherein he instructs his flock in reference to the true principles upon which all governments should be based—showing, what is conveyed also by the

Encyclical and Syllabus, that those founded upon the will of the people are all wrong and heretical, and that none are right but those founded upon the religion of the Roman Catholic Church. These are the words in which he expresses this idea:

“The faith and knowledge which come from God are the sole base of stable government and public peace. They bind together all orders of a people by a unity of mind and will; and they transmit the traditions of law, of authority, and of obedience from generation to generation.”

Another is “a great united pastoral,” from a number of German archbishops and bishops, in May, 1871, designed primarily to enforce obedience to the dogma of infallibility. In this document an attempt is made to defend against the charge of Dr. Dollinger and others, that the papacy designs to interfere with the domestic politics of the States, and re-establish the “medieval hierarchic system.” But it is so made as to bear the appearance of sincerity to the public, while at the same time the real object is sufficiently made known to the initiated. They say:

“Of all the bulls designated by the opponents of the doctrine [infallibility] as dangerous to the State, *only one is dogmatic*, the bull *Unam Sanctam* of Pope Bonifacius VIII., and this has been accepted by a general council; so that the infallibility of the general councils and of the Church would be quite as dangerous to the State as that of the pope.”

Pope Boniface VIII. strained the authority of the papacy “to a higher pitch than any of his predecessors.” (Hallam’s “Middle Ages,” chap. vii., p. 304, Harper & Brother’s edition.) He was not only one of the most ambitious, but one of the most execrable and infamous of the popes, having been charged, by the authority of the powerful sovereign, Philip the Fair of France, with “denying the immortality of the soul,” and “the presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist;” and calling “the host a piece of bread to which he paid no respect;” and maintaining that “the pope, being infallible, could commit incest, robberies, and murders without being criminal, and that it was heresy even to accuse him of having sinned;” and “that he openly proclaimed fornication to be one of the most beautiful laws of nature;” and that he “lived in concubinage with his two nieces, and had several children by both of them.” (Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 35, 36.)

John Villani copied and preserved, from authentic documents, some of his axioms, among which are the following: “Men have souls like those of beasts; the one are as much immortal as the other.” “The Gospel teaches more falsehoods than truths; the delivery of the Virgin is absurd; the incarnation of the Son of God is ridiculous; the dogma of transubstantiation is a folly.” “The sums of money which the fable of Christ has produced the priests are incalculable.” “Religions are created by the ambitious to deceive men.” “Ecclesiastics must speak like the people, but they have not the same belief.” “It is no greater sin to abandon one’s self to pleasure with a young girl or boy than to rub one’s hands together.” “We must sell in the Church all that the simple wish to buy.” (*Ibid.*, p. 37.)

This pope was, of course, infallible (!) by virtue of the decision of the Council of Trent, which teaches that, “however wicked and flagitious, it is certain that they still belong to the Church; and of this the faithful are frequently to be reminded, in order to be convinced that, were even the lives of our ministers *debased by crime*, they are still within her pale, and, therefore, *lose no part of their power*, with which her ministry invests them.” (“Catechism of the Council of Trent,” pp. 73, 74. Published under the sanction of Pope Pius V. Translated by Rev. I. Donovan. F. Lucas, Jun., Baltimore, 1829.)

And being incapable of committing any error in matters concerning the powers of the papacy and the welfare of the Church, being, in these respects, the “vicegerent of God,” though as a man he was utterly debased, his bull *Unam Sanctam* was an act of infallibility, and, therefore, these German bishops solemnly announce, in this pastoral, that it has been “accepted by a general council;” that it has, consequently, become “dogmatic,” and is now a part of the religious faith of the Roman Catholic Church, which all its members are bound to entertain, and which only heretics deny. They do not publish the bull, for it would contradict, in flat terms, what had just preceded the reference to it in the pastoral, and thus startle the public mind. Besides, in addressing the priesthood, there was no necessity for this; for they know already that of all the bulls issued by all the popes, from the beginning, that called *Unam Sanctam* stands alone in impudence and audacity. Inasmuch, then, as this bull is thus declared to be binding upon the conscience of all the Roman Catholics of the world, and is pointed out to the priesthood, in the very paper which contains the Syllabus, as the key to its interpretation, its contents should be generally understood, so that the public judgment may be correctly formed. This is what it says:

“Either sword is in the power of the Church, that is to say, the spiritual and the material. The former is to be used by the Church, but the latter for the Church. The one in the hand of the priest, the other in the hands of kings and soldiers, *but at the will and pleasure of the priest*. It is right that the temporal sword and authority be subject to the spiritual power. Moreover, we declare, say, define, and pronounce that *every human being should be subject to the Roman pontiff, to be an article of necessary faith.*”*

* Hallam’s “Middle Ages,” chap. vii., p. 303; Dowling’s “History of Romanism,” p. 353; Du Pin’s “Ecclesiastical History,” vol. xii., p. 7.

That the classical reader may translate this celebrated bull for himself, it is given in the original, as follows:

“Uterque est in potestate ecclesie, spiritalis scilicet gladius et materialis. Sed is quidem pro ecclesia, ille vero ab ecclesia exercendus: ille sacerdotis, is manu regum ac militum, sed ad nutum et patientium sacerdotis. Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio, et temporalem auctoritatem spiritali subjici potestati. Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omni humane creature declaramus, dicimus, definimus, et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate fidei.” Extrav., lib. i., tit. viii., c. 1. Apud Hallam and Dowling, ut supra.

With this distinct explanation of the politico—religious faith promulgated by the infallible popes, and sanctioned by a general council, before us, we can fully understand the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX., and should be at no loss to tell what Archbishop Manning meant when he said, “the hated Syllabus will have its justification,” and “would have saved society!” Its justification will be found in the complete wreck of all the Protestant and non—Catholic nations, whose people are to be saved from themselves by being made the degraded and miserable subjects of the papacy. And then, when the Jesuit shout of gratified revenge shall go up from Rome, and the *debris* of shattered popular governments shall be lying all around, the temporal sword will be drawn “at the will and pleasure of the priest,” and he who shall dare to question that all this is the will of God, will be racked in every limb by the tortures of the Inquisition, or consumed by its re-enkindled flames.

Chapter VIII. Pope's Temporal Power Not Divine

Infallibility before the late Decree.—The Pope's Temporal Power not Divine.—The Italian People.—The Government of the Papal States.—Jesuitism.—Mutilation of Books at Rome.—Union of Church and State by Constantine.—His Grant Supposititious (based primarily on surmise rather than adequate evidence).—He did not unite with the Church of Rome.—Rome was governed by Imperial Officers.—The Apostles had no Temporal Power.

IT was asserted by Protestants generally, before the decree of papal infallibility was passed, that if that doctrine could ever obtain the approval of a general council, it would be employed to advance the favorite theory of the Jesuits, that the spiritual power of the pope includes the temporal as one of its necessary incidents, inasmuch as it belonged to the primacy of Peter, and was divinely conferred upon him. The Jesuits themselves practiced no duplicity upon this question, but openly asserted their doctrine with a confidence which would now seem to have been awakened by a perfect knowledge of their power over all the authorities of the Church, including the pope. Their boldness won them the victory, and they are now complete masters of the situation. All the energies of the Church, in so far as the pope is enabled to arouse them, are placed under their guidance; and even the venerable pontiff himself is spending the close of a long and honorable life in endeavoring to establish the doctrine they have maintained so earnestly as an essential and indispensable part of the true faith. With his vanity flattered by their caresses, and persuaded to believe that he stands in the place of God on earth, he omits no opportunity of declaring that he has been appointed by divine decree to direct and regulate all such secular affairs as pertain in any way to the Church, its faith, its discipline, and the universality of its sovereignty.

Of those within the Roman Catholic Church, who were unwilling to accept this doctrine, there were two classes: one denying the infallibility of the pope, and claiming it only for the Universal Church; and the other insisting that if it were recognized it would confer no temporal power upon the pope, because it was not necessarily included in the spiritual, and had not been divinely established as an incident to the primacy of Peter. To this latter class, it may be fairly said, belonged a considerable portion, if not a majority, of the Roman Catholics in the United States. These had not yet felt the tremendous pressure of the Jesuit power, and honestly endeavored, by this argument, to remove what they considered to be Protestant prejudice against their Church. It was not composed entirely of laymen, but included some of the prelates and clergy, who were not yet prepared to turn over the Church to Jesuit dominion. They could not see how it was possible, if God had made the temporal an appendage to the spiritual power, that so many centuries should have elapsed without its announcement by the Church in some authoritative form. And they were encouraged in this by the highest ecclesiastical authority in the United States.

In 1848, Archbishop Kenrick, of Baltimore, prepared for the press a treatise on the Primacy, in which great learning and ability are displayed. It was published in that year, and a sixth revised edition was also published in 1867. When he comes to speak of the relations between the pope and secular affairs, he begins his first chapter on the "Patrimony of St. Peter" with this emphatic sentence:

"The primacy is essentially a spiritual office, which *has not, of divine right, any temporal appendage.*"

The “small principality in Italy” over which he is sovereign is, he says, designated “the Patrimony of St. Peter,” on account of its having been “attached to the pontifical office, through reverence for the Prince of the Apostles.” He declares that this “*has no necessary connection with the primacy;*” and because “Catholics not living within the Roman States are not subject to the civil authority of the pope,” he treated of it no further than to trace its history; (“The Primacy of the Apostolic See,” by Archbishop Kenrick, sixth edition., p. 255.) and to this we shall have occasion hereafter to refer.

He says again: “In making Peter the ruler of his kingdom, he [Christ] did *not give him dominion, or wealth, or any of the appendages of royalty.*” (*Ibid.* p. 255.) Then, going on to show that “*the —Bishop of Rome was not yet a temporal sovereign*” (*Ibid.* p. 257.) at the time of Leo the Great—the middle of the fifth century—he says also, at another place, that the power of interfering with, and regulating, the “political order” in the nations was vested in the popes “by the force of circumstances,” and was not “a *divine prerogative of their office.*” (*Ibid.* p. 276.)

What Roman Catholic archbishop, or bishop, or priest, in the United States would repeat these words today? See, again, what the pope says: “The civil sovereignty of the Holy See has been given to the Roman pontiff by a singular counsel of Divine Providence;” and as “regards the relations of the Church and civil society,” “all the prerogatives, and all the rights of authority necessary to governing the Universal Church, have been received by us, in the person of the most blessed Peter, *directly from God himself.*” (*Ante*, chap. vi., p. 162.)

Has the faith changed? Did not Archbishop Kenrick understand what it was? Was he a heretic? But this conflict of authority is in no other way important to us than to show how the honest apprehensions of Roman Catholics in the United States were allayed before the pope’s infallibility was announced, and to excite to such inquiry as will show how, in reality, the temporal power was acquired whether it is of God or man, whether it was obtained legitimately or by usurpation. Thus we shall be better prepared to understand the import of the issues which the papacy has precipitated upon us.

Archbishop Kenrick did not consider it necessary, in his work on the Primacy, to treat of the pope’s temporal power in Rome, any further than to trace its history. Nor was it necessary that he should do so, in view of his denial of its divine origin. He did not consider it to be a part of the faith of the Church that he, or any body else, should believe that it was conferred by Christ upon Peter, and had come down through an unbroken line of succession to the present pope. The new order of things, however—the introduction of the new faith—gives great importance to the question; because if it be true that the temporal power of the pope, anywhere, is of divine origin, then the new faith is right and the old faith wrong; and the world may reasonably expect that, either by its own consent or the providences of God, it may yet be compelled to admit its universality. If, on the other hand, it had its origin in fraud, usurpation, and imposture, those of us to whom the charge of infidelity is now imputed may breathe more freely.

Can it be possible that the Italian people violated the law of God by the act of terminating the pope’s temporal power in the Papal States? and that they have thereby cut them selves off from reasonable hopes of heaven, unless they shall restore it? Or were they justified, after the example of the United States, in throwing off the papal yoke and adopting a form of government which, although monarchical, is representative? If the former—if God did make Peter king of Rome, and Pius IX. his

successor in royal authority— then no such justification can exist, revolution is offensive to God, and every government which has grown out of it must stand accursed at the bar of heaven. Arraigned, as we are, upon such a charge, both as principals and accessories, we must be allowed the privilege of the most abandoned criminal, the right to plead to the jurisdiction of his triers.

It is a common remark of the supporters of the papacy, that the civil Government of Rome and the Papal States, by the pope and his curia, was altogether paternal, that it looked carefully after the interests of the people, was most considerate of their happiness, and was, in fact, one of the best governments in the world. If this were true, it is not easy, according to any ordinary rules of reasoning, to account for the fact that Pope Pius IX. has held the temporal scepter, during all the years of his long pontificate, by an exceedingly frail and uncertain tenure. To him, as a king, there could be no strong personal objections. He is represented as kind—hearted and benevolent, and, no doubt, truthfully so. Even Gavazzi concedes as much. (Gavazzi's "Lectures and Life," p. 230.)

But these very qualities may unfit him for the duties of government, by subjecting him to the undue influence of men around him, who play upon them. Such has, undoubtedly, been the case. Antonelli, his Cardinal Secretary of State, is understood to be both ambitious and unscrupulous, just such a man as would hold the curia and all the inferior officers of government in strict subordination to his will.* He would, in all probability, have little difficulty in dictating the policy and measures of the administration. If the pope has ambition, he could excite it; if he has none, he could create it. Thus We may account for their joint efforts to check the current of adverse circumstances which have, during the present pontificate, pressed upon the papacy, and rendered it necessary that the pope should be held upon his throne by French bayonets. Thus, also, may we account for the Encyclical and Syllabus, and other papal bulls and briefs, wherein the attempt is made to weld religion and politics together, and make it appear that the people, however oppressed, have no more right to resist the divine right of kings than they have to violate the ten commandments. That the papal government was oppressive has been settled by the Italian people, hitherto the most devout Roman Catholics in the world. By their act, that fact, as such, is entitled to a place in history; and that they were justified in it, as we were justified in our Revolution, a brief recital of facts will abundantly show.

* Mr. Edmund About, a modern writer, and Gallican Catholic, thus speaks of Pius IX.:

"The character of this honest old man is made up of devotion, of good nature, of vanity, of weakness, and of obstinacy; with a spice of malice, which peeps out from time to time. He blesses with unction, and pardons with difficulty; a good priest, and an incompetent king."—*The Roman Question*, by About, p. 135.

Of Cardinal Antonelli he says: "He was born in a den of thieves."—P. 140. "He seems a minister ingrafted on a savage."—P. 147. "All classes of society hate him equally."—*Ibid*.

F. Petruccelli de la Gattina, who has continued the discussion of the questions begun by Mr. About, does not speak so favorably of the pope. He says: "The mildness of Pius IX. resembles those coverings which are put on old arm—chairs, to conceal stains and rents." — *Rome and the Papacy: its Men, Manners, and Government in the Nineteenth Century*, by F. Petruccelli de la Gattina, p. 272. He continues: "He does not elevate himself to the stature of God, but shrinks God to the stature of a poor priest, and drags him into all the follies, passions, and interests of a caste which is confounded with humanity."—P. 277.

He also condemns Antonelli in the strongest terms, by speaking of “the thefts, the villainies, the rudeness of this cardinal.”—P. 275. Of the papacy, under his guidance, he says, it “is like the subterranean sewers of large cities; it carries all the filth; and where it is stopped and filters, it spreads infection and death.”—P. 292.

The Papal States, during the pope’s temporal dominion, were held as religious property—as “*an ecclesiastical benefice*.” The people were considered as so many tenants, who occupied and enjoyed the estate on “the condition affixed by the infallible head of the Church, for her welfare, and not their own.” They possessed no civil rights whatever, in the sense in which the world holds them, but only such privileges as their sovereign, the pope, thought proper to confer upon them; and these could be changed, modified, or wholly withdrawn, at his personal discretion, or whenever the interests of the Church should require it. If the Government was a trust, held alone for the benefit of the Church, as papists allege, then the people had no right to demand of it any thing on their own account. The Government was conducted wholly without reference to them, and they were required to submit to whatsoever it did, and to all the laws proclaimed by the papacy.

Popular liberty was, therefore, unknown, and was impossible. The papacy alone was free to do as it pleased; and this was called *the freedom of the Church*! The people, having thus no voice in public affairs, were in a condition of vassalage. The Government was a revival, with slight exceptions, of the old system of feudalism, without its redeeming features. There was no change, or promise of change: every thing moved on in the old grooves which had been worn by centuries of papal absolutism. A writer who personally observed this says:

“At every appeal to alienate any part of his sacred estate, or to grant any privileges to his subjects, on the ground of their inherent rights, the pope talks of Constantine, and Pepin, and the blessed Countess Matilda, and, shaking his infallible head, doggedly thunders, “Non possumus!” (A Latin, Catholic, religious phrase that translates as “we cannot”) *

* “Inner Rome,” by Rev. C. M. Butler, p. 15. This book deserves extensive circulation. It presents an admirable portrait of the political, religious, and social condition of Rome, as observed by the author during a residence there of two years. I have known Dr. Butler many years, and for myself rely implicitly upon what he says. He is corroborated in his views of the civil government in the Papal States by M. About and La Gattina in their works, from which quotations have been made. Both of these have been translated from the French, and published in this country.

There was no written constitution, not even a collection of precedents, from which the citizen could learn the extent or nature of the privileges conceded to him. Whatever of fundamental law there was could be found only in the decrees, canons, and constitutions of councils, and the bulls and briefs of popes, published in a language which none but the educated nobility could understand. Ecclesiasticism absorbed all secular as well as all spiritual power. Cardinals, prelates, and priests were a privileged class, and did as they pleased.

On one occasion a priest “endeavored to induce a hackman to take him at a lower than his usual fare,” and, upon his refusal to do so, he was imprisoned for several weeks. (“Inner Rome,” by Rev. C. M. Butler, pp. 15, 16.) As late as 1851, Bertolotti, “Inquisitor—general of the Holy See,” published a papal edict defining certain crimes to which penalties were affixed, and the duties of informers. These

included “all heretics;” all guilty of any “acts from which can be inferred a compact, express or tacit, with the devil;” all who should “hinder in any manner whatever the proceedings of the office of the Holy Inquisition;” all who published “writings against the high—priest, the sacred colleges, superiors, ecclesiastics, or against the regular orders;” all “who without license retain writings and prints which contain heresies, or the books of heretics;” and all who “have eaten, or given to others to eat, meat, eggs, *latticini* (the products of milk), on forbidden days, in contempt of the precepts of the Church.”

And, as encouragement to informers, it was provided that “whoever fails to denounce the above criminals to the Holy Inquisitor and special delegate against ‘heretical pravity’ shall be subject to *excommunication!*” What trifling with sacred things! Under this *parental* (!) government, if a poor Italian should have written a word against a profligate priest, who might have tried to rob his home of its most precious treasure, or should have been found with a Protestant Bible in his house, or a history of the American Revolution, or the Life of Washington, or the Constitution of the United States, or the Declaration of Independence, he would have been arraigned before the “Holy Inquisitor,” punished as a criminal, shut out from the Church by excommunication, and visited with the wrath of God, for violation of his divine commands! And this several centuries after the close of the Middle Ages—after the world has been lifted out of darkness into light!

The precise punishment for these several degrees of crime was not defined—almost every thing being left to the discretion of the Inquisition. Its general character, however, may be inferred from a document published in 1850 by the cardinal archbishop, cardinal bishop, and other archbishops and bishops of the Marches and of the province of Umbria. Referring to the crimes of “blasphemy, in observance of the sacred days, profanation of the churches, and violation of fasts, and immoralities,” this edict fixes as penalties, according to circumstances, “excommunication, or imprisonment, or fines, or castigation, or exile, or even death.” It provides that “the names of the informer and *the witnesses* shall be kept secret,” so that the offender may never know who are his accusers, or have an opportunity openly to confront them, and that half the fines shall go to the informer and officers executing the law, and the other half “to the benefit of holy places.” (“Inner Rome,” by Rev. C. M. Butler, pp. 17-19.)

It is impossible, in the very nature of things, that such a system of government as this could have been otherwise than harsh, severe, and oppressive—the very embodiment of tyranny. Can it be possible that God designed the human family to be subject to the perpetual curse of such rule as this, and cut them off, by a divine decree, from all possibility of its removal without sin? If he did, how happens it that he has not long ago, as he did with the pursuers of the Israelites, cast the revolutionary innovators, “horse and rider, into the sea?”

In 1861, a large crowd assembled in the Corso and in Monte Citorio, and shouted “*Viva Italia! Viva Vittorio Immanuele!*” They were immediately fired upon by the papal gendarmes—one of whom was stabbed in the melee. For this a man by the name of Locatelli was arrested and tried. Although there was no evidence identifying him with the transaction, yet he was convicted and executed! Even the President of the Sacra Consulta, when he presented the record of conviction to the pope, advised him, in view of the insufficiency of the evidence, “to exercise clemency.” But “the pope, who cannot sign a sentence of death, laid over this document the *fatal black ribbon*, and Locatelli died, shouting “*Viva Italia!*” (“Inner Rome,” by Rev. C. M. Butler, pp. 21-23.)

The cases of punishment by imprisonment and exile for “political crimes” are too numerous for detail, and too horrible to be recited with composure. Di. Butler mentions some of exceeding cruelty and hardship, where native Romans were banished for the suspicion of being opposed to the Papal Government. This class of criminals are specially sought after by the police who infest the country. And so odious had this papal police become in consequence of the manner in which they—broke in upon the most sacred privacy of the citizens, that “*no Roman will enter into this hated service*. No Roman would probably be trusted in it. It is made up of *foreigners of various nations*. Many of them are criminals and disbanded soldiers of Francis II. So detested are they by the Roman people that it is not considered safe for them to make arrests during the day. They are made at night, or in the early dawn.” (*Ibid.*, p. 38.)

Religious toleration was unknown. English Protestants were permitted to hold their services only within the Porto del Popolo; and no Protestants whatever were allowed to do so within the walls of Rome! “Gendarmes guard the door of the English chapel to see that none of the faithful stray into those poisoned pastures.” In 1862, Protestant services were performed at the house of an American lady, about twenty miles back of Rome, on the Alban Hills; and upon being discovered by the gendarmes, it was broken up! *

* All this would, undoubtedly, be right and proper to the author of the following sentiments, who contributes as much as almost any other man to mold Roman Catholic sentiment in the United States:

“The Protestant is bound to be liberal to Catholics, but Catholics cannot be liberal toward any party that rejects the Church, and must hold them to be the enemies of God, not on his own private judgment, but on the infallible authority of the Church of Christ.”—*New York Tablet*, September 7th, 1872.

The informer in this case was supposed to have been a man of whom it is related that he was a poor and humble citizen, without any title, but that the pope, being once compelled to pass the night in his house, and it being derogatory to his official and personal dignity to “sleep under the roof of an untitled citizen,” he made the poor fellow “a Roman noble before going to bed, and slept with a good conscience!” (Butler, pp. 209-211.)

There can be no reasonable doubt that many of these measures of severity are to be traced to the influence of the Jesuits at Rome. It is well understood that all the machinery of the Papal Government has been directed by them for a number of years; and their whole history shows that whenever they possess power, it is employed with a single object only—to advance the interests and perpetuate the debasing principles of their order.

An ex—priest, a Roman by birth, who was once curate of the Magdalene parish in Rome, professor of theology in the Roman University, and qualificator at the Inquisition, thus expresses himself:

“From the period of the Council of Trent, *Roman Catholicism has identified itself with Jesuitism*. That unscrupulous order has been known to clothe itself, when occasion required, with new forms, and to give a convenient elasticity to its favorite maxim, *that the end is every thing, and all the means to attain it are good*. But by depending on the skillful tactics of the ‘Society of Jesus,’ the court of Rome has been constrained to yield to its ascendancy, confide her destiny to its hands, and permit it to direct her interests; and of this control Jesuitism has availed itself in the most absolute way. It has constituted

the powerful mainspring, more or less concealed, of the whole papal machinery.” (“Rome, Christian and Papal,” by L. D. Sanctis, D.D., p. 5.)

It should excite no surprise, therefore, in the mind of any man who does not believe that God designed mankind for perpetual bondage, that the Italian people were anxious to get rid of a government so opposed to the spirit of the age and the progress of the nineteenth century, and that they did get rid of it as soon as papal infallibility was decreed and the French troops were withdrawn. It had not about it a single element of popularity—nothing to make a Roman citizen feel that he was any thing but a serf, and nothing to stimulate him to a proper conception of his own character or that of his country. It was the last surviving vestige of the Middle Ages, and seems to have been providentially spared only that the people of Italy might be enabled to observe the contrast between it and the advancing modern nations, until they should be fully enabled to strike down all the civil appendages of the papacy. It was such a union of Church and State, and so complete a subordination of the State to the Church, as demonstrated by all its workings how impossible it was to establish any form of political freedom where it existed. It stood among the nations like the fabled upas-tree in the Javanese forests, emitting a poison which liberty could not inhale without dying. And thus, while we are able to comprehend the motives of the Italian people in desiring its overthrow, we can also understand why the Encyclical and Syllabus were issued, and why all the progressive nations were arraigned for refusing to recognize all this wrong and injustice as rightfully done in the name of religion.

And this leads us, in the regular order of our inquiries, into an examination of the real origin of the temporal power of the pope, that thereby we may be enabled to decide whether it is a divine or human power—whether it was, as Pius IX. alleges, conferred on Peter by Christ, or has been the creation of fraud, intrigue, and usurpation. History on this subject is much confused; yet the truth may be discovered, by patient investigation, through all the myths and fables which have been woven into it.

There is nothing in which ecclesiastical and secular historians better agree than that, during the times of primitive Christianity, the spiritual and temporal jurisdictions remained distinct—each exercising authority only over those matters which pertained to itself. It is difficult to account for a denial of this, except upon the ground of ignorance or mendacity. The distinction was preserved for a number of centuries, even in relation to jurisdiction over heretics, which more immediately concerned the Church than any thing of a mere secular nature.

The most disturbing element in the early Christian Church was Arianism. This was condemned by the Council of Nice in 325, because heresy was within the spiritual jurisdiction. But the Council did not undertake to prohibit the circulation of Arian books, because that belonged to the temporal jurisdiction, and was left to Constantine, the emperor, who did it by imperial edict.

The Council of Ephesus, in 431, condemned the heresy of Nestorius, but left the circulation of his books to be prohibited by the Emperor Theodosius.

The Council of Chalcedon, in 451, condemned the Eutychians for heresy, but the Emperor Martian prohibited the circulation of their books.

The second Council of Constantinople, in 553, declared Eunomius to be a heretic, but the Emperor Arcadius suppressed his books by an imperial law.

All these councils are recognized by the Roman Church as ecumenical, and as having possessed the highest jurisdiction and authority in the Church—a fact never authoritatively impeached until the decree of papal infallibility was passed by the late Lateran Council. It will not do for a papist to say that these councils did not properly understand and define the true relations between the spiritual and the temporal power. And he presumes greatly upon the popular ignorance who asserts that they were changed until that result was produced by papal usurpations.

Many books have been written to prove the primacy of Peter in both honor and authority, as a foundation for the additional assumption that Christ, in establishing his Church, gave it an external hierarchical organization; that, of necessity, he conferred upon this organization plenary authority over all matters of faith and morals; that supremacy is involved in this authority; that, as the necessary consequence of this supremacy, all Christians must defer to and obey it; that the Church was established and organized by Peter at Rome; that he was its first bishop; and that all the subsequent bishops and popes of Rome, in the regular and unbroken line of succession, have enjoyed the same supremacy and held the same authority held by Peter. All the arguments to support these propositions are made within a circle, varying only according to the learning and ingenuity of those who make them. They all assume the same postulates and reach the same conclusions—to wit, that the Roman is the only true Church; that she alone possesses the organization instituted by Christ upon Peter, and, therefore, also the supremacy and authority conferred on him; that she alone, through her infallible pope, has the power to decide and define the faith and the nature and extent of her own authority over all nations and peoples; and, consequently, that whatever she shall decide and declare to be the law of God, in the domain of faith and morals, must be accepted and believed as such.

These propositions have theological aspects, not necessary to be discussed here; but they are grouped together because they constitute the basis of that jurisdiction over spiritual and secular affairs by means of which the papacy has exercised its wonderful authority over the world. The thoughtful investigator cannot be expected, in the present age, to acquiesce in the justness and legitimacy of this jurisdiction, unless he shall find it conferred by the teachings and example of Christ and the apostles. And if, on the other hand, it shall appear to have grown alone out of leagues and compacts and concordats between popes and kings, and the usurpations which invariably attend them, then he will be justified in regarding it as unwarrantable and illegitimate. And if it arose out of the consent of the nations, at a time when they were threatened with annihilation, as some assert, then the nations, now existing in the enjoyment of stability and progress, cannot be denied the right to withdraw their assent from such a measure of temporary expediency, if, indeed, they are under any obligation to recognize it at all, and more especially so if it interferes with their stability and impedes their advancement.

The papacy itself has often found authority in the divine law for giving its assent, once withheld, and for withdrawing it when once given, in matters both spiritual and temporal; and if the nations of the nineteenth century, not desiring to turn back to the medieval times, shall find in its example justification for denying to those times the right to confer upon it authority to block up their pathways of progress and improvement, it ought to know that its acquiescence would be far more consistent with primitive Christianity than its present persistent and passionate resistance.

We must accept all papal testimony upon these questions with many grains of allowance, for much the most important part of it has come from the manufactory at Rome, and does not reach the dignity of

proof. A distinguished Roman Catholic of Venice, and priest of one of the papal orders, has given us a timely and necessary caution on this subject. The “most learned Father Paul,” referring to the extraordinary influence which the popes were enabled to acquire by means of the prohibition of books and the universal practice among them of not permitting the circulation and reading of any that did not teach obedience on the part of the people to the ecclesiastical power, says:

“But as there were already in God’s Church those who made use of religion for worldly ends, so the number of them is now full. These, under a spiritual pretense, but with an ambitious end and desire of worldly wealth, would free themselves from the obedience due to the prince, and take away the love and reverence due by the people, to draw it to themselves. To bring these things to pass, they have newly invented a doctrine, which talks of nothing but ecclesiastical greatness, liberty, immunity, and of her jurisdiction. The doctrine was unheard of until about the year 1300, neither is there any book found concerning it before that time: then did they begin to write of it scatteringly in some books; but there were not above two books which treated of nothing else but this, until the year 1400, and three until the year 1500. After this time the number increased a little, but it was tolerable. After the year 1560, this doctrine began to increase in such manner that they gave over writing, as they did before, of the mysteries of the Holy Trinity, of the creation of the world, of the Incarnation of Christ, and other mysteries of the belief; and there is *nothing* printed in Italy but books in diminution of secular authority and exaltation of the ecclesiastical, and such books are not printed by small numbers, but by thousands. Those people which have any learning *can read nothing else*; the confessors likewise know none other doctrine, nor, to be approved of, need they any other learning. Whence comes in a perverse opinion universally, that princes and magistrates are human inventions, yea, and tyrannical; that they ought only by compulsion to be obeyed; that the disobeying of laws and defrauding the public revenues do not bind one unto sin, but only to punishment; and that he that doth not pay, if he can fly from it, remains not guilty before the Divine Majesty; and contrariwise, that each beck of ecclesiastical persons, without any other thought, *ought to be taken for a divine precept, and binds the conscience*. And this doctrine, perchance, is the cause of all inconveniences which are felt in this age. There wants not in Italy pious and learned persons which hold the truth, *but they are not suffered to write, nor to print*. Something comes written from another place, but presently it is prohibited. And little thought is taken of heretical books, especially those that treat of the Articles of Faith; but if any one comes that defends the prince his temporal authority, and saith that ecclesiastical persons are also subject to public functions, and *punishable if they violate the public tranquillity*, these are condemned books, and persecuted more than others. They have gelded the books of ancient authors by new printing of them, and taken out—all which might serve for temporal authority.” *

* “History of the Inquisition,” by the Rev. Father Paul Servita (Sarpi): London edition, 1676; bound with his “History of the Council of Trent,” pp. 874, 875.

This author wrote shortly after the death of Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, and when, as appears from his statement, the papacy had been brought completely under the influence of the doctrines of that order. He is better known as Sarpi, and his “History of the Council of Trent” has been long accepted by the learned as a work of standard authority. He lived for some years at Rome, where he enjoyed the confidence of the pope; as he did also that of Cardinal Bellarmine, the great Roman

Catholic annalist. His evidence upon the subjects of which he treats is of such importance as to justify the foregoing long extract. And he is equally important authority upon another point. He also exposes the fraudulent methods employed at Rome to falsify history, as one of the means of extending and perpetuating the supremacy of the papacy over the legitimate temporal authority of the nations. He informs us that Clement VIII., who was pope from 1592 to 1605, prescribed a rule making all writers of Roman Catholic books so subservient to the papacy that their books “might be corrected and amended, not only *by taking away what is not conformable to the doctrine of Rome, butt also with adding to it.*” This, he says, was “put in practice,” and, by means of it, books were fraudulently mutilated to make them support ecclesiastical usurpation, when their authors designed no such meaning.

As late as the seventeenth century, the “Index Expurgatorius,” printed, by authority of the pope, at Rome, contained notes of the places where many “authors ought to be canceled;” and this dishonest practice of altering the language and meaning of books was carried so far, says Father Paul, that “at this present, in reading of a book, a man can no more find what the author’s meaning was, but only *what is the Court of Rome’s, who hath altered everything.*” (“History of the Inquisition,” by Rev. Father Paul Servita, p. 875.)

There are very few exceptions in history to the rule, that those who possess themselves, wrongfully and unjustly, of the power to govern others, are not apt to halt long at the means of preserving it. Machiavelli has been severely censured for having taught the doctrine that “the end justifies the means;” but it should be remembered, in seeking for the proper interpretation of his motives, that his “Prince” was written, not so much for the purpose of originating new principles of action, as to exhibit the nature and operation of those that almost universally prevailed in his time; and that when he came to illustrate the effect of the doctrine that “a prudent prince cannot and ought not to keep his word, except when he can do it without injury to himself,” but should play “the part of the fox,” the example which served his purpose best was that furnished by the pontificate of Alexander VI., whose whole life he characterized as “a game of deception,” and of whom he also said, “Oaths and protestations cost him nothing; never did a prince so often break his word or pay less regard to his engagements.” (Machiavelli’s “History of Florence,” and other Works (“The Prince”), Bohn’s ed., pp. 459, 460.)

He had before his mind the Jesuit influence upon the papacy and the princes of Europe, whose combined authority was directed to the accumulation of power in their own hands, no matter at what sacrifice by the people. It was this influence which molded the ethics of the papacy; and whether the odious principles of the Jesuits were deduced from the examples of former popes, or fixed first in the minds of those of the sixteenth century by Loyola and his disciples, is of no consequence, in view of the fact that the temporal power of the pope is shown by all impartial history to have grown out of the most stupendous system of fraud and usurpation ever known to the world.

The steps which led to it were gradual and progressive. So far from its having a divine foundation, arising out of any authority conferred by Christ upon Peter, it had its inception in the time of Constantine, to whom, more than to all others, the papacy is indebted for the origin of its most important immunities and privileges. He was the first to lay a foundation for the union of Church and State, to mingle religion and politics together; and he did this not only to increase his own power, but the influence of the Roman priesthood, in return for the assistance they rendered him when he

overthrew Maxentius, the reigning Emperor of Rome. At the proper time, we shall see that the combination to effect these ends was political, not religious, and that there was no thought of its serving any other purpose until the calling of the Council of Nice, by Constantine himself, without any agency whatever on the part of Pope Sylvester, for the ostensible object of suppressing the heresy of Arius, but for the real purpose of producing a closer and more intimate union between the imperial and ecclesiastical powers.

Some of the papal writers are disposed to go behind the concessions made to the Church of Rome by Constantine, and to search for the temporal power in the ownership of ecclesiastical property before that time. A book has lately been written in Germany—translated and published in the United States—enforcing this view by a variety of arguments.*

* “Rome and the Popes,” translated from the German of Dr. Karl Brandes, by Rev. W. I. Wiseman, S. T. L., chap. xvi., p. 84.

It is here called the “Patrimony of Peter,” the “supreme jurisdiction of the see of Rome;” and it is said that Ignatius referred to it as “a presidency of charity,” when, as this author alleges, he assigned to the Roman Church supremacy over all the other churches. This argument, if it proves any thing, proves too much for the advocates of the temporal power; for, at the time Ignatius wrote, all the churches in Asia and Africa were the owners of ecclesiastical property, equally with that at Rome; and some of the Asiatic churches, as those at Jerusalem, Antioch, etc., had been such owners before there was any thing like an organized Christian Church known or heard of at Rome. Hence, if this ownership conferred any temporal power higher than the mere right to use and enjoy church property, the other churches possessed it in the same degree as the Roman, and no superiority could arise out of that cause. But it really proves nothing; for the plain reason that in no age of the world have civilized nations ever recognized any temporal power, in the sense of that claimed for the popes, as derived from the mere individual or corporate right to hold and enjoy property. The right to hold real property is attached, primarily, to the sovereignty, and is enjoyed by individuals or corporations by grant from it or when it is taken by force strong enough to make resistance successful. When conferred by grant or any form of concession, there is no abatement of the sovereign power, which, for all the purposes of government over both the property and its possessor, remains as before.

Nor is it true that Ignatius recognized any such supremacy in the Roman Church, as is asserted, with such apparent confidence, by this author. Fortunately, the recent publication of the writings of the “Ante-Nicene fathers” will enable any diligent inquirer to investigate these matters for himself; and thus to avoid being misled by second—hand authorities, which, as Sarpi tells us, are often culled and clipped at Rome, to make them express, not what the authors meant, but what the papacy desires. Ignatius addressed his “Epistle to the Romans” to the Church which “*presides in the place of the region of the Romans*,” * thus showing that, whatever was the nature of the presidency possessed by the bishops of Rome at that time, it was limited to the region round about Rome, and did not extend into other regions.

* “The Apostolic Fathers,” published by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, p. 280. See also “The Apocryphal New Testament,” published by Dewitt & Davenport, New York.

And in the same sense he saluted all the other churches to which his epistles were addressed—those at Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, Philadelphia, and Smyrna. He wrote his Epistle to the Romans while on his way to Rome from Antioch, where he was sent by Trajan to be thrown to the wild beasts. His chief object was to notify them that he was rejoiced at the dispensation which was about to enable him “to fight with beasts at Rome;” that is, to suffer martyrdom for the cause of Christ. He said nothing from which the presidency of Peter can, by possibility, be inferred—not even by the most ingenious torture of his language. When he spoke of the authority to issue commands to the Roman Christians, he referred to Peter and Paul unitedly, and not to Peter alone; and then only for the purpose of contrasting himself with them, they being apostles and he a follower. (“The Apostolic Fathers,” p. 212.)

When, elsewhere, he spoke of the obligation of obedience, he admonished each particular church addressed by him to show it to its own bishop. To the Ephesians he said, “Ye should run together in accordance with the will of the bishop who by God’s appointment rules over you.” (*Ibid.*, p. 149.) After counseling the Magnesians to revere their “most admirable bishop,” he said to them, “Be ye subject to the bishop, and to one another, as Christ to the Father, that there may be a unity according to God among you.” (*Ibid.*, p. 186.) To the Trallians he said, “Be ye subject to the bishop as to the Lord.” (“The Apostolic Fathers,” p. 190.)

He commended to the Philadelphians their bishop, with whom he desired them to maintain union; telling them, “where the shepherd is, there do ye as sheep follow;” (*Ibid.*, pp. 233, 234.) and, further exhorting, them to unity, said, “Be ye followers of Paul, and the rest of the apostles, even as they also were of Christ;” (*Ibid.*, p. 218.) making no mention whatever of Peter, but directly excluding, almost by express words, all idea of his primacy or superiority. To the Smyrneans he said, “See that ye all follow the bishop,” and “Let no man do any thing connected with the church without the bishop,” and wherever he was there should they be, because “*wherever Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church;*” (*Ibid.*, pp. 248, 249.) that is, the universal body of Christians, and not merely the Church of Rome, of whose power to govern the other churches he seems never to have had a thought.

And, in further and still more convincing proof that he did not recognize the primacy of Peter, or of the Roman Church, he begged the Romans, in his Epistle to them, to remember the Church in Syria in their prayers, since, instead of him, it then had no bishop, but only the Lord “for its shepherd;” (*Ibid.*, p. 218.) which could not have been the case if the Bishop of Rome was, as is now pretended, the shepherd of the whole flock—the universal shepherd.

And in his letter to Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna, he begged him, and not the Bishop of Rome, to assemble a council, to elect a bishop for the Church at Antioch, in his place, and “to bestow on him the honor of going into Syria;” (*Ibid.*, pp. 264, 265.) which he, undoubtedly, would not have done if Rome had been the seat of episcopal primacy, and if the bishops there had possessed what is now so dogmatically and imperiously claimed for them, “the plenitude of power to feed, rule, and govern the Universal Church.” (“The Vatican Council,” by Manning, p. 61.) And thus we find the precise fact to be, that Ignatius is authority against, rather than for, the existence of what is now called “the patrimony of Peter;” at least, up to the year 107, which is supposed to have been the year of his martyrdom.

This same German author, in further support of his views, refers to the action of two of the pagan emperors to prove that the patrimony of Peter, or temporal power of the pope, was recognized by them as existing in the third century. He says, “Alexander Severus decided a lawsuit respecting a piece of property in favor of the Roman Church,” treating it as a “corporate body;” (Brandes, p. 85.) and that “the Emperor Aurelian, though an enemy and persecutor of the Church, recognized the supremacy of the pope over all the Christians of the empire.” (*Ibid.*, p. 86.) If such assertions as these were not gravely set forth as argument in a standard work of the Church, and designed, by its republication, to influence public opinion in the United States, they would scarcely be worthy of notice. As it is, they only serve to show how utterly indefensible is the claim of temporal power at the time referred to.

Although Alexander Severus was not, yet his mother was a Christian, as we learn from Origen, and his conduct toward the Christians may, in some measure, be attributed to her influence. As an exhibition of his liberality—probably induced by her—he issued an edict of toleration, prohibiting any violence against his subjects on account of their religion. (“History of the Popes,” by Cormanin, vol. i., p. 35.) That the Church held property in Rome during his reign, as a recognized corporation, must be true; for Roman corporations were provided for and protected by Numa Pompilius, as early as about the fortieth year of Rome. (Plutarch, vol. i., p. 178.) When the laws of the Decemvirs—the “twelve tables,” were engraved on brass and fixed up in public view, full protection was given to all these corporations; (Livy, bk. iii., ch. lvii.) including, of course, such as the Church afterward became. Therefore, the decision of so liberal a prince as Alexander Severus, merely in support of the right of the Church to hold property as a corporation, proves only two things: first, that the Christians were not persecuted during his reign; and, second, that he administered the laws with integrity and impartiality. He would, in like manner, have maintained the same right in any other corporation, as he did, in fact, in all the pagan corporations. Hence his decision amounts to nothing as an argument in favor of the temporal power of the popes. It really proves the reverse, if anything; because it serves to show that the Roman Church, instead of deciding upon its own right to property in Rome by its own hierarchical authority—as it is now pretended it has always done—was compelled, like all the other corporations of Rome, to submit it to the emperor, and to abide his decision, because he possessed the superior temporal jurisdiction of the State. The Bishop of Rome was then a subject—not in any sense a sovereign.

Nor does the papal theory derive any more or better support from what was done by the Emperor Aurelian. He was, for a while, disposed to favor the Christians, but at last, according to Lactantius, issued “bloody edicts” against them. (“History of the Catholic Church,” by Noethen, p. 132; “Eccl. Hist.,” by Eusebius, bk. vii., ch. xxx.)

The case of Paul of Samosata came before him to be judged — probably before he became a persecutor. The fact that he finally decided such a case—involving *heresy* in one of its aspects, which was an offense against the laws of the Church, and not against those of the empire—is perfectly conclusive against the claim of papal supremacy at Rome at that time; that is, up to the pontificate of Felix I., between the years 270 and 275, when the case was decided. It proves, beyond any reasonable ground for controversy, that—as during the previous reign of Alexander Severus the Roman Church and its bishop were entirely subordinate to the emperor and the laws of the empire. And that this subordination extended even to ecclesiastical matters, the case adjudged by Aurelian abundantly shows,

as the history of the same case also shows, that the jurisdiction of the Roman bishop was limited, as it was in the time of Ignatius, to “the place of the region of the Romans.”

Paul of Samosata was Bishop of Antioch, in Syria, and denied the divinity of Christ. For this a council was assembled at Antioch to try him, *without the agency of the Church or Bishop of Rome*—which would scarcely have been the case if the supremacy now asserted had then existed. According to Eusebius, this council was composed of bishops from Caesarea, Pontus, Tarsus, Iconium, and Jerusalem, and many presbyters and deacons (Eccl. Hist., by Eusebius, bk. vii., ch. xxviii.)—all from the Asiatic churches, and none from Rome — with Firmilian, Bishop of Caesarea, as its president. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Du Pin, vol. i., p. 172.) Paul was convicted of heresy, but not excommunicated, in consequence of a promise that he would retract his error. Having failed, however, to do this, a second council was assembled at the same place in the year 270, which deposed Paul, and elected another bishop to succeed him, and who took possession of the see of Antioch. All these proceedings were conducted, from first to last, by the Asiatic churches, and the Roman Church had no connection whatever with them. A bishop was tried for heresy, convicted, excommunicated, and removed from office, and another elected to fill his place, by these early fathers, and yet Rome was not consulted! But Paul did not submit without some show of resistance. As he was “unwilling to leave the building of the church” that is, claimed the right to occupy the house and premises—” an appeal was taken to the Emperor Aurelian,” says Eusebius. (Eusebius, bk. vii., ch. xxx.) And why to the Emperor, and not to the Church or Bishop of Rome? The answer is simple and conclusive: because neither the Church as a corporation, nor the pope as a bishop, had any jurisdiction over temporal affairs, even to the extent of deciding upon the right of an heretical bishop to occupy church property; nor any jurisdiction to review or decide upon the proceedings of the bishops of Asia!

Both the Church of Rome and its bishop, as well as the other churches and bishops throughout the empire, were subject to the civil laws of the empire. And because of this subordination, and because both Antioch and Rome were within the empire, all the parties concerned were compelled to abide by the judgment of the emperor. “And he decided,” says Eusebius, “most equitably on the business, ordering the building to be given up to those to whom the bishops of Italy and Rome should write.” (*Ibid.*) Cormenin records his decision in somewhat different language, thus: “The prince decided that the possession of the episcopal palace pertained to those who entertained relations with the Bishop of Rome, and the other prelates of Italy, and that Pope Felix, having refused to hold communion with Paul of Samosata, he should consequently be driven from his see.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 46.)

These two statements, however, are substantially the same—that is, that the emperor decided in favor of those Christians at Antioch who were in fellowship, not merely with the Bishop of Rome, but with the “other prelates of Italy,” who unitedly represented the Italian churches, including that of Rome with the others. Nothing could have been more natural; for, although both Rome and Antioch were in the empire, Aurelian, a pagan prince, could, of course, have no other ideas of Christianity than such as he derived from direct and immediate intercourse with his Roman and Italian subjects. Therefore, upon the question whether or not Paul forfeited his rights as a bishop in Asia by a violation of Christian faith, he referred to them because they were in Rome and its vicinity, and decided according to their definition of orthodoxy—they occupying merely a secondary or advisory position. But to say of this, as this author does, that it was a recognition by Aurelian of “the supremacy of the pope over all the Christians

of the empire,” is an assumption wholly unwarranted by the facts. The case of Paul of Samosata proves the very reverse. And the most that can be fairly said, if not all that can be said, in reference to the Church at Rome, up to the time of Aurelian, is, that it was permitted by law to hold property, as also were all other corporations and churches throughout the empire. Whatsoever temporal power was necessary to enable it to hold and enjoy this property, it possessed — no more, no less. The Bishop of Rome, as its ecclesiastical head, did not possess one single element of sovereignty.

This author, however, after attempting to prove that the temporal power existed in the times of Alexander Severus and Aurelian, seems himself persuaded that the right was a mere shadowy one; for immediately after he asserts that it was “formally recognized” by “an edict of Constantine.” (Brandes, p. 86.) Constantine did not enter Rome till the year 312, during the pontificate of Melchiades, which was about a quarter of a century after the death of Aurelian, and about three—quarters of a century after that of Alexander Severus. If, therefore, the popes possessed temporal power in the time of either of these last—named emperors, it must have been only partial and limited, or no necessity for a formal recognition of it by an imperial edict would have existed. But passing by any attempt to convict him of inconsistency by a critical review of his language, let us see whether this pretended grant of Constantine will stand the test of investigation, and whether there is any sufficient foundation for it to rest upon.

That Constantine recognized the Church at Rome as an existing ecclesiastical corporation, as some of his predecessors had done, is unquestionably true. And it is also true that he went farther than any of them in strengthening and protecting it. He is called the “*Christian Emperor*,” by way of distinction; but when we shall come, at another place, to look into the history of his connection with the Roman clergy, we shall find that his only claim to this title consists in the fact that he was the friend and patron of the ecclesiastical organization which gave him its support when he marched his army from Britain and Gaul into Italy to supplant the reigning emperor and seize upon the empire. The pretext that, on his way to Rome, as a pagan prince, he saw a flaming cross in the heavens, bearing the inscription, “Under this sign thou shalt conquer,” answered its end in a superstitious age, but is scarcely entitled to the place it has received in history. The fact is, he cared very little for Christianity beyond the use to which he put its professors, which was to build up and secure his own power.

Although he convened the first Council of Nice, dictated the most material part of its creed, and made it the measure of orthodoxy by his imperial decree, yet he deferred his own baptism and union with the Church until just before his death, in 337, when he received baptism at the hands of an Arian and heretical bishop. He was, therefore, never a Roman Catholic at all, but, according to the present teachings of that Church, was always a heretic, and not a Christian, unless a man can possess both characters at the same time! His motives were in the main worldly; and, hence, the inference is unavoidable that what he did for the Church at Rome was done chiefly to advance his own ambition. He had the sympathy of the Roman clergy, who were quite willing to assist him in expelling Maxentius, not only because the latter was a cruel and licentious prince, but in return for the privileges he conferred upon them. And as they were most efficient and valuable aids of each other, these privileges were both important and extensive. But it can in no sense be properly said that they were to the extent of conferring upon the Bishop of Rome, as the head of the Church, any share of the temporal power,

which, as all reliable history shows, he was careful to retain in his own hands, both at Rome and elsewhere throughout the empire.

By a royal decree, he commanded all his subjects to honor the Christian religion; he revoked all acts of persecution against the Christians that had been proclaimed by his predecessors; he released Christians who had been deprived of their liberty; he placed them in important posts of government at Rome; he commanded that part of the funds collected from tributary countries should be paid over to the clergy; he built and ornamented churches; and he permitted litigants to appeal to the bishops, instead of the secular courts, if they preferred it. (Eccl. Hist.,” by Sozomen, bk. i., ch. viii., ix.; “Eccl. Hist.,” by Socrates, bk. i., ch. iii.) Eusebius has preserved several of his edicts in reference to the Church. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Eusebius, bk. x., ch. v.) Not one of them, however, confers any temporal power, or recognizes any previously existing. One of them distinctly ignores all such power in the Bishop of Rome. The first commands the restoration of certain church property; the second is of like character; the third convenes a council of bishops at Rome, to preserve the unity and peace of the Church; and the fourth convenes another council for the same purpose. In these two last he provides by imperial edict for matters exclusively belonging to the Church, when, if the temporal power had belonged to the Bishop of Rome, they would have been within his sole jurisdiction.

Why should he thus act independently of ecclesiastical authority upon such a subject? Undoubtedly it must have been only on the ground of his own imperial supremacy in spiritual as well as temporal affairs. He was willing to confer honor upon the Church and emoluments upon the clergy, but determined that both the Church and the clergy should be held in subordination to the State. Otherwise, what would he, as emperor, have to do with church unity? He was not a member of the Church, according to the orthodox standard of the Roman Church, not even a Christian! Manifestly, he must have felt his superiority over all the Roman hierarchy, even in the affairs of the Church, when, in one of his edicts, he used such language as this in reference to them:

“Hence it has happened that those very persons who ought to exhibit a brotherly and peaceful unanimity, rather disgracefully and detestably are at variance with one another, and thus give this occasion of derision to those who are without, and whose minds are averse to our most holy religion. Hence it has appeared necessary to me to provide that this matter, which ought to have ceased after the decision was issued by their own voluntary agreement, should be fully terminated by the intervention of many.” *

* Eusebius, bk. x., ch. v. This extract is taken from an “epistle in which the emperor commanded another council to be held, for the purpose of removing all the dissension of the bishops,” says Eusebius.

The expression “our most holy religion” was used here not in such a sense as signified his own personal faith, but to indicate, what all the facts prove, that as the imperial head of the State he considered himself also the imperial head of the Church. And that this was his idea—if there were otherwise any doubt about it—is shown by another edict preserved by Eusebius, wherein he expressly separates the clergy from all temporal affairs, by exempting them from all further secular service. And this is the reason he assigns: that they may not “be drawn away from the service due the divinity, but rather *may devote themselves to their proper law*, without any molestation.” (Eusebius, bk. x., ch. vii.)

In so far, therefore, as the general history of Constantine's administration of public affairs is concerned, there is no contemporaneous history to show that he recognized any temporal power in the hands of the Bishop of Rome. On the contrary, the assumption that he did seems so utterly groundless as to leave no room for further discussion.

The further pretense, that by actual imperial donation he made over Rome and Italy to the popes, had its origin in the fertile brain of Pope Adrian I., who, in order to obtain important concessions from Charlemagne, doubtless considered it necessary to impress him with the belief that he would, by granting them, be following the example of Constantine. *

* "Fables Respecting the Popes of the Middle Ages," by Dr. John I. Ign. Von Dollinger, London ed., p. 118. This book was written when the author was in full fellowship with the Church of Rome.

Previous to this time, says Dr. Dbllinger,"there is not a trace to be found of the donation which has since become so famous." (*Ibid.*, p. 108.) And he shows that while, from time to time, many canonists and theologians have maintained its verity, in order to found upon it "a universal dominion of the pope," yet that after Baronius, one of the most distinguished of the Church annalists, pronounced it a forgery," all these voices which had shortly before been so numerous and so loud became dumb." (*Ibid.*, p. 177.) The fact is, that no writers who have proper regard for their veracity now maintain the truthfulness of this donation of Constantine. The fraud served its purpose during the Middle Ages, among an ignorant and superstitious population, but it no longer bears the test of intelligent scrutiny. Dean Milman calls it a "deliberate invention," a "monstrous fable," and a "forgery as clumsy as audacious." (Milmani's "Latin Christianity," vol. i., p. 94.) Reichel characterizes it as "an ignorant blunder and a falsehood — a falsehood, however, let it be borne in mind, which faithfully reflects the thoughts and feelings of the age which gave it birth." * To accumulate proofs upon this subject, in this inquiring age, would seem to be a work of supererogation.

* "The See of Rome in the Middle Ages," by Reichel, London ed., p. 58. This author gives the letter of Pope Adrian I. to Charles Martel, wherein he sets forth this pretended donation, in order to win his assistance against his enemies.—*Ibid.*, note 1.

Not only is there nothing in all the concessions of Constantine from which a grant of the most limited temporal jurisdiction can be inferred, but in the edict preserved by Eusebius he excludes all idea of the kind. The clergy are set apart by it from those engaged in secular employments, and admonished to "devote themselves to their proper law"—that is, to the discharge of their ecclesiastical and priestly functions. He had, according to Sozomen, entrusted them with the most important offices under the government after he won the Roman scepter, in return for their assistance to him. But it is evident, from what he said of them, in the epistle given by Eusebius, about their disgraceful and detestable variances with each other, that he found it necessary to prohibit their further intermeddling with temporal affairs, and to take upon himself, as emperor, the assembling of a council to heal their dissensions.

It must be remembered that Constantine did not reside at Rome. At the time he took possession of the empire he passed, says Gibbon, "no more than two or three months in Rome, which he visited twice during the remainder of his life, to celebrate the solemn festivals of the tenth and of the twentieth years

of his reign.” (Milman’s Gibbon’s “Rome,” vol. i., p. 485.) After relieving the city from the cruel tyranny of Maxentius, he abolished the praetorian guards, to prevent the recurrence of abuses. But “he made no innovation in the government, magistracy, and offices, and abrogated no laws except such as were useless and unjust;” restoring, as was shown by an inscription upon a public statue, “the Senate and the people of Rome to their ancient splendor.” *

* “Modern History,” by Dr. Fredet, p. 101. This is a work of great research, by a professor of history in St. Mary’s Roman Catholic College, Baltimore.

It is evident, therefore, that, in his absence from Rome, while engaged in prosecuting his wars, he left the temporal government just as he found it, which entirely forbids the idea of any temporal authority having been conferred upon the pope. He merely tried the experiment of admitting the clergy into the magistracy, but soon repented of this. What he did in that direction was far more calculated to excite ambition than piety, and subsequent history shows that it did lead to those corruptions which carried the Church far away from its apostolic purity.

Why Providence permitted such consequences to follow is beyond all human comprehension. We can no more fathom the mysteries in the plan of the Divine Government than we can give sensibility to a grain of sand. Life abounds in enigmas, with limitations and conditions which nothing but omnipotent wisdom could have imposed; and he who attempts to measure them by standards of human knowledge will find impediments at every step which his sagacity cannot over-leap. The naturalist may watch the germ from its first springing into life to the full maturity of the flower, and trace out all the stages of its existence with truthful accuracy; and the scientist may gather from the earth, the ocean, and the rocks, evidences of time, marked out by lines of growth, as age is marked by furrows upon the human face; but in the entire panorama of being there is everything to show—from the minutest to the grandest scenes in nature, and in the origin, growth, and downfall of governments—that God is the omnipresent sovereign, and that his providences are “past finding out.” He is everywhere present in history; yet he has given man his intelligent superiority over all other created beings, that he may work out results within the compass of his powers, for the divine honor and his own good.

That he designed, from the beginning, the ultimate triumph of virtue over vice, of truth over falsehood, and of Christian humility over ambition and selfishness, the infidel may deny with his lips, but cannot doubt in his heart. But it was no part of his infinite plan that this victory should be won in a day, a year, or a century; or his Son, when he mingled in the affairs of the world, robed in our humanity, would have thrown down all the altars of paganism and established his universal kingdom on the earth. Instead of this, He lived and ministered long enough to set an example of perfect purity to man, and left His Gospel in charge of his apostles, that its precepts might teach mankind those principles of truth, justice, morality, and charity, which nature, without revelation, does not teach.

The apostles began their work by establishing the Church, first at Jerusalem, then at Antioch, and then at other places throughout Asia, where the Jew, with or without circumcision, entered into the fold; leaving the Gentile world yet without a knowledge of the Word. From these beginnings Christianity was carried to Rome, where the foundation of a new Church was laid under the preaching of Paul, over which he watched for “two whole years” in “his own hired house.” *

* Acts xxviii., 30. Paul, though a prisoner, was not in actual confinement; and his sphere of Christian labor in Rome would not have been limited to a "hired house," if there had been a church already established there, under the ministry of Peter.

Here it continued to exist, "without spot or blemish," until worldly ambition crept into the flock, when Constantine tempted it by gifts of office, and money, and property, and power. Then the grand consummation of the Christian triumph was postponed. Rome had already held the pagan world in subjugation, and her bishops and clergy, tempted by the remembrance of her former greatness, were not content to rest in their career of ambition, until all the primitive churches were brought down in humiliation at their feet. When this was accomplished, stimulated and emboldened by their first success, they reached out to grasp the scepter of the world. Who can tell how much the nations have been impeded in their march of progress by these events? But for them the world might have escaped the blight and paralysis of the Middle Ages, and have pursued an unbroken and unchecked course of advancement from the beginning of Christianity. And, instead of now lamenting the loss of all her temporal power, and mourning to see her pope sitting among shattered and fallen columns, without a crown upon his head, the Church of Rome might have held today such a place in the affections of mankind as would have made her word, in spiritual things, the universal guide of human conduct.

Chapter IX. Argument of Archbishop Kenrick

Same Power conferred on all the Apostles.—Roman Church not the First Established.—Ancient Churches Equal.—Leo I. Great and Ambitious. His Interviews with Attila and Genseric.—Persecution of Priscillian.—Rival Popes.—Belisarius seized Rome, and made Vigilius Pope.—Pope Silverius put to Death.—Vigilius and Justinian.—The “Three Chapters.”—Popes elected with Emperor’s Consent.—Gregory I.

IT has been already seen that Archbishop Kenrick has treated the question of the pope’s temporal power with more fairness than is common among its defenders. This was to have been expected on account of his superior learning, and was alike due to the intelligence of the age and to his own Christian character. He does not grope about like a blind man—as many of the papal writers do—amidst the fabulous obscurity of the early centuries, to hunt for inferences which have nothing but the imagination to support them, and so torture them that they may appear like facts. Nor does he pretend—as Pope Pius IX. and the Jesuits do—that the temporal power was divinely conferred on Peter; that it is “of necessity,” and, therefore, has always existed since Christ established his Church. Yet even he, with all his acknowledged sagacity, has not entirely escaped the Jesuit snare; for, after telling us that the disciples had “no dominion over the least spot of earth,” and that Peter had none “of the appendages of royalty” given him, he proceeds immediately to say that “he had powers of a supernatural order, for the government of men in order to salvation.” (“The Primacy of the Apostolic See,” by Kenrick. part ii., ch. i., p. 225.)

The critic might justly say that the distinguished archbishop has here fallen into what the lawyers call a *non sequitur*; for it is by no means a legitimate inference to say that, because Christ left Peter without temporal dominion, therefore he conferred supernatural powers of government upon him. Our present inquiries, however, are of a more serious and important character. What idea he intended to convey by “powers of a supernatural order” is not clear. Such power must, necessarily, exceed all natural power, and can only exist miraculously. Its possessor must be able to alter the laws of nature. Was it, therefore, given to Peter to be exercised in spirituals alone? or in temporals also? or in spirituals of so comprehensive a nature as to include temporals?

In whatsoever degree it was conferred, it was the power to work miracles; and, as such, was possessed by all the other apostles equally with Peter. When Christ ordained the twelve, and sent them forth to preach, he gave them all “power to heal sicknesses, and to cast out devils.” (Mark iii., 15. The Douay and Protestant versions agree in this rendering.) And as they went through the towns of Galilee, they perplexed Herod the tetrarch by “healing everywhere.” (Luke ix., 6.) And “many wonders and signs were done by the apostles” on the day of Pentecost. (Acts ii., 43.) Peter healed the impotent man in the temple. (Acts iii., 7.) And Philip worked miracles in Samaria. (Acts viii., 6.) And when Paul and Barnabas went into Iconium, Paul caused the lame man of Lystra to leap up and walk. (Acts xiv., 10.) “And God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul” at Ephesus. (Acts xix., 11.)

And other evidences abundantly show that miraculous gifts were conferred upon all the apostles. Then, if, by the fact of imparting supernatural powers, Christ designed that they should be employed “for the government of men in order to salvation,” there was no special designation of Peter for that purpose, any more than the other apostles. They were all equal in the possession of the power; and, as whatever authority they had must have arisen out of it, they were equal in authority also. To select Peter,

therefore, as the sole custodian of the supernatural power, in illustration of the authority of the pope over temporals, is, to say the least of it, an evasion of the question. That he had such power is not denied by any except those who reject revelation. But that it was given him for interference with the temporal affairs of government is shown by no part of the divine record; nor can it be inferred from what was done by him or any other of the apostles in their ministry. If Christ had designed such interference, he would have indicated it by some example of his own; and if he had intended to establish a Church at Rome, founded alone upon Peter, and with a distinct organization, to be maintained by supernatural power, he would have conferred such power alone upon Peter, and not upon the other apostles also. If the possession of supernatural power gave authority to establish the Church, and this power was possessed by all the apostles alike, then the churches at Jerusalem, at Antioch, and other places in Asia, which preceded that at Rome, antedated the Roman Church in the possession of the power to govern men in order to salvation. And then, also, the churches established by Paul at Corinth, and Ephesus, and other places, stood upon a precise equality, as it regards authority and jurisdiction, with that at Rome, even if it be conceded that the latter was established by Peter. Christ gave to neither of them precedence over the other, nor over any other of the apostles.

Whether either of them, in establishing a church, intended to transfer to it the supernatural power which he possessed, to be preserved throughout all time, their records do not instruct us. But that either one transferred more of such power than another, or that Peter was the only one who transferred any at all, is a proposition which may be dogmatically asserted, as it is, but cannot be maintained by argument. Therefore, when Christ said, "Upon this rock I will build my Church," he meant to declare himself to be the rock upon which each and all the apostolic churches should be founded, with the authority he conferred upon all the apostles as the origin of their unity. The unity designed by him was in the beginning, and "the beginning proceeds from unity" in him, says the eloquent Cyprian, one of the foremost of "the fathers," and a martyr of the third century. Therefore, he continues, "Assuredly the rest of the apostles were also the same as Peter, endowed with a like partnership both of honor and power;" and "the episcopate is one, each part of which is held *by each, for the whole*." ("The Writings of Cyprian," vol. i., pp. 280, 281. "Antenicene Christian Library," vol. viii.)

Archbishop Kenrick does not argue his proposition; he merely states it. But it is easy to see that its logical result is this: that if the supernatural power includes authority over temporals, because they are embraced in spirituals, then the temporal power was conferred in the act of conferring the spiritual, and existed alike, from necessity, in all the apostolic churches. Inasmuch, therefore, as he had just stated that the temporal power of the pope was not divinely conferred, and undoubtedly means that the supernatural was, his consistency can be maintained in no other way than by setting him down as emphatic authority against the whole Jesuit theory of the temporal "patrimony of Peter."

It is of no consequence to inquire here how long the supernatural power conferred upon the apostles continued to be possessed by their successors, in the work of spreading the Gospel— whether it ceased with those who came directly in contact with them, or with John, the last survivor. For if, at the beginning, the power was equally possessed by all the apostles, and not by Peter alone to the exclusion of the others, it would be absurd and illogical to say that it survived to a single church alone, or to the bishop of a single church. That would bring about a unity not founded upon Christ, but upon the supernatural power of one apostle—not a unity of affection, but of compulsion—for none but those

who argue falsely will insist that the apostles changed their relations to each other after the Crucifixion, or that they designed that the churches they established upon principles of equality should have that equality either destroyed or disturbed. It is sufficient to know now that even the pope, with infallibility to aid him, has no supernatural power; that he cannot set aside a single law of nature, or perform any other miraculous act. Whatever supposed miracles are now attracting the notice and exciting the devotion of the faithful are attributed to the “Mother of God,” not to the pope.

And therefore, upon the hypothesis of Archbishop Kenrick, if all the right which the papacy has to interfere with temporals arose out of the supernatural power conferred on Peter; and if the pope now possesses no supernatural power, Peter is left without a successor in the temporal order! And that is the end of the controversy, until that power shall be re-conferred. That the world will be better off without conceding it to the pope, is abundantly proven by the fact that the freer the modern nations have been from the papal influences, the more rapidly have they progressed; and still more clearly by the additional fact, that since the load of papal oppression has been removed from the States of the Church, Rome is beginning to assume a dignity and importance which she has not known for centuries.

The frank admissions of Archbishop Kenrick in relation to the destitute condition of the Apostle Peter, and his entire want of dominion, leave those who defend the divine foundation of the temporal power without anything to rest their theory on. They will not pretend that anything done by Christ was improperly done. The Church would pronounce them heretics if they were not ready to concede that the Christianity he established, and the Church he founded by apostolic agency, were necessarily possessed of the utmost perfection. If, then, Christ established a perfect system of Christianity, and founded a perfect church, and sent forth Peter and the other disciples “without scrip or staff,” with no “dominion” over any part of earth, and without “wealth, or any of the appendages of royalty,” to extend the influence of religion and enlarge the borders of the Church, is it not an impeachment of the Divine plan to say, as they do, that temporal power, and large wealth, and the appendages of royalty are necessary to the propagation of the Gospel? The apostles, without any power or dominion, did the work of the Master well and faithfully, and sought after neither at the hands of governments or individuals. But when those who ought to have followed in their footsteps turned away after temporal dominion, they set up their wisdom above that of God, they substituted their pride for the apostolic humility, and checked the progress of Christianity by blocking up the avenues to religious truth, and the highways of the world’s advancement.

Demonstration of this is found in a long array of facts connected with the origin and growth of the temporal power. History abundantly proves that this power has been employed by ambitious popes for their own personal advancement; and that it has been so unblushingly used in violation of the teachings of Christ and his apostles, that many of them have made it equally, if not more, heretical to deny its existence as to deny the divinity of the Saviour! Peter lived all his life without dominion, and at his death, says Archbishop Kenrick, “bequeathed to his successors no inheritance but the labors and dangers of his office;” (“The Primacy,” etc., by Kenrick, p. 525.) and yet the present pope is convulsing the world with intense excitement by continually asserting that Christ conferred temporal dominion and royal authority on Peter; that he, as Peter’s successor, is entitled to the same dominion by inheritance; and that those who have taken it away, as well as those who deny the legitimacy of his claim, have sinned against heaven and are accursed of God! Why should he mourn so sadly, and his supporters

grieve so much, at the loss of that which, as Archbishop Kenrick shows, has been added by others since the death of Peter? Has Christianity so changed since then that it needs the aid of external force and temporal power to sustain it?

But, notwithstanding these admissions, so candidly and frankly made by Archbishop Kenrick, he falls, at last, into the same course of reasoning so common among the supporters of the papacy; and finds, in the circumstances recorded by him, enough to satisfy his own mind that when the popes did come into possession of their temporal power it was legitimately obtained, and without any usurpation. Yet he has not, and could not, tell *the time* of this important event. He readily concedes that the document so frequently referred to by the Jesuits as the donation of Constantine is “supposititious;” (Based primarily on surmise rather than adequate evidence.) yet concludes, with De Maistre, that, notwithstanding this, Constantine did make a donation of some kind, the nature and extent of which, however, he does not attempt to explain; for the manifest reason, that he could not. The most that he can say of it is based upon the authority of the infidel Voltaire, who said that the Church of St. John, in Rome, was presented with a large revenue and lands in Cambria, and that other emperors, subsequent to Constantine, increased this patrimony. But Voltaire expressly says that this was not given to the pope, but was a mere donation of property to the Church—to a particular church in Rome; and it could not, therefore, have been any part of the papal patrimony out of which it was possible for the temporal power to have arisen.

It is, undoubtedly, true that the pope, as the head of the Church in Rome, did have a certain amount of authority necessary to enable him to see that the property of the Church there, and of those within that jurisdiction, was properly taken care of and managed. In the aggregate this property was, even then, very considerable, and yielded a large revenue. Archbishop Kenrick says, upon the authority of Fleury, that it included “some houses and farms, not only in Italy, but likewise in Sicily, Africa, and Greece.” But this authority could not have been anything more than what was necessary to protect the use and enjoyment of this estate—the mere authority of ownership, under the civil law, just as is now secured to all the churches in the United States. The wealth yielded by it was attended with influence, but not necessarily such as pertains to the temporal power claimed by the popes. It was, doubtless, such as large possessions have produced in every age; for, in this respect, it is not probable that society has ever undergone much change.

The power acquired by the possession of property is of a very different kind from that involved in the control of governments and the management of public affairs. Archbishop Kenrick thinks that, in the case of the popes, it was such that, after Constantine removed the capital of the empire from Rome to Constantinople, “the Bishop of Rome” was left “in a position almost independent; the pontifical chair being no longer overshadowed by the imperial throne.” (“The Primacy,” etc., by Kenrick, p. 256.) In proof of this, he does not cite any grant or concession to the pope, but merely a reply of Pope Leo the Great to the Emperor Marcian, when he excused himself from attending a general council, on the ground that his absence from Rome would endanger the public peace, stating that “temporal necessity does not allow me to leave Rome.”

But the learned archbishop strangely overlooked several important facts which, fairly interpreted, do not support his conclusions. In the first place, we have seen that Constantine never resided at Rome, and therefore the removal of the capital to Constantinople could not have made the pontifical chair any

the less overshadowed than it had been before. In the second place, we have also seen that when Constantine conquered Rome from Maxentius he made no change in the government. Nor did he make any when he removed the capital, other than to divide the empire into four parts, leaving Rome under the government of prefects, who represented the imperial power. This temporal power was not shared by the popes during his life. In the third place, we have also seen, upon the authority of Eusebius, that he had become dissatisfied with the bishops and clergy on account of disgraceful quarrels, and had, by imperial edict, confined them “to their proper law,” that is, to their ecclesiastical functions; a fact which forbids the idea that he conferred temporal power upon the pope, when he knew that thereby he would violate his own edict. In the fourth place, he became in the end so greatly dissatisfied with the orthodox clergy, that he never united, by baptism, with the Roman Church, but “banished many Catholic bishops.” (“Encyclopedia Americana,” art. Constantine.)

And still further, one hundred years had elapsed from the death of Constantine to the beginning of the pontificate of Leo the Great, during which time so many changes had occurred in the empire, under the government of more than a dozen emperors, that the condition of affairs created by Constantine could not be properly inferred from anything said by Leo to Marcian. The intervening years were too numerous, and the multitude of events too varied.

But a true understanding of the pontificate of Leo I. will show that, although he made extraordinary and almost superhuman efforts to grasp power which did not properly belong to the papacy, for the purpose of bringing all the other churches into obedience to that at Rome, yet that what he did in that direction was based exclusively upon his claim of spiritual supremacy, and not upon his possession of temporal power, either as conferred by grant from the empire, or as included in the spiritual. Any such claim as the latter, then asserted by him, would have brought him in open collision with the emperor—a result which, ambitious as he was, he was extremely and studiously anxious to avoid. Yet, at the same time, it is not to be disputed that Leo went as far as he dared to attach temporal supremacy to the spiritual “patrimony of Peter;” and if he failed, it was owing more to the firmness with which the Emperor Marcian retained possession of the imperial power than to the want of skill, tact, and ambition on the part of the pope; for the acknowledged possession of all which qualities he has been placed upon the calendar of Roman saints, and has won the title of Great.

He complained that the Patriarch of Constantinople had asserted rights as belonging to that see, which he insisted did not exist; and in a letter to Marcian begged him “to make use of his authority to keep the patriarch in order, and hinder him from encroaching upon the rights of other bishops;” (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Du Pin, vol. iv., p. 96.) which conclusively proves that, even in reference to such spiritual jurisdiction as involved the obedience of other churches and bishops, he recognized himself as dependent on the emperor. When he wrote to the bishops he assumed an imperial air, and expressed himself in words of imperial authority; but when he addressed the emperor he exhibited the deference of inferiority.

The first Council of Nice, in the year 325, had fixed the time for the celebration of Easter, making it a matter of religious faith; yet Pope Leo I., more than a hundred years after, finding a controversy upon the subject still going on among Christians, wrote to the Emperor Marcian, beseeching him “to command” that steps be taken to bring about uniformity. (*Ibid.*, p. 99.) He also wrote to the empress, exhorting her to use her authority to bring some monks to submit to the Council of Chalcedon, which

was held during his pontificate and was one of the ecumenical councils. (*Ibid.*) He had no power to restore Juvenial, Bishop of Jerusalem, to his see, after he had been expelled; and when it was done by the emperor, thanked him for it. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Du Pin, vol. iv., p. 99.) When disturbances existed in the Church of Alexandria, and both the contesting parties had addressed him on the subject, not having authority to quiet them, he appealed to the Emperor Leo to do so, and not to suffer heretics to thrust themselves into the government of the Church. (*Ibid.*, p. 102.) He also solicited the same emperor to send orthodox bishops to Alexandria, and to restore the bishops of Egypt, who had been driven out by the heretics. (*Ibid.*, p. 103.) When the emperor, of his own accord, removed an heretical bishop of the see of Alexandria, Pope Leo congratulated him upon the act, and requested the appointment of an orthodox bishop in his—place. (*Ibid.*, p. 104.)

Can there be any room to doubt, in the light of these facts, gathered from the work of a distinguished Roman Catholic historian, about the relations existing between the Emperors Marcian and Leo and Pope Leo I.? That his condition was one of dependence, is left beyond controversy; and dependence, too, to such an extent as precludes all possibility of his having possessed any temporal power over the affairs of Rome or any other part of the empire, or any authority even in spiritual matters beyond the local jurisdiction of the Church of Rome, and that only in the same sense and to the same extent as was possessed by other bishops in the local jurisdiction of their several churches.

That Pope Leo I. was a great man and a great pope, nobody ought to question. He was so immeasurably above other popes immediately before and after him, that he is entitled to a prominent place in history. That he was also ambitious, is an accepted fact. But we should keep in mind the difference between the ambition to govern the world, and the power to do it: the one is a sentiment, the other a fact. He, undoubtedly, claimed that, as the successor of Peter at Rome, he was endowed with divine authority to govern all the churches of the world in spiritual things, because the Roman Church was the only one founded on Peter, and, therefore, was “the mother and mistress” of them all.

And that he would have stretched this authority so far as to have included temporals, but for the decisive stand taken by the emperors, is equally undoubted; for he went so far as to foreshadow the extraordinary pretensions which other popes attempted to justify, several centuries afterward, by the authority of the “False Decretals,” which, as is well understood, were forged for the express purpose of supporting the temporal power. He brought the bishops and clergy so submissively at his feet, that, upon the reading of one of his letters in the Council of Chalcedon, in the year 451, the members exclaimed, “Accursed be he that admits not that Peter has spoken by the mouth of Leo!” He was the first pope whose eloquent preaching stirred the people of Rome; and in the ecclesiastical world he reached a far higher degree of distinction than any of his predecessors. *

* Milman’s “Latin Christianity,” vol. i., ch. iv.; Reichel’s “See of Rome,” pp. 33, 93, 145. These Protestant authorities speak of him in high terms; but Cormanin, a Roman Catholic (vol. i., p. 83), censures both his ambition and his intolerance.

And if, in investigating the question of his temporal power, we were to confine ourselves to his claim and acts of spiritual supremacy alone, we might readily fall into the error of supposing that he was really a temporal prince. Whereas, the truth is, that he was not so in any proper sense; though one can well imagine that, as by far the greatest man in Rome, he must have been deferred to by the Roman

people in all matters concerning the peace and welfare of the city; and more especially so, as he was a native of Rome and immediately and personally identified with its fortunes.

Thus, when Attila marched his army upon the city, and the whole population was thrown into consternation for fear he would ravage it, as he had done Pavia and Milan, the Senate was assembled to consider what measures of defense should be adopted. It was decided to send "an honorable embassy to Attila" with the view of obtaining pacific terms; and, by common consent, it was agreed that Pope Leo should be at the head of it, not merely because he was pope, but on account of his eminent ability. He occupied no such relation to the temporal affairs of the city as made him their especial guardian and protector, but, at the solicitation of the imperial authority and the Senate, accepted the position and went out to meet the terrible prince who had acquired the reputation of being "the scourge of God," and "enemy of mankind." He did not go as a temporal ruler, but at the solicitation of the civil authorities, representing the empire, in whose hands all the temporal power was lodged. He went as an ambassador, attended by Avienus and Trigetius, "two of the greatest men of the empire," and several senators.

At the point where the Mincio discharges itself into the Po near Mantua, an audience was granted to the embassy by Attila, which resulted in the withdrawal of his army beyond the Danube, and the safety of the city. It is represented by the papal writers, upon the authority of Baronius, who borrowed it from "a writer of the eighth century," that this result was brought about because "Attila saw two venerable personages, supposed to be the apostles St. Peter and St. Paul, standing on the side of the pope while he spoke; ("Lives of the Saints," by Buttler, vol. iv., p. 69.) as if it were produced by the special interposition of Providence. But this story is scarcely worthy of credit, because of the fact, if no other, that Attila was utterly insensible to all such influences and appearances. It was, undoubtedly, owing to the irresistible eloquence of Leo, to whom, on this account, and beyond all question, belong all the honor and glory of the achievement.

History records no more magnificent triumph, none which exhibits higher personal qualities on the part of the chief actor. The speech of Leo, says Maimbourg, was "so fine and judicious, so forcible and moving," that Attila "was immediately softened," and from having been "a ravening wolf, as he was before, he became gentle as a lamb, and immediately granted him the peace he desired." ("Historical and Critical Dictionary," by Bayle, art. Leo I., vol. iii., p. 758 (B); second edition.)

There was nothing supernatural about this; no indication of any direct Providential interference through the agency of Peter's successor. And the additional story of an old man with a drawn sword having been seen by Attila in a vision, and his having been terrified by his threats, is still more unworthy of belief. Leo's reputation needs no such fictitious aid, no such monkish inventions; and is rather impaired than benefited by this and the foolish tale of his having cut off his hand, and its miraculous restoration, in answer to his prayers! (See Maimbourg, quoted by Bayle, vol. iii.)

Yet, great as his triumph over Attila was, there is satisfactory proof that there was nothing supernatural about it, in the fact that he was unable to achieve a like one over Genseric, when he afterward advanced upon Rome. Although his influence was then sufficient to cause three of the principal churches, including that of St. Peter, to be exempted from the general pillage, ("Historical and Critical Dictionary," by Bayle.) yet the city was otherwise subjected to terrible devastation. Everything that he did, on both these occasions, was consistent with distinguished citizenship merely; and was most

appropriately performed by him as, personally, the greatest of living bishops—greater by far than any emperor who occupied the throne during his pontificate.

But high and distinguishing as were the qualities which rendered Pope Leo I. the most conspicuous man of his age, there is another aspect in which his character is to be viewed, which, while it exhibits his thorough devotion to the papacy, leaves a blot upon his reputation which no adulation can gloss over. And it proves also that the temporal power in Rome was not lodged in his hands, but in those of the emperor; behind whom, in this particular instance, it is found very convenient to shelter him from that just measure of indignation which is inherited by his persecuting and vindictive spirit.

An old law of the empire, enacted to please former persecuting popes, provided *for punishing heretics with death*; * but it had remained for a long time unexecuted, as the other emperors, imitating the example of Constantine, had been content to banish them merely. Priscillian, however, was put to death for heresy under this law, during the pontificate of Leo I., and he specially approved of and justified the bloody deed and all its accompanying horrors.

* It will appear at the proper place that a similar law was enacted in England when the papal power was supreme in that country.

The venerable Gnostic was imprisoned, bound with cords and chains, by the cruel and heartless monks, who were the mere tools and mercenaries of the pope. They “made his limbs crack under the pressure of his chains, and plunged both of his feet into a heated brazier.” They “tore from him his hair and the skin of his skull, they burned with hot iron all parts of his body, and poured upon his wounds boiling oil and melted lead, and at last plunged into his entrails a rod heated in the fire,” from which, of course, after the most intense and excruciating agony, he expired. (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 86.) Although it is pretended that no pope ever directly sanctioned the shedding of blood on account of heresy, and the supporters of the papacy always throw the censure of such cruelty upon the secular authorities, yet Leo I. did approve and justify this horrid deed, and then endeavored to escape the consequences by charging it to the laws of the empire, which, if he had been a temporal prince in Rome, as is now asserted, he could have executed or suspended at his pleasure.*

* The letter of this great pope, approving the infliction of the death penalty upon Priscillian, is referred to by three Roman Catholic historians. It is here given, that the reader may see the sentiments of the papacy, expressed by one of the greatest of the *infallible* (!) popes, in reference to the best method of disposing of heretics!

According to Cormenin, it was thus: “My lord, the rigor and severity of your justice against this heretic and his disciples have been of great aid to the clemency of the Church. We have heretofore been content with the mildness of the judgments which the bishops delivered in accordance with the canons, and we did not desire bloody executions; now, however, we have learned that it is necessary to be aided and sustained by the severe constitutions of the emperors; for the fear of religious punishment frequently makes heretics recur to a spiritual remedy, which can cure their souls from a mortal malady by a true conversion. —CORMENIN, vol. i., p. 86.

Maimbourg represents him as having praised the Emperor Maximus for the deed, and as saying:

“That the rigor and severity of his justice against that heresiarch (leader of heresy), and his disciples, whom this prince put to death, were a great assistance to the clemency of the Church. For though the Church contents herself with that leniency of judgment, which the bishops exercise according to the canons, against obstinate heretics, and admits of no bloody executions, it is, however, much aided and supported by the severe constitutions of the emperors, since the fear of so rigorous a punishment sometimes makes heretics have recourse to the spiritual remedy, to cure the mortal

disease of their heresy by a sincere conversion.”—BAYLE, vol. iii., p. 758 (A). Du Pin says that Leo, referring to the Priscillianists, said:

“That the magistrates themselves have had so great an hatred for that detestable sect, that they have used the severity of the laws against them, punishing the author and principal abettors with death. And that not without reason, because they saw that all laws, divine and human, would be subverted, and the civil society disturbed, if such persons, who divulged so detestable errors, were suffered to live. That this severity had been used a long time together with the leniency of the Church, because though the Church, being contented with the judgment of her bishops, avoids all sanguinary punishments, yet it is helped by the edicts of princes, which cause them that fear temporal penalties to have recourse sometimes to spiritual remedies.”—Du PIN’s *Eccl. Hist.*, vol. iv., p. 93.

The offense of Priscillian was that he adopted the doctrines of Manichaeus, who, being a Persian, sought to coalesce the doctrines of the Persian magi with the Christian system. His execution was abhorred by the bishops of Gaul and Italy, who, unlike the pope, “had not yet learned that giving over heretics to be punished by the magistrates was either an act of piety or justice.”—MACLAINE’S Mosheim’s *Eccl. Hist.*, vol. i., p. 129.

For this act of approval, he must stand at the bar of the nineteenth century equally culpable as the civil authorities of the empire, and more so for the detestable sentiments in which it was expressed. But the fact that Priscillian was executed by the civil authorities settles, beyond all controversy, that Leo I., great and all-powerful as he was in spiritual affairs, did not possess any temporal power, even in Rome. And Archbishop Kenrick honestly concedes this when he says, “Although the Bishop of Rome was not yet a temporal prince, yet this spiritual power was surrounded with so great secular influence that he almost ranked as a prince;” (Kenrick, part ii., ch. i., p. 257.) manifestly, because of his high personal qualities, his great eloquence, and the energy of his will.

Yet the archbishop, immediately after making this concession, would have it to be implied that the popes did possess some temporal power, by the statement of the fact that, in the year 484, Pope Felix II. “complained to the Emperor Zeno that the laws of nations had been violated by the injurious treatment of his legates.” (*Ibid.*) But this proves nothing to the purpose. It had long been the custom of the Christian nations to receive the legates of the pope, and to treat them with that degree of respect to which the Roman Church was entitled, so long as their missions were confined to spiritual matters. But none of them had yet been so reduced to obedience as to submit, without murmur, to the direct interference of the pope, either by legates or otherwise, with their secular affairs. Even in Spain, which was more under the influence of the pope than any other nation, his authority was restricted to matters concerning the Church.

The relations between the Emperor Zeno and Pope Felix II. were those of sovereign and subject. During the pontificate of Simplicius — immediately preceding that of Felix—Zeno became emperor, upon the death of the Emperor Leo. But a revolt was stirred up against him by Basiliscus, who succeeded in driving him from the throne and taking possession of it. He expelled the orthodox and put heterodox prelates into their places, in which he was resisted by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Pope Simplicius approved the course of the patriarch at first; but afterward, with the hope of excluding Timotheus from the see of Alexandria on account of the rivalry between them, he advised him to resist Zeno, the legitimate emperor, and support the cause of Basiliscus, the heretical usurper, thus giving his official support to heresy, and his sanction to an act of open revolt against the throne! The patriarch

followed his advice to the extent of making war upon the supporters of Timotheus, and the empire was thrown into such commotion that Zeno was enabled with his army to retake possession of the throne by the expulsion of Basilicus.

This embarrassed the pope for a time; but, with true papal adroitness, he endeavored to restore himself to the good opinion of Zeno by taking his side. He had no conscientious scruples about changing from one side to the other, provided he always found himself in concert with the strongest party. Zeno was not at all averse to the reconciliation, because, in the confused and unsettled condition of affairs, he needed the assistance of the pope to keep the empire in his hands. And an incident soon transpired showing that the pope did not intend to forfeit the protection of the emperor by any act invading the imperial jurisdiction. Each was playing the part of a skillful politician; power, and nothing else, being the stake they played for.

Upon the death of Timotheus, the priests of Alexandria elected his successor, without consulting either the emperor or the pope; the latter at that time, as Bishop of Rome, having no recognized jurisdiction over the Church at Alexandria. Zeno, incensed at this election, expelled the new bishop from his see, who in revenge appealed to Pope Simplicius, hoping to obtain his intervention in his favor. Probably the pope, in order to increase his own importance and authority, might have decided the appeal, but he was given to understand by the emperor that it was an affair beyond his jurisdiction, and he submitted to the necessity of non—interference, and left the emperor to have his own way, even upon this ecclesiastical matter, of so much importance as the appointment of a bishop over the Alexandrian Christians.

At the commencement of the pontificate of Felix II. this expelled bishop was at Rome, and so played upon the prejudices of the pope against Constantinople as to induce him to send legates to the emperor to protest against the protection given to heretics there. These legates, being engaged in what Zeno considered an insolent mission, were arrested by his orders, thrown into prison, and threatened with death. But they had an equal appreciation with the pope of the advantages of being on the strong side, and obtained their freedom by recognizing as the legitimate Bishop of Alexandria the heretic against whom Pope Felix had protested. When they returned to Rome, they were deposed and excommunicated. Failing then to bring the Patriarch of Constantinople over to his side, Pope Felix issued a bull of excommunication against him, and addressed to the emperor the letter mentioned by Archbishop Kenrick, complaining of the treatment of his legates. All this was done by virtue of his spiritual authority alone. But even in that aspect of it, nothing was accomplished by it, for all his pretensions were treated with scorn by the emperor, with whom he had no inclination to come into direct collision.

Although he had much to be proud of, and exercised plenary powers in all the ecclesiastic affairs at Rome; whenever he came in conflict with the emperor, even in reference to the domestic affairs of that city, he was reduced to the condition of a subject, and laid no claim to any temporal power whatever. And thus it is certain that at the close of the pontificate of Felix II., in the year 492, the Pope of Rome neither had, nor claimed to have, any temporal power, as a part of “the patrimony of Peter,” or derived in any other way. He was a mere bishop, like the bishops of Alexandria, Corinth, and other places, and his powers were limited to the administration of spiritual affairs. In temporal matters he was as much subject to the emperor and the laws of the empire as any of the inferior clergy or the people.

The struggle, however, for the acquisition of temporal power went on all the time, with results varying according to circumstances. The strong popes gained upon the weak emperors; but when the latter were courageous enough to assert and maintain the authority of the empire, the papacy was dwarfed into the narrowest proportions. The Church, in the mean time, was left to drift along into whatsoever currents the interest and ambition of the contending factions carried it, and the cause of genuine Christianity was made subordinate to political rivalries, and would have expired if God had not preserved, even in Rome, faithful guardians to shelter and preserve it.

The century which elapsed between the pontificate of Felix II. and that of Gregory I.—embracing the reigns of fifteen popes—contributed but little toward conferring temporal power upon the Bishop of Rome. The emperors continued to maintain their ascendancy, although the angry controversies between the Eastern and Western Christians kept up a perpetual strife between Rome and Constantinople, in which some of the popes proved themselves the superiors of the emperors in the management of public affairs. There was no relaxation of their efforts to consummate the policy of Pope Leo I. by bringing all the existing governments into subjection to the papacy. On the contrary, this became a ruling and controlling passion, which never underwent abatement, except when policy and expediency dictated it, and then only to make the final triumph more sure. In the year 498, two popes were elected—one at Constantinople, and the other at Rome. Neither being disposed to give up his pretensions, it was submitted to the judgment of King Theodoric, at Ravenna, to decide between them (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 97.)—a fact which proves that worldly policy, far more than the influence of the Holy Ghost, was allowed to settle the important question as to who should be the successor of Peter and God's Vicar on earth!

Pope Symmachus, in whose favor the king decided, while he made no claim of temporal power as against the emperor, did assert a spiritual jurisdiction over the world; which, if it had been conceded to him, would have absorbed the temporal power. He told the Emperor Anastasius that he was superior to all the princes of earth, because they governed human affairs, while he disposed of "*the goods of heaven*;" (Cormenin, vol. i., p.97.) a pretense precisely like that now set up by Pope Pius IX., that the ecclesiastical, being above the temporal and civil authority, has the divine right to dictate its policy and govern the world!

By the year 529, priestly ambition had become almost universal, and, as a natural consequence, popes were elected by intrigue and the most corrupt means. In that year Boniface II. was elected by one party, and a rival pope by an other party, at Rome. But Boniface triumphed over his rival, and had the satisfaction of anathematizing him after death had removed him out of the way. To prevent the recurrence of such an event, he convened a council in the Church of St. Peter at Rome, and had a decree passed allowing him to designate his successor! Having secured this extraordinary power, in violation of the universal practice of the Church, he appointed one whom he required the bishops to recognize "by oath and in writing!" This was, of course, infallibly done — without the possibility of error! But another council was soon after convened, and this decree was set aside, when Boniface cast his own infallible (!) bull into the flames. (*Ibid*)

At his death, "the Holy See, being set up at auction," was obtained by John II., who "*paid enormous sums to his competitors, and obtained the pontifical tiara.*" (*Ibid*) The senators, who then had a voice in the election, sold their votes openly, and the general corruption was shameless and disgusting. So little

respect had one pope for another, that Pope Agapetus, the successor of Felix II., burned in public the bull of anathema which Pope Boniface had published against his rival; and thus one infallible pope condemned another!

Pope Agapetus was not much influenced by the prevailing ambition, and was disposed, both by precept and example, to arrest the evils of the times. He submitted, as a dutiful subject, to the Emperor Justinian in temporal affairs, and to the councils of the Church in spiritual, seemingly endowed with a commendable degree of Christian humility. On account of this, he never reached, on the records of church history, a higher eminence than to be known as a man of sincerity and of more integrity than most of the popes of that age.

At his death the scenes attending the election of his successor were disgracefully corrupt. Says Cormanin: "Priests sold their suffrages; cabals struggled, raised upon their competitors, and carried off the partisans of their adversaries; and at length victory remained with the richest, the most skillful, or the most corrupt." (Cormanin, vol. i., p. 110.) This same author also says that Silverius bought the pontificate from King Theodatus; (*Ibid.*) but Du Pin, while admitting that Anastasius affirmed this to be true, is disposed to doubt it, and to follow Liberatus, "an author more ancient and more credible than Anastasius," who supposed that the election of Silverius was regular and canonical. (Du Pin, vol. v., p. 46.) Be this as it may, it is unquestionably true that Theodatus desired to secure a pope devoted to his interest, that he might the more readily prevent Belisarius from marching his army upon Rome; and whether he sold the pontificate to Silverius or he was canonically elected, it cannot be doubted that the king assented to it with the understanding that he should have the assistance of the pope. But Belisarius entered Rome with an army of one hundred and fifty thousand Goths, and Silverius either did or "was suspected to hold correspondence" with him; thus betraying the king and turning over the city to these terrible enemies. (*Ibid.*)

If Belisarius thus enjoyed the fruits of the pope's treason, he was not disposed to leave the traitor unpunished. He therefore deposed Silverius, and elevated Vigilius to the pontificate. This infallible pope caused the deposed but equally infallible Silverius to be banished to a desert island, under charge of executioners, who put him to death by the slow process of starvation! (Du Pin, vol. v., p. 47.)

Yet, notwithstanding all this, Vigilius was recognized by a General Council and "acknowledged for a lawful pope," says Du Pin, "without proceeding to a new election, or even confirming that which had been made. (*Ibid.*) His name, as also that of Silverius, who has been made a saint—is found in every published list of the popes; and, strange as it may now seem, one of the ecumenical councils of the Church—the second of Constantinople—was held under his pontificate, and received all its authority and validity from his official approval, as the infallible successor of Peter!*

* The history of this General Council and of the pontificate of Vigilius is most instructive to the student of ecclesiastical history. The chief points of controversy in the Church, at that time, arose out of what were called "The Three Chapters," that is, the Nestorian heresy contained in the writings of Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus—a letter of Ibas, Bishop of Edessa, and the works of Theodore, Bishop of Mopsuesta. These were condemned by the Emperor Justinian; but Pope Vigilius rejected his edict and excommunicated Theodorus of Cesarea, its author. The council was convened to settle the controversy. It condemned "The Three Chapters," but not their authors, having decided "that the works of an author could be justly censured without condemning him personally!" Vigilius refused, at first, to approve this condemnation, and was banished. "Nevertheless," says Du Pin, "not being guided by zeal for the truth,

but by his own caprice or interest, he quickly condemned them after an authentic manner, that he might return into Italy.”—History of the Catholic Church, by Noethen, p. 265; Lives of the Saints, by Butler, vols. iv., v., vi., p. 608; Ecclesiastical History, by Du Pin, vol. v., p. 47. For history of this council, see Du Pin, vol. v., p. 135.

He was made pope November 20th, 537, and the death of Silverius did not occur until June 20th, 538. Yet Butler says: “Vigilius was an ambitious intruder, and a schismatic, as long as St. Silverius lived; but after his death became lawful pope by the ratification or consent of the Roman Church, and from that time renounced the errors and commerce of the heretics,” (Butler’s ” Lives of the Saints,” vols. iv., V., vi., p. 608.) a method of covering up the heresy and tergiversations (subterfuge) of a pope neither ingenious nor plausible.

His fierce contest with the Emperor Justinian about the Three Chapters led to his being summoned to Constantinople by the emperor, when he was arrested and held in custody. On his return to Rome after his release, he died, as some have supposed, by poison; when Pelagius I., by order of Justinian, and without waiting for the formality of an election, clothed himself with the pontifical mantle and declared himself pope! When he reached Rome, the clergy and people refused to recognize him, and charged him with the murder of Vigilius. With the assistance, however, of the temporal authority of the emperor, he maintained himself on the chair of Peter for nearly four years. This combination of facts gives but little support to the pretense that popes are always elected by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and still less to the doctrine of papal infallibility and temporal power.

In the year 566, two bishops of Burgundy were convicted, by a provincial synod, of adultery, rape, and murder, and were expelled from their sees. They appealed to Pope John III., as spiritual head of the Roman Church, and he restored them. (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 120.) Such examples could not do otherwise than lead to many abuses and extortions, as well as to great assumption of pontifical authority. The latter was carried to such an extent, that some of the popes declared themselves the dispensers of a fourth part of the property of the Church, in order that thereby they might become the distributors of large rewards to their dependents and friends. By these means they were so rapidly becoming the rivals of princes, that the latter resolved upon resisting, with more firmness, their efforts to acquire absolute independence and superiority. The emperor, therefore, decreed that his consent should be necessary to the valid elections of the bishops of Rome, Ravenna, and Milan. This decree was in force at the election of Pope Gregory I., in the year 590. Gregory—from humility, it is said—wrote to the emperor to induce him not to confirm his election; a circumstance which excludes all possibility of there having been any temporal power possessed by the popes up to the close of the sixth century.

The popes, unquestionably, struggled hard to acquire it, but without success. Their ambition was unbounded; and such was the character of the most of them that they would have adopted any means to obtain their end; yet they were held in inferiority by the strength of the imperial power, and compelled to remain subjects. By their machinations, and the perpetual schisms they engendered, they succeeded, in the end, in sundering all the bonds of affection and alliance between the Eastern and the Western Christians. They had to await the rise of more powerful allies in the West—of Pepin and Charlemagne—before they could break the ties of their allegiance to the empire. But they succeeded in this also, by the infliction of terrible blows upon the true prosperity of the Church.

If the peaceful diffusion of the Gospel had been their sole object, and the Christian spirit of charity and toleration had occupied their minds, their personal struggles with each other, and their numerous controversies about heresy, would have been attended with far less disastrous results, and would not have given rise to so much cruelty and persecution. But other and more unworthy motives prevailed, temporal ambition took the place of the higher Christian virtues, and whatever they did was centered in the groveling object of acquiring earthly power. The government of the world became the great prize for which the combatants contended, on both sides, and the cause of Christianity was only saved from final and complete overthrow by the sheltering protection of Providence, and the courage of the few pious and devoted men, who, in spite of all the prevailing corruption, preserved their own Christian integrity and the teachings of the apostolic fathers.

Chapter X. Constantine

Churches Independent before Constantine.—Victor I. endeavored to establish the Supremacy of Rome.—Ambition of the Popes.—Aided Constantine to overthrow Maxentius.—Consequences.—Constantine a Usurper.—Maxentius the Lawful Emperor.—Constantine baptized just before his Death. His Motives.—Influence upon Roman Clergy.—Arianism.—The Council of Nice.—The Pope had Nothing to do with It.—Called by the Emperor. The Pope did not preside by his Legates.—He did not approve the Decrees as Necessary to their Validity.—Constantine was the Master Spirit. He dictated the Creed.—He fixed Infallibility in the Council.—The Council did not decree the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome.—It enacted only Twenty Canons.—All other pretended Ones are Forgeries.

THE many schisms which have occurred in the Roman Catholic Church, and the frequent elections of rival and hostile popes, lead to the conclusion that there is something inherent in the papal system which renders entire unity impossible. As all minds of any intelligence naturally repel any attack upon their independence, the harshness and severity employed by the popes to keep this class of minds in subjection have necessarily induced antagonisms. The ignorant alone, outside the governing class, have proved submissive; and they only because they are unconscious of their inferiority. These, for many centuries, constituted the mercenary armies of the papacy.

There is no difficulty in tracing this want of unity to its real source, or in showing that, but for the disturbance of Christian harmony in the Church by such popes as subordinated the interests of Christianity to the accomplishment of their own personal ends, Roman Catholicism might have been, today, a very different thing from what it is. It might have been one of the most powerful and effective instruments in carrying on the work of improving and elevating the world. And the present pope, instead of sending forth mingled curses and groans from a pretended prison, might have united in the general rejoicing at the advanced condition into which modern Christianity and civilization have brought the nations.

The Church of Christ was undoubtedly established upon a rock, because the faith upon which it rested was designed to be more immovable than the mountains. Love, charity, harmony, and all the heavenly virtues clustered together at its foundation, and there can be nothing rightfully about it to destroy its symmetry or mar its beauty. But the papal system is constructed out of uncongenial and inharmonious materials. It was the work of man—not God. Erected out of beautiful materials gathered from the partial wreck of apostolic Christianity, by mingling them with the rude fragments of pagan Rome, it lacks the symmetry of a perfect plan, and displays the conflicting designs of its various architects. Its external organization has grown out of illiberal and unchristian divisions, fomented by designing popes and prelates, with no higher object than to gain authority and distinction for themselves, even at the sacrifice of the simple faith and worship of the early Christians. Its own factions have never ceased to prey upon its vitals from the hour of its birth, and have been to each other what the plagues sent down from the gods were to those who first stole fire from heaven. It has made fierce and cruel war upon everything that stood in its path or endeavored to check its ambition; and if, at any time, it has been met by intolerance, the weapons used against it have been supplied from its own armory, and belong to the brood of monsters which itself has hatched.

Before the time of Constantine, each of the several churches planted by the apostles and the early fathers exercised its own jurisdiction over its own members, and thus preserved harmony in faith and

worship. The right of visitorial guardianship, exercised by the apostles while planting and watering them in infancy, existed no longer, because there was no longer any necessity for it. But while each church governed its own affairs, they all realized the necessity of preserving a spirit of unity, and such brotherhood and fellowship among the whole as would enable them to sympathize with and assist each other in the adjustment of their local disagreements, if any should arise. A harmonious and beautiful Christian system was thus created, worthy of the divine approval, and under it the Catholic Apostolic Church was able to stand up and ward off the staggering blows of the pagan emperors.

The first efforts to disturb this harmony were made by the bishops of Rome. About the beginning of the third century, Victor I., with a view to establish the primacy of the Church of Rome, endeavored to compel the Asiatic churches, by threats of excommunication, to conform to its custom in keeping the festival of Easter. About half a century afterward, Stephen I. attempted to assume jurisdiction over the Church of Spain; and, still later, Dionysius made a like attempt over the Church of Alexandria. These attempts at ecclesiastical absolutism at Rome were so sternly rebuked by the great fathers, Ireneus and Cyprian, as to demonstrate that the leading churches could not be subjugated, unless by some power they were unable to resist. The bishops of Rome soon saw that this power was political imperialism; and they availed themselves of the first opportunity of uniting Church and State at Rome, in order to obtain possession of it. This opportunity was the arrival of Constantine, at a time when the corrupt materials necessary for such a union were abundant at Rome. Eusebius, who was a prelate of eminence at that time, gives this account of the clergy:

“But when, by reason of excessive liberty, we sunk into negligence and sloth, one envying and reviling another in different ways, and we were almost, as it were, on the point of taking up arms against each other, and we were assailing each other with words as with darts and spears, prelates inveighing against prelates, and people rising up against people, and hypocrisy and dissimulation had arisen to the greatest height of malignity, then the divine judgment.... began to afflict its episcopacy.... But some that appeared to be our pastors, deserting the law of piety, were inflamed against each other with mutual strifes, only accumulating quarrels and threats, rivalry, hostility and hatred to each other, only anxious to assert the government as a kind of *sovereignty for themselves*.” (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Eusebius, bk. viii., ch. i.)

It has even been charged that Marcellinus, who was Bishop of Rome in 304, shortly before the arrival of Constantine, solemnly abjured (renounced) the Christian religion” and “offered incense to idols in the temples of Isis and Vesta.” (Cormenin, vol i., p. 48.) However this may be, it is not at all wonderful, in view of the condition of things pictured by Eusebius, that when Milchiades, a few years after, became Bishop of Rome, he was willing that the reigning emperor should be removed and the empire seized by Constantine, in order thereby to unite his fortunes with the State, and those of the State with the Roman Church. Constantine was not a member of the Church then the only visible sign of Christianity; but the bishop and clergy of Rome assisted him to expel Maxentius, the reigning emperor, expecting to receive—if not upon the express condition that they should receive—the direct favor and protection of the empire. With the emperor on their side, they could readily see how easy it would be to draw all the religious controversies throughout the empire to Rome, and thus lay the foundation for the supremacy of the Church there.

But, even without this, their rebellion against Maxentius* was followed with results both direct and consequential. The direct were: the union of Church and State, the introduction of secular affairs into the Church, the increase of ambition and corruption among the clergy, and the planting of the foundations upon which the monstrous usurpations of the papacy have since rested. The consequential were: the introduction of measures which overthrew the primitive Church, the spreading of discord, jealousy, and divisions throughout all the churches, and, finally, the great schism which separated the Eastern and Western Christians.

* Maxentius persecuted the Christians, but was the legitimate emperor; and, therefore, if Constantine had failed, all who assisted him would have been rebels against the law of the empire.

It is worthy to be repeated that, before the time of Constantine, each of the churches of Asia, Africa, and Europe had enjoyed its own independence, with no asserted or recognized principality in either over the others. Rome had no more power than Alexandria, or Alexandria than Antioch, or Antioch than Jerusalem. As the most ancient and first—established churches, those of Jerusalem and Antioch had a sort of precedence of honor, derived from the association of the names of the apostles James (the Lord's brother) and Peter and Paul, with their history. But in neither of them had there been any pretense of authority or primacy set up. They were content to adhere, in what they did and taught, to the practice of that forbearance, charity, and toleration exhibited in the apostolic assembly at Jerusalem, by which they hoped to lead the world into that condition of meekness and humility which is experienced at the genuine impress of true Christianity upon the heart, whether it be that of prince or peasant.

Eusebius gives also an account of the rapid progress of Christianity under these influences. He speaks of “those vast collections of men that flocked to the religion of Christ, and those multitudes crowding in from every city, and the illustrious concourse in the houses of worship.” (Eusebius, bk. viii., ch. i.)

Such results could have been produced only by the example of pious and holy lives on the part of the ministers of religion—of such lives as would arrest the attention of the multitude, and prove to them how far preferable, and how much more ennobling and elevating, was practical Christianity than any of the old philosophies. The reverse of this flattering picture, which he likewise painted, could only have been produced by other examples of the very opposite character, such as had their birth in the prevailing pride and ambition of Rome.

When Constantine reached Rome—not yet being a Christian, even by profession—he manifestly desired to secure the co—operation of both pagans and Christians, in order to maintain possession of the empire, which was his chief desire. He had no legal claim to rule in Rome. At the division of the empire by Diocletian, he selected three colleagues to govern it jointly with himself—Maximian, Galerius, and Constantius, the father of Constantine. None of these had any other claim to the title of Caesar than this. The distribution of the empire was as follows: to Constantius were given Gaul, Spain, and Britain; to Galerius, the valley of the Danube; to Maximian, Italy and Africa; and Diocletian retained Thrace, Egypt, and Asia. (“Decline and Fall,” etc., by Gibbon (Milman's), vol. i., pp. 406, 407.)

Maximian, therefore, was emperor at Rome. At his death, in 306, Maxentius, his son, became his successor, by the act of “the applauding senate and people,” (*Ibid.*, p. 461.) which placed him lawfully

in possession of that part of the empire. About that time, Constantius died in Britain, while administering his part of the empire. (*Ibid.*, p. 457.) Constantine was present, and upon him his father “committed the administration of the empire;” upon the principle that, being his eldest son, he was entitled to it by the law of inheritance. (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, bk. i., ch. xxi., p. 21.)

In no possible view of this act can it be said to have conferred upon Constantine any right to that part of the empire in which Rome was situated. Giving to his right by inheritance, or gift from his father, the utmost extent, his jurisdiction as emperor was confined to the countries over which Constantius ruled; that is, Gaul, Spain, and Britain. He, however, was not content with this; the field was not large enough for the gratification of inordinate ambition like his. Eusebius, his only biographer, tells us that he “drove from his dominions, like untamed and savage beasts,” those who seemed incapable of civilization; “reduced to submission” parts of Britain; and “then proceeded to consider the state of the remaining portions of the empire.” No part of it attracted his attention so much as Rome, “the imperial city,” and he therefore “prepared himself for the effectual suppression of the tyranny” which prevailed there under Maxentius; that is, for snatching the imperial crown from the brow of Maxentius and putting it upon his own. (*Ibid.*, clih. xxv., xxvi., pp. 23, 24.)

The pretense that he desired to go to Rome to relieve the Christians there from the oppression of Maxentius is idle, for he was not yet a Christian. He desired the empire, and for that purpose alone he marched his army to Rome. Upon reaching there, he had two things to do in order to secure the desired success: first, to drive out Maxentius, and, second, to conciliate the inhabitants. The first accomplished, he undertook the second by granting equal freedom of religious worship to both Christians and pagans, thereby signifying his condemnation of religious persecution. This was altogether conformable to the wishes of the Christians, for, up to that period, the example of toleration set by the apostles and early Christians had been universally practiced by them, except in the instances where the bishops of Rome had endeavored to establish their primacy over those of the other churches.

Thus established in Rome, Constantine entered immediately upon a system of measures by means of which the clergy were greatly advanced, as a reward for their support of his cause. He conferred great favors upon them, such as they had never before enjoyed. (Ante, ch. viii.) Those already corrupted by the prevailing disorders of which Eusebius speaks were, beyond all doubt, quite ready to accept this arrangement, without any inquiry beyond the mere question of personal benefit to themselves; and as these had control of the Church at Rome, it soon resulted in uniting the Church and the State together in such a way as to make one dependent on the other. Even then he had not become a Christian by uniting with the Church; nor did he do so for a number of years after the Council of Nice. Yet he convened that council, was present during its sessions, participated in its deliberations, and dictated its decisions. It is a gross perversion of history to call him a “Christian emperor” in the sense that the papists continually do, for none of the fathers from whom we derive information of those times give any account of his baptism into the Church until he was about to die, long after his capture of Rome.

Socrates says that, in the sixty—fifth year of his age, he received “Christian baptism,” in Nicommedia, and died in a few days. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Socrates, bk. i., ch. xxxix.) Sozomen says the same thing, adding that it was in the thirty—fifth year of his reign. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Sozomen, bk. ii., ch. xxxiv.) And so does Theodoret. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Theodoret, bk. i., ch. xxxii.) And also Eusebius. (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, bk. iv., ch. lxi.) Eusebius talks about God having frequently manifested

himself to him, and everybody is familiar with his story about the sign of the cross in the heavens; and it is undoubtedly true that he had great respect for Christianity.

But all this does not go to show, against other acknowledged facts, that he had become so connected with the Church at Rome as to be moved by motives of piety alone to bestow so many royal favors upon it. The fact is, he never united with the Church of Rome at all. When baptized in Nicomedia, the ceremony was performed by Arian bishops and in an Arian church; so that he never was, according to the teachings of the Roman Church, an orthodox Christian, but died, as he had lived, a heretic. When he allied himself; therefore, with the clergy at Rome, that act must, of necessity, be referred to some other motive than the service of God, or the special advancement of Christianity. There could have been no other than a temporal motive, that of securing and retaining possession of the imperial crown. And it is equally conclusive also, that the clergy of Rome had no other than a temporal motive in forming so close and intimate alliance with a prince who had not demonstrated his devotion to Christianity by uniting with their Church; which, we are now told by those who profess to be their successors, is the only sure passport to heaven. Thus, the union formed under these circumstances, and by these contracting parties, between the Church and the State was, on the part of both, a mere scheme of ambition, designed for no other purpose than to acquire power. If Christianity had any thing to do with it, it was of secondary consideration.

Understanding perfectly well the wishes of such of the clergy as had brought the Church into the condition described by Eusebius, and how they were to be kept faithful to him, one of the first steps of Constantine was to issue an edict commanding large sums of money to be paid to “certain ministers.” (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Eusebius, bk. x., ch. vi.) He exempted the clergy from public service. (*Ibid.*, bk. x., ch. vii.) He placed the Christians “in almost all the principal posts of the Roman Government.” (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Sozomen, bk. i., ch. viii.) He decreed that part of the funds levied from tributary countries should be sent “to the bishops and clergy.” (*Ibid.*) He enacted a law giving immunity to the clergy in reference to taxation. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Du Pin, vol. ii., p. xvi.) Also another permitting appeals from the secular courts to the bishops. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Sozomen, bk. i., ch. ix.) He provided, for the first time, that persons should be allowed to leave their property to the Church by will. (Eccl. Hist.,” by Du Pin, vol. ii., p. xvi.) Who could doubt the result of such unbounded favoritism as this? It soon raised the Church at Rome to an unparalleled condition of grandeur. The clergy became a privileged class, sheltered and protected as they thus were by the emperor. When the emperor was gone—for he remained there but a little while—they did as they pleased, for everybody understood the terrible vengeance in store for those who resisted. The compact was faithfully executed by both parties, to the temporal profit of both.

The men of that day are not supposed to have been materially different from those of the present times. Hence the splendor and magnificence introduced into the Roman Church led to such departures from the simple modes of apostolic worship as were supposed to be necessary to arrest the attention of the pagan part of the population, and to attract them to that Church. Much of this splendor was, in fact, borrowed from the pagan worship—while much of it originated in the pride and vanity of the clergy. It should not surprise us now to know that, in the midst of such a state of things as this, the bishops struggled with each other for the ascendancy, as Eusebius tells us, while, at the same time, *they were*

thoroughly united in the wish and purpose to make the Roman Church the “mistress” and ruler of all the other churches.

Certainly there is no example of such struggles and contentions found in the lives of the apostles; no question about personal or official supremacy. Paul rebuked Peter at Antioch for his course toward the Jews; but no controversy about authority grew out of it. And Cyprian, one of the great fathers of the third century, strongly condemned anything of the kind, in these expressive words: “For none of us ought to make himself a bishop of bishops, or pretend to awe his brethren by a tyrannical fear, because every bishop is at liberty to do as he pleases, and can *no more be judged by another than he can judge others himself.*” (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Dn Pin, vols. i., ii., p. 132.)

It is more than probable that the controversy about Arianism, which did so much to retard the progress of Christianity, grew out of the pride and vanity of the original contestants—Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, and Arius, one of his presbyters. Such was the opinion of Constantine. He “wrote to rebuke them” for having originated a disturbance “of a truly insignificant character, and quite unworthy of such fierce contention.” He cared nothing about the point of doctrine involved—whether the Son was of the same or of like substance with the Father, or whether the three persons in the Trinity were equal or not. The probability is that he had no well—defined views about it. At all events, his chief complaint was that they had made “a controversy public which it was in their power to have concealed;” also that it was “the disputatious caviling of ill—employed leisure,” and was “rather consistent with puerile thoughtlessness than suitable to the intelligence of priests and prudent men. (“Life of Constantine,”) by Eusebius, bk. ii., ch. lxxviii.; Sozomen, bk. i., chb. xvi., xvii.)

But this useless controversy, on account of the virulence and malignity with which it was carried on by the bishops and clergy on both sides, led to the Council of Nice, in 325 — the first ecumenical council. The Christian world had got along well enough for nearly three hundred years without any such assemblage. Innumerable heresies had sprung up between the planting of the Church at Jerusalem and that time; and the influence of the greater part of them, if not nearly all, had been dispelled by the love and charity which the apostolic fathers and their immediate descendants reflected in their lives and example. To none of them had occurred the idea of an external church organization with powers of compulsion. And yet the Council of Nice, in one respect, was one of the most important assemblages ever held, in this: that it placed the Christian sentiment of the apostolic age in the formula of a creed which, if it had never been disturbed, would at all times have furnished—it would yet furnish—the common ground of Christian union throughout the world. This, however, is to be attributed mainly to the fact that the purity of Christian life and Church government had been preserved in the ancient churches, whose influence dictated all the fundamentals of the Nicene Creed; so that the result was in no sense aggressive, but simply responsive to the existing Christian sentiment of the age.

In another respect, the cause of true Christianity would have fared better if it never had been held, or, if held, it had grown out of other causes, and had been controlled, in some of its aspects, by other influences. We find demonstration of this in the fact that the papal writers yet refer to it in proof of the supremacy and infallibility of the pope and Church of Rome; whereas, apart from the causes which led to it and the external influences brought to bear upon it—that is, in so far as it concerns the Christian faith—it proves neither, but the reverse.

Bolder than those who have higher reputations to maintain, a recent writer, to whom reference has heretofore been made, has carried this claim to its extremest limit by alleging that all the ecumenical councils, including that at Nice, as well as the whole Church from the beginning, have recognized papal infallibility as the only true Christian faith. It scarcely need be said that he is a *Jesuit*. He says:

“The first Council of Nice, intended to give greater publicity to the condemnation of Arius, was convoked by Pope Silvester, under the reign of Constantine the Great, who used his imperial authority to facilitate the meeting of the fathers. The sovereign pontiff presided by his three legates, one of whom was Osius, Bishop of Cordova. The other two were priests. Osius, whom Athanasius styles the *leader* of the council, occupied the first place, attended by his two companions. How great the deference here shown to the papal authority, since the mere reflection of it gave even simple priests the precedence over bishops, who, on the present occasion, were either Orientals or Greeks, and yet never objected to this conduct of the legates, as implying an undue assumption of power! This fact alone suffices to show that *the prerogatives of the Holy See were then recognized all over the Christian world*. No one, therefore, will be at all startled by the fact that, even previous to any measures taken by the councils, the legates, acting under instructions, condemned the blasphemous doctrines of Arius. The fathers were guided in their deliberations by these instructions, as well as by the symbol of faith prescribed by Silvester and brought from Rome, together with a number of disciplinary regulations. At the close of the council, *all the acts were sent to Rome for confirmation*.” (“Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope,” etc., by Weninger, pp. 104, 105.)

When Sir Walter Scott wrote about the “tangled web” woven by those who “practice to deceive,” he must have had in his mind some such monstrous perversion of facts as is contained in this brief extract. It would be difficult to find elsewhere so much misrepresentation upon important points of history in so brief a compass. And yet it is deliberately put forth, and largely circulated in this country, as veritable history—as one of the chief foundation-stones upon which the superstructure of the papal edifice has been erected.

We occasionally meet with individuals who so frequently repeat romantic and improbable stories, that they come at last to believe them true. And such would seem to be the only apology for those who give utterance to these unfounded and unsupported assertions. They might be left to indulge in their delusion, but for the uses they now make of them. Since, however, they base upon them the right of the papacy to confront the world and command all human progress to cease, they themselves create the necessity for the discovery of the precise truth. Having, by their vindictive assaults upon Protestantism, invited the investigation, they will have no right to complain if, when the truth is discovered, their whole system of papal supremacy should topple and fall before it.

This author supports his statements by references to no other of the “Greek fathers” but Sozomen. He, however, cites Athanasius to prove that Osius, or Hosius, was “the leader of the Council of Nice,” and the eighteenth and twenty—ninth canons of the council to show that the supremacy and primacy of the pope was formally acknowledged by it. Why should we not apply to the investigation of such matters as these the same rules of evidence by which we test the truth or falsehood of any other statements we find in history? Undoubtedly he did not expect them to be subjected to so severe a test, but that does not release from the responsibility of doing so those who desire to ascertain the truth.

Sozomen is supposed to have written his “Ecclesiastical History” about 440—’45—more than a hundred years after the Council of Nice. That of Socrates was written about the same time, probably a little later. Eusebius, who was a member of the Council of Nice, preceded both of them with his “Ecclesiastical History,” and, of course, wrote about many things of which he had personal knowledge. In his “History,” however, he does not speak of the proceedings of the council, but of matters preceding it. All we learn from him about the council is found in his “Life of Constantine.”

Theodoret’s “Ecclesiastical History ” was designed as a continuation of those of Sozomen and Socrates, and must have been written a few years only before his death, which occurred about 458. These are the “Greek fathers,” from whom must be learned all that can now be known of the history of the Council of Nice, whenever we turn aside from mere guess—work and speculation and enter into the region of fact.

Not one of these authors connects the Bishop of Rome in any direct form with the Arian controversy *before* the Council of Nice. Eusebius, who took part in it, does not, either in his “History” or “Life of Constantine.” Yet this mere omission on his part might not be held conclusive, if the others had done so upon the strength of tradition only. He tells us that he “thought proper to pass by” many things, “particularly the circumstances of the different heads of the churches, who from being shepherds of the reasonable flocks of Christ that did not govern in a legal or becoming manner, were condemned by divine justice as unworthy of such a charge;” and also, “the ambitious aspirings of many to office, and the injudicious and unlawful ordinations that took place, the divisions among the confessors themselves, the great schisms and difficulties industriously fomented by the new members against the relics of the Church, devising one innovation after another, and unmercifully thrusting them into the midst of all these calamities, heaping up affliction upon affliction.” (Eusebius’s ” Book of Martyrs,” ch. xii.) He speaks here of the “heads of churches,” in the plural, which excludes the idea of there having been any such thing known in his day as the Church of Rome being the head and “mistress” of all the churches: but as we must conclude, from what he elsewhere said, that he intended to picture the melancholy condition of things existing at Rome, in consequence of the alliance between Constantine and the Roman clergy, it is easy to see that he also included Rome when he spoke of” the ambitious aspirings of many to office,” and the consequent “divisions” and “innovations.” Prudential reasons, therefore, may have restrained him from any special reference to the connection of the Bishop of Rome with the Arian controversy. However this may be, he is silent on that subject, and we have now no means of supplying, the omission, if it is merely an omission, unless it call be gathered from what he may have left to be inferred, or from the other authors named, or be specially manufactured in support of some preconceived theory. So far from his having said anything justifying such an inference, he excludes any such idea entirely in his “Life of Constantine,” where, speaking of “the people being thus in every place divided,” and the prevalence of “the bitterest disunion,” he says that “Constantine appeared to be the only one on earth capable of being His [God’s] minister,” to provide “the healing of these differences,” without referring to the Bishop of Rome as having any agency or authority in the matter. (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, bk. iii., ch. v.)

Sozomen gives an account of the origin of the controversy between Arius and the Bishop of Alexandria, and states the fact that the latter convened a council of African bishops within his own ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and “cast him [Arius] out of the Church,” together with certain African

presbyters and deacons who agreed with him. Arius, in defense, sought “the favor of the bishops of other churches,” and addressed letters to them. The Bishop of Alexandria also “wrote to the bishops of every church “not to Rome specially, where alone it would have been necessary to write if that had been the seat of headship and primacy in the Church Universal. Numerous synods were held. “Arius sent messengers to Paulinus, Bishop of Tyre; to Eusebius Pamphilus, (The author of the “Ecclesiastical History.”) who presided over the Church of Cesarea in Palestine, and to Patrophilus, Bishop of Scythopolis.”

Intelligence of these dissensions having reached Constantine, the emperor, who had been a long time absent from Rome, he was “greatly troubled,” probably because he sincerely desired, by this time, that the cause of Christianity should not be injured by them, and probably also because he feared that these perpetual divisions among the clergy would weaken his hold upon the imperial throne at Rome. He accordingly went to work at once to employ his temporal authority to heal the breach, and “rebuked” the contestants, Arius and Alexander, as already stated. (Sozomen, bk. i., chh. xv., xvi.)

Sozomen does not give this letter of Constantine, but Eusebius does; and it shows very clearly that he acted in the matter wholly without reference to the Bishop of Rome. It, moreover, shows too that he had a just and intelligent appreciation of the great principle upon which Protestantism is based; for, after characterizing the dispute between Arius and Alexander as upon “truly insignificant questions,” merely “some trifling and foolish verbal difference,” he points them to the example of the philosophers, who, “though they may differ as to the perfection of a principle, they are recalled to harmony of sentiment by *the uniting power of their common doctrines*,” and counsels them not to let “the circumstance which has led to a slight difference between you, since it affects not the general principles of truth, be allowed to prolong any division or schism among you;”....”for we are not all of us like-minded on every subject, nor is there such a thing as one disposition and judgment common to all alike.” (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, chh. lxiv.—lxxii.)

It is therefore manifest that the Christian sentiment which Eusebius attributes to Constantine was not that exclusive and sectarian sentiment which the clergy at Rome were then endeavoring to establish, and which, as he could readily foresee, would widen rather than close up the breach. Although he may have favored the Christians there from a general conviction of Christian duty, and given temporal authority to the clergy from motives of State policy only; yet it is also manifest that he did not intend to permit any church organization to grow up at Rome, with exterior authority sufficient to control or absorb the legitimate power of the other churches. However much a Christian he may have been, he was now at the head of a pagan empire, and no doubt thought that his whole public duty was performed by the establishment of religious toleration. Hence, in dealing with the Arian controversy, he ignored entirely any claim of exclusive jurisdiction on the part of the Bishop of Rome, if any such was set up, which is not probable, and treated the question as one which he, as emperor, was required to submit to all the bishops alike. And this view of the policy of Constantine will sufficiently explain his subsequent dealings with the Roman clergy.

Socrates gives substantially the same general account as Eusebius and Sozomen, adding the letter of the Bishop of Alexandria. This letter is as conclusive as it is possible for negative evidence to be upon the question of Romish supremacy at that time. It is addressed “to the bishops constituted in the several cities”—not to the Bishop of Rome alone. This great orthodox bishop employs this language: “To our

beloved and most honored fellow—ministers of the Catholic [not Roman Catholic] Church everywhere.” He complains especially that Eusebius of Nicomedia (Not the historian.) had taken the side of Arius, and argues at length to show the heretical tendency of their teachings.

Matters, however, only became worse: “To so disgraceful an extent,” says Socrates, “was this affair carried, that Christianity became a subject of popular ridicule, even in the theaters.” Eusebius of Nicomedia demanded of the Bishop of Alexandria that the sentence of excommunication he had pronounced against Arius should be rescinded; and many letters were written on both sides, some favoring and some opposing this proposition. The opposing factions became divided into “sects,” and these, with the Eunomians, Macedonians, and Melitians, threatened to put an end to all the harmony that had previously existed in the several churches. And yet Socrates, like Eusebius and Sozomen, omits any mention of the Bishop or Church of Rome, either as appealed to by the parties, or as interfering to quiet the dissensions. He makes Hosius the messenger by whom Constantine sent his letter of rebuke to Alexander and Arius, but does not connect him in any way with the Bishop of Rome. (Socrates, bk. i., chh. v., vi., vii.)

Theodoret also refers to the beginning of the controversy. He inserts a letter from the Bishop of Alexandria to the Bishop of Constantinople, wherein several other “sects” are named, besides those mentioned by Socrates: to wit, the Ebionites, Artemontes, Sabellians, and Valentinians (a branch of the Gnostics); thus demonstrating that sects did not grow out of Protestantism, but justifying the inference that if they did not necessarily arise out of the attempt to establish Roman exclusiveness, they were increased by it. He publishes the letter of Arius to Eusebius, wherein he calls the Bishop of Alexandria “the Pope Alexander.” This is the first time that the title of *pope* appears in any of these “Greek fathers” in connection with the Arian controversy. And he gives also a letter from Eusebius to the Bishop of Tyre. Nowhere, however, does he refer to the Bishop of Rome, or the Pope of Rome, as having anything whatever to do with either Alexander or Arius, or with their respective adherents. But, in enumerating the bishops of Rome, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Constantinople, he says, “The Church of Rome was at this time ruled by Silvester;” and neither says nor intimates that he ruled any other of the churches, or that he had any more authority than the bishop of any other Church. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Theodoret, bk. i., chh. ii.—vi.) Manifestly, it is a just inference, from the fact that no letter is shown to have been addressed to or from him, that he was then considered by the whole Christian world as having no such exclusive authority.

The evidence, therefore, both affirmative and negative, furnished by these early fathers, rendering it almost positively certain that, before the Council of Nice, the Bishop of Rome was not referred to, by appeal or otherwise, as a judge or arbiter to settle the dispute about Arianism, it is necessary, in order to ascertain his true relation to that council, to know by whom it was convened, and under whose auspices its business was conducted. These same authors must also settle this question.

Eusebius says: “Resolved, therefore, to bring, as it were, a divine array against this enemy, he [Constantine] convoked a general council, and invited the speedy attendance of bishops from all quarters, in letters expressive of the honorable estimation in which he held them.” And he speaks of his summons as a “command” and an “imperial injunction.” (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, bk. iii., ch. vi.)

Sozomen says that after the letter of the emperor, sent by Hosius to Alexander and Arius, had failed to restore harmony,” Constantine convened a synod at Nicaea, in Bithynia, and wrote to the most eminent men of the churches in every country, directing them to be there on an appointed day.” (Sozomen, bk. i., ch. xvii.) Socrates says, “When, therefore, the emperor beheld the Church agitated by both these causes, he convoked a general council, summoning all the bishops by letter to meet him at Nice, in Bithynia.” (Socrates, bk. i., ch. viii.) Theodoret, referring to the failure of Constantine to bring about a reconciliation, says, “He, therefore, proceeded to summon the celebrated Council of Nice; and commanded that the bishops, and those connected with them, should be mounted on the asses, mules, and horses belonging to the public, in order to repair thither.” (Theodoret, bk. i., ch. vii. See also Du Pin, vol. ii., pp. 12, 250.)

Now, with this evidence before us — and this is all we have from these early fathers, beginning with Eusebius, who personally knew all about it—are we not justified in saying that, when papal writers say, as Weninger does, that the Council of Nice was “convoked by Pope Silvester,” they state as a fact that which is not a fact—to speak in the mildest terms? The plain and well—established truth is that he had nothing more to do with it than the bishops of the other churches, and not so much as some of them—especially those to whom Alexander and Arius had addressed their letters. It was wholly and entirely the work of Constantine, the emperor, who never even became a catechumen, by baptism, in the Church of Rome; whose only Christianity was Catholic, in the sense of universality, and not in the sectarian sense of Rome, and who had not yet become so unselfish as to overlook the worldly object he had in view when he employed the clergy to aid him in the administration of civil affairs; which was, to keep himself firmly seated upon the imperial throne. He was willing to unite the Church with the State; but no word ever escaped him, so far as his biographer has reported, signifying any other purpose than that of keeping the Church below and inferior to the State.

On one occasion, when addressing a company of bishops in the presence of Eusebius, he said to them, “You are bishops whose jurisdiction is within the Church: I also am a bishop, ordained by God to overlook whatever is external to the Church;” (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, bk. iv., ch. xxiv.) whereby he intended to have it distinctly understood that he should permit no church organization with external powers, either of coercion or otherwise, to inter-meddle, directly or indirectly, with the affairs of the empire.

The assignment of a direct and immediate agency to the Bishop of Rome in convoking the Council of Nice being false, the other statements of Weninger might be held, inferentially, to be false also. “Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,” (False in one thing, false in everything) is an old and well—approved law maxim. But as it is a maxim which, though sometimes true, is said not to be of general application, and grave matters like those we are discussing should not be left to inference merely, his other statements should likewise be tested by the proofs.

He says, “The sovereign pontiff presided by his three legates, one of whom was Osius, Bishop of Cordova.” This statement is more false than the one preceding it. Spenser says, in “The Faerie Queene,”

“For he that once hath missed the right way,
The further he doth go, the further he doth stray.”

Eusebius, after a general enumeration of the countries from which the “distinguished prelates” who attended the council came, says, “The prelate of the imperial city [Rome] was prevented from attending by extreme old age; but his presbyters were present, and supplied his place.” He does not refer to any other presbyters who were there, and certainly does not include Hosius among those who represented the Bishop of Rome, for two reasons: first, because he classes him among the prelates; and, second, because, in the preceding sentence, referring to Hosius, he had said, “Even from Spain itself one whose fame was widely spread took his seat as an individual in the great assembly.” (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, bk. iii., ch. vii.)

Hence, Hosius, who was Bishop of Cordova, and the only representative of Spain present, took his seat in his own individual right as one of the most distinguished prelates, and not as a mere presbyter or legate of the Bishop of Rome, of whom he was the equal in authority and the superior in fame.

Sozomen, referring to the absence of the Bishop of Rome on account of old age, says, “But his place was supplied by Vito and Vicentius, presbyters of his Church.” * Thus he makes *two* legates only from Rome, and not *three*; and does not mention Hosius as one of them.

* Sozomen, bk. i., ch. xvii. Du Pin calls them Victor and Vicentius, “Eccl. Hist.,” vol. ii., p. 251; and Tillemont, Vitus and Vincentius. See post.

Socrates makes no statement on his own authority, but refers approvingly to what Eusebius has said. He says nothing about Hosius being the legate of Silvester, but refers to his presbyters. Theodoret does not mention Hosius, but agrees with Sozomen as to the number of the papal legates, and with Eusebius, Sozomen, and Socrates as to their character—that is, that they were presbyters, and not bishops. He says Silvester “sent two presbyters to the council, for the purpose of taking part in all the transactions.” (Theodoret, bk. i., ch. vii.)

Hosius was not a *presbyter of Rome*, but was the Bishop of Cordova in Spain, as is stated by both Sozomen (Sozomen, bk. i., ch. xvi.) and Socrates, (Socrates, bk. i., ch. vii.) and could not, consequently, have been one of the papal legates. But not a word is stated by either of these authors about the Bishop of Rome being represented by Hosius, either as one of his legates or in any other capacity. They all concur in the precise contrary, that he was represented by presbyters, and not bishops; and Sozomen and Theodoret agree that there were only two of these. And why were they only presbyters? The answer is plain. Each one of the churches in Asia, Europe, and Africa had its own bishop, and its own distinct jurisdiction. They existed upon terms of perfect equality, none having any primacy or supremacy over the others. Therefore, when these bishops were summoned by Constantine, those who could not attend in person sent their presbyters—as the Bishop of Rome did—and those who attended represented their own churches. Hosius represented his own Church, and was a man of far too much celebrity to have surrendered his equality with his brother bishops to play an inferior part in the name of such a bishop as Silvester, of whom scarcely anything was known beyond the fact of his having been Bishop of Rome, until the false and forged legends of the monks in the fifth century assigned to him the connection with the Council of Nice, which has ever since been disingenuously repeated by the supporters of papal power and infallibility.

But who presided over the Council of Nice? Weninger says, "The sovereign pontiff presided, by his three legates." Enough has been said to show that there was no such thing as a "sovereign pontiff" known or recognized in those days, especially not in the sense here meant; but that need not be dwelt on here. There were but two legates, and they were both presbyters only. Can any man of intelligence suppose that such an assembly, composed of so many distinguished bishops, at a time like that, when rank and station had attached to them far more of dignity and influence than they now have, would have submitted to be presided over by mere presbyters?

The supporters of the monkish fable have observed this difficulty, but have proved themselves equal to it by increasing the papal legates to three, and making Hosius one of them! There were a large number present, besides him, of eminent ability. Eusebius says, "Some were distinguished by wisdom and eloquence, others by the gravity of their lives, and by patient fortitude of character, while others again united in themselves all these graces." And he speaks of men among them "whose years demanded the tribute of respect and veneration." ("Life of Constantine," by Eusebius, bk. iii., ch. xi.)

Socrates mentions two of "extraordinary celebrity," the bishops of Upper Thebes and of Cyprus. Who of all these presided? There is no positive answer to this question. Manifestly, it was not considered a matter of any special consequence, and certainly not as in any way affecting the merits or validity of what was done, or the fact would have been stated. Eusebius says that, upon the assembling of the body, "the bishop who occupied the chief place in the right division of the assembly then rose, and, addressing the emperor, delivered a concise speech," etc., (*Ibid.*, bk. iii., ch. xi.) but he does not say who this was. Nor does Sozomen, or Socrates, or Theodoret. But Eusebius shows enough to dispel the papal fiction and forgery, that one of the pope's legates presided, by the statement of the fact, of which he had personal knowledge, that a "bishop," and not a "presbyter," presided.

Weninger says, "Osius, whom Athanasius styles the leader of the council, occupied the first place." If this were an established fact, it would prove only this: that, in order to support the claim of Romish supremacy, its advocates originated the false assertion that he was one of the papal legates, without a single word of authority from any responsible or reliable quarter. Athanasius became Bishop of Alexandria in 326, the year after the council. He was present at the council as a deacon; and whatever is found in his writings in reference to it is entitled to the greatest consideration, and ought to be accepted as true. In his "Second Apology," he calls "Hosius the father and president of all the councils," (Du Pin, vol. ii., p. 251, note.) not specially of the Council of Nice. He certainly does not say here that he was the leader of that council.

Between the beginning of the fourth century and the Council of Nice there were twelve councils assembled. (See Du Pin's "Chronological Table of Councils," attached to vol. ii. Of his "History.") To which of these did Athanasius refer? If to all, including that at Nice, then it was merely probable that Hosius presided over that council. But it is more probable that he designedly employed general language, because, like Eusebius, Sozomen, Socrates, and Theodoret, he did not consider the presidency of the Council of Nice as a matter of any special importance; otherwise he would, undoubtedly, have stated who presided there, for he knew precisely what the fact was. At all events, he leaves it in doubt whether he intended to include Nice or not. And reasoning thus, Du Pin, the learned Roman Catholic historian, says, upon this question, "'Tis not certainly known who presided in this council, but 'tis very probable that it was Hosius." (*Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 251.) But, upon this hypothesis, he

proceeds immediately to say that he did so “*in his own name*,” and, therefore, not in the name of the Bishop of Rome, or as one of his legates.

And in a note to this text it is stated that at least two writers, Proclus and Facundus, have alleged that Eustathius, Bishop of Antioch, presided. It then continues: “But it is more probable that Hosius presided there *in his own name, and not in the pope’s*; for he nowhere assumes the title of Legate of the Holy See, and none of the ancients say that he presided in this council in the pope’s name. Gelasius Cyzicenus, who first affirmed it, says it *without any proof or authority*.” (*Ibid.*)

But there is other cumulative evidence to the same effect, also from the very highest Roman Catholic authority. Tillemont, in his learned and instructive “History of the Arians, and of the Council of Nice,” disposes of this question in very decisive and expressive—language. Alluding to the council, and after stating that it was convoked by Constantine, and not by the Bishop of Rome, he says:

“Neither Eusebius nor the ancient historians say anything of St. Silvester’s sending any other legates to the Council of Nice, but the two priests, Vitus and Vincentius. There is none but Gelasius Cyzicenus who says that Hosius of Corduba had the same post. His authority, how inconsiderable soever it be, could not but be of weight, if it was not certain that he corrupts the text of Eusebius by inserting this and some other clauses.”

Then, referring to the pretense that Hosius presided over the council in the name of the Bishop of Rome, and to the language of Athanasius already quoted, he continues:

“We have even some authorities for believing that it was St. Eustathius of Antioch who presided in the council. For John of Antioch, writing to St. Proclus, about the year 435, gives him the title of “first” of the holy fathers assembled at Nice, and Facundus, the “first” of that council. It is collected from Theodoret that he had the first place on the right hand, and that he made a speech to Constantine in the name of all the bishops—which, of course, belongs to the president. It is thought the same might be shown from St. Jerome. The chronicon of Nicephorus calls him expressly the chief of the fathers at Nice. St. Anastasius Sinaita might likewise mean the same thing; and the title of president is found in a letter attributed to Pope Felix III., which would be much more considerable authority if there were not many reasons to induce us to believe that this piece is not older than the eighth century.”

In a note it is said: “Gelasius Cyzicenus, who lived at the end of the fifth century, is the first we find who says that Hosius was the pope’s legate in the Council of Nice, with the priests Vito and Vincentius. He even reports this fact as a thing very authentic, since he *inserts it in the text of Eusebius*, as if it belonged to it. *But it is not found there in the printed copies*. Valesius takes no notice of *anything like it* in the manuscripts. And it is even evident that the text of that historian cannot be read, as Gelasius quotes it, *without a manifest corruption and perverting his sense*.

“All that can be said of this pretended delegation of Hosius, is that all the historians mention his assisting at the Council of Nice, and speak of legates who were sent thither by the pope; but that no author more ancient than Gelasius, nor perhaps any more modern who is worth notice in this matter, puts Hosius in the number of those legates. Even the ‘Synodicon,’ which in other respects is full of faults, does by no means place Hosius among the pope’s legates.” (“History of the Arians and of the Council of Nice,” by Tillemont, vol. ii., pp. 599, 600, 669, note iv. London ed., 1732.)

Thus is this falsehood, which originated *nearly two hundred years after the Council of Nice*, completely disposed of by authorities which no honest searcher after the truth can disregard. Until it was invented as a cover for papal usurpations, not one word was to be found anywhere, in any history, showing, or tending to show, that Hosius was one of the pope's legates, or presided in his name. The forgery has its parallel only in the "False Decretals," which soon followed it.

If he did preside in any other name than his own, it is far more likely to have been in that of Constantine than of the Bishop of Rome. Constantine convened the Council, and was present; the Bishop of Rome had nothing to do with it except to send his representative, as he was prevented by old age from attending in person, like other bishops. We know nothing of the relations between him and Hosius, except that they were bishops of distinct and independent churches, one in Italy and the other in Spain. But we do know, as Du Pin says, that Hosius "was much esteemed by the emperor," and that he was, according to the intimation of Eusebius and the statements of Sozomen and Socrates, the messenger by whom he sent his letter of rebuke to Alexander and Arius. This would give some plausibility to the belief that he presided in the emperor's name. But this is of no importance, since the question before us involves simply the truth or falsehood of the pretense that Hosius presided in the name of the pope. This is shown to be not only unsupported by a word of proof, but absolutely false—a bold and unblushing forgery!

Weninger says again: "The fathers were guided in their deliberations by these instructions [those of the pope to his legates], as well as by the symbol of faith prescribed by Silvester and brought from Rome."

If history did not furnish the most positive proof of the falsity of what is here asserted, it might be supposed to be true, because of the frequency of its repetition and the apparent sincerity with which it is made. But, like what has gone before it, it vanishes before the "touch-stone of truth."

The council was disturbed at the very beginning by angry discussion among the discordant bishops. Says Eusebius: "Some began to accuse their neighbors, who defended themselves, and recriminated in their turn." He continues: "In this manner numberless assertions were put forth by each party, and a violent controversy arose at the very commencement." The contending parties seem to have addressed themselves not merely to the assembly itself, but to the emperor. Manifestly, he was regarded as the ruling spirit of the council. He, probably, did not attempt to employ his imperial authority to control its deliberations, but it is unquestionably true that they were mainly influenced by the deference paid to it by a majority of the prelates. It is probable, even, that many of them were absolutely governed by it. Eusebius says as much in this: that, notwithstanding the violence of the discussion, "the emperor gave patient audience to all alike, and received every proposition with steadfast attention, and, by occasionally assisting the argument of each party in turn, he gradually disposed even the most vehement disputants to a reconciliation." By his address, and his eloquence in the Greek language, he persuaded some, and convinced others, "until at last he succeeded in bringing them to one mind and judgment respecting every disputed question." The result thus produced was, "that they were not only united as concerning the faith," but also as to the time of celebrating the feast of Easter. Whereupon the "points" were "committed to writing, and received the signature of each several member," and a festival was solemnized in honor of God. (Life of Constantine," by Eusebius, bk. iii., chh. xiii., xiv.)

In all this there is no mention made of the Bishop of Rome, or of any instructions from him, or of any formula of faith prepared by him, or of anything said or done by his legates. The emperor himself is the front figure in the assembly. All others are in the background.

Sozomen says that after Constantine had burned all the complaints of the contending bishops against each other that had been handed to him for investigation, he took part in the deliberations of the council. He heard each party for and against Arius, and, after the condemnation of Arius by the council, sent his followers into banishment by an imperial decree. The “Confession,” or “Symbol of Faith,” was decided on with his approval. This is not inserted in Sozomen’s history, because he thought “that such matters ought to be kept secret” from “the unlearned,” and to be known only “by disciples and their instructors.” (Sozomen, bk. i., ch. xx. 306) But he nowhere mentions any instructions from Rome, or any participation by the pope’s legates in the proceedings of the council.

The account given by Socrates agrees with that of Eusebius, from whom it is taken, but he gives the “Confession of Faith,” and points out the manner of its adoption, without any reference to the Bishop of Rome or his legates, or any instructions from him. (Socrates, bk. i., cb. viii.)

Theodoret is somewhat specific as to the manner in which the creed was adopted, predicating his statement upon the authority of a letter written by Athanasius immediately after the council to the Christians of Africa. Alluding to the bishops, he says “they all agreed in propounding” certain declarations of faith; yet he does not include the Arians among these, for they stated their “conclusions” in such a way as, according to him, to expose “their evil design and impious artifice.” He states the final adoption of the “Symbol of Faith,” and gives also an important letter from Eusebius of Cesarea, the historian, which throws much additional light upon the character of the proceedings, and the personal agency of Constantine in fixing the terms of the formulary.

It shows, indeed, that the word *consubstantial* (of the same substance, nature, or essence)—the most important and conspicuous word in the creed—was inserted upon his suggestion alone. When the creed, as agreed upon by the bishops, was laid before the council, it did not contain this word, yet it is here stated that it was “fully approved by all;” and the letter continues:

“No one found occasion to gainsay it; but our beloved emperor was the first to testify that it was most orthodox, and that he coincided in opinion with it; and he exhorted the others to sign it, and to receive all the doctrines it contained, with the single addition of one word—*consubstantial*.” (Theodoret, bk. i., chh. viii., xii.)

With such facts as these staring them full in the face, it is but little less than the boldest imposture for the papal writers to pretend, as they do, that the proceedings of this council were controlled by instructions from Rome, and that the formulary of the creed was prepared there and forwarded by the legates of the pope. In what estimate can they themselves hold the theory of papal primacy and supremacy when it has to be upheld by such wholesale perversions of history?

The introduction of the one word, *consubstantial*, into the creed by an emperor who, whatever may have been his Christian convictions, was not yet baptized into the Church, led to one of the fiercest and most protracted controversies the Church ever had. The insertion of it, after the assent of all the bishops had been obtained to a form of creed without it, shows the degree of influence which Constantine had

over the council, how completely it was the creature of his imperial will, and how idle and violative of truth it is to say that he would himself have yielded, or have permitted others to yield, to the dictation of the Bishop of Rome. The latter may have commanded respect by his age and piety, but he had no right to command any obedience beyond the limits of his own ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which he may have asserted himself, or which had been assented to by other bishops; whereas it is well known that Constantine so wore the robes and wielded the imperial power of Caesar as to brook no disobedience to his royal will, whether exercised in the affairs of State or Church.

Having convoked this council of his own accord, he felt that he had the right to overlook, if not to dictate, its proceedings, as the most certain and expedient mode of bringing discordant elements into harmony, and saving the cause of Christianity from discomfiture. If any instructions from Rome had been presented, he would have heeded them or not, as may have suited his designs. That he was master of everything done there is sufficiently apparent from all the proceedings; and if it were not, Theodoret shows that he was, at another place.

When certain accusations of a criminal character were made against some of the bishops, and laid before him, he put them aside till the close of the council, when he burned them publicly, and declared he had never read them, saying “that the crimes of priests ought not to be made known to the multitude, lest they should become an occasion of offense or of sin. He also said that if he had detected a bishop in the very act of committing adultery, he would have thrown his imperial robe over the unlawful deed, lest any should witness the scene, and be thereby injured.” (Theodoret, bk. i., ch. x.)

Most amiable and considerate emperor! Most fortunate bishops! Yet it ought not to be supposed that any very large number of those who were assembled in this celebrated council needed this kind of royal protection, as it is not to be doubted for a moment that many of them were of that class of sincere Christians in whose care the cause of true Christianity and genuine piety is at all times safe. Those who had control of the proceedings were, doubtless, in a great degree, the instruments of Constantine; while such as were really devoted to the welfare of the Church were left to acquiesce, from fear of the royal displeasure, and to return to their churches, and there regulate, by their example, the Christian deportment of their flocks.

Weninger makes another equally unsupported assertion when he says that “at the close of the council all the acts were sent to Rome for confirmation.” His object is to maintain by it the propositions, first, that the decrees of a general council are not valid without the approval of the pope; and, second, that this approval was obtained before those passed by the Council of Nice took effect. Nothing of the kind then occurred. There is not a word or syllable of evidence to that effect.

Eusebius says that, after the council had closed, Constantine “gave information of the proceedings of the synod to those who had not been present, by a letter in his own handwriting,” which letter he gives at length. It is imperially addressed by “Constantinus Augustus to the Churches.” He tells them, “I myself have undertaken that this decision should meet the approval of your sagacities;” and commands them to receive it as a “truly Divine injunction, and regard it as the gift of God;” because “whatever is determined in the holy assemblies of the bishops is to be regarded as indicative of the Divine will.”

He does not refer to the Bishop of Rome at all, either with reference to his approval or otherwise. And when counseling unity of practice in regard to the festival of Easter, he does not refer to the practice at

Rome alone, or to the decrees of its bishops, or to any other particular church, to show what that unity is, but tells them that it consists in the practice which prevails in Rome, Africa, Italy, Egypt, Spain, Gaul, Britain, Libya, Greece, Asia, Pontus, and Cilicia; thus ignoring, to all intents and purposes, the claim of Roman primacy, if any such were then made. Eusebius also alludes to a letter from the emperor to the Egyptians as “confirming and sanctioning the decrees of the council.” (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, bk. iii., chh. xvi.—xxi., xxiii)

Sozomen alludes to the letter mentioned by Eusebius, written by the emperor to the churches, as well as that to the Alexandrians, and says he “urged them to receive unanimously the exposition of faith which had been set forth by the council;” making no reference to the pope’s approval. (Sozomen, bk. i., ch. xxv.)

Socrates gives this letter to the Alexandrians, and another to the “bishops and people,” as well as that to “the churches.” They all set forth the binding obligation of the decrees of the council, without any reference to the pope, or his connection with them in any way. (Socrates, bk. i., chli. ix.)

And Theodoret states the same facts, and inserts the same letters. (Theodoret, bk. i., chh. ix., x.)

It is not pretended by any of these authors that the decrees of the council were ever submitted to the pope, or that it was supposed to be necessary. The very reverse is true, both as it regards the fact and the universal sentiment then prevailing. However much Rome may have desired her triumph over the old apostolic churches, she had not then achieved it.

The reference to the proceedings of the council, and to the eighteenth and *twenty—ninth* canons, made by Weninger, to show that it fully recognized the primacy of Rome and the infallibility of the pope, not only does not help him out of the difficulty, but gets him deeper into it. We give him the benefit of his statement in his own words. He says:

“A yet more cogent proof is furnished us by the very acts of the council itself. The eighteenth canon rules that the Church, faithful to the teachings of the apostles, has reserved all cases of importance to the arbitration of the Holy See: *Cujus dispositioni omnes majores causas antiqua apostolorum auctoritas reservavit.*’ Can there be any case of greater importance—’major causa’—than a question about matters of faith?” (Weninger, p. 106.)

Now, it so happens—unfortunately for this author and the cause he supports at the cost of so much candor—that there is not one word in the eighteenth canon of the Council of Nice which the most skilled and practiced ingenuity can torture into what he has here alleged. On the contrary, the sentiment and action of the council, so far as it acted at all, was precisely the reverse. The eighteenth canon is not even upon the subject referred to, and makes no reference to it whatever. There are no such words to be found in it as “*Cujus dispositioni omnes majores causas antiqua apostolorum auctoritas reservavit.*” It has relation to presbyters receiving the Eucharist from deacons, and is in these words, as translated by Boyle:

“CANON XVIII. *Of Presbyters receiving the Eucharist from Deacons.*—It having come to the knowledge of the great and holy council, that in certain places and cities the Eucharist is administered by deacons to presbyters; and neither law nor custom permitting that those who have no authority to offer the body of Christ should deliver it to those who have; and it being also understood that some

deacons receive the Eucharist before even the bishops, let, therefore, all these irregularities be removed, and let the deacons remain within their own limits, knowing that they are ministers of the bishops, and inferior to the presbyters. Let them receive the Eucharist in their proper place, after the presbyters, whether it be administered by a bishop or a presbyter. Nor is it permitted to deacons to sit among the presbyters, as that is against rule and order. If any one will not obey, even after these regulations, let him desist from the ministry.” *

* “Historical Views of the Council of Nice,” by Boyle (1836), p. 62. These “views” may also be found attached to Cruse’s Eusebius, Boston ed., 1836.

If it be objected that the translation here used is by a Protestant divine, it is answered that to the same effect is that of the learned Du Pin, a doctor of the Sarbonne, and Regius Professor of Divinity at Paris. (Du Pin, vol. ii., p. 253.) And the great Tillemont, whose authority, as a Roman Catholic historian is unquestioned, speaking of it, says: “The eighteenth canon humbles the pride of some deacons who administered the Eucharist to priests. It likewise forbids them to sit among the priests—that is, to sit in the church as priests.” (Tillemont, vol. ii., p. 644.)

Here it is abundantly shown that there could not, by any possibility, have been in this eighteenth canon anything of the kind alleged by Weninger, and that his statement amounts to an entire perversion of its meaning—that it is, in fact, a palpable misrepresentation of it. Whether originated by him or some other defender of the papacy, is of no consequence, since the forgery and its object are both apparent. That it is a forgery, like the “False Decretals,” anybody who will take the pains to investigate may easily see. The Council of Nice did not intend, in any part of its proceedings, to confer supremacy over the other churches upon that at Rome, or upon the Bishop of Rome, or to recognize it as existing. The jurisdiction of the several churches, as established by “ancient usage,” was defined by the sixth canon, which is thus given by Du Pin: *

* The Nicene Council did not, in the sixth canon, consider the question of primacy at all. Referring to that part of it which points out such rights of the Bishop of Rome as were analogous to those of the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch, Dr. Hefele says: “It is evident that the council has not in view here the primacy of the Bishop of Rome over the whole Church, but simply his power as a patriarch.”—*History of the Christian Councils*, by Hefele, p. 394. Elsewhere he quotes approvingly from another: “The Council of Nicaea did not speak of the primacy.”—*Ibid.*, p. 397. He also says the sixth canon “does not consider the pope as primate of the Universal Church, nor as simple Bishop of Rome, but it treats him as one of the great metropolitans who had not merely one province, but several, under their jurisdiction.”—*Ibid.*, p. 397. St. Augustin spoke of Pope Innocent I. as “President of the Church of the West”—not as primate of the whole Church.—*Ibid.*, p. 399. St. Jerome considered the Bishop of Alexandria as Patriarch of Egypt, and the Bishop of Rome as Patriarch of the West, each having authority only in his own patriarchate.—*Ibid.*, p. 400. The Synod of Arles, in 314, regarded the Bishop of Rome as having jurisdiction only over several dioceses.—*Ibid.* Justinian spoke of the ecclesiastical division of the world, in his day, as divided into five patriarchates—Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem—each independent of the other.—*Ibid.*

“We ordain, that the ancient custom shall be observed which gives power to the Bishop of Alexandria over all the provinces of Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, because the Bishop of Rome has the like jurisdiction over all the suburbicary regions (for this addition must be supplied out of Ruffinus); we

would likewise have the rights and privileges of the Church of Antioch and the other churches preserved; but these rights ought not to prejudice those of the metropolitans. If any one is ordained without the consent of the metropolitan, the council declares that he is no bishop; but if any one is canonically chosen by the suffrage of almost all the bishops of the province, and if there are but one or two of a contrary opinion, the suffrages of the far greater number ought to carry it for the ordination of those particular persons.” (Du Pin, vol. ii., p. 252. Boyle’s translation (p. 59) is substantially the same, though somewhat different in phraseology.)

Tillemont says it was the opinion of Baronius that the necessity for this sixth canon grew out of the resistance by Melitius, the Bishop of Lycopolis, and founder of the sect called Melitians, to the authority of the Bishop of Alexandria; and thus refers to the canon:

“This canon orders that the rights and pre-eminences which some churches had of old, as those of Alexandria and of Antioch, should be preserved. It regulates particularly the jurisdiction of that of Alexandria over Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, by that which the Church of Rome had.”

He then proceeds to show that Ruffinus confines the jurisdiction of the Church of Rome to the “suburbicary churches” only; and, thus limited, he considers it to have included no other churches than those existing, in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. (Tillemont, vol. ii., p. 640.)

This canon, as interpreted by both these great Roman Catholic authors, as well as by Boyle, means this, and nothing more: that as the Bishop of Alexandria had power and jurisdiction over the churches in the provinces of Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, and the Bishop of Rome had like power and jurisdiction over those in the diocese, or suburbs, of Rome, so should the Bishop of Antioch and the bishops of the other churches have like power and jurisdiction, each within his provincial limits, each province being required to preserve, according to the ancient custom, the rights of its metropolitan church. There is not one word about the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome beyond his diocese; not a word about his authority over any other churches but those within the Roman suburbs; not a word about appeals to him in cases of disagreement about the selection and ordination of bishops outside his provincial limits; not a word about the Church at Rome as the “mother and mistress of all the churches;” not a word about the “Holy See” of Rome; not a word about any obligation to obey the Bishop of Rome, any more than the bishops of other churches; and not a word about the pope, either in his pretended capacity of “Head of the Church,” or any other. With all this before him, it was necessary that this author should have been trained in the Jesuit school, in order to fit him for the task of unblushingly shutting his eyes to it.

But Du Pin leaves no room for doubt about the meaning of the council, or the interpretation of its decrees, when he says: “This canon, being thus explained, has no difficulty in it. It does not oppose the primacy of the Church of Rome, but neither does it establish it. It preserves the great sees their ancient privileges—that is, the jurisdiction or authority which they had over many provinces, which was afterward called the jurisdiction of the patriarch or exarch (a bishop in the Eastern Orthodox Church ranking immediately below a patriarch). In this sense it is that it compares the Church of Rome to the Church of Alexandria, by considering them as patriarchal churches. It continues, also, to the Church of Antioch, and all other great churches, whatsoever rights they could have; but, lest their authority should be prejudicial to the ordinary metropolitans, who were subject to their jurisdiction, the council confirms

what had been ordained in the fourth canon concerning the authority of metropolitans in the ordination of bishops.” *

* Du Pin, vol. ii., p. 252. The fourth canon provides that a bishop should be ordained by all the bishops, except where it is difficult to assemble them, etc., when it may be done by three, with the consent of the others by letter—its validity depending upon the metropolitan bishop of the diocese; which means that it shall not depend upon the consent of the Bishop of Rome, unless in his diocese.—*Ibid.*

It is important to observe scrutinizingly this language of this great author, for it is full of meaning. He says this canon “does not oppose the primacy of the Church of Rome, but neither does it establish it.” The reason is plain: *no such primacy was then asserted*, or had then been heard of, except in the pretenses set up by a few of the popes, or would have been tolerated by the bishops of the other churches. For these reasons, the canon was silent on the subject. But although it was silent in words, it rebuked in spirit this ambitious pretense, by defining distinctly the jurisdiction of each one of the “great churches,” and so defined it that one should not be considered greater or more privileged than another. No thought of primacy or superiority entered the minds of any of the leading bishops of the council, and if there had been one there to claim it for any particular church, he would have been sternly and indignantly rebuked. The whole history of those times, and everything known of this council, proves this, and whatsoever may be palmed off upon the superstitious and credulous part of the world to establish the contrary is false and forged, manufactured with the same disregard of truth and history as were the pseudo—Isidorian and other fabricated decretals.

The metropolitan bishops referred to in these canons had a recognized superiority over the other bishops of their provinces. Originally the bishops had assistants, or coadjutors, who aided them in the discharge of their episcopal duties, when disabled by old age or infirmity. It is supposed that some of these had episcopal ordination, and that others were only presbyters; but, in the end, they were all recognized as bishops, with limited and distinctly marked jurisdiction. This difficulty was remedied, however, when one was chosen superior to the rest, and invested with certain powers and privileges for the good of the whole. He became the primate, or metropolitan, that is, the principal bishop of the province to which he belonged.

Eusebius speaks of Titus as superintendent, that is, metropolitan, of the churches in Crete;(Eusebius, bk. iii., ch. iv.) and Chrysostom says that Timothy was entrusted with the government of the Church throughout Asia. (Bingham’s “Antiquities of the Christian Church,” bk. ii., chh. xv., xvi., where this subject is fully discussed.) And it was in this sense alone that the jurisdiction and superiority of metropolitan bishops was spoken of by the Council of Nice. Each province, or diocese, had its own metropolitan bishop, or primate, and the idea that the Church at Rome was, as it regarded the others, the metropolitan church, and its bishop primate over all, never was asserted in this council, or claimed by any body there, so far as any true history shows, or tends to show.

Weninger, pursuing his favorite idea, and seemingly resolved that it shall be no fault of his if it is not maintained, as the foundation upon which the claim of papal supremacy must rest, says also:

“The *twenty—ninth* canon [of Nice] reads as follows: ‘The incumbent of the Roman See, acting as Christ’s vicegerent in the government of the Church, is the head of the patriarchs, as well as Peter

himself was.’ ‘Ille, qui tenet sedem Romanuni, caput est omnium Patriarcharum cicut Petrus, ut qui sit Vicarius Christi super cunctum Ecclesiam.” (Weninger, p. 107.)

It has already been clearly and sufficiently shown that no such matters as are involved in this statement were considered or acted on by the Council of Nice at all, in so far as either of the canons referred to is concerned. But, after perverting, and misquoting, and mutilating these, this author overleaps every possible difficulty at a single bound, and adds a canon which was never enacted by the council! There were only twenty canons in all passed by the Council of Nice! And such is the undoubted “truth of history.” Neither Sozomen nor Socrates give the number. Theodoret gives the number as twenty. These are his words: “The bishops then returned to the council, and drew up twenty laws to regulate the discipline of the Church.” (Theodoret, bk. i., ch. viii.) Du Pin says:

“These rules, which are called canons, are in number twenty, and there never were more genuine, though some modern authors have added many more.” (Du Pin, vol. ii., p. 252.)

There is this note explanatory of this text of Du Pin:

“Theodoret and Ruffinus mention only these twenty canons: though the latter reckons twenty—two of them, yet he owned no more, because he divided two of them. The bishops of Africa found but twenty of them, after they had inquired very diligently all over the East for all the canons made by the Council of Nice. Dionysius Exiguus, and all the other collectors of canons, have acknowledged but these twenty. The Arabic canons which Ecchellensis published under the name of the Council of Nice cannot belong to this Council.” (*Ibid.*, note (k).)

Referring again to “the twenty canons,” he continues:

“I do not think that there ever were any other acts of this council, since they were unknown to all the ancient historians. There is a Latin letter of this synod to St. Silvester [then Bishop of Rome] extant, but it is supposititious, which has no authority, and which has all the marks of forgery that any writing can have, as well as the pretended answer of St. Silvester. Neither is that council genuine, which is said to have been assembled at Rome by St. Silvester for the confirmation of the Council of Nice. *The canons of this council are also forged*, which contain rules contrary to the practice of the time, and which it had been impossible to observe.” (Du Pin, vol. ii., pp. 253, 254. See, also, note (1))

Tillemont is not less explicit. In his “History of the Council of Nice,” he explains the contents of the twenty canons, and says:

“These are the twenty canons of the famous council, which are come to our hands, and are the only ones which were made. At least, none of the ancients reckoned them more than twenty. Theodoret mentions no more. When the Church of Africa sent to the churches of Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople for the canons of Nice, they sent them only the same twenty which we still have; and the twenty-two of Ruffinus contain no more than these twenty, only they are divided after another manner; insomuch that there is no room to believe that any more were made.” (Tillemont, vol. ii., p. 645.)

But Tillemont was fully informed of the efforts that had been made—like that of Weninger—to add to these canons, in order to build up and support the papal system. And, as a faithful historian and honest

member of the Roman Catholic Church, he felt himself constrained to expose and denounce them. He says:

“We find many other determinations attributed to the Council of Nice, in the pretended letters of the popes Mark, Julius, and Felix; in a letter from St. Athanasius to Pope Mark; in Gelasius Cyzienus; and in an Arabic collection given us by Turrianus. But there is nothing more plain than that all these are apocryphal, without excepting Gelasius, who we know gives us very often suspected pieces.” (*Ibid.*, P. 646.)

And he does not spare one of the infallible (!) popes who engaged in this nefarious attempt to add to these canons by forgery, in order to affirm the right of appeal to Rome! He says:

“Pope Zosimus alleges two canons of the Council of Nice, which allowed bishops and even other ecclesiastics to appeal to the pope. But the Church of Africa proved these canons to be forged; neither Zosimus nor his successors were able to prove the contrary; and it is acknowledged now that these canons belong to the Council of Sardica, (Which was not an ecumenical or general council.) and not to that of Nice.” (Tillemont, vol. ii., p. 647.)

It is not often that so much convincing evidence is found accumulating upon one point as there is upon this. So overwhelming is it, that no writer of the present day, unless he be a Jesuit, will venture to hazard the loss of his reputation for veracity by assigning any other than twenty as the number of Nicene canons. One of the most recent investigators of this question among the learned divines of England is Dr. E. B. Pusey, who published, a few years ago, a history of all the councils, from the assembly at Jerusalem, in 51, to the Council of Constantinople, in 381. Having before him all the authorities bearing on the question, he fixes the number of Nicene canons at twenty, without seeming to suppose the matter debatable. (Pusey’s “Councils of the Church,” p. 112. See, also, “History of the Christian Councils,” by Hefele, pp. 262, 434.)

Yet, directly in the face of all this, this Jesuit defender of the primacy and infallibility of the pope unblushingly publishes a false and forged canon, which he calls the twenty—ninth, to prove that the Council of Nice thereby declared the Bishop of Rome to be “Christ’s viceregent in the government of the Church,” and “the head of the patriarchs as well as Peter was!” Can bold effrontery be carried further? The forgery, whenever and by whomsoever made, is bold and entire, made out of whole cloth. There is not a single word by any of the early “fathers” that can be tortured, by the utmost ingenuity, into such a meaning. On the contrary, we have seen that where the Bishop of Rome is spoken of in the sixth canon—and he is referred to in no other—he is merely called by that title, as all the other bishops are called by their titles, without any indication of preference to him over the others. He is never spoken of as “Christ’s viceregent,” or as “head of the patriarchs,” nor is the Church of Rome ever alluded to as the “Apostolic Church.”

It cannot be too frequently repeated that this twenty—ninth canon is a downright forgery—one by which the world has been already sufficiently imposed on. It has been clung to by the supporters of the pope, as against the rights of the whole Church, because they know that if deprived of evidence that the first ecumenical council sustained their theory of papal infallibility, it necessarily falls to the ground. That it did not sustain it, and that there was no pretense of its existence then, is absolutely incontestable.

Chapter XI. Pepin

Temporal Power.—None possessed by Peter.—Alliance between Pepin and Zachary.—Double Conspiracy.—The Pope released the Allegiance of the French People.—Made Pepin King.—The Lombards in Italy. —The Pope bargained with Pepin, and was guilty of Revolt against the Empire.—Pepin seized Territory from the Lombards, and gave it to the Pope.—Both were Revolutionists and Traitors.—The Pope usurped what belonged to the Empire.—Pepin did not conquer Rome.—The Divine Right of Kings.—Pepin's Second Visit.—Pope sent Letters to him from the Virgin Mary, Peter, etc.—He re—affirmed his Gift to the Pope.—Charlemagne.—Adrian I.—He absolves the Franks from all Crimes in Bavaria.—Makes Charlemagne Emperor.—He completes the Papal Rebellion against the Empire.—Charlemagne confirmed Pepin's Gift.—He did not grant any Temporal Dominion in Rome.— He dictated the *Filioque* in the Creed.

ALL inquiry into the origin and history of the temporal power of the popes is necessarily attended with difficulty. It often requires a very discriminating judgment to separate fact from conjecture—that which is true from myths and fables. One reason for this is found in the fact that the papal writers are not agreed among themselves, either in reference to its real source, the time of its origin, or the precise occasion and manner of its recognition by the Church. This of itself excites in an intelligent mind a reasonable doubt of its legitimacy; for, however derived, there would be, if it were legitimate, some landmarks to verify its title. If it were divine, as Pius IX. asserts, there would be, undoubtedly, some word or act of Christ, or of his apostles, or of the primitive Christians during the first centuries, to attest a fact of so much importance, especially as it is now required that it shall be accepted as a necessary part of the true faith. If conferred by the nations, to preserve themselves from anarchy, some distinct historic record would have been made of it, as a guide to future ages.

In the absence of any convincing proof upon these points, the impartial mind will naturally run into the conclusion that its origin was, at least, suspicious. And if it is found that it had no existence in the Apostolic Age, and was not recognized as a part of the early Christian system, this other conclusion must inevitably follow: that it is the product of human ambition, resting upon authority which the popes have wrenched from the nations by illegitimate means, and not upon any divinely conferred upon Peter or the Church of Rome.

When the apostle Peter, in anticipation of the approaching end of his life, wrote to the Christians of Asia Minor, he affectionately admonished the elders or ancients as an equal, not as a superior in the papal sense; and was careful to tell them that, in feeding their flocks, they should not be “lords over God’s heritage”—or, as the Douay version has it, should not be “domineering over the clergy”—but that all Christians, old and young, should be clothed with “humility.” He claimed to be only an *elder* himself, and assumed no authority whatsoever beyond that possessed by other apostles — the authority to counsel and advise those to whom he wrote, that they should not “be led away with the error of the wicked,” or fall from their “own steadfastness.” With this fact kept in our minds, we shall be the better able to understand the history already detailed, and to interpret that which follows.

Glancing, then, at the centuries immediately following the age of Constantine, we find nothing better established than that the thrones of the European nations were disposed of by fraud, violence, and bloodshed. They were at the mercy of those monarchs who had the heaviest legions and were the most

skillful in crime, especially those who were adepts in murder and assassination. By these means one line of kings was terminated and another established, as interest or policy dictated, the people all the while being transferred from master to master, with no other change in the character of their slavery than that which arose out of a change of tyrants.

Clovis the Great, who terminated the dominion of pagan Rome in Gaul by the battle of Soissons, in the year 486, established the French monarchy and the Merovingian line of its kings. His descendants, by regular hereditary succession, held the crown for more than two centuries and a half. Childeric III. was the last king of that line; and when we reach the termination of his reign we begin to stand on solid ground in our inquiries into the origin of the temporal power. The incidents connected with that event are inseparably associated also with the growth of the papacy, and in no other way than by an accurate understanding of them can we see how its enormous power has been acquired—how, by the successful union of Church and State, the divine right to govern the nations, and to dispose of crowns and peoples, has been established and perpetuated.

Childeric III. was the legitimate heir to the throne of France, and held it by virtue of the established and recognized law of the monarchy, there having been no break in the regular line of succession from Clovis for two hundred and fifty years. Pepin, son of Charles Martel, held the office of “mayor of the palace,” which placed him next to, but not upon, the throne. For fifty or sixty years his family had furnished to France some of the most distinguished leaders of her armies, and Pepin was in no sense inferior to any who had preceded him.

Childeric was a feeble prince, but he was the lawful king; and Pepin, stimulated by his ambition, conceived the purpose of supplanting him, and placing the crown upon his own head. The plan, however, was more easily formed than executed, as, notwithstanding his effeminacy, Childeric was esteemed on the ground of his being an immediate descendant of the great Clovis. This fact forbade any resort to direct force by Pepin, but his genius enabled him to contrive other effective means — the first of the kind known in history. Like all the descendants of Charles Martel, he was a champion of Christianity, and sympathized with the popes in their efforts to terminate their allegiance to the Eastern emperors; and hence he conceived the idea of bringing to his aid the authority of the Church of Rome to enable him to accomplish his ambitious plans. He therefore sent ambassadors to Pope Zachary, soliciting him to employ this authority to release the people of France from their allegiance to Childeric, in direct disregard of the laws of France, and to transfer the crown to him. *

* “Milman’s Gibbon’s Rome,” vol. v., p.28; “Latin Christianity,” by Milman, vol. ii., p. 410; “History of France,” by Michelet, vol. i., p. 111; “History of France,” by Parke Godwin, p. 393.

What had the Church of Rome, or its pope, to do with the internal and domestic affairs of France? or with the allegiance of the people of France to the legitimate possessor of its throne? Unquestionably there is no other fair construction to be put upon the conduct of Pepin than that it was an invitation to the pope to become a joint revolutionary conspirator with him against the lawful government of France. And both Pepin and Pope Zachary so understood it, as is manifest from their subsequent conduct, especially from the promptness with which the latter interfered in behalf of the former by the employment of his ecclesiastical power of absolution.

At that time the pope was a subject of the Eastern emperors, the successors of Constantine; and it will appear in the sequel that he the more readily lent his high authority to this end, because he saw in the success of Pepin the promise of erecting a power in the West which he, or his successors, could employ in sundering their own allegiance to the Eastern empire. His reasoning was, doubtless, this: that if Pepin, by his ecclesiastical aid, could make treason against Childeric successful in France, he, by the aid of Pepin, might make his own successful against the empire to which Rome belonged. Whatever the motive, however, the fact is attested by the unanimous voice of history, that Pepin did become king of France only by the aid of the pope's exercise of spiritual authority, as the head of the Roman Church, which he unscrupulously employed for that purpose, while he was himself the subject of, and owed temporal allegiance to another monarch.

Seemingly unconscious of the obligation which rested upon him to keep the Church pure and uncontaminated, and not to employ the sacred things of religion for mere worldly and ambitious ends, he entered into the schemes of Pepin with the greatest alacrity (cheerful willingness). Without stopping to count the cost, either to religion or the Church, he complied with Pepin's request in a manner which must have been exceedingly gratifying to him, and which placed him under obligations he was subsequently quite ready to recognize. In violation of the hereditary and legal right of Childeric, and in direct opposition to the established laws of France, he issued his papal brief absolving the people from their allegiance, and transferring the crown to Pepin, the ambitious and revolutionary usurper. And, as if he actually wielded the authority of God himself, he went even one step farther than this, by prohibiting the French people from ever thereafter exercising any freedom of choice in the election of their king, or from ever depriving the Carolingian princes of the crown—that is, the descendants of Charles Martel.

Gibbon, speaking of this extraordinary use of spiritual power, says: "The Franks were absolved from their ancient oath; but a dire anathema was thundered against them and their posterity if they should dare to renew the same freedom of choice, or to elect a king, except in the holy and meritorious race of the Carolingian princes;" * that is, having thus been brought under the spiritual dominion of the pope to such an extent as to allow him to dictate their domestic policy and dispose of their crown, the curse of God would rest upon them if ever thereafter the French people should dare to repeat the act of electing a king, except in the interest of the papacy and with the consent of the pope!

* "Milman's Gibbon," vol. v., p. 29. "To be crowned king in those days was to have the sanction of religion added to the reality of the earthly power. After that ennobling ceremony the office of king became invested with loftier attributes than merely the reverence of men. It was considered something divine and sacred; resistance to its authority grew to be not only rebellion, but sacrilege; and henceforth, however nearly a great noble might approach the monarch in power, he was immeasurably inferior to him in dignity and rank."—*History of France*, by Rev. James White, p. 26.

A monarchy thus established could not be otherwise than devoted to the pope. Michelet, speaking of it, says: "This monarchy of Pepin's, founded by the priests, was devoted to the priests." (*Hist. of France*," by Michelet, vol. i., p. 111)

There is no dispute about the main facts thus far. A modern Roman Catholic historian in the United States has put them in a succinct form; and, while he endeavors to convey the idea that it was altogether

right and proper for the pope to absolve the French people from their allegiance to Childeric, yet he narrates the circumstances with commendable fairness and impartiality. ("Modern Hist.," by Peter Fredet, D.D., p. 183, and note F., p. 494.)

The ecclesiastical historians are not less distinct in their statements. Dr. Waddington, referring to the usurpation of Pepin, says: "This occurrence is generally related as the first instance of the temporal ambition of the Vatican, or, at least, of its interference with the rights of princes and the allegiance of subjects." *

* "Church Hist.," by Waddington, p. 148; "Maclaine's Mosheim's Eccl. Hist.," vol. i., pp. 194, 195; "The Old Catholic Church," by Killen, pp. 389, 390.

Cormenin condemns the pope in decided language, and charges that he sent letters to Pepin, "encouraging him in his ambitious projects, and authorizing him, *in the name of religion*, to depose Childeric III., and to take possession of his crown." *

* "Hist. of the Popes," by Cormenin, vol. i., p. 188. That the Roman Catholic annalists claimed, in behalf of the pope, that he acted by virtue of "his apostolic authority" in disposing of the French crown, is shown by Parke Godwin, in his "History of France," vol. i., p. 394.

This *politico—religious* alliance between Pepin and the pope has most important aspects which cannot escape observation. On the part of the pope, it was the assertion of the divine right to dispose of the crown of France without regard to the wishes of the French people, and to compel them to obey him in the subsequent management of their own affairs. And it was equivalent to the assumption of like authority over all other nations and peoples. This is a claim before which the temporal power in the Papal States is dwarfed into insignificance; and yet the pope did not even possess this at the time of this extraordinary assumption. Manifestly it could not be conceded to him without bringing all the nations at his feet, and without taking away from the people, wherever they possess it, the power to make their own laws, select their own agents to execute them, and regulate their own domestic concerns. And it should not be overlooked, in view of its enormity, that it is precisely this same divine power to which Pius IX. now lays claim. With him there can be no higher or better evidence of right than the exercise of it by one of his infallible predecessors. And there will be no impediment to its universal recognition, whenever mankind shall be brought to the concession that the Church, through her infallible head, defines her own powers and jurisdiction.

The alliance began to bear its legitimate fruits without much delay. The Lombards had seized upon and held a great part of Italy, including the province of Ravenna, the capital of which, as the former residence of the great Ostragothic King Theodoric, and of the Greek Exarchs, had grown into rivalry with Rome. This territory belonged to the Eastern empire, whose emperors, it is alleged by the defenders of the papacy, were either not disposed or too feeble to defend it, and had been held about two years by its Lombard conquerors. But Astolphus, the Lombard king, was not satisfied with these possessions, and threatened to seize upon Rome, which still belonged to the empire. The pope, being unwilling to let Rome be brought under the dominion of the Lombards, fearing that its ecclesiastical power would be transferred to Ravenna, and the papacy be thereby made subordinate to the Exarchate,

inaugurated immediate measures for resistance. Those who justify the exercise of temporal power by the popes, say that he petitioned the emperors to send assistance to Rome, to repel the contemplated attack of Astolphus.

Dr. Fredet, being too candid to deny that Rome then “belonged to the emperors of Constantinople,” but admitting that fact, says, “Pope Stephen sent to implore necessary succors from Constantine Copronymus, *in whose name the government of Rome was still exercised.*” (Fredet, p. 184.) These succors, if called for, were not furnished; and the same author, in assigning the reason, says that the “emperor was too deeply engaged in warring against the images of the saints to think of sending troops against the Lombards.” (*Ibid*)

Whatever the precise facts may have been, the question lay between the Roman people, in whose name the pope acted, and the emperor, to whom, as subjects, they owed allegiance by the existing law of nations. The pope, as a subject, also owed this allegiance no less than the people. His power was exclusively ecclesiastical, and possessing none over temporal and political matters, whatsoever he did in reference to these, he did, necessarily, as a subject. He could not get rid of the obligation of his allegiance by any act short of revolt against legitimate authority. And this relation in which he and the Roman people stood to the emperors must be kept in mind, in order to understand the full bearing of the subsequent events out of which the temporal power arose.

Dr. Fredet, referring to the condition into which the people were thrown by the neglect of the emperors, also says: “In this extremity the Romans embraced the last resource which was left them, that of calling the valiant monarch of the French to their assistance.” (Fredet, p. 184.) And upon the same subject he says, at another place:

“Thus, finding implacable enemies both in the barbarians [Lombards] and in their own sovereigns, the people, driven almost to despair, began to sigh ardently after a new and better order of things. The eyes of all were turned toward the pope, as their only refuge and the common father of all in distress. In this state of desolation, the sovereign pontiffs, unable any longer to resist the eagerness of the multitudes flying into their arms for protection and refuge, and destitute of every other means, applied to the French, who alone were both willing and able to defend them against the Lombards.” (*Ibid.*, note G, pp. 495, 496.)

This statement presents, it is believed, the papal view in the most satisfactory light. And yet the reader cannot fail to observe how distinctly it asserts the *revolutionary* right of the Roman people, under the guidance of the pope, to throw off their allegiance to their lawful sovereigns, the successors of Constantine. And the resort to this remedy is both excused and justified, in the absence of any accusation of misgovernment or oppression against the emperors. They are charged with not having been sufficiently prompt and energetic in defending Rome against the threatened attack of the Lombards; not with having been guilty of any wrong or injustice toward either the Roman people or the pope. Modern revolutions have been inaugurated as the last and ultimate remedy for grievances which can be endured no longer without an abandonment of all natural rights; and yet it is against these that the fiercest anathemas of the papacy have been launched. Here, however, the pope is justified for having put the temporal affairs of Rome in the keeping of the French king, for the twofold purpose of

defending them against the Lombards, and of acquiring the temporal power himself, at a time when the Roman people were not suffering any oppression from the empire.

Rome, for several centuries before that time, had acquired no distinct existence as a nation, and, as Dr. Fredet agrees, it belonged to the territorial possessions of the Eastern emperors. They had never abandoned their claim to it, and had never expressed a willingness to do so. Hence, the right of the Romans to act independently of the emperors, in order ultimately to resist their authority, was purely revolutionary, and cannot be justified, even in the modern view, unless it was a necessary measure of relief against severe and irremediable oppression. How such a right can be defended at all, consistently with the expressed opinions of the present pope and his defenders, it is difficult to understand. Can it be that they regard revolution as justifiable only when it inures to the benefit of the papacy?

The Eastern emperors, at the time referred to, were at war with the Arabs, a fierce and formidable enemy. (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 191.) The fact of having to carry on such a war as this may, in some degree, account for their alleged neglect of the Roman people. But, besides this, it is also true that the controversy between the Eastern and Western Christians, in reference to the worship of images, had much to do in fixing the relations between them, especially those between the emperors and the popes. It is the most probable and plausible view of the matter to say that, on account of this purely religious disagreement, and the violence to which it led on both sides, the pope was very ready to avail himself of the existing condition of affairs to throw himself under the royal protection of Pepin, and thus build up a powerful monarchy in the West, under the shelter of which he could consummate his contemplated revolt against the emperors. In the light of subsequent events this is the most natural conclusion, and several contemporaneous facts contribute to its support.

When the pope invoked the aid of the emperor; the latter instructed him to go to the court of Astolphus, the Lombard king, and to demand the restoration of Ravenna and the other cities he had seized, in the name of the empire; showing thereby that he had no idea of abandoning his authority and jurisdiction over any part of Italy. This imperial order was obeyed by Stephen III., who was then pope,(2) by visiting the court of the Lombard king and making the demand in the name of the emperor, and as his ambassador.

* He is sometimes called Stephen II., but erroneously, as Stephen II. was pope only a few days, and was never consecrated.

It was, however, refused by Astolphus, who had no idea of willingly surrendering the advantages he had acquired by the possession of Ravenna and other cities. The pope not only expected this, but had prepared for it by taking other steps independently of the emperor, and without his knowledge. These exercise a controlling influence in deciding upon his motives. He had already addressed himself to Pepin, and had also written to the French dukes, "beseeching them to come to the rescue of St. Peter," and promising them, says Cormenin, "in the name of the apostle, the remission of all the sins they had committed, or might commit in the future, and guaranteeing to them unalterable happiness in this world, and eternal life in the next." (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 191.)

He had also made up his mind, before he set out for Pavia, where the Lombard king held his court, that he would go directly to France, and hold a personal interview with Pepin, for the better explanation and

understanding of his alliance with Pope Zachary, and of their mutual relations in consequence of it. (*Ibid.*) From these facts it is perfectly apparent that he had deliberated upon his revolt against the empire, and plotted the means of carrying it out before he left Rome.

That he was guilty of both duplicity and perfidy is beyond all question; for, while acting as the official ambassador of his sovereign, he was at the same time engaged in making a hostile treaty with a foreign monarch. He was not deterred by the consideration of any misfortune which might befall the empire. After the refusal of Astolphus, he hastened on to France, and negotiated another alliance with Pepin, without reporting his failure to the emperor. He had set out upon his revolt with resolute steps, and, conscious of the strength of the military power he was invoking, cast his eyes no longer toward Constantinople, except with a view to plan more successfully the measures by which he hoped to sunder his allegiance to the empire. By the laws of nations, as they now exist, this would be treason; but, however it may have been then considered, the pope doubtless sought for his justification in the fact that Constantine Copronymus was an iconoclastic emperor, and Pepin was a faithful son of the Church, and the head of a monarchy which, “founded by the priests, was true to the priests.” It was the most natural thing in the world for him to conclude that, as the papacy had been the means of enabling Pepin to make his own revolt against Childeric III. successful, Pepin would reciprocate the favor by helping him to break off his allegiance to the Eastern emperors. Such combinations among ambitious and aspiring men have been frequent in the world, yet history gives no account of any other that has been followed by so long a train of consequences.

Pepin, no doubt anticipating advantages to himself, readily consented to comply with the request of the pope. He marched his army against the Lombard king, and compelled him to surrender up all the Italian territory occupied by him. And here at this point we see the advantages which the papacy achieved by the alliance; for Pepin, entirely ignoring the claim of the empire, caused the territory to be surrendered *to the pope*, in the name of “the see of Rome!” And the pope accepted the royal present with as little compunctions of conscience as if he were a subject of the King of France, instead of the emperor of the East. The territory thus surrendered included Ravenna, Bologna, Ferrara, and the Pentapolis, all of which, it is said by the papal writers, was conveyed by “solemn grant,” in order that Rome, with these territories as an appendage to it, should be erected into an *ecclesiastical State*, with the temporal power to govern it in the hands of the pope. This, it should be observed, was in the year 754—seven and a half centuries after the commencement of the Christian era—and constitutes the only basis of the papal claim to temporal power which has the slightest plausibility about it, or is in any sense defensible. Without stopping now to inquire why, if this power were absolutely necessary to Christianity and the Church, it was so long permitted by Providence to be deferred, there are several questions arising out of the foregoing circumstances too important to be passed by.

Was there any such “grant” as is alleged to have been made by Pepin, conferring title to the surrendered territory upon the pope? One would suppose, if there had been, that it would have been produced before now, in order to settle the many controversies that have taken place on the subject. Its existence has been frequently denied, and its exhibition has been invited and challenged in a variety of ways. The limits of the grant have been often controverted, some popes endeavoring to enlarge and others to contract them. An inspection of it at any time would have settled all these questions. But, although it has been said that it is preserved in the Vatican at Rome, *it has never yet been produced!*

Fontanini, in his defense of the jurisdiction of the pope, “intimates that this grant is yet extant, and even makes use of some phrases that are said to be contained in it.” But, as is well remarked by Dr. Maclaine, this “will scarcely be believed. Were it, indeed, true that such a deed remains, its being published to the world would be undoubtedly unfavorable to the pretensions of Rome.” He refers also to the fact that, in a dispute between the Emperor Joseph I. and the pope concerning Commaehio, the partisans of the latter constantly refused to exhibit the deed; and also to the further fact that Bianchini had given a specimen of it “from a Farnesian manuscript, which seems to carry the marks of a remote antiquity;” and then says: “Be this as it may, a multitude of witnesses unite in assuring us that the remorse of a wounded conscience was the source of Pepin’s liberality, and that his grant to the Roman pontiff was the superstitious remedy by which he hoped to expiate his enormities, and particularly *his horrid perfidy to his master, Childeric.*” (“Maclaine’s Mosheim,” vol. i., p. 195, note.)

It is a rule of law that, when a party pretends—to have in his possession evidence that would explain any matter of controversy in which he is involved, the fact of his withholding it should be construed unfavorably to his pretensions. Therefore, as more than eleven hundred years have elapsed since the conquest of Pepin from the Lombards, and during all this time no “grant” from him to the pope has ever been produced, it is not unreasonable to conclude that none such was ever made. And yet it is true, doubtless, that Pepin did put the pope in possession of the conquered territory, and confer upon him, as far as he could, the authority to govern it, as the head of the Roman Church, but without any attempt to convey it by deed.

If history were entirely silent upon the subject, this much might be inferred from the nature of their relations to each other, they being such as to create upon the part of each the reciprocal obligation to do anything the other should require. The pope made Pepin a king, and why should not Pepin aid the pope to break his allegiance to the Eastern emperors and become a king also? Whatever would justify the act of revolt in the one case would equally justify it in the other. If the pope had ecclesiastical authority sufficient to legalize the treason of Pepin against Childeric, the French legions had physical power enough to legalize the pope’s treason against his lawful sovereign. Therefore, in this spirit of mutuality, and in entire disregard of all legal rights, “the splendid donation was granted, in supreme and absolute dominion, and the world beheld, *for the first time*, a Christian bishop invested with the prerogatives of a temporal prince.” (“Milman’s Gibbon,” vol. v., p. 32; “The Temporal Power of the Papacy,” by Legge, p. 23.)

It is insisted by many who defend the temporal prerogatives of the popes, that this donation of Pepin only restored to them jurisdiction which they had previously possessed. Even Archbishop Kenrick, in support of this assertion, has been tempted, when speaking of the act of Pepin, incautiously to say:

“This can scarcely be considered a mere donation, since a great portion, if not all, of the territory *had already belonged to the pope*; whence Stephen IV., in the year 769, urged the French princes, Charles and Carloman, as a matter of duty which they owed to St. Peter, to see that *his property*, usurped by the Lombards, should be fully *restored.*” (Kenrick’s “Primacy,” p. 261.)

The mind of the learned archbishop must have been some what confused when he wrote this. He first states as a fact the ownership of territory by the popes *before* the donation of Pepin, in the year 754, during the pontificate of Stephen III., and, to establish this, cites the action and claim of Pope Stephen

IV., in the year 769—fifteen years afterward! This is neither logical nor satisfactory. But the important question at last is, whether or no the statement of fact is to be relied on. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile it with the historical narrative, if, indeed, it is not positively contradicted. Dr. Fredet, manifestly, does not believe it; on the other hand, he directly contradicts it. He insists that the donation of Pepin was “a solemn grant to the see of Rome of that part of Italy which is, on this account, called the Ecclesiastical State, and has ever since composed the temporal dominion of the popes.” But he immediately says, “*Before that time they [the popes] had been subject, in civil matters, to the Roman or Greek emperors.*” (Fredet, p. 185.)

And such is, undoubtedly, the fact, as history abundantly attests. This is conclusive upon the subject: that the authority and jurisdiction of the Eastern emperors over Rome never absolutely ceased until Charlemagne was made emperor of the West, in the year 800—nearly half a century after the alleged donation of Pepin. It took the popes all this time to sunder entirely the ties of their allegiance to the East, and it was only then accomplished by the strength of the French armies. The prowess of Charlemagne made their usurped jurisdiction over civil matters secure; and until then, both by the laws of the empire and the law of nations, the popes were the subjects of the emperors, and owed to them the duty of allegiance and fidelity.

History does not inform us that there was any *political* quarrel, or cause of quarrel, between the government at Constantinople and the people of Italy or Rome. So far as their civil affairs were concerned, everything was satisfactory and harmonious. The whole existing disagreement arose out of the question of the worship of images, and was therefore entirely religious. *

* The iconoclastic controversy began under the pontificate of Gregory II. (715—731), and while Leo the Isaurian was emperor. It was carried on with great violence. There is great discrepancy among the Eastern and Western historians in regard to its earliest stages. The former charge Gregory II. with having immediately proceeded to the extremity of organizing a revolt against the empire, and of releasing the Italian people from their allegiance. This is denied by the latter. Du Pin does not credit it.—*Eccl. Hist.*, vol. vi., p. 132. Dean Milman omits any reference to the charge. — *Latin Christianity*, vol. ii., p. 293—327. But CORMENIN treats it as true, and records many alleged outrages committed by the pope, such as seizing the envoys, who were the bearers of conciliatory letters from the emperor, and putting them to death.—*CORMENIN*, vol. i., pp. 178, 179.

Upon this subject the difference was radical and irreconcilable; and there can be no reasonable doubt that this was the primary and inciting cause of the pope’s action. He could readily foresee his own weakness as the subject of an iconoclastic emperor, and the strength he would acquire by a close alliance with the French kings, and the establishment of a strong monarchy in the West, devoted to the Church and, more especially, to the papacy. Hence, the only legitimate inference from his whole conduct is, that he employed the influence of religion and of the Church to excite the minds of a superstitious and ignorant population against their civil government, in order to obtain from a foreign king, to whom he owed no allegiance, the concession of his temporal power, that he might thereby be enabled to break off his own lawful allegiance to the empire. Every step taken by the different popes who participated in these movements justifies this belief, and the result confirms it. Rome needed only that her popes should possess temporal power to make her superior to Constantinople; and for this prize the contest was carried on with unabated zeal until the final victory was won.

How could Pope Stephen III., while occupying the relation of subject to the empire, acquire title to territory or temporal power, by the donation of Pepin, a foreign prince? Was it within the power of Pepin to release him from his lawful allegiance? Did not all the rights transferred to him by Pepin inure to the benefit of the empire? Can a rebel, by treaty or alliance with a foreign power, acquire any legitimate rights against his government or his lawful sovereign?

It is necessary that these questions shall be decided in order to understand the nature of the donation from Pepin to the pope—whether or no any temporal power was rightfully acquired by means of it, even if it be conceded to have been to the full extent claimed by the papal writers.

It is believed that the law of nations has undergone no change in reference to these matters, from the earliest ages of Christian civilization. By its provisions a rebel can acquire no rights in his own behalf as against his own government; for whatever he may do, whether by himself or by foreign aid, is considered only as resistance to lawful authority. A successful revolt is another and different matter. In that case, rights are obtained and held only by revolutionary force, and when they become accomplished facts, are, in the judgment of modern nations especially, entitled to the highest consideration.

The American idea is, that the best nations in the world have been the result of revolution; which is justified or not, according to the degree of wrong and oppression it is designed to resist. But those who defend the temporal power of the popes derive no assistance from this doctrine; for one of the most prominent features in the papal teaching is the doctrine which denounces revolution and resistance to legitimate civil authority. If the conduct of Pope Stephen be measured and judged by these teachings, he undoubtedly brought himself, not only in open hostility to the law of the empire, but to the law of nations and of God. Nor will the papacy be aided by what is called the doctrine of accomplished facts, for it has invariably taught that no rights are conferred by them when they grow out of resistance to lawful authority, no matter how long they may be enjoyed; as the pope shows in his Encyclical of 1864, and as will abundantly appear hereafter.

The conclusion is unavoidable, that the popes acquired no rightful authority by the donation of Pepin. The territories donated were held by the Lombard king only by conquest, and had only been so held since the year 752—but two years. (“Fall of the Roman Empire,” by Sisniondi, p. 312; “History of the Church,” by Fry, p. 186, London.)

The superior title of the empire had not been abandoned, but still existed. If Pepin had taken them from the emperor, then his title might have been defended; and in that event he could have disposed of them as he pleased. But he took them from the Lombards, not from the empire, which left the title of the empire a subsisting and valid claim, which could only be extinguished by force or treaty. Neither of these modes having been resorted to, they could be taken by the pope only as a subject, not as an independent prince; having no right, by the law of nations, to acquire such title as Pepin attempted to confer upon him. He could only hold them in trust for his sovereign. Therefore, as he owed lawful allegiance to the empire, the title conferred upon him by Pepin inured to the empire. If he claimed, or attempted to exercise, power independently of the empire by virtue of it, he was, by the law of nations, guilty of usurpation. And hence it follows that the temporal power of the popes derived from the

donation of Pepin was not legitimately obtained, but was usurped by a flagrant violation of the law of the empire, and the law of nations.

The controversy about the worship of images was used as a pretext for its acquisition, but the real motive is exposed by the whole transaction. It was to build up a civil power in the West, with the pope as a temporal prince, which should make the West more powerful than the East, and restore to Rome her old pagan distinction of “Mistress of the World.” And such is the “truth of history,” when it is extracted from the mass of contradictions.

Dr. Fredet was too sagacious not to have seen the force of the suggestions here made, and he has endeavored to counteract their influence. He is compelled to admit that, at the time of the defeat of the Lombards by Pepin, the emperor, Constantine Copronymus, continued to maintain his claim to the territory embraced in the donation of Pepin. He says:

“At this juncture two ambassadors arrived from *Constantinople*, to claim for the emperor the restitution of the cities and provinces which had been usurped by the Lombards.” (Fredet, p.185.) But then, in order to avoid the force of the argument that, as these territories were held by the Lombards by usurpation, their recapture inured to the nationality to which they legitimately belonged, he says also, at another place:

“It is a principle laid down by civilians, and founded on the law of nations, that he who conquers a country in a just war *not undertaken for the former possessors, nor in union with them*, is not bound to restore to them what they would not, or could not, protect and secure.” (*Ibid.*, note (g), p.496.)

But if it be conceded that this is the statement of a just principle, it is broad enough to disprove the claim of temporal power based upon Pepin’s donation. The reconquest of the territory held by the Lombards was, in the eye of the law of nations, “undertaken for the former possessors.” The emperor, it is true, did not solicit aid from Pepin; but the pope, *who was his subject*, did. Pepin was bound to know, and did know, that the pope was in revolt against his sovereign. Consequently, there were but two aspects in which he could have viewed his interference—either that he was acting in behalf of the emperor, at the solicitation of his subject, or was acting in behalf of a rebellious subject against his lawful sovereign. If the former, then, by the law of nations, his donation inured to the empire; if the latter, he violated that law by becoming a party to an armed rebellion. But, in point of fact, Pepin did not render assistance to the pope, *as against the emperor*, but moved his army against the Lombards, and left the pope, after his donation, to settle the question of his treason with the emperor. Therefore, his donation to the pope was made to him as a subject, not as a prince; and, consequently, as a subject can take no title to territory which had once belonged to his sovereign after its recapture, the donation of Pepin inured to the empire, and not to the pope.

If, thereafter, the pope was enabled to maintain his title to it, he could only have done it by successful revolution, which would bring it within the doctrine of accomplished facts, now repudiated by the papacy. In any view of it, we cannot escape the fact that whatever temporal power the popes acquired by these proceedings was obtained by usurpation.

Why did the French king make a donation of territory, with the authority of temporal government, to the pope? This was about the middle of the eighth century, and for more than seven hundred years the

Church had existed without a temporal ruler, without a king, and without a crown to place upon the brow of a king. There had been, up to that time, six ecumenical councils of the Church,* and by none of them had it been declared, as an essential part of Christian faith, that the pope was infallible, or that his temporal power was necessary to the successful government of the Church, or to the successful propagation of the truths of the Gospel.

* The first Council of Nice, A.D. 325; the first Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381; the Council of Ephesus, A.D. 431; the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451; the second Council of Constantinople, A.D. 553; and the third Council of Constantinople, A.D. 682.

Why, therefore, this gift of a temporal crown? Manifestly, it was the reward which Pepin paid to the pope for enabling him to maintain his treasonable resistance to the King of France, by means of which he hoped to destroy a rival political power in the East, and transfer the scepter of universal dominion to the West. It was the legitimate fruit of the alliance between the king and the pope, by which the former gave political power in exchange for the ecclesiastical protection of the latter. The king made himself a party to the treason of the pope, and the pope made himself a party to the treason of the king. They were joint conspirators against lawful authority; one against his lawful king, the other against his lawful emperor—both against their national allegiance. Each had a worldly object alone—the acquisition of princely power; and therefore they both stand condemned by every just principle of international law, as they would do were their conduct now to be adjudged by the unbiased judgment of all the leading nations.

During the late rebellion in this country (America) ten of our States held possession of all their territory, by military force, for several years—more than twice as long as the Lombards held Ravenna. They excluded the authority of the National Government, defied its power, and erected a government of their own. Suppose Napoleon III., the “favorite son of the Church,” had marched his army from Mexico into these States, taken possession of them, and turned them over to the temporal government of Pope Pius IX., whose throne he was then holding up, then the pope would have had precisely the same temporal power over all these ten States as Pope Stephen III. acquired by the gift of the King of France! The statement of such a proposition sufficiently refutes it; and yet there are those who habitually exhaust argument and eloquence in supporting the validity of a title thus acquired. Toleration does not require that these things shall be passed over in silence, nor is its spirit violated by their arraignment at the bar of public opinion.

But there is a view of the question of temporal power, designedly passed over until now, which is of sufficient importance to be considered. Suppose it be conceded that the pope did acquire temporal power by the donation of Pepin, what, then, was its extent? We have already seen, what all readers of history know to be true, that this donation only included the Italian territory held by the Lombards, and taken by Pepin from Astolphus, the Lombard king. This was Ravenna, Bologna, Ferrara, and the Pentapolis—*but not Rome*. The Lombards did not hold possession of Rome. Pepin did not have any authority over Rome, for he made no conquest of it; nor did he pretend to donate it, or any temporal authority over it, to the pope. If he had the authority, and did confer temporal power over the territory he took from Astolphus, then he made the pope prince over that territory alone, *and not over Rome*. In Rome he remained a subject to the emperor, and could derive no right there from the donation of Pepin.

Whatever temporal power, therefore, he acquired in Rome must rest upon some other foundation than the donation of Pepin. As the papists pretend to assign no other, it is necessarily the result of usurpation.

It has been remarked that the motives of both Pepin and the pope were worldly—that they had reference alone to *temporal dominion*. This is a legitimate inference from all the facts. The faith or creed of the Church, as it had come down from the Council of Nice, was in no way involved in any of the pending matters of controversy, except as it was connected with the disagreement about the worship of images. There were no prevailing heresies calculated to disturb the harmony of the Church. *

* There is nothing to be found in the proceedings of the first six ecumenical councils favoring the worship of images. The Emperor Leo, therefore, when he attempted to put a stop to it, did not violate any expressed article of faith. A council of three hundred and thirty—eight bishops was held in Constantinople, in the year 754, which condemned it. But this council was repudiated by the Roman Christians.—Du PIN, vol. vi., p. 133. The second Council of Nice was held under the pontificate of Adrian I., in the year 757, and is called ecumenical, although the number of bishops who attended it were less than those who assembled at Constantinople. It condemned the council at Constantinople, anathematized those who repudiated the worship of images, and authorized that kind of worship, by introducing it for the first time into the confession of faith.—Du PIN, vol. vi., p. 139.

The heresy of Macedonius, which denied the Godhead of the Holy Ghost, had been disposed of by the first Council of Constantinople, in 381; that of Nestorius, which affirmed that there were two distinct persons in Jesus Christ, by the Council of Ephesus, in 431; that of Eutyches, which denied the two distinct natures, divine and human, in Jesus Christ, by the Council of Chalcedon, in 451; and the Monothelite heresy, which asserted Jesus Christ to have no human will separate from the divine will, by the third Council of Constantinople, in 682. Harmony, therefore, pervaded the Church in all its religious departments. Its faith was unagitated, its creed unassailed.

But the pope, looking out from the midst of this internal peace and concord upon the troubled political elements in France, had his own ambition excited, and did not stop long to consider of the means of gratifying it. The step taken by him was as fatal to true piety, as it has in the end, after centuries of agitation, proved to be to the papal power he so ambitiously acquired. By it, he pulled down the Church from her high mission of saving souls, dragged her sacred robes in the muddy pool of earthly politics, and put her upon a career of corruption which has caused her own children to afflict her with mortal stabs. He declared to Pepin that it was *the will of God* that he should take the crown from the head of Childeric, and put it upon his own head! Pepin needed no other persuasion than this to make him a devotee of a religion so favorable to his ambition. It was the very faith which of all others suited him the best. He was easily persuaded to aid a pope who taught a doctrine so palatable to him, and to make it the religion of France, because it confined all subsequent kings to his own line! He staked all his fortunes upon the hazard. And he won the prize; while the venerable Church, which was thus turned away from her peaceful paths, and made to enter upon an ignoble mission, received a cruel and paralyzing blow. Centuries have passed since then, during which she has experienced the most varied fortunes, but she is yet reeling under that blow.

We have but to look at the manner in which the popes employed their spiritual authority in order to promote temporal and secular ends, to see how the Church was made to violate the injunctions of its

founder, the example of the apostles, and the peaceful teachings of the early Christians. The retrospect reflects no credit upon those who became the active agents in these measures, but is made necessary by the enormous pretensions now set up in behalf of the papacy. And it will serve to show, also, *how necessary it is for the best interests of mankind that the nations shall not again suffer the Church and the State to be united.* (Emphasis the Webmaster's)

As perfidy seemed to be a common vice in those days among both popes and kings, Pepin had scarcely retired with his army from Italy, before Astolphus, the Lombard king, made preparations to break his treaty by threatening to retake the provinces he had surrendered and lay siege to Rome. Pope Stephen III. again had recourse to Pepin, urging him in the most imploring terms to return to Italy and defend his "donation" to the Holy See. With him the great question was the possession of the exarchate of Ravenna, supposing that, unless that were destroyed, it would become, in the hands of the Lombards, who were Arian Christians but defended the worship of images, too formidable as the ecclesiastical rival of Rome. It is quite certain that this was the chief ground of quarrel between the pope and Astolphus; and that, "if the pope had allowed the Lombards to occupy the exarchate, they would have been loyal allies of the pope." ("Latin Christianity," by Milman, vol. ii., p. 424, note 1.)

The pope, therefore, could not keep his anxiety within moderate bounds, and addressed several letters to Pepin. In one of them, according to Cormanin, he says: "I conjure you by the Lord our God, and his glorious mother—by the celestial virtues and the holy apostle who has consecrated you king—to render to our see the donation which you have offered it;" (Cormanin, vol. i., p. 193.) thus again invoking the aid of religion in securing temporal power to himself. But Pepin was not so ready as before to embark in an enterprise which offered no further prospect of gain to himself; and, indicating some indifference to these appeals to his religious sentiments, the pope was driven to a still more desperate expedient—that of sending him several letters purporting to have been written by the Virgin Mary, angels, martyrs, and saints, and one by St. Peter himself, all of which, it was alleged, *had been sent down from heaven for the purpose!* The translation of that from Peter is thus given by Dean Milman:

"I, Peter the Apostle, protest, admonish, and conjure you, the most Christian kings, Pepin, Charles, and Carloman, with all the hierarchy, bishops, abbots, priests, and all monks; all judges, dukes, counts, and the whole people of the Franks. The mother of God likewise adjures you, and admonishes and commands you, she as well as the thrones and dominions, and all the hosts of heaven, *to save the beloved city of Rome from the detested Lombards.* If ye hasten, I, Peter the Apostle, promise you my protection in this life and in the next, will prepare for you the most glorious *mansions in heaven*, and will bestow on you *the everlasting joys of paradise.* Make common cause with *my people of Rome*, and *I will grant whatever ye may pray for.* I conjure you not to yield up this city to be lacerated and tormented by the Lombards, *lest your own souls be lacerated and tormented in hell, with the devil and his pestilential angels.* Of all nations under heaven, the Franks are highest in the esteem of St. Peter; to me you owe all your victories. Obey, and obey speedily, and, by my suffrage, our *Lord Jesus Christ* will give you in this life length of days, security, victory; *in the life to come, will multiply his blessings upon you, among his saints and angels.*" *

* "Latin Christianity," vol. ii., p. 424. Cormanin gives this same letter, in a somewhat different translation, but one which does not make the sense materially different from the above. The original Latin, taken from Labbe, may be found in "The See of Rome in the Middle Ages," by Reichel. London ed., p. 65. For Cormanin's translation, see

“History of the Popes,” vol. i., p. 193. Du Pin refers to this letter as “in St. Peter and Stephen’s name,” but does not publish it. Du Pin’s “Ecclesiastical History,” vol. vi., p. 108. He attributes it to Pope Stephen II., when the transaction occurred during the pontificate of Stephen III.

Archbishop Kenrick, although he alludes to the relations between Stephen III. and Pepin, does not directly mention this letter, neither admitting or denying it; yet he gives a quotation from a letter which could scarcely have been any other than this.—The Primacy of the Apostolic See, by Kenrick, part ii., p. 261.

We can account for this letter and its contents only upon the supposition that its author considered himself as standing in the place of God on earth, or that he was entirely indifferent to the means employed, provided they produced the result he sought for. The ignorance and superstition of the age was such as to encourage this mingling together of divine and temporal things; and Stephen III. was the kind of pope to avail himself of it, notwithstanding the impious and blasphemous character of the act. He understood the temper and position of Pepin, and knew that he considered himself indebted to Pope Zachary for his crown, and to the priests of France for the encouragement of that popular superstition which enabled him to maintain it under pretense of “divine right.” And he did not miscalculate. Whether Pepin believed that the letter came from heaven, and directly from St. Peter, or that the pope, as God’s vicegerent, had the prerogative right of committing so palpable a forgery, it is of no present consequence to inquire. He yielded to the entreaties of the pope, and again advanced into Italy with his army; acting, doubtless, from the conviction that, if he did not, the clergy would persuade the people of France that he was defiant to the commands of the apostle, and deserved the anathemas of the Church. This time, however, his movements were attended with no other immediate consequences than the surrender of Ravenna to the pope, and probably the confirmation of his former donation.

Cormenin speaks of the subsequent deposit of his “deed of gift” upon the confessional of St. Peter, by Fulrad, the counselor of the French king; (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 193.) but we have already seen that the probabilities are against the existence of such a document, and that the gift of Pepin was only verbal.

Astolphus, the Lombard king, did not long survive these events. He died in the year 756, when a controversy arose about the Lombard crown between Didier, Duke of Istria, and Ratchis, a monk. The latter gained Pope Stephen to his support by promising not to disturb him in his possession of Ravenna, and that he would make large donations “to enrich St. Peter”—an object of which the popes have never lost sight. But Pepin did not favor this arrangement, and took the side of Didier. The pope then, from policy alone, abandoned the cause of the monk, and recognized Didier as the lawful sovereign of Lombardy. He was not disposed, however, to change sides so readily without some reward, and succeeded in obtaining from Didier a concession of the city of Fuenza and the duchy of Ferrara, and some other places—so true was he to the purpose of enlarging the papal domains and the establishment of the temporal power. He soon after died, in the year 757, and was succeeded by Paul I. The events of the three next pontificates have no special bearing upon the question we are considering, except as showing that the controversies about the worship of images between the popes and the emperors continued, and that Didier still cherished the purpose of seizing upon the exarchate of Ravenna. All the plottings and political intrigues of him and the popes had reference to that object, each being resolved to possess it at every hazard.

Pepin died in the year 768, and left the kingdom to his two sons, Carl and Carloman, the former of whom, at the death of his brother, became the sole possessor of the crown, by the name of Charlemagne.

In the year 772, Adrian I. became pope. During his pontificate, which lasted twenty—three years, the *politico—alliance* between the papacy and the French king bore other fruits, not less conducive than those already borne to the advancement of papal power.

When Charlemagne became king he found all the nations of Europe in a state of comparative decrepitude; and, inheriting the sentiments and courage of his father, resolved upon making the French monarchy the controlling and all absorbing power in the West. Not satisfied with the possession of France and Western Germany, he extended his dominion into Italy, Spain, and other parts of Germany; which of necessity brought him into immediate intercourse with the popes. Fully informed of the advantages his father had derived from their employment of the ecclesiastical power in his behalf, he readily saw that his interests required him to make a similar use of them. He therefore gathered about his court distinguished “foreign priests” from all the leading nations; who, besides being men of great learning, were “the light of the Church” and the kinsmen “of bishops and of saints.” (Michelet, vol. i., p. 114.)

He professed strong attachment to the Roman Church and its religion, and there is no reason for supposing that he was insincere. But, as he understood it, the Church and its teachings were designed as aids to his political power. Beyond this, it is probable that he cared but little for either. With these opinions, he was readily induced, by the influences around him, to strengthen the ecclesiastical power in France. “Being,” says Michelet, “sure of the pope, whom his family had protected against the Greeks and Lombards,” he displayed his great sagacity as a statesman by these movements, designed as they were to bring all the authority of the Church to bear upon the measures of his reign.

Two measures were specially conspicuous. He “confirmed the institution of tithes,” which required that one—tenth of all the taxes levied upon the people should be paid to the churches and the priests. He also freed the Church from secular jurisdiction—that is, made it independent of the State—by a law, found in his Capitularies, in these words:

“It is our pleasure that neither abbots, nor presbyters, nor deacons, nor sub-deacons, nor any priest whatsoever, be brought before the public and secular tribunals, but be delivered for trial to their bishop.” (Michelet, p. 115, note.)

His munificence (benevolence) toward the clergy was unbounded. “He augmented their wealth, he enlarged their privileges, he confirmed and extended their immunities; and, were it not that he was one of the greatest and wisest princes who ever reigned, some writers would not have hesitated to place him among the weakest of mankind.” (Waddington, pp. 149, 150.)

And his direct dealings with the pope were not less distinguished for their liberality. He was a consummate statesman—far the greatest of his age—and was quite willing to leave the popes to the gratification of their ambition when it did not interfere with the success of his own measures. One object he was specially desirous to accomplish; this was, to sustain the popes in their defiance of the Eastern emperors, that thereby the seat of empire might be transferred from the East to the West.

Besides his wars with the neighboring nations, Charlemagne had a quarrel with the Duke of Bavaria, which furnished him an opportunity of availing himself of the alliance between the pope and his father, aid of making religion serve the purpose of promoting both his own and the pope's ambition. Pope Adrian I., in full sympathy with his purposes and plans, took his side against the Duke of Bavaria, and launched a terrible bull of excommunication against him and all his subjects—not for any offensive act against religion or the Church, but on account of objects entirely temporal. It is necessary to observe the character of this bull, in order to understand the progressive steps toward the acquisition of temporal power, and to see with what little remorse of conscience sacred things were mingled with political controversies, and made subservient to ambitious ends. If, in order to make an act *infallible*, it must concern the faith alone, and be addressed to the Universal Church, then it would be unjust to say that this bull was stamped with that character. But if, when the pope speaks in the name of God, he speaks *ex cathedra*, then Adrian I. was infallible when in this bull he declared “that the Franks were absolved in advance from all crimes they might commit in the enemy's country; and that *God commanded them, through his vicar, to violate girls, murder women, children, and old men, to burn cities, and put all the inhabitants to the sword.*” *

* Cormenin, vol. i., p. 204. Such a bull as this would seem almost incredible, if it were not found in the history of a Roman Catholic author. But this is the pope who absolved Offa, King of the Mercians, in England, from the crime of killing Ethelbert, the king of the East Angles, upon the condition that he should allow Peter-pence to be collected in England. The same author says that “avarice was his ruling passion,” and that “he displayed remarkable political skill in the management of the Church, His supple and adroit spirit knew how to bend before power, in order to augment the authority of Rome, and extend her rule over the people.”—*Ibid.*, p. 207.

The obligations between the pope and the king were, of course, reciprocal, and required each to serve the other—the one with the thunders of excommunication, and the other with the thunders of artillery. The pope had a quarrel with the Duke of Beneventum, because the duke refused him permission to make money levies upon his subjects for *increasing the revenues of St. Peter*; and Charlemagne, in return for the sanction which the Pope had given, in God's name, of all the enormities his army might commit in Bavaria, despoiled the duke, by force, of five of his best cities, and *added them to the domains of the pope*! The alliance now began to bear richer and more abundant fruits, which had become so ripened as to be ready for plucking by either party, accordingly as temporal interest or ambition stimulated him.

Adrian I. died, however, before they were all gathered, and left it to his successor, Leo III., to compensate Charlemagne for his munificent gift. This was done by Leo in a manner well calculated to gratify the vanity of a less ambitious king than Charlemagne. He sent to him “the keys of the confessional of St. Peter, the standard of the city .of Rome, and magnificent presents,” and urged him to send some French lords to Rome, who should receive the oath of *temporal fidelity* from the Romans; (Cormenin, p. 207.) for, as yet, notwithstanding the donation of Pepin, the pope had not ventured to make any pretensions to the rights of a temporal king.

It had not then been revealed to him that the law of God made this necessary for the protection of Christianity and the Church! The presence of weaker and feebler kings than Pepin and Charlemagne was necessary to such a revelation as this. Charlemagne did not, of course, object to being made

emperor, for that was one of his cherished objects; but, bad as the times were, he had so just a sense of shame, that he desired the vices of the Roman clergy to be first reformed. These were so flagrant that he considered it a reproach to Christianity that they should be tolerated under the very eye of the pope, and so wrote to Leo III., urging the application of corrective measures. Leo, unwilling to take issue with him upon the subject, indicated a wish to make the desired reform. But whatever efforts were made in that direction proved abortive on account of the opposition of the clergy of Rome, who organized a conspiracy against the pope.

Two priests, aided by the monks, made an attempt to take his life, seized him in the street, dragged him by the beard, sought to break his skull with stones, to put out his eyes, and pull out his tongue; and at last plunged him into a dungeon. He was, however, released, after several days of confinement; when, fearing a renewal of the attack, he invited Charlemagne to visit Rome, that he might more certainly secure his protection. The invitation was accepted, and the great king entered Rome in December, 800, when the pope, placing a crown upon his head, turned over to him that part of the empire with as cool impudence as if it were his to bestow, declared him emperor, crowned as such “*by the hand of God!*” Two objects were accomplished by this stroke of policy—the pope’s treason to the empire was made effectual, and Charlemagne was made “Emperor of the Romans,” which placed the diadem of the Caesars upon his brow. (Fredet, p. 191; Cormenin, vol. i., p. 209.) The Eastern emperors were now supplanted at Rome, and the King of France was placed at the head of a great Western empire!

Of course he could do nothing less, in return for the crown given him by the pope, than confirm the donation of Pepin, his father, to the Church; which it is said he did without hesitation. By this means he acquired the title of “the favorite son of the Church,” which title has been ever since applied to all the monarchs of France who have remained true to the Church and the papacy. He was also repaid by the pontifical blessing, and furnished with a copy of the canon laws of the Church, from which it was designed he should learn the nature and extent of his obligations of obedience to the pope, and the necessity of preserving the union between the State and the Church. *

* Du Pin says that “Adrian gave to Charlemagne the code of Dionysius Exiguus;” with additions “favorable to the pretensions of the Court of Rome.” These, he says, however, were “forged when the False Decretals were made, and perhaps by the same author.”—Du PIN, vol. vi., p. 115.

Most unfortunate has it been for France that this code of canon laws was ever assented to by her great king, or taken by him into her dominions. It tied her fast to the car of the papacy, and through tribulation, anguish, revolution, bloodshed, and every form of suffering, it has at last pulled her down into the abyss. The magnificence of her scenery, the grandeur of her cities, the fertility of her soil, the beauty of her climate, the bravery of her armies, the genius of her children, all combined, could not excite in the minds of her people a sufficient sense of their own manhood to save her. With her fate sealed to that of the papacy, she and it have sunk into a common grave. When her day of resurrection shall come, she must clothe herself in new robes, leave the papal wreck to decay amidst the debris of fallen and lost nations, construct with her own hands a new grandeur, and place her people where they yet deserve to be—far forward in the ranks of those who know what it is to shelter and protect themselves by institutions of their own creation, without the aid of kings or popes, or any other of the medieval forms of tyranny.

It is important to know, in this connection, the extent of the territory granted by Charlemagne to the pope, in order that the precise extent of the papal domains may be ascertained. Fredet confines it to the provinces granted by Pepin. Speaking of the popes becoming independent of secular princes, he says:

“This independence they obtained through the instrumentality of Pepin and his successor Charlemagne, who conferred on the popes such an extent of temporal power as might enable them freely to exercise their spiritual authority.” (Fredet, p. 185.)

At another place he says, “Charlemagne manifested his attachment to the Apostolic See by ratifying and augmenting the donation which Pepin had made in its favor;” but he does not state in what the augmentation consisted. (*Ibid.*, p. 187.) He does not speak of any additional grant made in the year 800. Cormenlin is not more specific, although he speaks of large donations given to several churches in Rome. Waddington says “he renewed and even increased the grant” of Pepin. (Waddington, p. 149.) Reichel says he “ratified the donation of his father, Pepin, by ceding to the pope the exarchate and the Pentapolis.” (Reichel, p. 69.) Dean Milman is more satisfactory, and limits the grant to those cities which afterward paid homage and delivered their keys to the pope — Ravenna, Rimini, Pesaro, Fano, Cesena, Sinigaglia, Iesi, Forlimpopoli, Forli, with the castle Sussibio, Montefeltro, Acerra, Monte di Lucano, Serra, San Marino, Bobbio, Urbino, Cagli, Luciole, Gubbio, Comachio, and Narni, taken from the Duke of Spoleto. (Milman’s “Latin Christianity,” vol. ii., p. 427.)

Thus we are enabled to see that neither by Pepin nor Charlemagne was there any grant of temporal power *in Rome* made to the popes. If it was designed by either of them to make them temporal princes at all, their authority, by the very nature of the concessions, was limited to the provinces taken from the Lombards and from the Duke of Spoleto, and held by conquest. There was no conquest of Rome by Pepin or Charlemagne. After the grant of Pepin, the pope was left a subject of the Eastern emperor, still in rebellion. But after that of Charlemagne, his relations were changed, and he became a subject of the “emperor of the Romans.” It is perfectly manifest, from all the history of those times, that Charlemagne did not intend to leave a king in any part of his dominions with superior authority to his own, or even with equal authority. When the iron crown was placed upon his brow by the pope, he became the sovereign of the Western empire, which included Rome.

Mr. Hallam, referring to this sovereignty, says: “Money was coined in his name, and *an oath of fidelity was taken by the clergy and people.*” (Hallam’s “Middle Ages,” p. 22: Harper & Brother’s ed.)

Undoubtedly, there was a considerable jurisdiction and authority conferred upon the popes, but it was subordinate to the jurisdiction and authority of the emperor. It was not temporal power in the sense claimed by the papacy. If so, the oath of fidelity would have been taken by the Roman people to the pope, and not to Charlemagne. It may be assumed, therefore, as a well—attested historic fact, that up to the time of Charlemagne’s death, which occurred in the year 814, the popes possessed no such temporal power in Rome as conferred upon them the right to prescribe the laws, administer the government, or exact civil allegiance to themselves. Whatever power they exercised, beyond that necessary for the mere protection of the property of the Church, was usurpation. And when they carried this usurpation to the extent of uniting the Church and the State in the territory since known as the Papal States, they impaired the spiritual strength of the Church, retarded the progress of true religion, and laid the foundation for that series of unfortunate measures by means of which the people were held in

ignorance, superstition, and civil bondage for hundreds of years, until they were rescued by the great reformation of the sixteenth century.

That the popes were both ready and willing to usurp temporal authority, is abundantly shown by history. In all the proceedings here recorded there was nothing of a religious nature—nothing that concerned the Christian faith—nothing to remind one of the devotion and simplicity by which the apostolic times were so much distinguished. They were the mere schemings of ambitious and selfish politicians, whose sole object was to concentrate temporal power in their own hands, as the means of bringing the people in subjection to themselves. They differ from similar acts of other despots only in this, that they were accompanied by an almost total disregard for the teachings of Christ and the apostles, while at the same time the name of God was constantly invoked to sanction every form of oppression and outrage. The popes even allowed the creed of the Church to be changed by the emperor, * in exchange for the privileges he conferred upon them.

* The controversy between the Eastern and Western churches in reference to the procession of the Holy Spirit—whether it proceeded from the Father alone, or from the Father and the Son—was carried on in an acrimonious spirit for many years. The Roman Church, while maintaining the latter doctrine, refused to permit the creed to be sung with the addition of the “Filioque.” Charlemagne, however, convened a council at Aix la Chapelle, in the year 809, to decide the question; and afterward commanded Pope Leo III. to confirm its decision, and to allow the “Filioque” to be added to the creed and to be sung with it. The pope, though “not pleased with this addition,” yielded to the dictation of the king, being afraid to incur his displeasure. —Du Pin’s *Eccl. Hist.*, vol. vii., p. 114; *History of Doctrines*, by Hagenbach, vol. i., pp. 468, 469.

Wealth and power seemed to be the only objects worth striving for, and corruption became almost universal. The papacy was at once elevated beyond anything known in its previous history, and immediately commenced to interfere in temporal affairs. The popes, separating themselves from the Eastern empire, assumed to direct the domestic affairs of nations, impiously claiming that whatever power they had derived from Pepin or Charlemagne was the *gift of God*, and that, therefore, God had appointed them to rule the world in his name! They accordingly entered upon the career of territorial conquest, and succeeded in further extorting from Louis le Debonnaire, the son and successor of Charlemagne, the right of sovereignty over Campania, Calabria, Naples, Salerno, and the islands of Corsica, Sardinia, and Sicily, although Sicily did not belong to France by any title known to the law of nations, even in those days of lawless conquest. By these and other kindred means the popes acquired their temporal power, and used it so ambitiously, and with so little regard for the rights of others, as at last to reduce all the sovereigns of Europe into obedience. Cormenin says:

“The sovereigns of the West placed armies under their command, ruined empires, exterminated people *in the name of St. Peter*, and sent the spoils of the vanquished to increase the wealth of the Roman clergy, and to support the monks in idleness and debauchery.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 213.)

Influence and power thus acquired were used, of course, for selfish and sinister ends; for men in all ages have been in this respect the same. And it was so used by the popes that the government over the Papal States became altogether ecclesiastical. It was conducted entirely by the popes, by the assistance of their cardinals and priests, all of whom were created by the popes, and were the mere slaves and creatures of their will. The people were treated as if born only for the purpose of being ruled, and of

contributing to the pride and elevation of their rulers. The popular degradation during the Middle Ages contributed to this; and, in order that there should be no change in this condition of affairs, and that the people should be kept so ignorant as not to aspire to any higher position, they were either deprived of all opportunity of education, or, if educated at all, it was only in ecclesiastical matters, and under the special direction of the priests, who took good care to see that their first and last lesson was obedience. Everything was ecclesiastical; and the power of excommunication, which was held in great dread by the ignorant population, was so perverted from its original meaning and design, that it was employed as the means of exacting submission to the papacy in all matters connected with the Government as well as the Church, and in the most common and trifling affairs of life. *

* “Very few of these exertions of the supreme authority of the Vicar of Christ have any bearing on the interests of religion. The political intrigues of the day, the temporal possessions of the Church, or the subordination of the hierarchy are, in almost all instances, the objects of the anathema. How the awful authority over the souls of men was degraded to the level of the pettiest interests is seen when some audacious scoundrels stole the horses of the pope during his progress through France. He promptly excommunicates the unknown thieves, unless the beasts shall be returned within three days; and he takes advantage of the opportunity to include in the curse some knaves who had previously pilfered his plate while staying at the Abbey of Flavigny—as he shrewdly suspects, with the connivance of the holy monks there.

That bishops were not disinclined to follow the example of their chief, and to use their control over salvation for their personal benefit, is apparent from the treatment of royalty in Wales about this time. Tewdwr, King of Brecknock, profanely stole Bishop Libian’s dinner from the Abbey of Llancore, when the angry prelate excommunicated him, and exacted an enormous fine as the price of reconciliation; and when Brockmeal, King of Gwent, and his family were anathematized by Bishop Cyfeiliawg for some personal offense, the fee for removing the censure was a plate of pure gold the size of the bishop’s face. A power so persistently and so ignobly abused requires something more than merely moral force to insure respect and obedience.”—*Studies in Church History*, by Henry C. Lea, p. 324.

The popes, having achieved success by tempting the ambition of kings, and conferring crowns and kingdoms upon them, on the condition that they should acknowledge the gift as made in accordance with the divine command, had no difficulty in making an ignorant and superstitious population believe that all the laws they prescribed were equally a part of God’s laws; that obedience paid to them was obedience to God; and, therefore, that any act of disobedience would not only deprive them of the protection of the Church in this life, but consign them inevitably to eternal tortures in the next.

And thus the Church and the State were completely united—the State obeying the Church. The Church, in fact, became the State by holding it in subordination. The people alone were punished; the ecclesiastics never. They were an exclusive and privileged class, who considered all others as mere “hewers of wood and drawers of water” for their superiors, of whom they were the chief. The great and controlling object was to make Rome what she had been in pagan times, the “mistress of the world;” so that the pope, as her *pope—king*, might make and unmake other kings, build up and destroy governments, and thus subject all mankind to his dominion, under the impious and shameless pretense that God had so provided in his law!

The foundation of the whole structure of government was this: that the pope was ordained king by Almighty God, and ruled by divine authority; and consequently, the subject was bound to passive obedience; and, not rendering this, offended God and committed a sin for which he deserved

punishment at the hands of the Church! This is precisely the kind of government which Pope Pius IX. defends in his Encyclical and Syllabus, and which he prefers to any of those constructed after the modern forms, and especially to that of the United States. It is the kind of government which he requires his followers to defend as a necessary part of their religious faith; and it is the kind of government which his hierarchy in this country would substitute tomorrow, if they had the power, for the popular institutions under which our nation has grown to its present greatness and distinction.

Chapter XII. The Ninth Century

The Popes Subjects of the Eastern Empire.—The Ninth Century.—The Emperor Leo V. and Pope Pascal I.—Image-worship.—Church of St. Cecilia in Rome.—Louis le Debonnaire.—Factions at Rome.—Constitution of Lothaire.—Eugenius II. and Valentine.—Gregory IV.—Sergius. —Death of Pope Leo IV.—The Alleged Popess Joan.—Peter-pence. East separates from West.—Nicholas 1. claims Universal Power.—His Manner of exercising it.—Boniface VI. poisoned by Stephen VII.—Trial of Dead Pope.—The Pseudo—Isidorian Decretals.—Victor I. and the Celebration of Easter.—Polycarp and Anacetus.—Ireneus.—The Character of the Decretals.—The Papal System based upon them.—All False and Forged.

IF, as Pius IX. and his Jesuit allies affirm, the temporal power of the pope is included in the spiritual, and has, like it, a divine origin, it must necessarily have a like universality with Christianity itself. It is in this sense that it is claimed to belong to “the primacy of Peter,” and is considered essential to the pope’s ecclesiastical supremacy over the world. Our investigations into its origin and growth, therefore, should be limited only by the means within our reach.

If it is in reality divine, and necessary, either at Rome or elsewhere, to the existence and dissemination of true religion, and if the liberalism and civilization of society based upon principles in opposition to it are injurious instead of beneficial to mankind, then its legitimacy, with all its attendant authority and consequences, should be conceded, in order that the papacy may have supreme jurisdiction over the world, and be able to bring all laws and institutions into harmony with its own conceptions of the divine will. But if, on the other hand, it has been the result of usurpation, fraud, and imposture, and if the world has been improved and advanced in proportion as it has escaped and separated from its influence, then those who are now so clamorous for its restoration should be held to be unsafe counselors, and be dealt with accordingly.

But whether it is the one or the other—whether it is to be restored at Rome or in any other part of the world—the study of its history is in every sense instructive, inasmuch as we can in no other way be brought into familiarity with the papacy, or comprehend fully the nature and character of the extraordinary pretensions now set up in its behalf. We should not expect good and beneficent results to flow from that which is founded upon fraud and wrong, if it shall appear to have been thus founded.

The question is constantly recurring—why should there have been such delay in the establishment of this tremendous power, if Christ or the apostles designed that belief in its necessity should be made an essential and indispensable part of the system of Christian faith? Manifestly they did not so design, or they would have taught it by some word or sign which would have come down to our age, by the Scriptures, or by tradition from the apostles. But nothing of this kind has reached us by either of these modes. Paul was imprisoned and martyred at Rome by the civil authority; and, if Peter was ever there, he met a similar fate. The several persecutions through which the early Christians passed originated with, and were conducted by, the same authority. And nowhere, in any history of the first centuries, is there a single word affirming that either Peter or Paul, or any bishop of the Roman or any other church, possessed the power of a temporal prince. On the other hand, in those primitive days of the Church the bishops and clergy devoted themselves to the work given them to do by the Master, and made it the study and effort of their lives to imitate his example of benevolence, humility, and love. They did not strive after the honors, wealth, or power of this world after temporal scepters and the crowns of kings—

but after the salvation of immortal souls. And yet he who today denies either the lawfulness or necessity of the pope's temporal power, if he belongs to the Roman Church, is excommunicated because he violates the true faith; and if he do not, is denounced, cursed, and anathematized as a heretic. And whole books are written, with learning and wonderful ingenuity, to prove that Christ's Church cannot exist without it!

The pope himself sends forth from his pretended prison his lamentations at its loss, and his followers forthwith combine themselves into a compact and formidable organization, demand assistance from the governments, *threaten another bloody crusade*, and pledge themselves never to remit their efforts until the crown of royalty is again placed upon the papal brow.

We have seen that this power did not exist in any form before the separation of Rome from Constantinople—of the West from the East—and also the effect of this separation upon its acquisition. This brings us to still more solid ground—to the investigation of events which, although not entirely free from difficulty, have a better foundation.

Mr. Hallam, who is accepted as undoubted authority on all hands, says: "The popes appear to have possessed some measure of temporal power, even while the city was professedly governed by the exarchs of Ravenna, in the name of the Eastern empire. This power became more extensive after her separation from Constantinople. It was, however, subordinate to the undeniable sovereignty of the new imperial family, who were supposed to enter upon all the rights of their predecessors. There was always an imperial officer, or prefect, in that city, to render criminal justice; *an oath of allegiance to the emperor was taken by the people*; and upon any irregular election of a pope, a circumstance by no means unusual, the emperors held themselves entitled to interpose. But the spirit and even the institutions of the Romans were republican." (Hallam's "Middle Ages," ch. iii., part i., pp. 126, 127. Harper & Brothers' ed., 1843.)

Archbishop Kenrick is not ingenuous when he quotes the first two sentences of the above extract to show the existence of the temporal power before the separation from Constantinople, and its increase "*on her separation from Constantinople*." By the omission of all the latter part of what Mr. Hallam says, he fails to show the "undeniable sovereignty" of the empire, that an oath of allegiance to it was required, and that the emperor had the right to interfere even in the election of a pope. Why this omission? Manifestly because the whole of what Mr. Hallam says repudiates all idea of any sovereignty except that possessed by the emperors—a concession which even so fair a man as Archbishop Kenrick could not make while held in the toils of the papacy. But his omission is not so bad as his misquotation. For the purpose of making it appear that the immediate effect of the separation of Rome from Constantinople was a great increase of the temporal power, with the consent of the King, of France, he quotes the second sentence in the above extract from Mr. Hallam, thus:

"This power became more extensive *on her separation from Constantinople*." (Kenrick, p. 261.) Mr. Hallam did not use this language. The word employed by him is "*after*," not "*on*:" "this power became more extensive *after her separation from Constantinople*." To say that the result was produced "*on the separation*," is equivalent to stating that it followed directly as a consequence; where as if it were *after* that event, the growth may have been slow and gradual, each step the work of usurpation. And this is Mr. Hallam's meaning, which Archbishop Kenrick endeavors to obscure by misquoting him.

The ninth century opened under the influence of the new order of things. For *eight hundred years* Christianity had existed in the world, and had grown, strengthened, and prospered, under the guardianship of bishops and priests who had no jurisdiction over temporal affairs. Even the bishops of Rome, with all their pride and ambition, had been limited in their authority to spiritual affairs, and the occasional claims they set up for an enlargement of their powers served only to show them that no such enlargement could ever be obtained with the consent of the people, and that if obtained at all, it must be the result of a combination with princes—a conspiracy against popular government. They well knew that it would be impossible to acquire the possession of unlimited power in Rome without the accomplishment of two things—successful revolt against the Eastern emperors, and the destruction of the Roman republic. The achievement of the first gave them the means of bringing about the last result.

The immediate consequence of the protection given to the popes by the French monarchs was the exercise of tyrannical authority over the inferior bishops and clergy, the object being to make the single will of the pope the governing, authority of the Church, not only in Rome, but all over the Christian world. Notwithstanding the recognized independence of the several churches during the apostolic times and for centuries afterward, and the unity of faith which had been then preserved by the diversities of local government, papal ambition soon became so all—absorbing as to see no other motive in the management of church affairs but its own gratification. Cormanin, referring to the change thus produced in religion, says:

“...holy traditions were despised, the morality of Christ was outraged; the orthodoxy of the Church no longer consisted in anything but *the sovereignty of the pope*, the adoration of images, and the invocation of saints; in sacred singing, the solemnity of masses, and the pomps of ceremonies; in the consecration of temples, splendid churches, monastic vows, and pilgrimages.

“Rome imposed its fanaticism and its superstitions on all the other churches; morality, faith, and true piety were replaced by cupidity, ambition, and luxury; the ignorance of the clergy was so profound that a knowledge of the singing of the Lord’s Prayer, the creed, and the service of the mass was all that was demanded from princes and ecclesiastical dignitaries.” (Cormanin, vol. i., pp. 211, 212.)

Pascal I. became pope in the year 817. Leo V., the Emperor of the East, and Theodore, Patriarch of Constantinople, sent nuncios to him with the view of reconciling the disagreement between the Eastern and Western Christians in reference to the worship of images. But the pope, fearing that a reconciliation of this kind would lead to the impairment of his papal influence and put an end to the alliance with France—and caring far more for his temporal power than for the restoration of harmony in the Church—refused to receive the nuncios, or to hear any suggestions of compromise. He drove them out of Rome in disgrace, and, relying upon the protection of the King of France, had the impudence, soon after, to send legates to Constantinople, and command the emperor to restore the worship of images.

How much, at that time, a few mild words, and the meekness and charity of true Christianity, would have done for the cause of genuine religion may be seen by those who will examine the history of those times. If the conciliatory spirit of the Eastern emperor had been reciprocated by the Roman pontiff, the East and the West might have been today united in Christian bonds, and the Church of Rome might have spread her spiritual influence over all the world. But other objects filled the mind of Pope Pascal I., who was determined to maintain his own authority, whatever the result to Christianity and the

Church. His stubbornness invited, naturally, a corresponding degree of illiberality on the part of the emperor, who caused the pope's envoys to be whipped through the streets of Constantinople, and the image—worshipers within his dominions to be treated with harshness and severity.

The pope now resorted to artifice to maintain himself. He invited the image—worshipers of the East to come to Rome, promising them protection. He rebuilt monasteries and churches for their accommodation, and, having exhausted his revenues in this undertaking, cunningly contrived an appeal to the superstition of his subjects, in order to extort further contributions from them. After rebuilding the Church of St. Cecilia, he placed her shrine upon its high altar; but the remains of the saint, who had been dead about six hundred years, were wanting to give sanctity to the place, and to excite the superstition of the attendants. With the view of discovering them, he convoked the people on Sunday, and, in their presence, fell into a supernatural sleep. After awaking, he declared that Cecilia had appeared to him in a vision, and pointed with her finger to the place of her interment! He visited the spot, took a spade, dug up the earth, and “discovered the body of the saint clothed in a robe of tissue of gold,” and with “*linen rags freshly impregnated with her blood!*” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 214; “Encyclopedia Americana,” vol. iii., p. 21, article *Cecilia*.)

These relics were removed to the church: the faithful were thereby excited to contribute largely of their wealth to the pontifical treasury, and an example was thus set which led to like imposture and fraud to such an extent that innumerable saints were fabricated in order that money might be raised by the sale of their bones—a practice which has been carried to such disgraceful and ridiculous extent that the wood of the true cross, the hair of the Virgin Mary, and that of St. John the Baptist, a part of the body of Christ himself, and hundreds of other equally impossible relics, have been, from time to time, fraudulently imposed as genuine upon the ignorant and deluded followers of the papacy. Such a state of things could not possibly exist without almost universal corruption and degeneracy at Rome, especially among the popes, priests, and lower clergy.

After the death of Charlemagne, Louis le Debonnaire, his son, became his successor as emperor, Germany having been added to the dominions of France. He was both weak and superstitious, and was easily subjected to the will of the pope. He sent his son Lothaire to Rome to be consecrated by the pope, who, when he reached there, was both surprised and shocked at the general depravity of morals which prevailed. He called the attention of Pope Pascal to it, and obtained from him a promise of reform; but so soon as Lothaire had left Rome, the pope caused two venerable priests to be arrested, charged them with having been informers, had their eyes put out, and their tongues dragged out, in his own presence, as punishment for their desire to reform the morals of the pope and clergy! (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 214.)

The Emperor Louis became indignant when he heard of this, and sent ambassadors to Rome to investigate the facts. Before these Pope Pascal solemnly swore he had nothing to do with it! They then demanded the delivery of the murderers, but this the pope refused, because they “were of the family of St. Peter, and that it was his duty to protect them against all the sovereigns of the world! (*Ibid.*)

That factions should have grown up under such a pope as this is not at all wonderful. They were excited to such a degree that at his death two popes were elected—one by the nobles and clergy, and the other by the people of Rome. The latter being the strongest, succeeded in placing Eugenius II. upon the

pontifical throne. Being a Roman, and the representative of the people, he was disposed to suppress the general immorality which prevailed among the clergy, and for this purpose sought the aid of the Emperor Louis to put down the opposing faction. Louis again sent Lothaire to Rome, accompanied by the venerable Abbot of St. Denis, in France, to ascertain the true condition of affairs. When he reached there, he heard the complaints of the people, who represented to him that they had been stripped of their wealth by former popes, and greatly oppressed by their tyranny. Lothaire, indignant at these abuses and outrages, commanded the pope to restore to the citizens their property which had been unjustly confiscated, and endeavored to provide against the repetition of these wrongs by the promulgation of a decree for securing to the people a voice in the government of their own affairs.

This constitution is important, as showing what might have been done for the cause of religion and reform, under an honest and unambitious pope, if Eugenius II. had lived long enough to provide for the faithful execution of its provisions. Among other things, it required that "equitable justice" should be rendered to the people; that "the exercise of the right of election of the chiefs of the Church" should not be impeded; that the emperor should be annually informed "in what manner justice has been rendered to the citizens," and how the constitution was observed; that the people of Rome should be asked "under what law they wished to live, in order that they may be judged according to the law which they shall have adopted;" and that all the dignitaries of the State should take an oath of fidelity to the emperor, which should be of superior obligation to their promise of fidelity to the Holy See. (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 215.)

This liberal constitution restored tranquility among the Roman people, which was greatly promoted by the proceedings of a council called by Pope Eugenius II., and the enactment by it of decrees looking to the reform of the clergy. But Eugenius died, after a pontificate of only three years, before any reformatory results were secured; leaving the clergy of Rome in a state of utter and debasing ignorance. They only knew how to follow the prescribed rules, to explain the Pater and the Credo, and to exact contributions from the people. Many of the inferior clergy could not distinguish the names of angels from those of devils, and, says Cormenini: "They believed that God was corporeal; they knew neither the creed of the apostles, nor that of the mass, nor that of St. Athanasius, nor even the Lord's Prayer." (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 217.)

Valentine, the successor of Eugenius II., would have done much to promote reform if he had lived; but it so happened that in those days the lives of such popes were of short duration. His pontificate lasted only five weeks. Upon his death Gregory IV., who was but a deacon, became pope. Though consecrated with the consent of the emperor, the latter wrote him, threatening to depose him if his conduct was not exemplary. At this Gregory became offended, and vowed that he would have revenge. This passion became more violent when, soon afterward, Louis compelled him to restore some property to the monastery of St. Mary, which he had illegally seized.

The first step incited by his pontifical vengeance was to stir up Lothaire to revolt against his father, under the promise that for this act of treason he should have the protection of the Church. History has recorded but few acts of perfidy so base as this. But it was a step in the road toward temporal and imperial power, and Pope Gregory IV. had no such conscientious scruples as forbade him to take it. He went to France to make his success more sure; and the French "Chronicle of St. Denis" says, that "the demons of hell animated all the children of Louis, and that Satan himself came in the person of the

Bishop of Rome, under the charitable pretext as if he wished to establish peace between the emperor and his children, but in reality to excommunicate the monarch and the bishops who opposed the execrable wishes of these unnatural children.” (*Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 219.)

The prelates of France, becoming indignant at the course of the pope, wrote him that if he persisted further in interfering with the temporal affairs of France, in violation of his oath of fidelity to the emperor, they would resist his ecclesiastical authority; and if he undertook to excommunicate them, they would defy him. Alarmed at this, he resolved upon leaving France. But before he carried this resolution into effect, his pride was excited by some monks who pretended to lay before him some declarations of the fathers and portions of the decrees of the Italian councils, which “declared him to be the supreme judge of all Christians.” Stimulated by these means, he again resolved to consummate his own and the treason of Lothaire. Then, pretending to desire a reconciliation between him and his father, he visited the emperor’s camp, where he was received with kindness.

While protesting to the emperor his “unutterable devotion,” he was engaged in producing defection among his troops, “by presents, promises, or threats.” Thus he succeeded in drawing away the troops from the emperor, and, after the pope left the camp, they went over to Lothaire, who made Louis prisoner, deprived him of his crown and royal robes, and made himself Emperor of the West, and King of France—all of which was directed and consecrated by this base and perfidious pope, whose conscience was not bound by either vow, pledge, or oath, however solemn. He was, nevertheless, infallible!

The people of France became excited to the highest degree by these movements. They refused to recognize Lothaire, drove him from the throne, and re-established Louis in power. Now it came his turn to be revenged upon the pope. For this purpose, he sent ambassadors to Rome to investigate his conduct; but, when they reached there, Gregory solemnly swore that he had rendered no assistance to Lothaire, that all his intentions were pure and innocent, and that he was devoted to Louis, whom he was ready to assist in punishing Lothaire, and his other children, for their treason! Louis, who was not only a weak prince, but kindhearted and excessively superstitious, forgave him and his children also, hoping to restore concord and quiet. But Lothaire, now realizing that the false-hearted pope had been making a tool of him to advance his own ambition, became furious at his new treachery, and ordered that both he and his priests should be treated with severity on account of it. This was also arrested by Louis, whose magnanimous conduct stands in striking contrast to that of this “execrable pontiff, who used religion as a plea to arm children against their father,” and of whom a Roman Catholic pen has recorded that he was a “cowardly, knavish, perfidious, and sacrilegious priest, destitute of principles and faith.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 220.)

The death of Louis led to a violent contest between his children; and to such disturbance throughout France as rendered the government and all public affairs insecure. Pope Sergius, successor to Gregory IV., had also an occasion to show himself the patron of treason growing out of these disorders, and to contribute by that means his example to the many others which, by the force of precedent, go to make up the law of the papacy. Nomenoe, a duke of Brittany, revolted against the King of Brittany, Charles the Bald, but was opposed by the bishops of the province. Lothaire, who favored the duke, sent large presents to the pope, and bribed him also to take his side. He, accordingly, issued his papal decree commanding the bishops to recognize Nomenoe as king, under pain of deposition and anathema, thus

invoking, as many other popes have done, both before and since, the aid of religion to accomplish worldly and ambitious ends. And while these examples present us with some of the instructive lessons taught by history, they also exhibit the manner in which the papal power grew, in a few centuries more, into enormous proportions.

The invasion of Italy by the Saracens put a stop, for a while, to the growth of the temporal power; but upon their defeat, under the pontificate of Leo IV., the affairs of the Church at Rome were thrown into such confusion that the few years following his death have never since ceased to be the cause of angry and acrimonious controversy. It is during these years when it is alleged that the Popess Joan occupied the pontifical chair, a matter not proper for discussion here. *

* This question is not without difficulty. Cormanin maintains that Joan was popess from A.D. 853, after the death of Leo IV., to 855, when the pontificate of Benedict III. commenced.—CORMENIN, vol. i., p. 225. But Butler, in his “Lives of the Saints,” denies the whole story, and calls it “a most notorious forgery.”—BUTLER, July 17th, article St. Leo IV. In this all the defenders of the papacy are agreed. In the chronological table of the popes published by the Church, they make Leo IV. pope up to A.D. 855, and Benedict III. his successor. But did he die in 853, as Cormanin asserts, or live until 855, as the papists assert? If he did, then there was either a Popess Joan, or an interregnum of more than two years. If he did not, but lived till 855, then there was neither the one nor the other. It is a question which may excite curiosity, but does not bear, in any form, upon that of the temporal power of the popes. Although Dr. Dollinger classes it along with the fables and myths of the Middle Ages, yet he says that there was no doubt, in the fifteenth century, about the existence of a female pope. According to him, her bust was placed in the cathedral at Sienna along with the busts of the other popes; and it was not till the seventeenth century that Pope Clement VIII. caused Joan to be “metamorphosed into Pope Zacharias.” John Huss, at the Council of Constance, referred to the Popess Joan, and was not contradicted.—*Fables respecting the Popes of the Middle Ages*, by Dollinger, pp. 30, 31.

About this time an event occurred Which contributed greatly to the increase of papal ambition. Ethelwolf, King of England, was a religious devotee—ardently enlisted in the papal cause. He visited Rome and had an interview with the pope, which resulted in his agreeing that the pope might levy Peter—pence all over his dominions, and in his agreeing to pay to him yearly large sums of money. Some historians allege that he made the kingdom of Great Britain tributary to the Holy See; but this, though not positively denied, is not stated by others. (Cormanin, vol. i., p.233; “Hist. of Eng.”by Rapin, vol. i., p.309; “Hist. of Eng.” by Lingard, vol. i., p. 95.)

However the fact may be, it is certain that the interview between King Ethelwolf and the pope did give greater impunity to those popes who were resolved upon interfering in the affairs of the nations. It was soon after this that the Eastern Christians, despairing of any compromise of their disagreements with Rome, resolved upon making their final separation from those of the West. And Pope Nicholas I., thus rid of this perplexing controversy, was furnished with more leisure to increase his temporal authority. Surrounded by kings who were ready, as the German emperor did, to kiss his feet, and to put themselves under his protection, in order to keep upon their thrones, he resolved upon asserting, as one of the prerogatives of Peter, the right to rule over the world. In replying to a letter from the bishops of Lorraine, in which they declared their submission to him, he employed this extraordinary language:

“You affirm that you are submissive to your sovereign, in order to obey the words of the apostle Peter, who said, ‘Be subject to the prince, because he is above all mortals in this world.’ But you appear to

forget that we, as the vicar of Christ, *have the right to judge all men*: thus, before obeying kings, you owe obedience to us; and if we declare a monarch guilty, you should reject him from your communion until we pardon him.”

“We alone have the power to bind and to loose, to absolve Nero and to condemn him; and Christians cannot, under penalty of excommunication, execute other judgment than ours, which alone is infallible. *People are not the judges of their princes*; they should obey without murmuring the most iniquitous orders; they should bow their foreheads under the chastisements which it pleases kings to inflict on them; for a sovereign can violate the fundamental laws of the State, and seize upon the wealth of the citizen, by imposts or by confiscations; he can even dispose of their lives, without any of his subjects having the right to address to him simple remonstrances. But if we declare a king heretical and sacrilegious, if we drive him from the Church, clergy and laity, whatever their rank, *are freed from their oaths of fidelity, and may revolt against his power*.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 242.)

The same pope wrote to Charles the Bald, to incite him against the King of Lorraine, saying, “We order you, in the name of religion, to invade his states, burn his cities, and massacre his people, whom we render responsible for the resistance of their bad prince.” (*Ibid.*, p. 243.)

He thus addressed an envoy from Constantinople: “Know, prince, that the vicars of Christ are above the judgment of mortals; and that the most powerful sovereigns have no right to punish the crimes of popes, how enormous soever they may be....; for no matter how scandalous or criminal may be the debaucheries of the pontiffs, you should obey them, for they are seated on the chair of St. Peter.” (Cormenin.)

Again: “Fear, then, our wrath and the thunders of our vengeance; for Jesus Christ has appointed us with his own mouth absolute judges of all men; and kings themselves are submitted to our authority.” (*Ibid.*, p. 244.)

When the King of Bulgaria became a convert to Christianity, he persecuted those of his subjects who refused to follow his example; and Pope Nicholas I. thus wrote him:

“I glorify you for having maintained your authority by putting to death those wandering sheep who refuse to enter the fold; and you not only have not sinned by showing a holy rigor, but I even congratulate you upon having opened the kingdom of heaven to the people submitted to your rule. A king need not fear to *command massacres*, when these will retain his subjects in obedience, or cause them to submit to the faith of Christ; and God will reward him in this world, and in eternal life, for these murders.” (*Ibid.*)

It should surprise no one to know that this pope so boldly asserted his infallibility as to claim equality with God. According to Gratian, he issued a pontifical decree, wherein he said: “It is evident that the popes can neither be bound nor unbound by any earthly power, nor even by that of the apostle, if he should return upon the earth; since Constantine the Great has recognized that *the pontiffs held the place of God upon earth*, the divinity not being able to be judged by any living man. We are, then, infallible, and *whatever may be our acts, we are not accountable for them but to ourselves*.” (*Ibid.*, p. 248.)

The Roman Catholic Church canonizes and places in her calendar of saints those whose devotion and piety she considers worthy of imitation. In this list she has placed seventy—six of her popes; and

pointing out these saints to her children, she says to them that their lives exhibit “the most perfect maxims of the Gospel reduced to practice,” point out “the true path,” and lead, “as it were, by the hand into it, sweetly inviting and encouraging us to walk cheerfully in the steps of those that are gone before us.” They are called “the greatest personages who have ever adorned the world, the brightest ornaments of the Church militant, and the shining stars and suns of the triumphant, our future companions in eternal glory.” And “their penitential lives and holy maxims” are commended to the faithful, as furnishing “the sublime lessons of practical virtue.” (“Lives of the Saints,” by Butler, vol. i., preface, p. 46.)

Now, when we consider that this pope, Nicholas I., has been made a saint, (“Catholic Family Almanac,” 1870, p. 47.) and that what he did and said is held in the most sacred remembrance, we cannot fail to realize the importance of scrutinizing closely the language employed by him in the foregoing decrees and encyclicals, and of knowing also their effect upon the acquisition of temporal power, and the ultimate consequences to which they led. Why was he made a saint if his pontificate was not designed as a model for imitation? Why should he be imitated, if his principles and policy are not to be made the principles and policy of all time? He was infallible, and could not err! He was in “the place of God upon earth!” Therefore, the Church must be as obedient to him today as it was during his pontificate! The Encyclical and Syllabus of Pope Pius IX. sufficiently show that he so understands it.

Between the close of the pontificate of Nicholas I. and the beginning of the tenth century, eight popes occupied the chair of Peter, as it is called, and were all faithful to the policy of Nicholas, in so far as they had the ability to be so. One of these, Boniface VI., called by Baronius “an infamous wretch,” was poisoned by the agency of the Bishop of Anagnina, who became his successor, under the name of Stephen VII. (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 273.) This infallible pope caused the body of his infallible predecessor, Formosus, who had been pope from the year 891 to 896, to be exhumed from its burial-place, “to punish him for having usurped the supreme dignity to his detriment.” He assembled a council of bishops, had the dead body “placed in the pontifical seat, the tiara on its head, the pastoral baton in its hand, and clothed with the sacerdotal ornaments.” He appointed an advocate to defend him, and propounded to the dead Formosus questions, which the advocate so answered as to amount to a confession of guilt by Formosus! Whereupon Pope Stephen VII. impiously pronounced sentence of excommunication and deposition against the insensible victim of his pontifical vengeance, struck him a blow which prostrated the dead body at his feet, stripped off its pontifical robes with his own hands, cut off three of its fingers, ordered the head to be cut off, and the body to be thrown into the Tiber! (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 274.)

All this was done in the name of religion, under the criminal pretense of obedience to the Gospel of Christ, which everywhere places love, charity, and benevolence as among the highest cardinal virtues. It is no wonder, then, that Baronius, the great Roman Catholic annalist, who defended the papacy in everything in which it was possible to do so, spoke thus of the condition of the Church at this time:

“Never had divisions, civil wars, the persecution of pagans, heretics, and schismatics caused it to suffer so much as the monsters who installed themselves on the throne of Christ by simony and murders. The Roman Church was transformed into a shameless courtesan, covered with silks and precious stones,

which publicly prostituted itself for gold; the palace of the Lateran was become a disgraceful tavern, in which ecclesiastics of all nations disputed with harlots the price of infamy.

“Never did priests, *and especially popes*, commit so many *adulteries, rapes, incests, robberies, and murders*; and never was the ignorance of the clergy so great as during this deplorable period. Christ was then assuredly sleeping a profound sleep in the bottom of his vessel, while the winds buffeted it on all sides, and covered it with the waves of the sea. And, what was more unfortunate still, the disciples of the Lord slept more profoundly than he, and could not awaken him either by their cries or their clamors. Thus the tempest of abomination fastened itself on the Church, and offered to the inspection of men the most horrid spectacle! The canons of councils, the creed of the apostles, the faith of Nice, the old traditions, the sacred rites, were buried in the abyss of oblivion, and the most unbridled dissoluteness, ferocious despotism, and insatiable ambition usurped their place. Who could call legitimate pontiffs the intruders who seated themselves on the chair of the apostles, and what must have been the cardinals selected by such monsters?” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 275.)

Such times as these were adapted to the practice of any kind of imposture and fraud which the popes and clergy considered necessary to strengthen the authority of the papacy. As an effective means of establishing a code of canon laws for the government of the Church, one Dionysius had previously compiled a body of decrees made by former popes. These went back no further than the pontificate of Siricius, in the year 385; (*Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 24; Milnan’s “Latin Christianity,” vol. iii., p. 191.) and had reference to matters of faith and the forms of church government. They gave no special impunity to crime, and were, in no very great degree, inconsistent with the principles prevailing in the apostolic times, except in so far as they recognized such pagan customs as were calculated to give popularity to the public worship of Rome. But they were unsuited to these times, in that they did not furnish a sufficient shelter for the corruption and imperialism of the popes, and did not sufficiently lay the foundation for their claim of dominion over the world. Something more was necessary; and the means of supplying this were not wanting. It consisted of the *False Decretals*, which are now universally considered to have been bold and unblushing forgeries. Yet, forgeries as they were, they constitute the corner—stone of that enormous system of wrong and usurpation which has since been built up by the papacy, to revive which Pope Pius IX. has now put forth his Encyclical and Syllabus, and numerous encyclical letters. These forgeries are attributed to one Isidore Mercator, of Seville, in Spain; but their real authorship is not entirely free from doubt. It is known, however, that they were carried from Spain to Rome by the Bishop of Mayence about the times we have been reviewing; times which, as there is no difficulty in seeing, were admirably adapted to such imposture.

Dr Dorner thinks that recent investigations have shown that they originated between the years 847 and 853, which period is covered by the pontificate of Leo IV. and the time assigned to the alleged Popess Joan; (“History of Protestant Theology,” by Dorner, vol. i., p. 30.) so short a time before the pontificate of Nicholas I. as to show that they constituted the authority upon which he based his extraordinary and impious assumptions of authority.

These pseudo—Isidorian decrees were designed as a compilation of the canons established as far back as the pontificate of Clement I., in the year 91, so as to fill up the gap between him and Siricius, who became pope in the year 385. During this period there were thirty—three popes, all of whom, except

one, Liberius, have been made saints. We shall better understand the purpose and character of these decretals by going back to the times of their alleged origin.

The second century closed with the pontificate of Pope Victor I., who distinguished himself by having, with the celebrated Tertullian, adopted the heresy of the Montanists, (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 31.) and inaugurated the controversy in relation to the festival of Easter. The Asiatic Christians, following the custom established by the evangelists St. John and St. Philip, celebrated this festival, like the Jews, on the fortieth day after the first new moon of each year; and when Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna and a disciple of St. John, visited Rome about the year 167-168, and found that it was the custom there to wait until the Sunday after the fortieth day, he declined to adopt it, and it was agreed between him and Anicetus, who was then pope, that each Church, the Eastern and Western, should follow its own custom. Thus, up to this time, there was perfect equality between the Greek and Latin churches, each retaining its own independence of the other. But when Victor I. became pope, he was not disposed to let the affairs of the churches remain in this quiet and pacific condition—so admirably calculated to advance the cause and progress of Christianity. He was the first pope who employed the thunders of excommunication, which have since been used with such terrible effect upon both nations and individuals.

He excommunicated Theophilus for asserting that Christ was a mere human, and Praxeus for his attempt to abolish the distinction between the three persons in the Trinity. For the latter purpose, he assembled at Rome a council—the first ever convened by a pope of his own authority—and this exercise of power caused him to conceive the idea of the superiority of the Church of Rome over all the other churches. And hence, in order to establish this superiority, he resolved upon forcing the Eastern Christians to adopt the custom of Rome in reference to Easter; and thus inaugurated a controversy which gave rise to subsequent usurpations, and, in the end, to the final separation of the Greek and Latin Christians. This effort to make a matter of so small importance a cause of quarrel was, at its inception, resisted by many of the bishops; and Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, censured the pope for it, in the name of the Church in France—then Gaul. He yielded to the pressure of these opinions, but not without having contributed toward laying the foundation for the subsequent claim of supremacy.

His immediate successor, Zephyrinus, who became pope in the year 202, has also been accused of favoring the Montanists; but this accusation is probably unjust, as, imitating Victor, he excommunicated them, including Tertullian. Tertullian was so much esteemed for his piety, and on account of the services he had rendered Christianity in his “Apology” and other works, especially that against the heresy of Marcion, that his excommunication excited general indignation. And, in order to escape the consequences of this act, Pope Zephyrinus was driven to assert the claim of superiority made by Victor, hoping thereby to pacify the Western priesthood by the prospect of their sharing with him the power and authority he hoped to secure by a triumph over the Eastern Christians. Under these two pontificates, therefore—from the year 194 to 221—ambition first began to creep into the Church at Rome, and to stimulate its popes to substitute motives of worldly grandeur and wealth for that simplicity which had distinguished the humble fishermen who had followed the Saviour during his earthly but divine ministrations.

And thus we see the reason why these False Decretals are carried back to the times previous to Pope Siricius, in order to show that these popes, who were the alleged authors of them, predicated their claim

of superiority upon the doctrines they contained, and designed them as the means of elevating the popes into earthly monarchs, and the whole priesthood into a powerful and irresponsible hierarchy.

The efforts now making to revive and re-establish them in this country make it important that the people should understand what they contain, so as to know what is meant by the temporal power of the pope, and what is proposed in the place of our Protestant institutions. They are, also, an additional key for the interpretation of the Encyclical and Syllabus.

In the first epistle attributed to Pope Clement I. he is made to represent himself as having immediately succeeded the apostle Peter in the pontifical chair, whereas it is well understood, and now conceded, that Linus and Anacletus were both bishops of Rome before Clement. But it needed authority of this kind to establish the assumption that Peter was the first pope, and this forgery answered the purpose. Besides, it recognized the book called "The Itinerary, or Book of the Voyages of St. Peter," which is, undoubtedly, apocryphal.

There are four other epistles also attributed to Clement, all of which are manifest forgeries. In one he is made to speak of princes and other ecclesiastical officers of the Church, when, in the time of Clement, none such were known. In another he is represented as addressing an epistle to St. James, wherein he calls himself the successor of St. Peter, when James died before Peter. And Clement is made to approve the doctrines of the Nicolaitans, who taught, says Du Pin, "that women ought to be kept in common." (For a thorough exposition of all these forgeries see Du Pin's "Eccl. Hist.," vol. i., p. 173.)

In a pretended epistle by Pope Anacletus, he is represented as a defender of Clement, when he died before Clement was Bishop of Rome. But he is made to speak of having received many things by tradition, in order to substitute tradition for fact — a thing which it was impossible for Anacletus to do, because he lived in the times of the apostles, when no tradition was necessary. The special object of this epistle, however, was to establish, by Anacletus, the proposition "that appeals from secular judges ought to be determined before bishops;" that "the privileges and laws of the Church ought to be confirmed;" that there should be "appeals from ecclesiastical judgments to the Holy See;" that there were "primates and metropolitans" in the Church: whereas it is well known that none of these orders existed, and none of these things were ever talked of or debated, until after the death of Anacletus.

In another epistle by the same bishop, it is said that he "would neither have bishops to be accused nor judged "a claim of immunity still persevered in.

The epistles attributed to Popes Evaristus and Alexander I., who were the immediate successors of Clement, contain nothing of special importance, but are made up of extracts from authors who lived long after their time, and refer to matters which did not occur for more than a century after they were dead.

Pope Sixtus I. is made to call himself an archbishop—a word not then used—and to speak of "appeals to Rome," and "the grandeur of that Church," and of the requirement "that all bishops wait for the pope's decision, and are instructed by his letters"— which, says Du Pin, are "modes of speaking never used by the first bishops of Rome."

Pope Telesphorus is made to say "that the laity and clergy could not accuse one another in judgment." And two letters are ascribed to Pope Higinus, of no special import, but condemned by their containing

quotations from the popes Leo I., Martin I., and Adrian I., who lived long after. There are also three letters from Pope Pius I., which are shown, in the same way, to be spurious.

Pope Anicetus speaks of archbishops, primates, and patriarchs—not instituted till long after—besides, says Du Pin, “many other things of the same nature.” There are also two letters from Pope Soter, which are also manifestly spurious.

An epistle by Pope Eleutherus “treats of ecclesiastical judgments in favor of the Court of Rome.” He is made to insist that “all causes relating to the Church ought to be determined there,” which, says Du Pin, “is a practice contrary to all antiquity.” This epistle is shown to be a forgery by abundant proofs. It copies a text out of St. John, and attributes it to St. Paul. It also contains passages from the writings of Pope Leo I. (A.D. 440), Felix III. (A.D. 526), Adrian I. (A.D. 772), from councils which had not met, and from the Theodosian code, when Theodosius was not emperor until nearly two hundred years after the death of this pope.

In an epistle by Pope Victor I. he is made to confer upon himself the further title of “Archbishop of the *Universal Church*,” and to speak of “appeals to Rome.” Its falsity is shown by the fact that it is addressed to Theophilus of Alexandria, who did not live till nearly two hundred years after. There is also another letter of his, directed to Desiderius, Bishop of Vienna, when there was no bishop of that name in Vienna till near the close of the sixth century.” (Du Pin, pp. 173-178.)

Pope Zephryrinus is represented as addressing an encyclical epistle, *ex cathedra*, to the bishops of Sicily, wherein he claims “final” jurisdiction in all cases relating to the trial of bishops, as belonging to the “seat of the apostles,” that is, Rome. He prescribes the rules which shall govern such trials, the chief of which is, that “an accused bishop” should not be condemned by “patriarchs and primates” until “they find that the person either confesses himself guilty, or is proved so by witnesses trustworthy and regularly examined, who shall not be fewer in number than were those disciples whom the Lord directed to be chosen for the help of the apostles, that is, seventy—two”—a number quite sufficient to prevent a conviction in any case. He then proceeds to declare, “Nor should anyone of superior rank be indicted or condemned on the accusation of inferiors,” and that all cases should be appealed to Rome. He claims for the pope the divine authority to bind and loose on earth and in heaven, as conferred by Peter and by the apostolic canons and constitutions. *

* Du Pin shows, incontrovertibly, that these canons and constitutions attributed to the apostles are also spurious.—Du PIN’s Eccl. Hist., vol. i., pp. 13-16.

He then provides what was most needed for establishing the power of the hierarchy, and securing perfect impunity to them by covering up and concealing whatever crime a bishop may commit, in these words:

“For bishops are to be borne by the laity and clergy, and masters by servants, in order that, under the exercise of endurance, things temporal may be maintained, and things eternal hoped for.” (“Anti—Nicene Library,” vol. ix., p. 145, *Epistles of Pope Zephryrinus*.)

Another epistle of this same pope, to the bishops of Egypt, is only worthy of notice because of the claim of power it sets up for the “Apostolic Church” at Rome, and the assertion that Peter was “chief of

the apostles.” Both these epistles are shown to be forgeries, by the fact that they contain passages from Popes Leo I. (A.D. 440), Vigilius (A.D. 540), Gregory I. (A.D. 590), Martin I. (A.D. 649), Adrian I. (A.D. 772), and from the Theodosian code.

Pope Calistus is represented as also issuing encyclical letters upon sundry subjects. In one he says: “Let no one take up an accusation against a doctor [teacher or priest], because it is not right for sons to find fault with fathers, nor for slaves to wound their masters.” In another, to the bishops of Gaul, he says, “Those who conspire against bishops, or who take part with such,” are guilty of a crime, and are condemned, “not only by the laws of the Church, but of the world.” Defining the punishment prescribed for this offense, he is made to say it had been “ordained” by his “predecessors,” that if the inferior clergy were guilty of it, they “should be deprived of the honor which they enjoy;” that those who did not belong to the clergy “should be cut off from communion, and expelled from the Church;” and “that all men of both orders should be infamous; and that, too, not only for those who did the deed, but for those also who took part with such.” Assigning the reason for this extraordinary protection to the bishops, and severity to their accusers, he says: “For it is but equitable that those Who despise the divine mandates, and prove themselves disobedient to the mandates of the fathers, should be chastised with severer penalties, in order that others may fear to do such things, and that all may rejoice in brotherly concord, and all take to themselves the example of severity and goodness.”

Section II. is on “those who have intercourse with excommunicated persons, or with unbelievers.” No one is to “have any intercourse with such in speech, or in eating or drinking, or in the salutation with the kiss, nor let him greet such; because, whosoever willingly holds intercourse with the excommunicated, in these or other prohibited matters, will subject himself, according to the ordinance of the apostles, to like excommunication. From these, therefore, let the clergy and laity keep themselves, if they would not have the same penalty to endure. Also, do not join with unbelievers, neither have any fellowship with them. They who do such things, indeed, are judged, not as believers, but as unbelievers.”

Section III. treats of “those who ought not to be permitted to prefer an accusation, or to bear witness, etc.,” and says: “Those, again, who are suspected in the matter of the right faith should by no means be permitted to prefer charges against priests and against those of whose faith there is no doubt; and such persons should be held of doubtful authority in matters of human testimony. Their voice, consequently, should be reckoned invalid whose faith is doubted, and no credit should be given to those who are ignorant of the right faith.” Even as it regards one who is entitled to make an accusation against a bishop or priest, he must not do it, except in the presence of him whom he seeks to accuse. (“Anti—Nicene Christian Library,” vol. ix., p. 203, Epistles of Pope Calistus.)

These epistles contain passages taken from the Council of Nice, and the fifth Council of Rome, which were held long after; and from the popes Gelasius (A.D. 492), Synmachus (A.D. 498), Gregory I. (A.D. 590), and Adrian I. (A.D. 772)—all showing their false and fraudulent character.

There is an epistle containing an *ex-cathedra* decree of Pope Urban I. addressed “to all Christians,” wherein it is prescribed that, instead of the practice which prevailed among the early Christians of holding property in common, it should be “left in the hands of the bishops, who hold the place of the apostles;” that the bishops should have “elevated seats, set up and prepared like a throne, ‘to show’ by

these that the power of inspection and of judging, and the authority to loose and bind, are given to them by the Lord;" that the faithful should hold "no communication with those with whom they [the bishops] have none;" and that those "whom they have cast out" shall not be received. ("Anti—Nicene Library," vol. ix., p. 217, *Epistle of Pope Urban I.*)

The forgery of this epistle is shown by the fact that it contains thoughts and words from Eusebius, who was not born until nearly one hundred years after, from Pope Gregory IV. (A.D. 827), and from the Theodosian code.

Pope Pontianus had but little time for issuing decrees; for his entire pontificate lasted only a few months. For the suspicion of wishing to disturb the peace of the Roman empire, during the reign of Alexander Severus, he was banished to Siberia, where he remained till about the year 235—237, when he was brought back, "and expired under the scourge." Eusebius makes his pontificate embrace five or six years, but there is great uncertainty about it. Nevertheless, epistles from him are placed among these palpable forgeries.

In the first, to Felix Subscribonius, "On the Honor to be bestowed on Priests," he is represented as saying: "And, again, they are not to be accused by the infamous or the wicked, or the hostile, or by members of another sect or religion. If they sin, they are to be arraigned by other priests; further, they are to be held in check by the chief pontiffs, and they are not to be arraigned or restrained by seculars or by men of evil life."

In his second epistle, "to all bishops," he is made to say: "Wherefore persons suspected, or hostile, or litigious, and those who are not of good conversation, or whose life is reprehensible, and those who do not teach the right faith, have been debarred from being either accusers or witnesses by our predecessors with apostolic authority; and we, too, remove them from that function, and exclude them from it in times to come, etc." (*Ibid.*, vol. ix., p. 232, Pope Pontianus.)

To show the forgery of these epistles, Du Pin says they "are made up of passages taken out of the vulgar Latin, St. Gregory, St. Jerome, Sixtus the Pythagorean: the rest is written in a barbarous style."

An epistle from Pope Anterus, "On the Transference of Bishops," was designed to prove, what no antecedent history shows, that Peter, as bishop, was transferred from Antioch to Rome. He says, "Peter, our holy master and the prince of the apostles, was translated for the sake of the common good from Antioch to Rome, in order that he might be in a position there of doing more service."

At another place he recognizes the obligation of the old Mosaic law, "that whoever has not given obedience to the priests should be stoned outside the camp by the people, or, with his neck beneath the sword, should expiate his presumption with his blood;" (Deuteronomy xviii., 12.) with the single qualification that "now, however, the disobedient is cut off by spiritual chastisement, and, being cast out of the Church, is torn by the rabid mouth of demons." ("Anti—Nicene Library," vol. ix., p. 240, Pope Anterus.)

Du Pin establishes this forgery by showing that the author speaks of a Bishop of Ephesus named Felix, when there was none such, and of a Bishop of Alexandria named Eusebius, which was untrue. He also shows that he was contradicted by the three councils, of Antioch, Sardica, and Chalcedon; and that he quotes from popes and others who did not live until after that time.

There are epistles from Pope Fabian, or Fabianus, who, according to Eusebius, was indebted for his election to the presence of the Holy Ghost alighting upon his head in the form of a dove! This pope employed the power of excommunication against Privatus, a bishop, for heresy; and inaugurated the ceremony of prostration at the feet of the pope upon the occasion of his election. Therefore there seemed, doubtless, to be a fitness in attributing some of these forgeries to him. The first of his epistles is addressed “to all the ministers of the Church Catholic,” and concerns “those who ought not to be admitted to clear themselves, and of the duty of having no fellowship with the excommunicated.”

Assuming that “by the divine precepts and the apostolic institutes” the pope is required to watch over “all the churches,” and exhorting the clergy to be “obedient and faithful children of the holy Church of God”—that is, of Rome—he says, “These men, and all else who do not teach the true doctrine, and hold not the true faith, cannot act as accusers of any true believer, because they are branded with infamy, and are cut off from the bosom of our holy mother, the Church, by the sword of the apostles, until their return to correct conversation and belief.” And he is made to repeat the same idea in other forms, thus:

“All who come under suspicion with respect to the Catholic faith *cannot be admitted as accusers of those who hold the true creed;*” and thus: “And therefore are charges, which are preferred by those who are objects of suspicion in the matter of the true faith, rejected.”

He is also represented as saying, “And if any one, setting aside the rules wittingly, sings with the excommunicated in his house, or speaks or prays in company with them, that man is to be deprived of the privilege of communion.”

He is then made to originate and invent, what every reader of ecclesiastical history knows to be untrue, the statement that Peter ordained Clement as his successor in the pontificate, and “addressed the people” at his ordination; whereas Peter died about the year 65—67, and Clement's pontificate did not commence till the year 91, nearly thirty years after! The words he is said to have used are these:

“Whence, also, the blessed chief of the apostles, Peter, addressing the people at the ordination of Clement, says this, among other things;” making him say that no man should be “on terms of friendship” with any one who was hostile to Clement; and also: “If, however, any one is not friendly, and speaks with those with whom he [the chief] speaks not, such a one belongs to those who seek to exterminate the Church of God; and though he seems to be with you in body, he is against you in mind and heart. And such a one is a much more dangerous enemy than those who are without, and who are openly hostile.”

All this is as entirely opposed to the spirit of true Christianity, such as Peter taught in obedience to the precepts and example of his Divine master, as it is consistent with that stupendous system of papal power and fraud which these forgeries were designed to build up.

There is another epistle of this same pope, addressed “to all the bishops of the East.” A portion of this has reference to the renewal of the chrism at the Lord's—supper every year; but it does not fail to lay down the same instruction, attributed by these forged Decretals to his predecessors. These words are put into his mouth:

“The apostles themselves and their successors decreed of old time that those persons should not be admitted to lay accusations who are under suspicion,.... or who are doubtful in the matter of the true faith.” Also: “Those have neither the right nor the power to accuse the priests or the clergy, who are incapable themselves of being made priests legitimately, and are not of their order,” etc. And again: “The priests, too, whom the Lord has taken to himself from among all men, and has willed to be his own, are not to be dealt with lightly, nor injured, nor rashly accused or reprehended, save by their masters, seeing that the Lord has chosen to reserve their causes to himself, and ministers vengeance according to his own judgment. For these are rather to be borne with by the faithful than made subjects of reproach, just as there is chaff with the wheat even in the last winnowing, and as there is bad fish with good even on their separation, which is yet to be on the shore—that is to say, at the end of the world. By no means, then, *can that man be condemned by a human examination* whom God has reserved for his own judgment, that the purpose of God, according to which he has decreed to save what had perished, may be unalterable.” He is then made to declare that all who have sinned shall “go down into the pit,” unless “*restored by sacerdotal authority*,” and to assign to the apostles the determination “that the accusing of priests should be a matter undertaken with difficulty, or never undertaken, that they ought not to be ruined or displaced by wicked men.”

By the assumption that he, as pope, is equal to the apostles, he is made to declare that if any one of the clergy “proves an enemy to his bishops, and seeks to incriminate them,” he shall be removed and given over to the *curiae*, or Court of the Inquisition at Rome, as its prisoner and slave for life, and “remain infamous without any hope of restoration;” and then this epistle proceeds,

“In like manner, we decree and ordain by apostolic authority that the flock should not dare to bring a charge against their pastor, to whose care they had been consigned, unless he falls into error in the faith; for the deeds of superiors are not to be smitten with the sword of the mouth; neither can the disciple be above the master,” etc.

Again: “After the example of Ham, the son of Noah, they are condemned who bring the faults of their fathers into public view, or presume to accuse or calumniate them, even as was the case with Ham, who did not cover the shame of his father Noah, but exhibited it for mockery. And in like manner those are justified by the example of Shem and Japhet, who reverently cover and seek not to display those matters in which they find that their fathers have erred.”

Then the mode of procedure against a bishop for violating the faith is prescribed, when the epistle says, “For his other acts, however, he is rather to be borne with by his flock and those put under him, than accused or made the subject of public detraction,” etc.

There is also a third epistle from this same pope, addressed “to Bishop Hilary,” wherein he is represented as repeating his decree in favor of priestly impunity, in these words: “We decree and resolve that those who are not of good conversation, or whose life is impeachable, or whose faith and life and liberty are unknown, should not have the power of accusing the priests of the Lord.” (“Anti—Nicene Library,” vol. ix., p. 249, *Epistles of Pope Fabian*.)

Epistles are also inserted from other popes, to wit: Cornelius, Lucius, Stephen I., Sixtus II., Dionysius, Felix I., Eutychian, Caius, Marcellinus, Marcellus I., Eusebius, Sylvester, Marcus, Julius I., Liberius, and Damasus I., so as to bring the Decretals down to the time of Pope Siricius, in the year 385; and

thus, with those compiled by Dionysius, to render the code of canon laws complete. The great ecclesiastical historian, Du Pin, says of them all, that they “are full of several passages taken out of the fathers, popes, and councils more modern than the very popes by whom they are pretended to be written; and in which many things are to be found that don’t in the least agree with the history of those times, and were purposely said to favor the court of Rome, and establish her pretensions against the rights of bishops and the liberties of churches.

But it would take up too much time to show the gross falsity of these monuments that are now rejected by common consent, and even by those authors that are most favorable to the court of Rome, who are obliged to abandon the patronage of these epistles though they have done a great deal of service in establishing the greatness of the court of Rome, and ruining the ancient discipline of the Church, especially in relation to ecclesiastical decisions and rights of bishops.” (Du Pin’s “Eccl. Hist.,” vol. i., p. 178.)

These liberal quotations from the False Decretals—otherwise scarcely excusable—are necessary to show how the popes and the Roman Catholic hierarchy have laid the foundation of their enormous power and prerogatives. The system they have built upon this foundation would have been bad enough if what has been put into the mouths of these popes had been actually uttered by them. But when it is considered that these things are the corrupt inventions of priests of the ninth century, and that this fact is known to all intelligent Roman Catholics, and frankly admitted by many of them, it almost staggers human credulity to suppose that there are now any in the world who are willing to risk their reputation for integrity and candor by attempting to maintain a system thus originated and upheld.

There is nothing else, among all the nations of earth, bearing any resemblance to it—no other system by which it has been so daringly and perseveringly proposed to erect within all the governments a foreign and antagonistic power, independent of all human law, and irresponsible to human authority. By means of it emperors, kings, princes, and peoples have been brought down in abject humiliation at the feet of innumerable popes, who, claiming to be in the place of God on earth, have lorded it over them with a severity which never abated and an ambition that could never be satisfied. It is marvelous to contemplate the origin and progress of such a structure of fraud and wrong, to observe the popular degradation which it wrought out, as the means of securing the triumph of the papacy, and to see the patience with which the world now tolerates the insolent ambition which demands its reconstruction in the name of God and humanity!

This language is not too harsh. The pretense set up in these false and forged decrees deserves condemnation in even harsher and severer terms. They were designed to secure to the priesthood the most perfect impunity, and to place them so far above the people as to put it out of the power of the latter even to complain at their oppressions. They allow a bishop or priest to commit any crime he pleases—murder, robbery, rape, or seduction—and deny his responsibility to the laws of the country where he resides, or to any other law but that which the pope may enact! They command the members of the Roman Catholic Church to regard these bishops and priests as their masters, and to conceal and cover up whatsoever crimes they may commit, rather than bring disgrace upon the Church! They pronounce as unworthy of belief all who are not members of that Church, so as to render the conviction of a bishop or priest impossible upon their testimony before the court of Rome, even for the most

outrageous offenses! They, in fact, authorize and license whatsoever a bishop or priest shall do, although he may drag his clerical robes into the very filth and mire of profligacy, prostitution, and vice!

Chapter XIII. The False Decretals

False Decretals, a 9th-century collection of ecclesiastical legislation containing some forged documents. The principal aim of the forgers was to free the Roman Catholic church from interference by the state and to maintain the independence of the bishops against the encroachments of the archbishops, who were attempting to extend their power. (Source Britannica.com)

The False Decretals.—Nicholas I. governed by Them.—His Character. Adrian II.—John VIII.—John XII.—Benedict IX.—Three Popes at Same Time.—German Emperors create Popes.—Leo IX.—Hildebrand.—He becomes Pope as Gregory VII.—Principles established by Him. His Quarrel with Philip of France.—His Bull against Henry IV.—He adopts the False Decretals.—Pius IX. does the Same.—Gregory VII. stirs up Revolt in Germany.—The Emperor Henry IV. in Rome.—Death of Gregory VII.—His Successors maintain his Policy.—Urban II.—Calixtus II.—Adrian IV. grants Ireland to England.—The Gratian Decretals.—They authorize Physical Compulsion and Torture.—Arnold of Brescia burned by Adrian IV.—Alexander III. and Victor IV.—Alexander III. releases the Subjects of Frederick Barbarossa from their Allegiance.—His Character.—Submission of Frederick.—The Third Lateran Council.—Decree authorizing Waldenses and Albigenses to be put to Death.—The Thirteenth Century.—Innocent III.—His Ambition and Usurpation.—His Claim of Divine Power.—He releases the Subjects of Otho from their Allegiance.—His Bull to put the Vaudois to Death.—The Inquisition.—Boniface VIII.—His Bull *Unam Sanctam*.—He caused a New Body of False Decretals to be composed.—Opposition of the Gallican Church.

WE shall leave our investigations incomplete, and our task unfinished, without further notice of the False Decretals and their contribution to the growth of the temporal power, inasmuch as the principles derived from them still remain a part of the canon law of Rome—those of the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX. being taken in part from them—and as the present struggles of the papacy and its Jesuit supporters are designed for the purpose of reviving and enforcing them wheresoever they can obtain the power to do so.

Although there were many good and pious Christians among the early popes and clergy of Rome, yet there was enough in the vicious habits of many of those who constituted the priesthood, at the time when these Decretals are alleged to have been dated, to justify the assignment of them to the popes whose names they bear. Many of them yielded to the influence of the example of Pope Victor, and the effect was apparent in their ambition and that of the clergy, which existed to such a degree that religion was almost entirely neglected, except in the mere ceremonial requirements of the Church. We have the authority of Eusebius—who is quoted by all Roman Catholic ecclesiastical authors as reliable authority—for the condition of the priesthood in his time. There is no other author whose history covers the times to which he refers, and as a leading prelate, and a member of the celebrated Council of Nice, he had ample opportunity for ascertaining the true condition of affairs. He says:

“But some that appeared to be our pastors, *deserting the law of piety*, were inflamed against each other with mutual strifes, only accumulating quarrels and threats, rivalry, hostility, and hatred to each other, only anxious to assert the government as a kind of sovereignty for themselves.” *

* “Eccl. Hist.,” by Eusebius, bk. viii., ch. i. At another place, in his “Book of Martyrs,” when speaking of the prelates of the Church, Eusebius says that he had “thought proper to pass by” other events than those related by him—that is, “particularly the circumstances of the different heads of the churches, who, from being shepherds of the reasonable flocks of Christ that did not govern in a lawful and becoming manner, were condemned, by divine justice, as unworthy of such a charge..... Moreover, the ambitions aspirings of many to office, and the injudicious and

unlawful ordinations that took place, the divisions among the confessors themselves, the great schisms and difficulties industriously fomented by the factious among the new members against the relics of the Church, devising one innovation after another, and unmercifully thrusting them into the midst of all these calamities, heaping up affliction upon affliction; all this, I say, I have resolved to pass by, judging it foreign to my purpose, wishing, as I said in the beginning, to shun and avoid giving an account of them.”—*Book of Martyrs*, ch. xii., pp. 374, 375.

And it is said by Cormanin that Marcellinus—who was pope in the year 304, and has been canonized as a saint even abjured the Christian religion, in order thereby to escape the persecution of the Emperor Diocletian! (Cormanin, vol. i., p. 48.) Even if these things were not true to the extent alleged, they were sufficiently so, beyond all question, to have had an injurious influence upon the cause of true piety, and to have placed the affairs of the Church in an unsettled and precarious condition, the precise extent of which it is now exceedingly difficult to ascertain. And this accounts, in a large measure, for the pertinacity with which these False Decretals have been assigned to those times.

Their authors well understood, at the date of their origin, and their defenders understand now, how easy it is to make history, and to make it acceptable to credulous minds, especially where there is no precise detail of facts to expose their falsehoods and assumptions. By all Roman Catholics who accept the teachings of the Church uninquiringly, these Decretals are regarded yet as true and genuine, because they have been put forth and endorsed by infallible popes, and because they are so instructed by their bishops and priests; while the bishops and priests deliberately employ them as the means of continuing their hierarchical power and authority, and thus gratifying their inordinate ambition.

Mosheim, after pointing out how different the ecclesiastical system of the ninth century was from that which prevailed in the ancient Church, says that the popes found it “necessary to produce the authority of ancient deeds to stop the mouths of such as were disposed to set bounds to their usurpations;” and he then proceeds:

“The bishops of Rome were aware of this; and as those means were deemed the most lawful that tended best to the accomplishment of their purposes, they employed some of their most ingenious and zealous partisans in *forging* conventions, acts of councils, epistles, and the like records, by which it might appear that in the first ages of the Church the Roman pontiffs were clothed with the same spiritual majesty and supreme authority which they now assumed.

Among these fictitious supports of the papal dignity the famous Decretal Epistles, as they are called, said to have been written by the pontiffs of the primitive time, deserve chiefly to be stigmatized. They were the production of an obscure writer, who fraudulently prefixed to them the name of Isidore, Bishop of Seville, to make the world believe that they had been collected by this illustrious and learned prelate. Some of them had appeared in the eighth century, but they were now entirely drawn from their obscurity, and produced, with an air of ostentation and triumph, to demonstrate the supremacy of the Roman pontiffs.

The decisions of a certain Roman Council, which is said to have been holden during the pontificate of Sylvester, were likewise alleged in behalf of the same cause; but this council had not been heard of before the present century, and the accounts now given of it proceeded from the same source with the Decretals, and were equally authentic. Be that as it may, the decrees of this pretended council

contributed much to enrich and aggrandize the Roman pontiffs, and exalt them above all human authority and jurisdiction.” (Maclaine’s “Mosheim’s Church History,” part ii., ch. ii., p. 216.)

Dean Milman, one of the most learned and reliable authors of the present times, says: “The False Decretals do not merely assert the supremacy of the popes—the dignity and privileges of the Bishop of Rome—they comprehend the whole dogmatic system and discipline of the Church, the whole hierarchy from the highest to the lowest degree, their sanctity and immunities, their persecutions, their disputes, their right of appeal to Rome.... But for the too manifest design, the aggrandizement of the see of Rome and the aggrandizement of the whole clergy in subordination to the see of Rome; but for the monstrous ignorance of history, which betrays itself in glaring anachronisms, and in the utter confusion of the order of events and the lives of distinguished men—the former awakening keen and jealous suspicion, the latter making the detection of the spuriousness of the whole easy, clear, irrefragable—the False Decretals might still have maintained their place in ecclesiastical history. They are now given up by all; not a voice is raised in their favor; the utmost that is done by those who cannot suppress all regret at their explosion is to palliate the guilt of the forger, to call in question or to weaken the influence which they had in their own day, and throughout the later history of Christianity.” (“Latin Christianity,” by Milman, vol. iii., pp. 59, 60.)

That they are now, and have been for many years, regarded as forgeries by candid Roman Catholics, even among the ultramontanes, is undoubtedly true. Marchetti says: “Learned men of great piety have declared against these false collections, which Cardinal Bona frankly calls a *pious fraud*.”

“Baronius does not as frankly regard them as a fraud; nevertheless, he would not use them in his ‘Ecclesiastical Annals,’ lest it should be believed that the Roman Church needed suspicious documents to establish her rights.”

Marchetti also says: “We may conjecture that Isidore gathered the decretals of ancient popes which the persecutions of the first centuries had not permitted to be collected, and that, animated by a desire to transmit the collection to posterity, he made such haste that he overlooked some faults and chronological errors, which were afterward corrected by a more exact criticism.” (*Apud* Abbe Guettee, in his late work on “The Papacy,” p. 258 (note).)

While they are here rejected as false, or, at least, as suspicious, there is an evident disinclination to give them up. Yet Fleury, the great Roman Catholic historian, is too frank to participate in the imposture or to exhibit any such inconsistency. He thus disposes of them:

“The subject—matter of these letters reveals their spuriousness. They speak of archbishops, primates, patriarchs, as as if these titles had existed from the birth of the Church. They forbid the holding of any council, even a provincial one, without permission from the pope, and represent appeals to Rome as habitual. Frequent complaint is therein made of usurpations of the temporalities of the Church. We find there this maxim, *that bishops falling into sin may, after having done penance, exercise their functions as before*. Finally, the principal subject of these Decretals is that of complaints against bishops; there is scarcely one that does not speak of them and give rules to make them difficult. And Isidore makes it very apparent in his preface that he had this matter deeply at heart.” (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Fleury, liv., xlv.; *apud* Guettee, p. 260 (note).)

The purpose and immediate effect of the False Decretals were shown in the last chapter, in the encyclicals, decrees, and letters of Pope Nicholas I. It was during his pontificate that they took” their place in the jurisprudence of Latin Christendom,” (“Latin Christianity,” by Milinai, vol. iii., p. 58.) by becoming an essential part of” the law of the Church.” He introduced them at Rome with true pontifical audacity, and the whole history of his pontificate shows that he regarded them as contributing material aid to his ambition. He did not hesitate to employ them, most unblushingly, as a justification for his outrageous blasphemies and usurpations. *

* “Soon after receiving the new implements forged in the *Isidorian workshop* (about 863 or 864), Nicholas met the doubts of the Frankish bishops with the assurance that the Roman Church had long preserved all those documents with honor in her archives, and that every writing of a pope, even if not part of the Dionysian collection of canons, was binding on the whole Church.”—The Pope and the Council, by “Janus,” p.80. See, also, Church of France, by Jervis, vol. i., p. 34. D’Aguesseau says that these Decretals may be “more correctly styled the body of the pope’s law than of the law of the Church.” *Apud* Jervis, Church of France, vol. i., p. 36 (note).

Now, when it is remembered that he did not—become pope till the year 858; that previous to that time nothing of the kind had been known to exist at Rome; and that the assumption of all—absorbing supremacy was based upon these palpable forgeries, he must be a bold man, and greatly insensible to shame, who will, in this enlightened and inquiring age, attempt to excuse or palliate his conduct. Even during his pontifical reign, powerful as he became, the French, or Gallican, bishops were not subdued by his threats of anathema and excommunication.

After the Synod of Metz, in France, had sustained the claims of Lothaire to his kingdom, which Nicholas was endeavoring to wrest from him, he tore up its decrees, pronounced it to be “an assembly of brigands and robbers,” and “declared the French prelates to be deprived of episcopal power.” He excommunicated and anathematized all who opposed the measures of his grasping ambition. But Gonthier, Metropolitan of Cologne; Teutgard, Archbishop of Treves; John of Ravenna, and “a great number of other bishops,” addressed him a letter, wherein they called him “infamous,” “a greedy robber,” “the murderer of Christians,” “iniquitous and cruel priest,” “sanguinary wolf,” “cowardly tyrant,” “the most infamous of the ministers of the temple of God,” “shameless cockatrice,” “venomous serpent,” “dog,” and by other names equally expressive of indignation and contempt; and concluded in these words:

BISHOPS DENOUNCE NICHOLAS I.

“We doubt neither thy venom nor thy bite; we have resolved with our brethren to tear thy sacrilegious decretals, thy impious bulls, and will leave thee to growl forth thy powerless thunders. Thou darest to accuse of impiety those who refuse from love to the faith to submit to thy sacrilegious laws! Thou who castest discord among Christians; thou who violatest evangelical peace, that immortal mark which Christ has placed upon the forehead of his Church; thou, execrable pontiff, who spits upon the book of thy God, thou darest to call us impious! How, then, wilt thou call the clergy which bends before thy power, those unworthy priests vomited forth from hell, and whose forehead is of wax, their heart of steel, and their sides are formed of the wine of Sodom and Gomorrah! Go to, these ministers are well made to crawl under thy abominable pride, in thy Rome, frightful Babylon, which thou callest the holy

city, eternal and infallible! Go to, *thy cohort of priests, soiled with adulteries, incests, rapes, and assassinations*, is well worthy to form *thy infamous court*; for Rome is the residence of demons, and *thou, pope, thou art its Satan.*” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 241.)

These bold and defiant words go to prove that there was, for a time at least, formidable opposition to the ambitious intrigues of the popes. The French and German clergy were so far removed from the neighborhood of Rome that they were slow to become the mere slaves of papal dictation. They looked rather to their own sovereigns for protection—which soon brought them all, sovereigns and subjects, under the pope’s censure and excommunication. And thus arose, out of these Decretals, that abhorrent and dangerous doctrine which so disgraced the Middle Ages, by which the popes claimed the power to release the subject from his allegiance to any disobedient prince, and to put any of the kingdoms under interdict, on account of matters merely temporal, and in no way concerning the faith of the Church.

An instance of this kind occurred under the pontificate of Adrian II., the immediate successor of Nicholas I. *

* Pope Adrian II. was a married man. His wife’s name was Stephanina. He had a daughter, who was stolen away by the son of another prelate!—CORMENIN, vol. i., p. 250; MILMAN, vol. iii., p. 67.

When Lothaire, King of Lorraine, died, he left no rightful heir to his kingdom; and a claim to it was set up by his brother Louis, who prevailed upon Adrian to espouse his cause and to interfere in his behalf by the employment of his pontifical authority. The pope wrote to the lords of Lorraine, not requesting merely, but commanding them to support the pretensions of Louis. He irreverently and impiously made this command “in the name of Christ,” and threatened all the metropolitans, dukes, and counts with excommunication in the event of their disobedience. He told them that, if they did not obey him, they should “be struck by the arms which God has placed in our [his] hands for the defense of this prince;” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 255; Milman, vol. iii., p. 71.) thus perverting the religious functions of his office by using them to accomplish ends entirely worldly.

Charles the Bald, in the mean time, seized upon the dominions of Lothaire, and was crowned King of Lorraine with the consent of the people, and by the bishops of the kingdom. Pope Adrian was greatly incensed. He declared that all who should assist Charles in his diabolical usurpation “would fall under anathema, and be given up to the companions of the devil.” He told the bishops of Lorraine that by the coronation of Charles “they were preparing him for hell.” (Milman, vol. iii., p. 71.)

While he did not accomplish anything by this impertinent intermeddling with the affairs of a government over which he had no legal control, yet he exhibited the purpose to interpose his pontifical power between Charles and his subjects, and thus to make himself master of their temporal affairs. That he did it under the claim of authority assumed by previous popes, and affirmed by the False Decretals, there is no reason to doubt. Milman says, “He quoted against the king the irrefragable authority of passages from the pseudo—Isidorian Decretals” that is, from the pretended letters of Popes Lucius and Stephen. (*Ibid.*, p. 76.)

ADRIAN II. STIRS UP REVOLT IN FRANCE.

And thus these miserable forgeries began early to bear their natural fruit. So strongly did Adrian rely upon them to sustain his presumptuous demands, that he ventured to censure Charles for having dared to insult his pontifical authority, and for not having prostrated himself at the feet of his legates! His letter to him concludes thus: "Impious king, we order thee to retire from the kingdom of Lorraine, and to surrender it to the Emperor Louis. If thou refusest submission to our will, we will ourselves go into France to excommunicate thee, and drive thee from thy wicked throne." (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 257.)

Finding Charles unmoved by his threats, Adrian sent legates into France to excite Carloman, the king's son, to revolt against his father—a favorite mode of procedure with the popes of that age, and which they tried to justify to themselves and the world upon the ground that the good of the Church required it, and therefore that God approved it. Carloman willingly entered into the papal plans; but he was arrested by Charles before they were carried into execution, and severely punished. Charles then sent the pope's legates back to Rome, accompanied by his own ambassadors, who bore a letter from Hinemar, Archbishop of Rheims, on his own behalf and that of the French bishops, in which Adrian was severely censured, and given to understand, in plain and most emphatic terms, that neither his anathemas nor excommunications would prevent Charles from holding on to the kingdom of Lorraine. At this the pope became perfectly infuriated, and immediately wrote to Charles, calling him an "execrable prince," ordering him to surrender Lorraine to Carloman, whose treason he had already excited, and informing him that if he did not, he would send his legate into his "accursed kingdom" to deal with him as he should think proper. He commanded the French lords not to take up arms in defense of their king, the French bishops not to obey his orders—all "under the penalty of excommunication and eternal damnation."

Charles now became irritated "by the audacity and insolence of this letter," and instructed Archbishop Hinemar to give the pope to understand, in unmistakable terms, and without further equivocation, that he would no longer submit to this unwarrantable interference with the domestic affairs of France. Among other things, Hinemar's letter in behalf of the king contained these strong words:

"We are established by God sovereign over the people, and are armed with a twofold sword, to strike the wicked and defend the good." Bold as the pope was, and secure as he felt himself to be, in that ignorant and superstitious age, under the protection of the False Decretals, he now became alarmed at the intrepidity of the King of France. He knew that Hinemar had counseled the king to separate France from Italy, on account, mainly, of the controversy between the pope and the Gallican Christians, and he greatly dreaded this result, on account of the fact that the withdrawal of French protection would expose Rome to powerful and vindictive enemies in other directions. He was anxious to hold on to France by means of the alliance formed by his predecessors with Pepin and Charlemagne, and govern its kings, at least to the extent of being able to employ their military strength in defense of the papacy; but finding Charles not disposed to bow before him, either his courage failed him, or he resolved upon practicing such duplicity as other popes besides him have well understood how to employ. In this art he was a perfect adept. Consequently, he intermediately retracted everything he had said against Charles in a letter which, as a specimen of papal insincerity and hypocrisy, has scarcely a parallel.

It shows how unreliable has been the judgment of at least one of the great popes about the duty which men owe to God. What it is one day it is not the next, accordingly as the pope's views of temporal policy may change, or as the papacy is the gainer or the loser! Here is what he said to the king:

“Prince Charles, we have been apprised by virtuous persons that you are the most zealous protector of churches in the world; that there exists not in your immense kingdom any bishopric or monastery on which you have not heaped wealth, and we know that you honor the see of St. Peter, and that you desire to spread your liberality on his vicar, and to defend him against all his enemies.

“We consequently retract our former decisions, recognizing that you have acted with justice in punishing a guilty son and a prelatical (prelate) debauchee, and in causing yourself to be declared sovereign of Lorraine and Burgundy. We renew to you the assurance that we, the clergy, the people, and the nobility of Rome, wait with impatience for the day on which you shall be declared king, patrician, emperor, and defender of the Church. *We, however, beseech you to keep this letter a secret from your nephew Louis.*” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 259.)

Thus we see how these False Decretals became a part of the canon law of Rome, how they were expressly prepared in aid of papal ambition, and how unblushingly they were employed to justify perfidious popes in assuming, as one of their official prerogatives derived from Peter, the right to dictate the temporal policy of governments, to make and unmake kings, and to require universal obedience; such obedience as should be prescribed by an ecclesiastical hierarchy raised above all human laws, entitled to commit the highest crimes, and to perpetrate all sorts of wrongs with impunity and without responsibility to any tribunals except those which were the mere passive and submissive tools of the papal will.

True, the blow aimed by Adrian II. at the rights of the French king recoiled upon his own head, and taught him that the Gallican Christians, under the lead of Hincmar, were not as easily reduced to obedience as were those of Italy, upon whose necks he had already planted his pontifical heel. But his immediate successor, John VIII., endeavored to recover from the effects of this recoil, and to regain the ground he had lost by recognizing the refractory Charles as the legitimate sovereign of Lorraine and Burgundy. This he resolved to do, if possible, by imitating the perfidious policy of Adrian; so as to bring Charles, by flattery, into the meshes of his pontifical net—a result which he well understood could not be accomplished by threats. Accordingly, he offered to make him “the protector of the Holy See,” and for that purpose invited him to Rome. Charles could not resist the temptation, and, upon going to Rome, was crowned emperor by the pope, who, true to the papal policy, took care to say to him, as he placed the crown upon his brow, “Do not forget, prince, that *the popes have the right to create emperors!*” (*Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 260.)

Charles was overcome by his ambition, and by accepting the crown upon these conditions reduced the empire over which he presided to the humiliating condition of a fief to the Holy See, and gave his sanction to the custom of crowning emperors by the popes; and, in the end, to the recognition of their authority over all the governments and temporal affairs of Europe. With what complacency such examples as this are referred to by the papal writers in proof of the pope's supremacy! An agreement between kings and popes that they shall jointly govern all mankind is held up to the world as a part of the law of God! Shall this example of the ninth century be repeated in the nineteenth? Or shall those

who are now seeking to repeat it be rebuked by the voice of popular indignation, which shall ring in their ears so long as they shall live?

But the end sought for was only reached by slow degrees and by gradual usurpations. It took many years of severe struggle on the part of the popes to consummate it, by the abolition of the old and the introduction of the new ecclesiastical system founded upon the pseudo—Isidorian Decretals. It required the combined intellect, courage, and unbending will of the three great popes, Gregory VII., Alexander III., and Innocent III., to do what all the other popes were unable to accomplish; that is, to elevate the papacy above all the nations, and place emperors and kings at their feet.

The author of “The Pope and the Council”—a book that deserves careful study, not merely because of the great ability it displays, but because it is written by a Roman Catholic, though opposed to papal infallibility—thus speaks of the times following immediately after the pontificates of Nicholas I., Adrian II., and John VIII.:

“Nearly three centuries passed before the seed sown produced its full harvest. For almost two hundred years, from the death of Nicholas I. to the time of Leo IX., the Roman See was in a condition which did not allow of any systematic acquisition and enforcement of new or extended rights. For above sixty years (883—955) the Roman Church was enslaved and degraded, while the Apostolic See became the prey and the plaything of rival factions of the nobles, and for a long time of ambitious and profligate women. It was only renovated for a brief interval (997-1003) in the persons of Gregory V. and Sylvester II., by the influence of the Saxon emperor. Then the papacy sunk back into utter confusion and moral impotence; the Tuscan counts made it hereditary in their family; again and again dissolute boys, like John XII. * and Benedict IX.,(#) occupied and disgraced the apostolic throne, which was now bought and sold like a piece of merchandise; and at last three popes fought for the tiara, until the Emperor Henry III. put an end to the scandal by elevating a German bishop to the see of Rome.” (“The Pope and the Council,” by “Janus,” pp. 80, 81.)

* John XII. was made pope A.D. 956, when he did not exceed eighteen years of age, and some authors represent him as only twelve. He was exceedingly dissolute, and was accused of incest with his own mother! Baronius, the great annalist, calls him “an abortion. “—CORMENIN, vol. i., p. 292.

Benedict IX. became pope A.D. 1033, at twelve years of age. He was driven from Rome; and Sylvester III. was made pope A.D. 1044. Sylvester was driven out by Benedict, at the end of about three months, when the latter again mounted the pontifical throne. He then sold the tiara, for fifteen thousand pounds of gold, to John XX., who entered upon the pontificate A.D. 1045. Benedict soon dissipated the money, when he retook the “chair of Peter” from John—thus making three “vicars” at the same time! They finally agreed to hold their orgies together, and “filled Rome with adultery, robbery, and murder,” and finally united in selling the pontificate to Gregory VI., and concluded the bargain “on the very altar of Christ itself!” Clement II. succeeded Gregory VI., when Benedict IX., “at the head of a troop of brigands,” again seized the throne. The emperor then made Damasus II. pope; and Benedict, getting rid of him by poison in a few days, once more placed the tiara upon his brow. The Emperor of Germany then put an end to these disgraceful scenes by giving the pontificate to Leo IX.—Ibid., pp. 328, etc.

The emperor having, by virtue of his temporal sovereignty over the empire (including Italy), obtained this recognized authority over the popes, they became, from necessity, more subject to Teutonic than to the Frankish influences by which they had been directed from the time of their alliance with Pepin and

Charlemagne. The Saxon and Salique emperors had by that time placed Germany in the very front rank of the nations; and although the German people were devoted, from education and habit, to the Roman Catholic religion, even then they gave occasional evidences of that natural love of freedom which has since enabled them to reach a condition of superiority over the Latin races, and to assert principles which have become essential to all the advancing and progressive governments of the world. The emperors protected the popes of their own creation with strong hands; and but for this, it is almost certain that the Church at Rome would have been overwhelmed by Italian corruption, and have sunk out of sight. ("Hist. of the Popes," by Ranke, p. 23.)

After the Emperor Henry III. had placed Leo IX., a German, in the pontifical chair, in preference to an Italian, it became well understood by all the aspirants for that position that, in whatsoever manner selected, no pope could be recognized as such without his consent. He swayed his temporal scepter over all parts of the empire, including the city of Rome. But this condition of affairs was submitted to by the Italians from necessity, not choice; and influences designed to counteract it were readily contrived. Among those most conspicuous in these counter—movements was the celebrated Hildebrand, afterward Pope Gregory VII., who employed all his acknowledged ability in the endeavor to persuade even the German popes that it was beneath their dignity to accept the tiara from a temporal prince. His ambition led him to abandon his cloistered life, that he might put himself into a position ultimately to become pope, and by these means he hoped to lay the foundation of that system of measures out of which subsequently arose, under his skillful management, that vast pontifical power which he wielded with so much success over emperors, kings, and peoples. For more than a quarter of a century before he became pope—passing through the reigns of eight popes—Hildebrand exercised a larger share of influence at Rome than any other man, not a pope, had ever done before. This commanding position was owing to his great courage, superior talents, and unbending will all of which were employed to gratify his inordinate ambition.

His leading and most cherished object was to overthrow the power of the emperors and establish the papal supremacy, not only at Rome, but elsewhere throughout the world. While Henry III. lived, he practiced his intrigues with great caution; but at his death, when Henry IV. became emperor, at five years of age, he took advantage of his minority, and more openly and daringly avowed his purpose. Although the popes Leo IX., Victor II., Stephen IX., Nicholas II., and Alexander II. all held their positions with the consent of these emperors, yet none of them was able to conduct the affairs of the Church upon any other policy than that dictated by Hildebrand, before whom they were all dwarfed into comparative insignificance. And when he himself became pope as Gregory VII., he had laid his plans so skillfully, that, while also compelled to obtain the assent of Henry IV. to his pontifical ordination, he had very clearly marked out his way to ultimate success.

He took his place at once in the very front rank of the leading men of his age. Like some giant oak which overshadows all the lesser trees of the forest, he rose to an immense height above all around him, and so impressed all Europe by the superiority of his intellect, that it required centuries to get rid of the influences of his pontificate. No man in history has received more fulsome praise or more violent censure; and while this is not the place to inquire which of these he most deserved, it cannot be denied that among all his other qualities none distinguished him so much as his ambition—his desire to make

the papacy the governing and controlling power of the whole world, in both spiritual and temporal affairs. In this aspect of his character alone is it now proposed to view him.

Gregory VII. commenced his pontificate by asserting the right to dispose of kingdoms, in imitation of the example set by Pope Gregory I., nearly four hundred years before. He granted to the Count of Champagne, in consideration of large sums of money, the right to conquer the kingdom of Arragon; and authorized him and other lords to seize upon the territory held by the Saracens and erect it into an independent kingdom, subordinate to the papacy. He quarreled with Philip, King of France, and threatened him with anathema if he refused to obey him. He concerted measures to force all the bishops and priests of the Church to the practice of celibacy, so that, separated from all family and domestic influences, they might constitute a great army, thoroughly and entirely devoted to the papacy. He roused up all the superstitious populations of Europe to undertake a holy war, by marching to Palestine and wresting it from the hands of the infidel; and failed to execute this purpose only because he feared the power of the Emperor of Germany, who opposed it. He took from the King of France the power of investing bishops, and excommunicated him for his resistance to his will. He directed the bishops of France to put the whole kingdom under interdict, and to tell the king, if he persisted in his refusal to obey him, that “the thunders of St. Peter will strike him, as God before struck Satan.” He summoned Henry IV. to appear before a council in Rome, under penalty of anathema, in case of disobedience; and when Henry threatened him in turn, he issued his bull of excommunication against him not because of his want of devotion to the faith of the Church, but on account of their differences upon questions merely temporal.

In this celebrated bull he appealed to the “holy mother of God, St. Paul, and all the saints in heaven,” to witness his sincerity, and then declared: “But since I have reached this throne by your grace, I believe that it is your will that Christian people should obey me, by virtue of the power which you [St. Peter] have transmitted to me of binding and loosing in heaven and on earth. Thus, for the safety of the Church, and in the name of God all—powerful, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, I prohibit Henry, who by reason of an unheard of pride has elevated himself against us, from governing the kingdoms of Germany and Italy. I free all Christians from the oaths which they have taken to him, and I prohibit all from serving him as king; for he who would oppose our authority deserves to lose his crown, his liberty, and his life. I burden Henry, then, with anathema and malediction; I devote him to the execration of men, and I deliver up his soul to Satan, in order that the people may know that the sovereign pontiff is the rock upon which the Son of the living God has built his Church, and that the gates of hell shall never prevail against it.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 370; “See of Rome in the Middle Ages,” by Reichel, p. 208; “Latin Christianity,” by Milman, vol. iii., pp. 437, 438.)

Gregory, far too bold for disguise, does not here pretend, as do many of the modern papists, that his right to interfere in the domestic affairs of Germany, so far as to dethrone the emperor and release all his subjects from their allegiance to him, was derived from the consent of the nations or from any human authority. He placed it upon the ground where the present pope and all his hierarchy understand it to rest; that is, upon the power to bind and loose—the power of the keys—as derived directly from God. In this sense he regarded it as a power sufficiently great and omnipotent to absorb all other power upon earth, by the possession of which, as the successor of Peter, he had the right to make and unmake kings, to construct and reconstruct governments, to wrest from those who disobeyed him all the

territory held by them, and to bestow it upon those who would hold it in subjection to his authority, and to do any and everything, no matter what, necessary to put the whole world under his feet. He had deliberately formed the purpose of creating an absolute and universal monarchy in the Church, and a no less extensive and despotic civil monarchy which should overshadow all existing nations, and had the courage to declare that he was acting in obedience to the commands of God, who had given him, as his earthly vicar, full power over all mankind, so that he could open or close the gates of heaven or of hell to them at his pleasure. He desired to bind all the people of every nation by a bond of allegiance to the Roman pontiffs, as the successors of Peter, so that all the contests in which nations or men should become involved should be settled at Rome, where the sole power of arbitrament and decision should exist. (Maclaine's Mosheim, part ii., bch. ii., p. 269.)

And the ground upon which he rested this enormous claim of authority shows that he had no other idea in his mind than that it rightfully belonged to him as the head of the Roman Catholic Church. He placed his right to command Philip of France expressly upon the ground that both that country and the soul of the king "were under the dominion of St. Peter," by virtue of his right "to bind and loose, in heaven and upon earth," well knowing, as he did, that the popes were indebted for all their dignity and dominion to the French princes, Pepin, Charlemagne, and their successors.

He pretended that Saxony was held as a fief in subjection to the papacy, because Charlemagne had given it as a pious offering to St. Peter. He maintained that Spain was the property of the Apostolic See; and that he had the right, by virtue of divine appointment, to exact homage of the Emperor of Germany, and the Kings of England, Hungary, Denmark, Poland, Russia, and all the powers and principalities of Europe, and to release their subjects from their allegiance in case of refusal, because they were all held in the same right. (Maclaine's Mosheim, part ii., chap. ii., p. 270.) Therefore, when he found that there were many refractory bishops who were unwilling to be drawn away from the support of their own kings, he endeavored to incite them to disobedience and revolt, by such letters as the following, which he addressed to the Bishop of Metz:

"As for those who maintain that kings cannot be legitimately deposed by popes, I refer them to the words and the example of the fathers; and they will learn that St. Peter said, 'Be ye always ready to punish the guilty, whatever their rank.' Let them consider the motives which induced Pope Zachary to depose King Childeric, and to free all the Franks from their oath of fidelity. Let them learn that St. Gregory in his Decretals [A.D. 590—604] not only excommunicated the lords and kings who opposed the execution of his orders, but that he even deprived them of their power. Let them not forget that St. Ambrose himself drove from the temple the Emperor Theodosius, calling him a profane man, sacrilegious, and a murderer.

"Perhaps these miserable slaves of kings would maintain that God, when he said to St. Peter, 'Feed my lambs,' excepted princes; but we will demonstrate that Christ, in giving to the apostle power to bind and loose men, *excepted no one*. The Holy See has absolute power over all spiritual things: why should it not also rule temporal affairs? God reigns in the heavens; *his vicar should reign over all the earth*. These senseless wretches, however, maintain that the royal is above the episcopal dignity. Are they, then, ignorant that the name of king was invented by human pride, and that the title of bishop was instituted by Christ? St. Ambrose affirms that the episcopate is superior to royalty, as gold is superior to a viler metal." (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 371; Milman's "Latin Christianity," vol. iii., p. 445.)

Here we have an example of the manner in which precedent may be made an apology for the most flagrant usurpation. Without pretense of authority for the construction he gave to the words of Christ when he conferred the power to bind and loose upon the apostles, except that derived from the examples of Popes Gregory I. and Zachary, the bold ambition of Gregory VII. prompted him to declare that this was sufficient for his purpose. He reached this conclusion manifestly because he regarded all popes, both good and bad, as infallible, and therefore incapable of error. In the same way the whole system of papal supremacy is built up: *one pope proving the existence of his enormous spiritual and temporal power by another!*

Thus, after the pontificate of Gregory VII. had ended, Alexander III. added him to the list of examples; and then Innocent III. added Alexander; and Boniface VIII. added Innocent; and now, in the nineteenth century, and in the face of all its progress, when the list is brought down to Pius IX., he invokes, in support of the doctrines of the Encyclical and Syllabus of 1864, the examples of all his “illustrious predecessors!”

Gregory VII. carried his interference in the affairs of Germany further than merely issuing papal bulls against Henry IV. He succeeded in stirring up revolt against him among the German nobles, who elevated Rudolph, Duke of Suabia, to the imperial throne, in opposition to Henry. The pope issued a decree in favor of Rudolph, again declaring Henry dispossessed of the crown, invoking upon his head the thunders of heaven, and declaring Rudolph “the lawful king of the Teutonic States.” Then, addressing St. Peter and St. Paul, he said:

“Now, blessed St. Peter and St. Paul, let the world know, by giving victory to Rudolph, that you can bind and loose in heaven; that you can give or take away empires, kingdoms, principalities, duchies, marquisates, countships, and the goods of all men; finally, that you take from the unworthy and bestow on the good, the pontificate, primacies, archbishoprics, and bishoprics. Let the people know that you judge spiritual things, and that you have an absolute power over temporal affairs; that you can curb the demons who are the counselors of princes, and annihilate kings and the powerful of the earth. Display, then, your greatness and your power, and let the world now tremble before the redoubtable orders of your Church. Cause especially the sword of your justice promptly to strike the head of the criminal Henry, in order that all Christians may learn that he has been stricken by your will.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 375.)

Notwithstanding this solemn appeal to Heaven— this impious invocation of the apostles in favor of his political intrigues in Germany—the prayer of the pope was not heard, the empire of Germany was not taken from its legitimate possessor, and the world did not tremble before the thunders of the Vatican! The pride of Henry, which had been sorely wounded by his former humiliation by Gregory, became excited; and the slumbering energies of the German people became aroused at this insolent attempt to place them at the feet of the papacy. Henry raised a large army, overthrew Rudolph— who lost his life in battle—marched to Rome, convened a council of German ecclesiastics and nobles, deposed Gregory, and placed the Metropolitan of Ravenna upon the pontifical throne, under the name of Clement III. (*Ibid.*; “Hist. of the Catholic Church,” by Noethen, p. 340.)

After many varying fortunes, Gregory was enabled to drive the anti—pope Clement from the throne, but he soon sunk under the tremendous load which pressed upon him, and in the year 1085 died,

uttering these words: “No, my hatred is implacable. I curse the pretended Emperor Henry, the anti—pope Guibert, and the reprobates who sustain them. I absolve and bless *the simple who believe that a pope has power to bind and loose.*” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 377.)

WHATEVER THE POPE COMMANDS IS RIGHT.

One other explanation by Gregory VII. of the principles upon which he acted will enable the reader to form a just appreciation of his character and ambition. It is given by Cormenin in these words:

“‘God is a spirit,’ says Gregory; ‘he rules matter; thus *the spiritual is above the temporal power.* The pope is the representative of God on earth; he should, then, govern the world. To him alone pertain infallibility and universality; all men are submitted to his laws, and he can only be judged by God; he ought to wear imperial ornaments; people and kings should kiss his feet; Christians are irrevocably submitted to his orders; *they should murder their princes, fathers, and children if he commands it;* no council can be declared universal without the orders of the pope; no book can be received as canonical without his authority; finally, no good or evil exists but in what he has condemned or approved.’” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 377.)

Thus understanding the principles of this great pope, we are the better enabled to press our inquiries one step further, in order to understand the source of these principles, and the method adopted by him to justify and enforce them. And here, again, the exhaustive work of “Janus” comes to our assistance. This author says:

“Gregory collected about him by degrees the right men for elaborating his system of Church law. Anselm of Lucca, nephew of Pope Alexander II., compiled the most important and comprehensive work, at his command, between 1080 and 1086. Anselm may be called the founder of the new Gregorian system of Church law, first, by extracting and putting into convenient working shape everything in the Isidorian forgeries serviceable for the papal absolutism; next, by altering the law of the Church, through a tissue of fresh inventions and interpolations, in accordance with the requirements of his party and the standpoint of Gregory.

Then came Deusdedit, whom Gregory made a cardinal, with some more inventions. At the same time Bonizo compiled his work, the main object of which was to exalt the papal prerogatives. The forty propositions or titles of this part of his work correspond entirely to Gregory’s ‘Dictatus,’ and the materials supplied by Anselm and Deusdedit.” (“Janus,” pp. 82, 83.)

This same author then goes on to show how, by these old and new forgeries, all based upon the pseudo—Isidorian Decretals, authority was found to justify every claim set up by the pope; how the pretended decrees of the popes were put in the place of the canons of councils, to supply all existing deficiencies; how they were made to justify the claim of Gregory of the right to give or take away kingdoms at his pleasure; how the bishops were made gods, so that no human tribunal could judge them; how even the lower clergy were made higher and more powerful than secular monarchs; and how Deusdedit, one of the forgers, falsely attributed to Boniface, the Apostle of Germany, the abominable sentiment that, “Even if a pope is so bad that he drags down whole nations to hell with him in troops, nobody can rebuke him; for he who judges all can be judged of no man: the only exception is in case of his swerving from the faith.” (“Janus,” p. 92.)

The main object of Gregory, and of all these forgeries, was to bring the Church to the point of recognizing the doctrine of papal infallibility as absolutely necessary to salvation. To accomplish this it was indispensable that the pope should, individually and personally, absorb all the powers of the Church, so that his decrees should become the law for the government of all Christians, without the aid or consent of either general or provincial councils. In the earlier ages general councils had always been assembled whenever it was necessary to settle questions of faith or discipline, and the canon law of the Church was rightfully composed only of their enactments.

Previous to the pontificate of Gregory there had been eight of these. The Council of Nice, in the year 325, condemned Arianism. The first of Constantinople, in 381, condemned the heresy of Macedonius. The Council of Ephesus, in 431, condemned the heresy of Nestorius. The Council of Chalcedon, in 451, condemned the heresy of Eutyches. The second of Constantinople, in 553, acted upon the disagreements between the Eastern and Western Christians. The third of Constantinople, in 682, condemned the Monothelite heresy. The second Council of Nice, in 757, condemned the Iconoclast heresy. And the fourth Council of Constantinople, in 869, deposed the Patriarch Photius, and restored Ignatius to his see.

None of these councils would have been held, or would have been necessary, if the doctrine of papal infallibility had prevailed in the apostolic times, or for centuries afterward. But Gregory was not satisfied with this old order of things—with the principles which prevailed before the Church of Rome was contaminated by the influence of papal ambition. Like those secular despots who governed their nations by laws of their own creation, without asking the assent of lords, nobles, or people, he resolved upon governing the Church without the consent of bishops, clergy, or laymen; in other words, to put himself in the place of God, as the sole dispenser of all spiritual and temporal authority. He loved absolutism because it gave him power, and he exercised power so as to make papal absolutism complete and universal. Therefore, he was the first pope who attempted the degradation of civil potentates, the first who “lifted the sacerdotal lance against the royal diadem.” (“Var. of Popery,” by Edgar, p. 217.)

And it should excite no surprise when we find him appealing “to the first forged document that came to hand as a solid proof” (“Janus,” p. 114.) of the lawfulness of his usurpations; or that he set up the false pretense that Charlemagne had made all France and Saxony tributary to the Holy See, and declared that there were documents in proof of it preserved in the archives of St. Peter’s! (*Ibid.*)

Great as he was, he had that bad ambition which has so often left its blighting influence upon the world, and which prompts its possessor to justify the means by the end in view. By the impious employment of sacred things to bring about mere temporal results, he left an example the influence of which has not yet died away at Rome. And, if his pontificate may yet be justly referred to as one of exceeding brilliancy and splendor, and if he may be pointed out as one of the cherished saints of the Church, to be loved and imitated by the faithful, the “truth of history” assigns this position to him only because the world judges by results, not details.

If we look only at the luster which rested upon the brow of the pagan Caesar, we are dazzled by its splendor; yet if we pause to inquire how he won the diadem, we almost hear the groans of the multitude of victims who were crushed beneath his heel. So, if we search accurately the history of this papal

Caesar, we shall find him reaching his lofty eminence by trampling the most holy and sacrethings under his feet, by giving way to the promptings of an unholy and unjust ambition, and by setting such an example as led to the corruption of subsequent popes, and the demoralization of nearly the entire clergy.

The successors of Gregory VII. not only adopted his principles, but followed his example, so far as they were permitted by surrounding circumstances to do so. Urban II. (1088—1099) incited a crusade against the infidels in Palestine by holding out “the spoils” of victory as an inducement. Calixtus II. (1118—1124) gave to a monk the authority to subjugate the Church of England to the court of Rome, and of re-establishing his authority in France. Innocent II. (1130—1143) hurled his anathemas at the head of Arnold of Brescia because he preached against the effeminate and corrupt lives of the priests and monks. Adrian IV. (1154—1159) excommunicated the King of Sicily, and granted the crown of Ireland to the King of England. *

* A feeble effort has been recently made to break the force of this important fact by a flat denial. The Rev. Father Burke, an Irish priest of great eloquence, in reply to a statement made by Mr. Froude, solemnly and fearlessly asserts “that Pope Adrian never issued any such document,” basing this positive statement mainly upon the ground that it was not heard of until about twenty years after its alleged date.—*Ireland’s Case stated, in Reply to Mr. Froude*, by Burke, lect. i., p. 36.

Bold affirmation of this sort may serve the purpose of a popular lecture, especially when delivered to an excited and sympathizing audience, but it amounts to very little against the weight of historic evidence. To say nothing of the numerous Protestant authorities in support of this grant, it is well attested by Roman Catholic historians. Lingard admits it, and states that it was read to a synod of Irish bishops, and afterward caused Roderic, King of Connaught, to hold his crown under the English king as long as he was faithful to him and paid tribute. He also shows that, in 1175, this grant was confirmed by Pope Alexander III., which last grant Father Burke also tries to prove a forgery.—*History of England*, by Lingard, vol. ii., p. 94.

The Rev. Father Thebaud, a Jesuit, is the author of a very instructive work, published in 1873, entitled “The Irish Race in the Past and the Present,” in which he speaks of the grant of Adrian without denying it. He says it was not known to Pope Clement III. (1187—1191). He admits that when Henry II. sent his army into Ireland, the Irish people or clans and their chieftains acknowledged his authority, but thinks they did not do it in the feudal sense, claiming for them, what is probably true, that their pledge “to do homage” to the English king did not deprive them of their right to live in the Pale if they chose, and to be governed by the Brehon law (pp. 138-145).

A “*History of Ireland*” was published only a few years ago (1868), written by Miss M. F. Cusack, “Nun of Kenmare,” in which the existence of Adrian’s grant is spoken of as an undoubted fact. It is said that it was made by the pope because he was an Englishman. The author subjoins the original bull in a note, wherein she says, “There can be no reasonable doubt of the authenticity of this document.” She further says that it was published by Baronius, from the “Codex Vaticanus,” and annexed to a brief addressed by Pope John XXII. (1316-1334) to Edward II.; also that John of Salisbury states in his “Metalogicus” that he obtained the bull from Adrian (p. 275, n. 6).

All these things were done *in the name of religion*, by its perversion to uses never contemplated by Christ or the apostles. The character of St. Peter was wholly changed; instead of being a minister of peace and love, sent forth without staff or scrip to preach the Gospel, he was transformed into a temporal prince, ambitiously striving after the conquest and subjugation of the world!

The Gratian Decretals made their appearance about the middle of the twelfth century. (“Janus,” p. 115.) These were issued from Bologna, then renowned for having the best law school in Europe, and were put forth under the sanction of the highest ecclesiastical authority. They too, like their predecessors, were full of forgeries—all designed to promote the cause of papal absolutism. “Janus” says of them:

“In this work the Isidoian forgeries were combined with those of the Gregorian writers, Deusdedit, Anselm, Gregory of Pavia, and with Gratian’s own additions. His work displaced all the older collections of canon law, and became the manual and repertory, not for canonists only, but for the scholastic theologians, who, for the most part, derived all their knowledge of fathers and councils from it. No book has ever come near it in its influence in the Church, although there is scarcely another so choke-full of gross errors, both intentional and unintentional. All these fabrications—the rich harvest of three centuries—Gratian inserted, in good faith, into his collection; but he also added, knowingly and deliberately, a number of fresh corruptions, all in the spirit and interest of the papal system.” (Janus,” p.116.)

A brief enumeration of a few of the principles, which by these new forgeries of Gratian became a part of the canon law of the Roman Church, will serve to illustrate still further the manner in which the papal system has grown. A system of religious persecution was elaborated. *Protection was given by the Church to homicides and murderers, when the acts were done in behalf of the papal cause.* It was made not only lawful, but a duty, to “constrain men to goodness, and therefore to faith, and to what was then reckoned matter of faith, by all means of physical compulsion, and particularly to torture and execute heretics, and confiscate their property.” It was provided that whosoever should kill an excommunicated person out of zeal to the Church was by no means a murderer; because all who are declared “bad” by the Church authorities “are not only to be scourged, but executed.” All who “dared to disobey a papal command, or speak against a papal decision or doctrine,” were made heretics.

The pope was placed upon an equality with Christ; these Decretals declaring that, “as Christ submitted to the law on earth, though in truth he was its Lord, so *the pope is high above all laws of the Church, and can dispose of them as he will, since they derive all their force from him alone.*” (Ibid., pp.119-121.)

If the reader has kept in mind the principles embodied in the false Isidorian Decretals, as well as those of the Gregorian code, and will add to them these equally flagrant forgeries of Gratian, he will be able to comprehend what was meant by the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church about the middle of the twelfth century, *and what is still meant by it!* It took more than a thousand years, from the close of the apostolic era, for these principles to grow and expand into the wonderful proportions they had then acquired; and even then the popes were indebted to the basest and most palpable forgeries for their existence.

ARNOLD OF BRESCIA BURNED TO DEATH.

Adrian IV. became pope in the year 1154. When Frederick Barbarossa, the Emperor of Germany, consented to be crowned by the pope, he made a concession to the papal authority which greatly flattered the pride and aroused the ambition of Adrian. But, besides his cession of Ireland to England, his pontificate was distinguished by nothing else so much as the conviction and execution of Arnold of Brescia, by burning, on account of his denunciation of the corruptions of the Roman priesthood. *

* Arnold was a republican, and opposed the whole hierarchical system, including the temporal power of the pope. He was condemned to silence by a council at Rome, and banished; but was finally seized and carried back to Rome, where, “by the judgment of the clergy,” he was “executed by the officer of the pope.”—MILMAN’S *Latin Christianity*, vol. iv., pp. 270, 271.

The forged Decretals were just beginning to bear fresh fruits—most palatable to the papal taste, because it was considered necessary to the further and successful growth of the papacy that every voice, like that of Arnold’s, which cried out for reform should be hushed, and that every arm raised against papal usurpation should be stricken down.

Alexander III. was his immediate successor—equally ambitious, and far more bold and daring. At the time of his election an anti-pope was also elected, who took the name of Victor IV.—the pontificate having become the object of most disgraceful struggles between rival aspirants. Frederick Barbarossa was at that time prosecuting a war in Lombardy, and Alexander III. commanded him not to press his conquests any further, unless he desired to incur the censures of the Church. Frederick paid no attention to these threats, but summoned both Alexander and Victor to appear before a council at Pavia, where it was proposed to decide which of them was the rightful claimant of the tiara. Alexander treated the order of the emperor with as much disdain as his own had received, and both anathematized and excommunicated Frederick, declaring that “*the power of the popes is superior to that of princes.*” The council, however, assembled and decided in favor of Victor IV., who was crowned at Pavia, and recognized as pope by the bishops and clergy of Germany and Lombardy.

Alexander now excommunicated Frederick the second time, and declared all his subjects freed from their oath of fidelity to him. This, like his former excommunication, was without effect upon the emperor, but it surrounded Alexander with embarrassments which would have crushed a less courageous man. With the Emperor of Germany, and the kings of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Lombardy recognizing Victor as the pope, and without any other support than the doubtful and hesitating alliance of the kings of France and England, Alexander III. bore up against the pressure with wonderful ability. Though unable to reach the papal palace in Rome, he was, nevertheless, “every inch a king”—bold, firm, and defiant. Such persistent courage rarely fails in the accomplishment of its object, whether good or bad.

At the death of Victor, which occurred in the year 1164, after the schism had lasted about five years, the whole aspect of affairs underwent a change. The exactions of Frederick in Lombardy had caused a formidable party to be formed against him there, and Alexander, taking advantage of the disaffection, was enabled, by the use of money, to buy his way into the city of Rome. Seated now upon the chair of Peter, and without a rival, he was able to turn his attention to the difficulties between the Holy See and the King of England, growing out of the exertions of Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, to bring that country into complete obedience to Rome. This he did so effectually, that in a short time he had the satisfaction of seeing the English king completely humiliated before him, begging his pontifical protection, and disgracefully swearing that he would “*submit always to the Roman Church,*” and requiring his sons to do the same.

The contest between Alexander and Frederick was long and fierce. The emperor marched into Italy with his army, but was repulsed. At one time a pestilence swept off his soldiers so rapidly, before the Walls of Rome, that he was compelled to retreat, which strengthened Alexander, on account of the popular belief that it was the work of the Divine hand. At last Frederick was driven to the necessity of submitting to terms of peace with the pope; and, when these had been agreed upon, he went to Venice to meet Alexander, from whom he humiliatingly begged absolution and forgiveness. The following account of this disgraceful scene is copied by Cormenin from the historian Fortunatus Ulmnus:

“When the emperor arrived in the presence of the pope, he laid aside his imperial mantle, and knelt on both knees, with his breast on the earth. Alexander advanced and placed his foot on his neck, while the cardinals thundered forth in loud tones, ‘Thou shalt tread upon the cockatrice, and crush the lion and the dragon.’ (Psalm 91:13.) Frederick exclaimed: ‘Pontiff, this prediction was made of St. Peter, and not of thee!’ ‘Thou liest,’ replied Alexander; ‘it is written of the apostle and of me;’ and, bearing all the weight of his body on the neck of the prince, he compelled him to silence. He then permitted him to rise, and gave him his blessing; after which the whole assembly thundered forth the ‘Te Deum.’” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 444.)

The next day Frederick Barbarossa, the degraded emperor of the great German nation, kissed the feet of Alexander, and, on foot, led his horse by the bridle as he returned from solemn mass, to the pontifical palace. And thus Alexander III. succeeded in accomplishing what many of his predecessors had striven for—actually placing his foot upon the neck of one of the greatest and proudest of earthly monarchs! The papacy had now risen to a height of grandeur and power which it had never reached before. The sword of Peter had conquered the sword of Caesar! This event gave so much joy to Rome that a picture of the pope treading under his feet the head of the emperor hung for a long time upon the walls of St. Peter’s Church at Rome, and was afterward painted in the hall of the Vatican. (“Journey into Italy,” by Montaigne, p. 321. Montaigne saw this picture in 1581.)

Alexander, now seated upon a throne higher than that of princes, found that while he had been so vigorously engaged in the prosecution of his ambitious projects, the internal affairs of the Church had become greatly deranged in consequence of the prevailing corruption among the clergy. The necessity for reform had also given rise to numerous heresies—as everything was called that did not favor the Court of Rome. He accordingly convened a general council at Rome, in 1179, (This is called the Third Lateran Council.) for the purpose, more particularly, of suppressing the Waldenses and the Albigenses. Among other decrees, this council enacted a canon, in which these humble and devout Christians are called “abominable” and “execrable heretics;” the faithful are admonished to take up arms against them, under the promise of indulgences; are released from all their obligations to them, even though they may arise out of treaty stipulations; are freed from all their oaths to them, however solemn; and are enjoined “to confiscate their goods, reduce them to slavery, and put to death all who are unwilling to be converted.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 446.)

Thus we find the False Decretals bearing still other fruit—the legitimate offspring of the execrable principle introduced by Gratian, which justifies a resort to *force*, in order to *compel* the recognition of the Roman Catholic faith—a principle still maintained, in our own day, in the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX.! (See the Syllabus, Appendix D, proposition xxiv.)

Alexander, in obedience to the council, preached a crusade against the Vaudois, and sent thou sands of ignorant and rapacious fanatics among them to strip them of their property, to persecute and exterminate them. All readers of history are familiar with the terrible scenes which ensued. Under a legate of the pope, their peaceful valleys were invaded, “scaffolds were erected, the instruments of torture rent anew the victims of superstition; then reappeared all the frightful apparatus which the ministers of tyranny could carry with them. Thousands of heretics, old men, women, and children, were hung, quartered, broken upon the wheel, or burned alive, and their property confiscated for the benefit of the king and the Holy See.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 447.)

The thirteenth century opened with Innocent III. and closed with Boniface VIII. in the pontifical chair, each of them ready to put in practice all the principles of the False Decretals, especially those which contributed to the augmentation of the papal power. The sixteen popes who intervened between them so conducted the affairs of the Church as to cause the historian Matthew Paris, a monk of St. Albans, to declare that he had rather die than assist in the prevailing iniquities. According to him, they practiced an “odious tyranny,” and their harpies snatched “even the last rags which cover the faithful to maintain the luxury of the court of Rome;” and so universal was the corruption, that he exclaimed, “Religion is dead, and the Holy City has become an *infamous prostitute, whose shamelessness surpasses that of Sodom and Gomorrah.*” Therefore, it was but the natural result of the condition of affairs at the beginning and end of this century, that both Innocent and Boniface should each endeavor to rival the most ambitious of their predecessors in extending and consolidating the power of the papacy.

Innocent III., after repossessing himself of some Italian possessions which his predecessors had lost, turned his attention elsewhere, so as to widen the fields of his conquests. He made an effort at negotiation with the Greek Christians, that he might bring them again under the papal dominion. But failing in this, he incited the Bulgarians to revolt against the Eastern emperor, caused a part of Servia to be detached from his empire, and made one of his own tools governor of that province. He quarreled with Philip, King of France, excommunicated him, and placed his kingdom under interdict, so that all the churches were closed for eight months, and the dead were left unburied! He pursued the grandson of Frederick Barbarossa, who was the legitimate heir to the throne of Germany, with his implacable hatred, and endeavored to dispossess him by declaring, first for Philip of Suabia, and then for Otho of Saxony, after the latter had made him large “presents!” He wrote to Otho:

“By the authority which *God has given us in the person of St. Peter*, we declare you king, and we order the people to render you, in this capacity, homage and obedience. We, however, shall expect you to subscribe to all our desires as a return for the imperial crown.” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 459.)

But after this pontifical gift of the German crown to Otho, he was defeated by Philip; when the pope, with the adroit cunning of a politician, recognized Philip as emperor. Philip, however, was assassinated soon after, and, thus being out of the way, the pope turned again to Otho and consecrated him as emperor at St. Peter’s in Rome, taking care to require of him an oath that he would defend the Church and its patrimony. Otho, failing in this to the extent demanded by the pope, was excommunicated, and all his subjects released from their allegiance to him!

Innocent was satisfied with nothing less than complete and entire submission to his will. And, true to the teachings of the False Decretals, he inaugurated measures of force and oppression to compel

obedience to the doctrines of the Church. He issued a bull to his legate, Dominic, commanding him to put all the inhabitants of the city of Beziers, in France, to the sword;* and, in obedience to it, sixty thousand Vaudois were buried beneath its ashes, none being saved but young girls and boys, who were abandoned to the brutality of the soldiers. He resolved to crush out the rising spirit of popular liberty wherever it made its appearance, and, for this purpose, canceled the concessions which the English barons had obtained from King John, in the Great Charter of Liberties, and ordered that they be disregarded, under the penalty of excommunication. In all these acts, and others of a kindred character, he showed himself possessed of very high qualities as the leader of a party; but all that he did was prompted by but one motive—that of raising the papacy above all the thrones and governments of earth. This, with him, was an all-absorbing and controlling passion.

* Du Pin, vol. ii., p. 151. This Roman Catholic author shows the steps taken by Innocent II. to “exterminate” the Albigenses in Languedoc, Provence, Dauphine, and Arragon. In the year 1199, he confiscated their estates. He excited their princes to engage in a crusade for their destruction. And whatsoever was done to accomplish this end was either by his express direction, or had his pontifical approval—even the establishment of the cruel and bloody Inquisition. He leaves no doubt whatever upon this latter point, when he says: “The pope and the prelates were of opinion that it was lawful to make use of force, to see whether those who were not reclaimed out of a sense of their salvation might be so by the fear of punishments, and even of temporal death.” There had been already several instances of heretics condemned to fines, to banishment, to punishments, and even to death itself, but there had never yet been any war proclaimed against them, nor any crusade preached up for the extirpation of them. Innocent III. was the first that proclaimed such a war against the Albigenses and Waldenses, and against Raymond, Count of Toulouse, their protector. War might subdue the heads, and reduce whole bodies of people; but it was not capable of altering the sentiments of particular persons, or of hindering them from teaching their doctrines secretly. Whereupon the pope thought it advisable to set up a tribunal of such persons whose business it should be to make inquiry after heretics, and to draw up information against them: and from hence this tribunal was called *The Inquisition*.”—*Ibid.*, p. 154.

The canon law, founded, as it then stood, mainly upon the pseudo—Isidorian, Gregorian, and Gratian forgeries, had already been constructed and construed with this end in view; and, therefore, the personal interest, no less than the ambition of Innocent III., led him to preserve all these forgeries with care, so that, in the course of time, the “pious fraud” might become sanctified by time, because perpetrated in the name of St. Peter! The result he hoped and sought for has been accomplished.

When Boniface VIII. became pope, in the year 1294, the affairs of the Church were in a very unsettled and disturbed condition. There were then, as there have always been, good and pious Christians among both clergy and laymen, with whom it was impossible to look unconcernedly upon the prevailing corruptions at Rome. Notwithstanding the Inquisition had been established by Pope Innocent III. for the purpose of suppressing all inquiry into these corruptions, there were some of this class who had the courage to defy it, and to cry out against the immoralities and vices of the popes and those who basked in the sunshine of their favor.

Not being numerous or powerful enough, however, to constitute an effective body of reformers, their very weakness invited the continuance by Boniface VIII. of the means inaugurated by Innocent III., in order to stifle their investigations and put an end to their complaints. The resort to force to do this, having now become a fixed principle of the canon law, Boniface, in continuing to employ it, not only had the example of his predecessors to justify him, but acted in accordance with his own inclinations.

Ciaconius said of him, while he was a cardinal, “This cardinal had a great depth of iniquity, knavery, audacity, and cruelty, as well as a measureless ambition, and an insatiable avarice.” (*Apud Cormenin*, vol. ii., p. 31.) And many opportunities were offered him, during his pontificate, to exhibit all these characteristics.

Boniface made a cruel and unjustifiable war upon the family of the Colonnas. There were two cardinals of this family, and these he drove out of Italy, despoiling their property and seizing their castles. He quarreled with Philip, King of France, about his affair with the Earl of Flanders, one of his own subjects, and threatened to interdict the kingdom unless he would recognize his temporal power over him. He commanded the clergy of France not to pay anything to the king for the support of the Government without his consent. He declared, in a bull issued for the purpose, that “God had established him over kings and kingdoms, to pluck up, to destroy, to scatter, to build; that the King of France ought not to think he has no superior, and is not subject to the pope; that he who is of that opinion is a fool and an infidel.” He addressed himself thus to Philip:

“Boniface the bishop, a servant of the servants of God, to Philip, King of France: Fear God, and keep his commandments. We will you to know that you are subject to us, both in spirituals and temporals.... We declare them heretics who believe the contrary.” (Du Pin, vol. xii., p. 5.)

Here was an act *ex cathedra*, from the chair of Peter, and concerning the faith. It was performed by an infallible pope, and, therefore, binds the faithful no less now than the day on which the bull of Boniface was issued.

The king, dukes, earls, and barons of France united in a protest against these extraordinary demands, and the Assembly of the States resolved that France was not subject to the pope in temporals. The prelates also interfered on the side of Philip, and addressed Boniface in favor of reconciliation. The pope, in reply, declared that the doctrine of the French Assembly was “schismatical, because it tends to the establishment of two supreme heads,” (*Ibid.*, p. 6.) and summoned the French prelates to Rome. This was forbidden by the king, and the controversy became exceedingly angry on both sides—one party asserting and the other denying the temporal authority of the pope in France.

Boniface convened a consistory in Rome, wherein one of the cardinals spoke “boldly for the authority of the pope over the temporalities of kings,” and Boniface did the same, insisting that he had the right to “depose” the king.

The king, on his part, listened to severe accusations against the pope, made by Nogaret, wherein he was charged with heresy, simony, robbing churches, tyranny, blasphemy, extortion, and many other crimes. The pope then issued his famous bull, *Unam Sanctam*, which was also an act *ex cathedra*, part of the faith of the Church. In this bull he declares “that the Church, which is one, has two swords, one spiritual, and the other temporal; that the temporal is subject to the spiritual; and that none can deny this truth without admitting of two supreme heads, with the Manichees.” (Du Pin, vol. xii., p. 7.)

We have already seen, elsewhere, the precise wording of this bull, and also that Pope Pius IX. has in his Encyclical declared it to be yet a part of the canon law, as containing principles by which his own pontifical conduct is regulated. And it remains only, in this connection, to be seen that Boniface, by virtue of his claim of infallibility, made it a part of the canon law of Rome.

Du Pin says: “This pope caused to be composed and published a new body of decretals, entitled *Sextus*, divided into five books, containing some decretals of his predecessors, from the time of Gregory IX., and many of those which he made in his own pontificate. This collection was not only rejected in France, but there was even a time when nobody durst make use of it, or quote it.” (*Ibid.*, p. 9.)

In view of all the foregoing facts, it is impossible to doubt about the origin of the temporal power of the popes, or that it was the result of usurpation, fraud, and forgery. Even acquired as it has been, it would have been acquiesced in by the Christian nations if the ambition of the popes had not tempted them to extend it beyond the boundary of the Papal States. If they had been content to let it stand where the Gallican Catholics of France were willing to concede that it existed—in those states alone—the present pope might yet have been the “King of Rome.”

The eloquent pen of Bossuet was employed to defend the independence of the Holy See, so as to protect it from the jealousies of kings and princes; yet he assigned to it the “heavenly power of governing” only when it was “under the protection of Christian kings.” (Primacy of the Holy See,” by Kenrick, p. 267.)

Not satisfied, however, with this, the popes have struggled for centuries, with untiring assiduity, to place all the governments of the world under their protection; to ignore the right of the people everywhere to construct their own governments; to make both kings and people obey them; to convert all the nations into one grand Holy Empire, with whomsoever should occupy the papal chair as its absolute monarch; and by these means to put the whole world under their feet!

Passing along nearer to our own time, we shall have no difficulty in observing the progress of the struggle inaugurated by these papal usurpations, and in realizing how necessary it was to the happiness, and especially to the freedom, of mankind that these usurpations should be resisted. And the lessons we shall thus learn will not only be instructive in this view, but we shall be compensated for the performance of the task by seeing the condition into which the world would be thrown if its progress were now arrested, and the nations were thrown back into the darkness and superstition of the Middle Ages by the triumph of the principles announced by the present pope. If forewarned, we shall ourselves be to blame if we are not also forearmed.

Chapter XIV. The Native Britons

The Native Britons.—Their Religion before Augustine.—Gildas and Bede.—Augustine holds Synod with British Bishops.—His Threats against Them.—Conversion of Ethelfied.—Battle of Carleageon, and Murder of Monks of Bangor.—Roman Religion introduced.—The Effects of It. Offa murders Etlielbeit, and the Pope pardons Him.—He establishes Peter—pence.—He accepts a Code of Canon Laws from Adrian I.—The Native Britons and the Saxons.—Their Customs and Religion are imparted to each Other.—Saxon Kings willingly accept the Doctrine of the “Divine Right” to govern from Rome.—The Norman Conquest.—Harold. William of Normandy.—The Decision of Alexander II. upon his Claim.—Consecrated Banner and a Hair of St. Peter.—Battle of Hastings.—Influence on England.—Celibacy introduced.—Example of the Legate of Honorius II.—Innocent III. and King John.—He releases the Subjects of John from their Allegiance.—Holds all Disobedient Kings to be Traitors to God.—His Claim of Power and that of Pius IX. the Same.—Church and State united.—Cardinal Antonelli to Papal Nuncio at Paris.—He approves the Bull *Unigenitus* of Clement XI.—His Theory of the Indirect Power.—Its Effect.—A Heretical King forfeits his Kingdom.—The Pope chooses a King for a Heretical Nation.

THE working of the papal system and its influence upon civil policy are nowhere more clearly seen than in the principal events which led to the Reformation in England. As we trace the birth of our popular institutions back to the great uprising of the people there, we cannot fail to realize how manifestly it was designed by Providence as the means of breaking the scepter of ecclesiastical tyranny and giving freedom to the human mind. Having already observed enough to demonstrate the necessity for reform among the prelates and clergy of the Roman Church, we shall find, as we go along, ample means of comparing Protestantism with Romanism, and more particularly with that perverted form of it which is maintained by those who direct the policy of the papacy, and exultingly call themselves “the princes of the Church.”

The native Britons had their own form of Christianity, existing apart from their Druidical worship, which, in whatsoever way it was acquired, they believed to be of apostolic origin. Upon this subject there is much false teaching in history. All the papal writers affirm that Christianity was first introduced into Great Britain in the year 597, by the monk Augustine and the missionaries who accompanied him from Rome, during the pontificate of Gregory I. And many Protestant writers concede this, seemingly disposed, without investigation, to accept it as a fact, because it has been so frequently and dogmatically asserted. * There is nothing farther from the truth; and the evidence of this is so abundant and conclusive that no intelligent man, if he will take the pains to examine it, can entertain any reasonable doubt upon the subject.

* In the “Outlines of History,” by Willson, which has become an American school-book, the subject is disposed of in a few words, thus: “It appears that about the year 597 Christianity was first introduced into England by the monk Augustine, accompanied by forty missionaries, who had been sent out by Pope Gregory for the conversion of the Britons. The new faith, such as it pleased the Church to promulgate, being received cordially by the kings, descended from them to their subjects, and was established *without persecution, and without the shedding of the blood of a single martyr.*” P. 261. The text will show how entirely unreliable are such unconsidered statements as these. They are almost as far from the “truth of history” as the stories of “The Arabian Nights.”

Clement, who was a disciple of Peter and a fellow-worker of Paul, and who was Bishop of the Roman Church about the end of the first century, wrote his First Epistle to the Corinthians shortly before his death—probably about the year 97. Referring to Paul, he says he preached “both in the East and West,”

and went to “the *extreme limit of the West*.” * Now, we know that after the Roman conquest of Great Britain, before the birth of Christ, the country was governed by a Roman prefect or proprietor, who maintained his authority by a large military force, and required the payment of an annual tribute by the native inhabitants. And we know also that the Britons were unable to expel the Roman magistrates and establish their independence until about the beginning of the fifth century. Hence the conclusion is clear that, if Paul preached in “the extreme limit of the West,” he must have gone to Great Britain and planted the Gospel there. Or, if the expression of Clement be taken in a narrower and more limited sense, and Gaul be considered as the utmost field of Paul’s labors, then we may conclude that the Christianity planted by him there was carried over to Britain by means of the intercourse between the Gauls and the Britons.

* “Anti-Nicene Christian Library, *“The Apostolic Fathers*, vol. i., p. 11. This epistle of Clement is also found in “*The Apocryphal New Testament*,” published some years ago in New York.

Eusebius and Theodoret both assert that Christianity was carried to Britain by some of the apostles, but without naming Paul or any other apostle. Tertullian and Origen both speak of it as established in their day—the first half of the third century—and the former says distinctly that Christ was solemnly worshiped by the inhabitants. Irenaeus says that Christianity was carried to the “Celtic nations,” which included the Britons.

Baionius, the annalist, says that there was a MS. in the Vatican library at Rome which proved that Simon Zelotes, the apostle, propagated the Gospel in Britain, and that Joseph of Arimathea went there about the year 35, and died there. Other authors mention the same facts; and Dorotheus, Bishop of Tyre, says that Aristobulus, to whom St. Paul refers in his Epistle to the Romans, was the first bishop of Britain. *

* *The authorities upon this subject are all compiled by Bishop Short in his “History of the Church of England,” pp. 1, 2. And also by a more recent author, the Rev. T. C. Collins Trelawny, in a work entitled “Perranzabuloe: The Lost Church Found.”*

Gildas the Wise wrote his “History of the Destruction of the Brittaines” in the year 546, fifty—one years before the mission of Augustine. Every page, and almost every sentence, of this book shows the existence of a British Christian Church at that time. It is crowded with extracts from the Old and the New Testament, and makes many references to the condition of the British Christians. At one place he says:

“Britaine hath Priests, but some shee hath that are unwise; very many that minister, but many of them impudent; Clearkes shee hath, but certaine of them deceitful raveners; Pastors (as they are called), but rather wolves prepared for the slaughter of Soules.” [Note: This is the original spelling.] *

* Gildas, London, 1641, p. 184. See “The Conquest of Britain by the Saxons,” by Haigh, London, vol. i., pp. 15, 16, showing that the native Britons carried their Christianity into Cornwall and Wales.

In the same connection he immediately speaks of “Apostolical decrees,” “Priesthood or episcopal dignity,” “followers of the Apostles,” “the office of a Bishop or Priest,” etc., thus establishing the fact, beyond controversy, that Christianity had been introduced and a British Church established long before Augustine was sent there by Gregory. As to the time when this was done, Gildas is not very explicit, but he states quite enough to show that the British Christians in his day traced their Christianity back to the apostolic times. Referring to their religion, he says:

“In the meane while, Christ, the true Son of God, spreading forth not onely from this temporall firmament, but also from the Castell and Court of Heaven (which exceedeth all times) throughout *the whole world*, his most (glorious light, especially (as we know) in the Raign of *Tiberius Caesar*, (whereas in regard to that Emperour) against the will of the Senate threatened death to the disturbers of the professors thereof, Religion was most largely without any hindrance dispersed of his infinite mercy, *did first cast on this Island*, starving with frozen cold, and in a farre remote climate from the visible sunne, his gladsome beames, to wit, his most holy Lawes.” [Written in old spelling.] (Gildas, pp. 13, 14.)

Some have supposed that Gildas intended to assert here that Christianity was carried to Britain in the reign of Tiberius. But this conclusion cannot be reached without great confusion of dates. Tiberius died about the year 37, and it was either during that or the preceding year that Paul was converted on the road to Damascus. The “door of faith” was opened to the Gentiles about the year 42 or 43. The assemblage of the apostles at Jerusalem was about the year 50. At that time it was agreed that Paul and Barnabas should “go unto the heathen,” that is, to the Greeks and Romans; and that Peter and John should “go unto the circumcision,” that is, to the Dispersion, in the provinces of Asia Minor.

Paul did not go to Rome until about the year 60, when he went as a prisoner, and there is not a word in the whole of the gospels to show that anyone of the apostles visited that city before that time. It was undoubtedly after that when Paul went to “the extreme limit of the West” to preach, and it is not likely that any of the apostles were there before him. Therefore Gildas could not have meant to fix the reign of Tiberius as the time when the Gospel was preached in Britain. And if his language be carefully scanned, it does not bear that meaning, although it is somewhat obscure. He must have meant to say that the light of the Gospel began to spread forth during the reign of Tiberius, which is the fact; that Tiberius “threatened death to the disturbers of the professors” of religion, and that then Christianity, having an opportunity to disperse itself, first reached the island of Britain. That this is his real meaning, and that he intended to assign the introduction of Christianity to Paul, is evident from the following language, which he elsewhere uses:

“Which of yee for the confession of the true word of Christ, hath, like the vessell of election, and chosen Doctor of the *Gentiles* [Paul], after suffering the chaines of imprisonment, sustayning of shipwracke, after the terrible scourges of whips, the continuall dangers of seas, of theeves, of *Gentiles*, of *Jews*, and of false apostles, after the labours of famine, of fasting, etc., after his incessant care had over all the churches, after his exceeding trouble for such as scandalized, after his infirmity for the weake, after his admirable peregrination over *almost the whole world* in preaching the Gospel of Christ, through the stroke of the sword lost his head,” etc. [Original spelling.] (Gildas, p. 217.)

Here, in speaking of the labors of Paul as extending over “almost the whole world,” the inference is unavoidable that he intended to include Great Britain, which, as a Roman province, was an important part of the world. But, however this may be, the fact is incontestable that Christianity in Great Britain antedated many years the mission of Augustine from Rome. And it is equally true that the British Christians had a church of their own, regularly organized, which existed independently of the Church of Rome. Even Lingard, the great Roman Catholic historian, is compelled to say, “That the Christian faith was publicly professed in Britain before the close of the second century, is clear from incontestable authority.” (“Anglo—Saxon Church,” by Lingard, p. 18 (note).)

But he immediately endeavors to break the force of this admission by insisting that after this time the race of native Britons disappeared before the Saxons, and that with them also disappeared their refinements and “knowledge of the Gospel;” and that the worship of Woden took the place of the worship of God. This is not probable, if it is even possible. It is a naked assertion without any proof to sustain it.

Venerable Bede refers to the desolating war carried on by the Saxons against the Britons, showing that the country was overrun by fire and sword, and the inhabitants “butchered in heaps.” But he says that some of them escaped to the mountains, some fled beyond the seas, and others “led a miserable life among the woods, rocks, and mountains.” (“Eccl. Hist. of England,” by Bede, Bohn’s ed., p. 25.)

Rapin says the Saxons became masters everywhere except in Wales. (“History of England,” by Rapin, vol. i., pp. 144, 145.) And Lingard himself, in another work, without entering into details, says it would be interesting “to exhibit the causes which transferred the greater part of the island from the milder dominion of the Romans to the exterminating sword of the Saxons.” (“History of England,” by Lingard, vol. i., pp. 42, 43.) It is not true, then, that the race of native Britons disappeared before the Saxons; and, inasmuch as they were not exterminated, it is a most natural conclusion that those of them who remained in Wales, and were concealed in different parts of the island, retained and preserved their religious faith and church organization. All history shows that when a people are thus persecuted and driven from their homes, they cling to these with the utmost tenacity and with unfaltering courage. And this conclusion is supported by the condition in which Augustine found the inhabitants when he reached there.

That there were then Christians there is undoubtedly true; and that they were all native Britons is equally true, for, as is conceded on all hands, none of the Saxons were converted until afterward. It may be laid down, then, as an indisputable fact, that Christianity always existed in Great Britain from the time of its first introduction; that is, at all events, from the second century.

When Augustine arrived in Kent, during the reign of Ethelbert, he came in immediate contact with an organized Christian community, having, ordained bishops and other church functionaries. With the assistance of the king he assembled these together, and invited them to unite with him in “the common labor of preaching the Gospel to the Gentiles.” They kept the festival of Easter according to the custom of the Eastern Christians, and not that of Rome a fact which goes to show that they had not then submitted to the Council of Nice, and were, consequently, independent of the Roman Church. And “they did several other things which were against the unity of the Church,” in the Roman sense; that is, against the supremacy of the pope. Thus, having their own Church organization and their fixed

principles of religious faith, they declined to “comply with the entreaties, exhortations, or rebukes of Augustine and his companions, but preferred their’ own traditions before all the churches in the world.”

Then, it is said, the pretended miracle performed by Augustine, of restoring a blind man to sight, extorted from the Britons the concession that he was a preacher of the divine truth; nevertheless, they declared “that they could not depart from their ancient customs without the consent and leave of their people.”

A second synod was subsequently held, no more favorable to Rome than the first. At this assemblage there were present, on the part of the British Christians, seven bishops, “and many most learned men.” To these Augustine proposed that if they would consent to keep Easter and administer baptism according to the custom of the Roman Church, and unite with him in the propagation of the word of God among the British people, he would “tolerate all other things” they might do; that is, if they would only recognize the sovereign supremacy of the pope over them, they could believe and do whatsoever else they pleased! The papal proposition was again rejected, the British Christians continuing to prefer their own to the religion of Rome, and at once the true spirit of Roman propagandism was displayed. *

* Rapin gives the answer of Dinoh, Abbot of Bangor, to the proposition of Augustine, in these expressive words:

“You propose to us obedience to the Church at Rome. Are you ignorant that we already owe a deference to the Church of God, to the bishop of Rome, and to all Christians, of love and charity, which obliges us to endeavor by all possible means to assist and do them all the good we can? Other obedience than this to him you call pope we know not of, and this we are always ready to pay. But for a superior, what need have we to go so far as Rome, when we are governed, under God, by the Bishop of Caerleon, who hath authority to take care of our churches and spiritual affairs?”—*History of England*, by Rapin, vol. i., p. 237.

“Giraldi’s Cambrensis is of opinion that Christianity came to England from Asia; it must not, however, be forgotten that the island was much visited by ships sailing from a portion of Africa, where a church was early established. There cannot be a question that, for a considerable period before the advent of Augustine, the Christian faith had taken root in England; and at the period of his visit there were among the Britons, in Wales and Scotland, native prelates, an ordained priesthood, and a ritual differing in essential features from the Roman. The Abbot of Bangor explained to Augustine and his associates that an apostolic church had existed in this part of the world without any subjection to the father of fathers, and, notwithstanding his mission from Pope Gregory, was likely to remain so.”—*Lives of the English Cardinals*, by Williams, London ed., vol. i., p. 22 (note), citing also “*Historical Vindication of the Church of England, in point of Schism*,” by Twysden, p. 7.

Seemingly conscious of being supported by a strong and aggressive power, Augustine replied to these humble and tolerant British Christians in words of insolent defiance and threat, “that in case they would not join in unity with their brethren they should be warred upon by their enemies; and if they would not preach the way of life to the English nation, they should at their hands undergo the vengeance of death!” (Bede, pp. 68-71.)

Did Augustine design this language as a threat? The language itself is susceptible of no other meaning; and if the foregoing quotation shows truly what he said, there is no room for doubt about it. The extract is taken from Bede, whose accuracy is not doubted by anybody, and who undoubtedly understood Augustine as threatening, vengeance against the British Christians, because they would not consent to obey the pope! No contrary interpretation could ever have been given to his words, had not the

defenders of the pope's supremacy found it necessary to break the force of this objection to their system of ecclesiastical organization by placing Augustine in the attitude of making a *prophecy*, and not a *threat*. Hence we find Lingard, one of their standard authors, instead of quoting truly from Bede, representing him as putting this language into the mouth of Augustine: "Know, then, that if you will not assist me in pointing out to the Saxons the way of life, they, by the just judgment of God, will prove to you the ministers of death." *

* "Anglo-Saxon Church," by Lingard, p. 42. The same author also uses the same language in his "History of England," vol. i., p. 55.

Let the reader compare these words with those of Bede, and he will see at a glance how the latter are perverted. Bede does not say a word about the judgment of God, which was to fall upon the Britons for their disobedience, or that they were to be providentially punished by having the Saxons become the "ministers of death" to them, or anything that can be tortured into such a meaning. Lingard is inconsistent with himself in putting these words into the mouth of Augustine. He had, but a little while before, said that before that time the Britons had "disappeared" before the Saxons; and yet, in order to change the threat of Augustine into a prophecy, he has the British Christians still existing as fit subjects for Saxon vengeance!

The papacy, however, requires far greater inconsistencies of those who enter upon its defense. In this particular case, it required the invention of a new set of words; and Lingard has supplied them. And, seeming indisposed to dwell upon them, he follows them with this single sentence, "He did not live to see the prediction verified," using the word in the sense of prophecy. But it is clear that the language of Augustine, as recorded by Bede, does not bear this interpretation. Other words are found at another place in his history, wherein he is represented as speaking of "the *prediction* of the holy Bishop Augustine."

Referring to the murder of "about twelve hundred" of the unarmed monks of Bangor by the Saxon king, a convert of Augustine, for no other offense than that of praying for the success of their countrymen, and refusing obedience to Rome, he says: "Thus was fulfilled the prediction of the holy Bishop Augustine, though he himself had been long before taken up into the heavenly kingdom." *

* Bede, p. 72. See also note, where it is said that this passage has been regarded as having been added to the original.

M. Augustin Thierry, referring to this statement, says: "It was a national tradition among the Welsh, that the chief of the new Anglo—Saxon Church caused this invasion, and pointed out the monastery of Bangor to the pagans of Northumberland. It is impossible to affirm anything positive on this point; but the coincidence of time rendered the imputation so grave as to make the friends of the Romish Church desirous of destroying all traces of that coincidence. In almost all the manuscripts of the sole historian of these events [Bede] they inserted the statement that Augustine was dead when the defeat of the Britons and the massacre of the monks of Bangor took place. Augustine was, indeed, old at that period; but he lived at least a year after the military execution which he had so exactly predicted."—*History of the Conquest of England by the Normans*, by Thierry, Bolin's ed., vol. i., pp. 39, 40.

If these words are really such as Bede used, they are consistent only with the supposition that the language of Augustine was that given by Lingard. But we have seen that his language was in every

essential particular different, and therefore are justified in looking upon this last extract at least with some degree of suspicion. If, however, it is accurately taken from the original, it is but the construction which Bede placed upon the language of Augustine, which he has handed down to us, and which we can interpret for ourselves.

Now, when it is considered that the words of Augustine were, that the British Christians “should be warred upon by their enemies,” and “should, at their hands, undergo the vengeance of death;” and, further, that he did not, as Lingard alleges, say one word about “the just judgment of God” which was to fall upon them, his plain and obvious meaning must have been that he would employ the means necessary to bring about this result; in other words, that as it was a part of the canon law of Rome that force could be rightfully employed to compel obedience to the papacy, he would teach this to the Saxon kings, his converts, and incite them to the bloody and murderous work. Why, otherwise, did he omit any reference to the “judgment of God?” And why, if the meaning of his language, as given by Bede, were not perfectly clear, and did not mean a threat instead of a prophecy, has it been considered necessary to substitute other language for it, not used by Bede, entirely perverting the original meaning?

There can be no other conclusion fairly arrived at, from the whole account of this transaction as given by Bede, than that Augustine had reference to his own agency, and not to the providence of God, in bringing about the punishment of these humble British Christians, for no other offense than that of adhering to their “ancient customs,” and preferring their “own traditions ” in preference to the customs and traditions of Rome, and of choosing to obey their own bishop rather than the pope! What was there in all this that God should curse them for, or should cause “about twelve hundred” of their number to be butchered in cold blood? Is it not time that the world should hear no more of such debasing superstition as this—that the vengeance of God will fall upon all who oppose the papacy—when we now see all the Roman Catholic governments destroyed, the temporal scepter of the pope broken, no king, or prince, or people on all the earth having either the power or will to defend the papacy, and the Protestant nations and peoples marching forward, with marvelous and unchecked prosperity, in the full sunlight of intellectual, moral, and material development?

The sequel shows how well Augustine accomplished his design, how true he was to the teachings of Rome. How different was his method of propagating the Gospel from that practiced by Christ and the apostles! They went among the humble and obscure, the poor and the unlettered; but he dealt only with the Saxon kings. And when he had brought these to realize that the best means of preserving their crowns was by adopting a system of religion which taught, as its starting—point, the necessity of *passive submission and obedience to authority*, he succeeded in so training his new converts as to cause them to murder the harmless British monks, merely for *praying* that the British Christians—their own countrymen—might be able to defend themselves successfully against the Roman Christians(!) at the Battle of Carlegion, where the attempt was made to destroy them for maintaining their ancient religion!

The manner in which Bede relates these events must excite the fire of indignation in every honest Christian heart, although more than twelve centuries have passed. It was the beginning of religious persecution in England, and at no one time since then has bloodier work been done. When the poor British monks went out to pray at the battle, taking no part in the conflict of arms, and Ethelfied, one of the converted Saxon kings, was informed of it, he said: “If, then, they cry to their God against us, in

truth, though they do not bear arms, yet they fight against us, because they oppose us by their prayers.”

* Then, out of twelve hundred and fifty, twelve hundred of these praying Christians were cruelly butchered, for refusing to acknowledge the Pope of Rome as the head of their Church!

* Bede, p. 71. Notwithstanding it is incontestably true that the British Christians were numerous at the time of the mission of Augustine and of this attempt to exterminate them by the sword, a late work published in the United States makes this statement, which is an improvement upon that of Lingard: “The Gospel was preached in England during the second century, but had become extinct at the time that kingdom was conquered by the Saxon idolaters, who banished the first inhabitants!”—*History of the Catholic Church*, by Noethen, p. 266.

And thus did papal vengeance and papal intolerance begin their work of bloody persecution at the very first planting of Romanism in England! To Rome all other Christianity than its own was—as it yet is—barbarism; and, therefore, the sword was drawn to hew down these poor British Christians, not because they did not worship God, but because they would not obey the pope! And thus we learn what papal writers mean when they tell us that Augustine first carried Christianity into England. With them there is no Christianity except that which comes from Rome—none which does not acknowledge entire and passive submission to the pope, none that does not put the pope in the place of God on earth!

Thus introduced, the papal power was preserved in England for hundreds of years, by the authority of kings who were held in obedience to Rome by that part of its religion which teaches that they govern by divine right; that they derive their crowns, not from the people, but from God, through the pope as his sole earthly representative. What ever occasional conflicts about spiritual and temporal jurisdiction may have arisen between these kings and the popes on account of personal interest or ambition, this sentiment has been common to them all. Differ as they may about other things, they have always agreed on this, because it keeps the people in subjugation to them. None understood better than they that those who select the rulers of a nation are its masters. The papacy has always taught that the people have no right to govern, but are bound to the duty of obedience to princes.

Therefore the popes have never hesitated to invoke the assistance of the armies of princes in carrying on the work of popular subjugation. They have caused mercenary hordes to be turned loose upon harmless and inoffensive people, as the Albigenses and Waldenses, without the slightest “compunctions visitings of conscience,” for no other purpose than to bring them down into a condition of inferiority and subordination. And when they have thus made princes minister to their ambition, they have held them in like subordination, by threatening to devastate their dominions.

Thus England was governed for centuries, with the load of papal tyranny pressing with the weight of mountains upon her. Her kings kept no faith except that which bound them to Rome; and the popes were always ready to release them from the most solemn obligations, and to sanction the most enormous crimes, when the interest of the papacy required it.

Offa, one of the Romish kings of the Heptarchy, invited Ethelbert, King of the East—Angles, to visit his court, under the pretense of marrying his daughter. But, that he might become master of East—Anglia, he violated the sacred laws of personal honor and hospitality by his assassination. To quiet the

remorse of a guilty conscience, he went to Rome to obtain a pardon from the pope, who, availing himself of the opportunity of extending his power and enlarging his jurisdiction, readily granted it “on condition he would be liberal to the churches and monasteries!” that, says the historian, being “the way of atoning for sins then!” (Rapin, vol. i., p. 187; “Anglo—Saxon Chronicle,” by Bede, A. 792, p. 342.)

Offa repaid this act of pardon by the pope in a manner which subsequently proved most fatal to the happiness and prosperity of England. One of the West—Saxon kings had already established at Rome a college for the education of English youth, and had ordered a penny to be collected each year from every family for its support. Offa extended this tax over Mercia and East—Anglia; and thus was originated the celebrated Peter—pence, which came to be afterward claimed by the popes as a tribute from the English to St. Peter and his successors, and which they converted to their own use for many years, and until it was abolished by Henry VIII. (Rapin, vol. i., p. 188.)

But King Offa did more than this to degrade his country, and to show how completely he had become the vassal of the pope, who was at that time Adrian I. The pope sent two legates to England with a code of ecclesiastical laws carefully prepared by himself, which he required to have introduced there for the government of the kingdom. These legates called two synods, one of which met in Mercia, and was attended by King Offa in person; and the introduction of this papal code as the law of England was, under his influence, consented to. (History of England,” by Lingard, vol. i., p. 78.) And thus a power was built up in England sufficiently strong to govern the country, without reference to the people or any responsibility to them, but responsible only to the pope! What these laws were can now be learned only by comparing them with others which have grown out of the papal system. But it may be safely assumed that the papal clergy were by them freed from all responsibility to the domestic laws of the kingdom, and were by this means erected into a privileged and irresponsible class, looking only to the pope for direction in all things. Pope Adrian I., whose character may be inferred from what has been elsewhere said, (Ante, ch. xi., p. 347.) would have been satisfied with nothing less than this.

Into what a condition of humiliating degradation, therefore, was England dragged down when the nation and people were laid at the feet of the papacy! It was the price of her obedience to papal despotism—the result of the *Christianizing* (!) influence of Rome upon her Saxon kings!

But it was impossible to destroy the attachment of the native Britons for their ancient religion, for that form of Christianity which they believed to have been derived from the apostles, as it was also impossible to break their courage. They and the Saxon common people had mingled together until, by association and intermarriage, their former prejudices had been worn away, and they now constituted a peaceful and homogeneous society. They had acquired all the leading characteristics necessary for a new and more vigorous nationality. The Britons imparted to the Saxons some of their ideas of religion and Christianity, while the Saxons, in return, imparted to them some of the principles of civil government they had brought with them from the valleys of the Elbe, the Eyder, and the Rhine.

Yet they were held in tight subjection by their princes, who were themselves held in equally tight subjection by the popes. The people were surrounded on every side by remorseless oppressors, and had to rise up, under this tremendous weight, by slow degrees, and through sufferings it would require many volumes to detail.

The Saxons belonged to the Teutonic, or Germanic, stock, and differed essentially from the Latin race, which clung to the shores of the Mediterranean. Having succeeded, as early as the fourth century, in resisting the aggressions of the Roman empire, they formed a confederacy, which laid the foundation of their “progressive greatness.” (“History of the Anglo—Saxons,” by Sharon Turner, vol. i., p. 132.)

Although overwhelmed by the armies of Charlemagne, their influence was never entirely eradicated, and their distinctive principles were preserved through every variety of fortune. These principles have always been, from the date of their first confederation, “singularly propitious to human improvement.” (*Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 135.)

At the time of their settlement in England, they had their chiefs, or war-kings, who were carefully held in subjection to the popular power; and when they elected a king, “their consent in the gemote (a public meeting or local judicial assembly in Anglo-Saxon England) continued to be necessary to the more important acts of his authority;” (“History of the Anglo—Saxons,” by Sharon Turner, appendix to bk. ii., vol. i., p. 183.) thus showing that they were not then governed without their own consent, even by their kings.

Their religion was pagan; yet after their conquest of England there is no evidence that they ever interfered with that of the native Britons until after their kings yielded to the influence of Rome! We have seen that the religion of these native Britons was at no time eradicated after the first introduction of Christianity, but, on the other hand, that it was preserved and cherished by the people. Hence, as the Saxons found Christianity there, it was impossible that they could have escaped its influence, as it was also impossible that the Britons could have escaped the Saxon influence. The common people had no motive to prompt them to engage in the work of exterminating each other; and to assert that they did so, except when constrained to it by the policy of their kings and the dictation of the popes, is utterly incredible. And it is not at all probable that any others than those who composed the respective armies ever engaged in this work. Indeed, there is little in history more certain than that the body of the people—Britons and Saxons—especially in the remote districts, mingled together in friendly association, so as to impress each other with their respective sentiments and opinions. By this kind of influence they became, at last, molded into one people; and there is much in their subsequent history to show that each imparted to the other principles and elements of character which still impress Anglo—Saxon institutions wherever they exist, and distinguish them from those which have been erected by the Latin race.

It cannot be doubted that the Saxon idea that the people were the source of even the kingly power, was readily accepted by the native Britons, who yet knew nothing about hereditary kings, or their divine right to govern. Nor can it be doubted that after the Saxon kings had become obedient servants of the popes, they labored assiduously to eradicate this principle, which had been inherited by the Saxon people from their Teutonic ancestry. These kings were captivated at once with the idea that they got their power from God, through the pope, and not from the people; for they could easily understand, ignorant as they were, that if the people could make, they could also unmake, kings. And hence they became ready and willing converts to the papal teaching—to a doctrine which confirmed their power to them. They cheerfully accepted a religion so congenial to their tastes—so necessary as the means of promoting their ambition. Rome has always understood well how to teach this to kings; and the latter have generally been apt and submissive pupils—quick to learn, and slow to forget.

There is no satisfactory evidence anywhere that the body of the Anglo- Saxon people ever assented to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, until it was taught as a part of the religious system of Rome, and imposed upon them by force. There is abundant evidence, however, to show that the partial and interrupted dominion of the Northmen in England, which continued for more than two centuries, was unable to destroy the early Anglo—Saxon influences. On the contrary, these influences remained impressed upon the popular mind, and were occasionally exhibited in the struggles of the people to throw off the yoke which their kings, in obedience to the popes, had fastened on their necks. But whatever may have been the result, in the natural course of events, of the mutuality of intercourse and sentiment between the native British Christians and the Saxons, they were, in the end, brought completely and compactly together under a common nationality, and jointly exhibited those qualities which achieved their triumph in all their contests with the kingly and papal power. And when they succeeded in ultimately creating the English nation, they so stamped it with their common sentiments and opinions, that in its wonderful progress it has absorbed even its conquerors, until, in this day, the whole world is influenced by its laws, its language, and its character.

The Norman conquest under William the Conqueror carried into England a fresh supply of papal influences. At the death of Edward the Confessor, Harold became king, by the almost unanimous consent of the nation. He was elected by the Witan, with the full approbation of the people, “in the exercise of their ancient and undoubted right,” and was “acknowledged as king by every earldom and every shire in England. He was king, alike by the will of his predecessor, by the choice of his people, by the consecration of the Church, by the homage of the thegns (aristocrats who ranked at the third level in lay society, below the king and ealdormen) and prelates of England.” (“The Norman Conquest,” by Freeman, vol. iii., pp. 21-70; Thierry, vol. i., p. 152.)

But William, Duke of Normandy, set up a claim to the throne based upon pretexts which, if they had been valid, would have conferred upon him no right whatsoever under the laws of England. He pretended that Edward had made to him a gift of the English crown before the selection of Harold as his successor, and that Harold had violated his oath to marry his daughter and to pay homage to him. William was a devout son of the Church, and submitted willingly to the direction of the great Lanfranc, Prior of Bec, and the foremost man in the Church of Normandy. Whether the plan was concerted by both of them, or originated in the fertile brain of the latter, is of no consequence; but it was agreed that William should submit his claim to the decision of the pope; that is, that the pope alone should decide who should be king of England, without any regard to the wishes of the people or the authorities of the nation.

The pope at that time was Alexander II., but “the power behind the throne” was the great Hildebrand. While any other foreign power on earth would have refused to decide such a question, yet the papal court did not hesitate to take jurisdiction of it, on the ground of possessing the divine right to dispose of crowns and kingdoms. It was of no consequence to inquire what the English people desired. They were incompetent to decide what the law of God required or forbade. Of that law the pope was the exclusive earthly custodian, as Pope Pius IX. still claims to be, and his jurisdiction was derived directly from God!

It marked “a distinct epoch in the history of European politics, when, for the first time, the occupant of the apostolic throne was called on to adjudge a disputed diadem.” (Freeman, p. 317.)

The ambassador of William, an ecclesiastic, was sent to Rome to plead his cause. No notice of the proceeding was given to Harold. But the trial went on. The pope was told that William “craved the blessing of the Holy See upon his righteous cause,” and if he succeeded would “hold of God and of the apostle the kingdom which he hoped to win.” One side only was heard. Harold had no advocate there to defend him against his Norman assailant. England had not submitted the disposal of her crown to such a tribunal, and recognized no right but her own to give or take it away. But the interest of England was not the question to be discussed or decided. The only question considered by that papal tribunal was—what did the interest of the papacy require to be done? The ambitious Hildebrand saw that the occasion was one for the establishment of a precedent, which would enable the papacy thereafter to dispose of all other crowns; and his counsel triumphed. A decree was passed, declaring Harold to be a usurper, and William of Normandy to be the lawful claimant of the English crown!

Harold and his followers were excommunicated, and William was authorized to go forth as an avenger of Heaven. He was required to teach the English people “*due obedience to Christ’s vicar*,” and, what the papacy never forgets, “to secure a more punctual payment of the temporal dues of his apostle.” (*Ibid.*, p. 320.)

A costly ring, “a hair of the prince of the apostles,” and a consecrated banner were sent to William, in order that it might appear that his “fraud and usurpation” had the sanction of Heaven. Every blessing held in store by the Church was conferred upon William, and the terrible thunders of anathema were hurled at the head of Harold. (*Ibid.*, p. 321; Thierry, vol. i., p. 159.)

While it is apparent that Pope Alexander II. had in all this the double motive of subjugating England to the papacy, and of giving greater strength and universality to its power, yet there is something behind it which the sagacious (having sound judgment) mind of Hildebrand could not have failed to discover. Although previous popes had employed the Saxon kings for the advancement of their ambitious designs, it was easy to see that it would not be safe to rely too much upon the Saxon and British people, who now, by several hundred years of intercourse, had become molded into one. The Teutonic stock never furnished good materials for slavery; and, therefore, the papal policy was so directed as to place England in the hands of those more closely allied to the Latin race. Hence, the preference given to, and the pontifical blessing bestowed upon, William of Normandy—a part of France. And hence, also, we find that, after the Battle of Hastings, and before William had reached London, the Romnish clergy went out to meet and congratulate him because he marched under the consecrated banner, was accompanied by the papal blessing, and was “well disposed to the Church.” *

* “*History of England*,” by Rapin, vol. ii., p. 230. Freeman says, when speaking of the disgraceful submission at Berkhamstead, that besides the Metropolitans of York and Canterbury and the Bishops of Worcester and Hereford, there were some of “the best men of London, and many others of the chief men of England,” who went on the “sad and shameful errand.”—*The Norman Conquest*, by Freeman, vol. iii., p. 547.

But little more was necessary to make the conquest of England complete. It was soon done, and William placed the crown upon his brow, in the name, not of the people of England, who were not

consulted, but of the Holy See of Rome. He had enforced with arms the decision of the pope, and had brought England down, in degradation, to the feet of the papacy.

Although William and other kings of the Norman line had some fierce controversies with the popes, about investitures and other kindred questions, yet they constantly and actively endeavored to eradicate all the Saxon influences in England, as far as possible, and substitute for them those of Norman origin; that is, to bring the country under the influence of the principles prevailing among the people of the Latin race, in preference to those of Teutonic origin. The popes, in order that the victory in these controversies might be won, and, at the same time, to keep the kings within their grasp, conducted them, on the part of the papacy, with marked sagacity. They made a merit of necessity whenever it forced them to submit to firm and resolute princes, in order that thereby they might preserve their strength for the more complete control of the weaker ones. And when they succeeded at last in having their legates recognized in England, they were enabled to place by the side of the king a power sufficiently great to keep the nation bound fast to Rome; and to war, by the aid of the Normans, more successfully against all the liberalizing influences of the Anglo Saxons.

The popes, however, needed a more efficient instrumentality than any they had yet possessed to bring about the complete subjugation of the English people. This was the introduction of celibacy among the English clergy. It was considered absolutely necessary to the perfect working of the papal system, that there should be organized a compact body of ecclesiastics, destitute of all those generous sympathies which grow alone out of the family relation, that they might be the better fitted to do the work of the popes. Notwithstanding sacerdotal celibacy finds no sanction among the early Christian fathers, and is directly opposed to the example of Peter and a majority of the apostles, * yet its introduction, as a matter of policy, was a display of great sagacity.

* It is supposed that all the apostles, except John and Paul, were married; and Clement, Ignatius, and Eusebius think that Paul was. It is certain that Peter and Philip had children. Not one of the early fathers condemns the marriage of the clergy. See the question fully discussed in Edgar's *"Variations of Popery,"* ch. xviii., p. 526.

The experience of mankind has demonstrated that there is no other place around which so many of the most ennobling sentiments continually cluster as the domestic hearth—stone; and that those who cherish in their hearts the kindly affections of home and kindred are the last to yield to such dictates of inhumanity as have been often exhibited by those who have built up and maintained the papacy. Therefore, the celibacy of the Roman clergy has been, since its introduction, considered one of the most effective means of establishing the supremacy of the popes; and for this purpose the attempt was made to introduce it into England, after the Norman conquest.

The pope then desired—as the present pope also does—to set apart the clergy from the body of the community, as a privileged class, with power to govern themselves by laws of his and their own enacting, independently of the civil power and the laws of the State. The English clergy were, at first, unwilling to give up their wives. Pope Gregory VII. (Hildebrand), during the reign of William the Conqueror, had a decree passed by a council at Rome forbidding them to marry. The clergy resisted it—for many of them had wives. A synod was called to consider the question, but it did not adopt the decree. A compromise was agreed upon with the pope's legate, to the effect that those who had cures

(pastoral charge of a parish) in the cities should put away their wives, while those who had benefices (ecclesiastical office) in the country should be allowed to retain them; but that none should be thereafter admitted to orders before they had sworn that they would not marry, thus showing that *celibacy is a mere measure of expediency and involves no religious principle*.

The imposition of this restraint had the effect of preventing competent men from taking orders, and inflicted serious injury upon the character of the clergy. Pope Pascal II., to remedy this—showing, at the same time, how pliant the principles of the papacy are when an important result is to be obtained—decided not to execute the canon rigorously in England, and granted a dispensing power to the Archbishop of Canterbury. But this prelate was less accommodating than the pope, and procured the condemnation of marriage by the decree of a London synod. Pope Honorius II. had to send one of his cardinals to England to see that it was executed. When he reached there, he, as legate, convened a council, wherein he denounced the married clergy in violent terms; saying, among other things, that “’twas a horrible crime to rise from the side of a harlot, and then to handle the consecrated body of Christ.”

That night, after this impious and vulgar assault upon one of the tenderest and most endearing relations of life—a relation sanctioned by the example of the Apostle Peter himself—this *pure-minded* (!) cardinal, fresh from Rome and the side of the infallible Honorius II., “*was caught in bed with a common woman!*” (Rapin, vol. ii., p. 420.) Of course, his precepts had but little effect against an example such as this, and other efforts were rendered necessary.

Some years after, another council was held, when it was considered necessary to give the power of enforcing the canon to the king—a duty which he readily undertook. Like the popes in the use of their dispensing power, he employed his authority to raise his royal revenue “by selling to the priests a dispensation to keep their wives!” (Rapin, vol. ii., p.420.) But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, celibacy finally became the absolute law of the Church in England, as elsewhere. The papal Caesar needed his corps of ecclesiastical subordinates, as completely devoted to him as were the commanders of the Roman legions to the pagan Caesars. Each struggled for absolute dominion, and the example of one was followed by the other. Rome, with each, was the central seat of empire—the “mistress of the world.”

Having, by these means and the politic use of the benefices and honors of the Church, caused the clergy to center all their affections upon the papacy, the popes were enabled to persevere in their schemes to aggrandize their power to such an extent that they compelled the disgraceful and humiliating surrender of the crown to them by King John. Pope Innocent III. resolved that the Archbishopric of Canterbury should be filled by Cardinal Langton—who, though an Englishman, had received a foreign education in France without regard to the wishes or consent of the king. John firmly resisted this for a while, and the pope, to punish him, placed the kingdom under interdict, so that divine service ceased in all the churches, the sacraments were withheld, public prayers were forbidden, and the church—yards were closed—the dead being thrown into ditches, like dogs, without any funeral ceremony. (*Ibid.*, vol. iii., p.193.)

The king, in retaliation, treated the clergy with severity, and was at last excommunicated by the pope. John remained unmoved, until the controversy became one involving simply, on one side, the triumph

of the king; on the other, that of the pope—neither party having the slightest regard for the interest or welfare of the people, and both king and pope entirely subordinating the peace and quiet of the Church to their own personal ambition for supremacy.

The pope finally sent two nuncios to England, with whom John was persuaded to agree that some ecclesiastics he had banished should be permitted to return, that the privileges of the Church should be restored, and that Langton should be confirmed as Archbishop of Canterbury—thus yielding to the pope everything he had desired at the beginning of the quarrel. But he yielded too readily, and displayed so little real courage, that Innocent III. was too bold a politician not to take immediate advantage of it. His manifest object was to humiliate the king, and reduce the kingdom to entire submission to himself, so that he could bring all the people under ecclesiastical government, with Rome as the seat of all authority. Therefore he demanded that all that had been taken from the clergy should be restored and full damages paid—when he knew that it was impossible for the king to do either. John being compelled to refuse, the pope pronounced another sentence of excommunication against him, and took immediate steps to stir up a revolt against the Government, by endeavoring to increase the dissatisfaction already existing among the people. The occasion was one which displayed the toweling ambition of Innocent III., and developed, in a most striking degree, the character of the papal policy, which, under like circumstances, would be developed in the same way today or tomorrow.

Pretending that the refusal of the king to do what he knew he had no power to do was rebellion against his authority as God's vicegerent, he fulminated a terrible bull, absolving the English people from their allegiance to the crown, and commanding them, upon pain of excommunication, no longer to obey their king! *

* He absolved the vassals of John from their oaths of fealty, and exhorted all Christian princes and barons to unite in dethroning the king, and in substituting another more worthy, by the authority of the Apostolic See." —*History of England*, by Lingard, Vol. ii., p. 163.

An event so remote as this would seem, at first glance, to have no special relation to the present times; but when it is observed that Innocent acted under a claim of divine right and of infallibility, and that the present pope sets up precisely the same claim, it is of the highest importance that the principle upon which he based his supposed right to release the English people from their allegiance to their own Government should be well understood.

What Innocent III. then did in England, Pope Pius IX. undoubtedly thinks he has the power and right to do in all the governments now existing. For that purpose the late Lateran Council enacted the decree of infallibility. In ascertaining this principle of papal usurpation we are not confined to Protestant authority. It is distinctly avowed by one of the most distinguished Roman Catholic authors—one whose "History of England" is recommended to the faithful in the United States.

Lingard, referring to the relations between Innocent III. and King John, states the ground upon which the former acted, as avowed by himself, in interfering with the dispute between John and the King of France—a matter purely temporal. He says that in this explicit statement is set forth "more plainly than any speculations of modern writers, the real ground on which the popes assumed their pretended

authority in temporal matters;” and, therefore, the language of the pope is the more worthy of careful scrutiny. He gives the following as the reasons by which Innocent justified himself:

“He first transcribes the following passage from the Gospel: ‘If thy brother trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between him and thee alone...., and if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more....; and if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican (Matthew xviii., 15—17). ‘Now,’ he [Innocent] proceeds, ‘the King of England maintains that the King of France, by enforcing the execution of an unjust sentence, has trespassed against him. He has, therefore, admonished him of his fault in the manner prescribed by the Gospel; and meeting with no redress, has, according to the direction of the same Gospel, appealed to the Church. How, then, can we, whom Divine Providence has placed at the head of the Church, refuse to *obey the divine command*?. How can we hesitate to proceed according to the form pointed out by Christ himself?.... We do not arrogate to ourselves the right of judgment *as to the fee*—that belongs to the King of France. But we have a right to judge *respecting the sin*; and that right it is our duty to exercise against the offender, be he who he may..... By the imperial law it has been provided that, if one of two litigant parties prefer the judgment of the Apostolic See to that of the civil magistrate (*apud* Grat., caus. ii., 9, i. can., 35), the other shall be bound to submit to such judgment. But if we mention this, it is not that we found our jurisdiction on any civil authority. God has made it our duty to reprehend the man who falls into mortal sin, and, if he neglect our reprehension, to compel him to amend by ecclesiastical censures. Moreover, both kings have sworn to observe the late treaty of peace, and yet Philip has broken that treaty. The cognizance of perjury is universally allowed to belong to the ecclesiastical courts. On this account, therefore, we have also a right to call the parties before our tribunal.” (“History of England,” by Lingard, vol. ii., pp. 153, 154 (note).)

And soon after, in explanation of the bull of Innocent releasing the English people from their allegiance, Lingard says:

“....Innocent grounded his temporal pretensions on the right which he possessed of judging of sin, and of the obligation of oaths..... At first, indeed, the popes contented themselves with spiritual censures; but in an age when all notions of justice were remodeled after the feudal jurisprudence, it was soon admitted that princes, by their disobedience, became traitors to God; that as traitors, they ought to forfeit their kingdoms, the fees which they held of God, and that to pronounce such sentence belonged to the pontiff, the vicerent of Christ upon earth. By these means the servant of the servants of God [the pope] became the sovereign of the sovereigns, and assumed the right of judging them in his court, and of transferring their crowns as he thought just.” (*Ibid.*, p. 163 (note).)

Now, if the reader will examine the first of these extracts, wherein Lingard quotes the language of Innocent, he will see that the latter derives his extraordinary power from the Gratian Decretals, which, as we have already seen, were made up of numerous gross and palpable forgeries! And if he will then take the pains to examine any of the recent encyclicals of Pius IX., especially that of 1864, (Appendix C. 29) he will also see that the latter derives his temporal power, which enables him to require obedience of governments as well as individuals, just as Innocent III. did, from his divine authority to judge of sin, and therefore from the same False Decretals! When he talked, in the Encyclical of 1864, about having derived from his “predecessors” jurisdiction over “all heresies and errors which are

hostile to moral honesty and to the eternal salvation of mankind,” it was manifestly his intention to place himself upon the ground occupied by Innocent; and it is equally manifest that the late Lateran Council intended to affirm his claim of universal jurisdiction over both “faith and morals”—that is, over all the sins committed by governments or individuals—by enacting the decree of infallibility.

It is a common boast of the papal writers that the faith and teachings of the Roman Church are immutable that they have always been, from the beginning, precisely the same. Has not Pius IX., then, and will not his successors have, according to its teachings, exactly the same power to judge of sin, wheresoever it exists, that Innocent III. had? Every thing now done and said by Pius IX. and his ultramontane allies is confirmatory of the fact that they so understand the character of the papal jurisdiction. But this question, the greatest of the present age, is susceptible of a more practical test.

Alexander II., at the dictation of Hildebrand, took jurisdiction over the political affairs of England, and gave away its crown to William of Normandy, because Harold had violated his oath, thereby committing a sin. Pius IX. has declared, in almost every variety of expression, that Protestantism is a sin, and that all the advancing nations and peoples are acting in violation of God’s law: why may he not, therefore, arraign them at the bar of the Roman Curia, pronounce judgment against them, and dispose of them as the interest of the Church shall require? Innocent III. declared that he did not derive his jurisdiction over nations from “any civil authority,” and Pius IX. has done the same thing. They both assert the Divine right to reprehend sin, and to compel amendment by ecclesiastical censures.

All this is of the faith and of morals, and, therefore, what they have said is to be taken as said *ex cathedra*. Innocent III. was as infallible when he released the English people from their allegiance, and declared that another king than John should be selected “by the authority of the Apostolic See,” as Pius IX. now is when he commands the faithful in Germany, Switzerland, and Brazil to resist the laws of their respective governments, and calls such resistance the true service of God. Therefore, the penalty for disobedience to the papal command must be the same in each case; for the Church—that is, the pope—judges *for herself* what she shall do, how she shall do it, and in what manner a refusal to obey her shall be punished!

Innocent III. made those who disobeyed him “traitors to God!” Are not those who disobey Pius IX. precisely the same? Innocent III. declared that “they ought to forfeit their kingdoms,” because they “held of God,” against whom they had committed treason; and “that to pronounce such sentence belonged to the pontiff, the vicegerent of Christ upon earth!” who was “the sovereign of the sovereigns,” and had “the right of judging them in his court, and of transferring their crowns as he thought just!” If one of the greatest of the popes has any authority in fixing the law of the Church, then this is as much its law today as it was when it was decreed at the Vatican; and that Pius IX. and all his Jesuit supporters so understand it, will not be questioned by any who will take the pains to examine the facts. It would require a volume even to compile, without comment, what has been written on this subject.

The Catholic World says: “While the State has some rights, she has them only in virtue and by *permission of the superior authority*, and that authority can only be expressed through the Church, that is, through the organic law infallibly announced and unchangeably asserted, regardless of temporal consequences.” (*The Catholic World* for July, 1870, vol. xi., p. 439.)

Dr. Brownson says: "No civil government, be it a monarchy, an aristocracy, a democracy, or any possible combination of any two or all of them, can be a wise, just, efficient, or durable government, governing for the good of the community, without the Catholic Church; and without the papacy there is and can be no Catholic Church." (Brownson's Quarterly Review, last series, January, 1873, vol. i., p. 10.)

Then, as an argument to enforce the proposition that "human laws repugnant to the divine law have no force what ever, and are on no account to be obeyed," he proceeds to say:

"Now, as all laws, as all rights, are spiritual or divine, and as all their vigor, as laws, is derived from the spiritual order, only a spiritual court, or representative of the divine order, is competent to judge of them, define, declare, and apply them to the practical questions as they come up in individual or social life. This representative of the divine order on earth is the Church, instituted by God himself to maintain his law in the government of men and nations. Hence the necessity of the union of Church and State; and the condemnation in the Syllabus of those who demand their separation and the independence of the State." (*Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 12.)

He says, moreover, that the State "is bound to protect" the rights of the Church "with physical force, if necessary," and "to govern in accordance with the divine law as she interprets, declares, and applies it." Also, that the Church has "the right to call upon" a Catholic state to suppress an insurgent heresy or schism, and to compel those who have personally received the faith to return to the unity from which they have broken away." (*Ibid.*, p. 17.)

Innumerable quotations of this kind could be inserted here, but to do so would only be a work of supererogation. It is more satisfactory to go directly to the Vatican, as everything coming from that quarter has upon it the unmistakable stamp of pontifical authority. In 1870, Cardinal Antonelli issued an official communication from Rome, directed to the papal nuncio at Paris, wherein he declared that "the maxims and fundamental principles of the Church" were derived from "pontifical constitutions," that is, decrees of popes, among which is the celebrated bull *Unigenitus* of Clement XI.; and then says:

"And, in truth, the Church has never intended, nor now intends, to exercise any direct and absolute power over the political rights of the State. Having received from God the lofty mission of guiding men, whether individually or congregated in society, to a supernatural end, she has by that very fact the authority and the duty to judge concerning the morality and justice of all acts, internal and external, in relation to their conformity with the natural and divine law. And as no action, whether it be ordained by a supreme power, or be freely elicited by an individual, can be exempt from this character of morality and justice, so it happens that the judgment of the Church, though falling directly on the morality of the acts, indirectly reaches over everything with which that morality is concerned." ("Vatican Council," by Archbishop Manning, appendix, p. 185.)

This is distinct enough to convince the most incredulous that it is a fixed and well-understood law of the Roman Church, that all individuals and societies and nations are within the circle of the papal jurisdiction; and that whatsoever they may do not compatible with God's law, as the pope shall define it, in the whole domain of faith and morals, he has the right to condemn, and does condemn, by virtue of authority derived directly from God. Hence, it will be perceived that the law of the Church is today just what it was announced to be by Innocent III., and that it confers upon Pius IX. precisely the same

authority which he claimed over the crown of England, and which Alexander II. exercised when he decided it to belong to William of Normandy.

The law being the same, the penalty for disobedience must be the same—for the Church never changes! In any given case of disobedience, whether by an individual or a nation, the act must be, necessarily, treason against God, as Innocent declared. The individual, for this offense, is cut off by the sword of excommunication from all fellowship with the faithful, and the doors of heaven are closed against him; if he be a civil ruler, his authority to govern is stricken from his hands, and those who owe him obedience by the laws of the State are commanded not to obey him. The nation, not having, like the individual, a corporeal body to be punished or a soul to be damned, forfeits all rights to the exercise of the power out of which its disobedience arose, and becomes thereby subject to the “sovereign of the sovereigns,” to whom God has given authority to pronounce judgment against it in his court,” and to transfer it to whomsoever he shall think “just;” that is, to the faithful who will bring it into the path of duty! And when all other remedial measures have failed, the Church, says Pius IX., has the right to avail “herself of force” to compel obedience! *

* The Syllabus condemns as one of the principal errors of the times the doctrine that “the Church has not the power of availing herself of *force*.” See Appendix D, paragraph v., sec. 24.

We are not left to any conjecture in reference to the punishment of individuals or nations for the heresy of disobedience to the pope, which is considered as disobedience to God. If the doctrine laid down by Innocent III. and Pius IX. is not explicit enough on this subject, it is so laid down by authors of recognized authority, who have compiled the law of the Church, as to leave no room for cavil. In 1773, a work was published in Spain, written by Alfonzo de Castro, a learned friar, which was designed to set forth the law of the Church for the punishment of heretics. These punishments he divides into two classes, spiritual and temporal. The latter are defined to be proscription and confiscation of property, and “the deprivation of every sort of pre-eminence, jurisdiction, and government, which they previously exercised over persons of every condition.” To this class belong kings and those who govern public affairs. “A king,” says he, “having become a heretic, is *ipso jure* (by the law itself) deprived of his kingdom, a duke of his dukedom, an earl of his earldom, and so with other governors of the people, by whatever name they are known.” And this is done by the pope, who “deprives a king of his royal dignity, and strips him of his kingdom; for in the matter of faith, kings, like other subordinates, are the subjects of the sovereign pontiff, who can punish them as he does others.”

Inasmuch as to deprive a ruler of his kingdom, the country would be left without a governor, unless something more were done, the law goes a step farther. This author states it in these words:

“If an heretical king have no heir, or *if the heir be also a heretic*, then *if the nation be not infected with heresy*, I should say that it has the power and right of electing the king, as it is said in the First Book of Kings, ‘The people makes itself a king.’ But if the people be infected with the same pestilence (of heresy) as the king, the people will be deprived *ipso jure* of the power of choosing for itself a king, and *then the business will devolve on the sovereign pontiff!*” (*Apud* Dr. Cumming. See his “Lectures on Romanism,” in London, in explanation of the teaching of Cardinal Wiseman, pp. 55, 56.)

And thus the remote facts in English history, already detailed, connect themselves with our own times, by the attempt of the papacy, under the lead of the Jesuits, to revive the papal doctrines of the Middle Ages, as the means of arresting the progress and advancing civilization of the nineteenth century. The passionate declamation of the pope, and the vaporing of a few hierarchs, or all of them, for that matter, amount to nothing in the abstract. Like all others of disappointed ambition, they are most prolific in terms of denunciation against those who have been driven out of the Roman Church by their severity and injustice.

And if they choose to drive them still farther by additional severity and injustice, and every form of anathema and malediction, Protestants are not likely to concern themselves very much about it. But when they impudently arraign whole nations of people, deny to them the right to govern their own affairs, pronounce judgment against them as heretics and traitors to God, and claim that the pope has the divine right to set his own rulers over them, it is quite time for us to understand what is to be the effect of all this upon the future destiny of our own country. But this question can be more satisfactorily considered when we shall have learned something more of the working of the papal system, which we are now asked to adopt in preference to that which has placed us in so eminent a position among the nations.

Chapter XV. The English Barons

The Pope turns England over to France.—Resistance of the Barons.—John resigns the Crown to the Pope.—Langton.—Charter of Henry I.—Barons form a League.—Langton supports the Barons.—Magna Carta.—John swears to obey it.—The Pope releases Him, and annuls the Charter. He claims England as a Fief.—Foreign Mercenaries.—Henry III.—Italian and Foreign Priests.—King promises to observe the Charter.—The Pope again releases Him.—Appeals to Rome.—Peter—pence.—Immunities of Clergy.—They murder with Impunity.—House of Commons established.—Pope again releases the King from his Oath.—Civil War.—The Barons defeated.—Their Treatment by the King and Pope.—Edward I. confirms the Charter.—The Pope releases Him.—Edward II.—The Statutes of Provisors and of Praemunire.—The Lollards.—Law for burning Heretics.—William Sawtre and Thomas Badby burned.—Lollards attacked.—Clergy exempt from Punishment in Secular Courts.—Their Corruption and that of the Popes.—Urban V. and Gregory XI.—Popes and Antipopes.—Scandalous and Disgraceful Conduct.—Gregory XII. Pope at Rome, and Benedict XIII. at Avignon.—Both declared Infamous by the Council of Pisa.—Alexander V.—John XXIII. deposed for Enormous Crimes by Council of Constance.—Martin V.—Influence upon the Church.—Corruption almost Universal.—The Fruits of the False Decretals.

THE condition into which King John was thrown by the attempt of Innocent III. to stir up an insurrection in England against his authority was embarrassing in an extreme degree. He had incurred the animosity of the Norman barons, who, after having at first entertained hostility toward the native Britons and the Saxons, had become reconciled to both, and were anxious to defend and share with them their ancient rights and privileges. These barons were Roman Catholics in all the essentials of religious faith; but as they found nothing in that faith, when uncontaminated by the influence of the papacy, requiring them to submit passively to the tyranny of either kings or popes, they became early imposed with the necessity of adopting such measures as would teach their rulers that the English people had some rights they were bound to respect. The occasion afforded them an opportunity of seeking to avenge themselves upon the king for the injuries he had inflicted upon them in a previous part of his reign; and as the power of the crown, when backed by that of the papacy, was too strong for resistance by any ordinary means, they began to combine with a view to his expulsion from the throne, and the election of another king more favorable to the people.

The pope, taking advantage of this disaffection, and supposing that there existed no further impediment to the consummation of his plans, issued another bull deposing John, and empowering the King of France to put the sentence into execution! Of course the King of France, faithful as he was to the Church, did not act altogether out of religious motives; nor did the pope, although he claimed to be employing a divine power only for the good of the Church, address himself to any such motive. The pretext of the good of the Church was, on the part of both, the mere cover for ambition of the baser sort. Therefore, we find the pope promising the French king, as a reward for his aggressive interference with the affairs of England, “the *remission of all his sins*, together with *the crown of England*, when once he had dethroned the tyrant.” (“History of England,” by Rapin, vol. iii., p. 203.)

It was scarcely possible to make a more bountiful bestowal of pontifical favor. In one breath the sins of a whole life-time were forgiven, and, in the next, the crown of a nation was given away! The pope had about as much right to do the one as the other: the first was an assumption of a prerogative which belongs to God alone; the second was a criminal violation of the law of nations. Both acts, under the pretense of Divine sanction, were impious. But the King of France readily accepted the proposition, and commenced military preparations to carry it into execution.

The pope, however, was too cunning a politician to permit measures to be carried to extremes, so long as there was a possibility of accomplishing his ends by other means; for he was sagacious enough to see that with Philip of France in possession of the English throne he might have an adversary far more formidable than John to deal with. Accordingly, he sent a legate to John to excite his fears by telling him that the barons would take the side of Philip, and to remind him of his unpopularity with the people. He hoped to bring John to terms without complying with his promise to Philip; for, like many other popes, he always interpreted the law of God as if it had been made flexible and yielding, merely for the purpose of advancing the papal ambition.

As the courage of John had already begun to fail, the legate had little difficulty in impressing his mind with the views of the pope, who, notwithstanding the anathema of the Church rested upon John's head, was still willing to treat with an excommunicated heretic, if thereby he could add to the power of the papacy. When the legate, therefore, found that John had become alarmed at the formidable alliance against him, he developed the whole papal plan by telling him that his only remedy was to put himself wholly under the protection of the pope, which he could do by becoming a dutiful son of the Church, and by promising to perform whatsoever the pope should enjoin upon him!

John, caught in the papal net, finally consented to these humiliating terms, and agreed to take the necessary oath. However, when the legate came to explain the terms of the surrender, he insisted that as John's offenses were "against God and the Church!"—as all offenses against the papacy are yet regarded by the advocates of infallibility—he must also resign the crown into the pope's hands! Forced by the seeming necessity of his condition, and with his spirit crushed by the violence of pontifical wrath, John consented even to this; and, publicly taking the crown from his head, laid it at the feet of the legate! He then signed a charter, resigning to the pope the kingdom of England and the lordship of Ireland! (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 208; Lingard, vol. ii., p. 165; Appendix, note, D.)

And thus the King of England became a vassal of the Pope of Rome, promising to pay a thousand marks a year in money, and binding all his successors to like obedience! And all this was done without any regard whatever to the interest or wishes of the people, who, under the impious pretense that God required it, were transferred from one despot to another, like cattle sold in the public market. And thus Pope Innocent III., by virtue of authority derived from the Forged Decretals, planted his feet upon the necks of the English people.

Even Lingard, conscious of the iniquity of the act, cannot refrain from saying that "this transaction has heaped everlasting infamy on the memory of John;" and he might, with equal propriety and justice, have added, like infamy upon the memory of Innocent III., who planned, plotted, and contrived it by fraud, usurpation, and deceit—all covered up under the flimsy disguise of infallibility. And yet, infamous as it was, it is not at all too strong to say that Pius IX. would avail himself of the same disguise, today or tomorrow, to do the same thing in England or the United States, or in any other country, under like favorable circumstances.

John having thus traded away the crown to the pope, to the disgrace of both seller and buyer, the dissatisfaction against him became intense throughout the kingdom. Langton, though the pope's legate, sympathized with the barons; and, in order to stimulate their zeal, he made known to them the existence

of an old charter granted by Henry I., a fact which was of the utmost importance to their cause, but of which they were previously ignorant. *

* Henry I., in order to obtain possession of the crown, promised to abrogate all rigorous laws made after the Conquest, and to restore the Government to the condition in which it was under the first Saxon kings. This he did by granting a charter, renouncing the unjust prerogatives usurped by William the Conqueror, and by William II., his (Henry I.'s) immediate predecessor.—*Rapin*, vol. ii., pp. 323-326. For copy of this charter see Thierry, vol. i., p. 344 (note).

Thus notified of this important grant, the barons were easily induced to enter into a league or confederacy to secure a greater degree of independence, upon the basis of the old Saxon liberties. When this movement was made known to the pope, he was gratified; not because he desired or intended that the barons should obtain any additional liberties, but because he hoped that the breach between them and the king would become so irreconcilable that they could not unite against him; for he understood perfectly well that if the king and the barons were united in opposition to him, they could soon terminate all his usurped authority in England. But Langton understood the policy and schemings of the crafty pope, and was determined that his countrymen should not be deprived of their ancient Saxon liberties, since they were preparing to make such noble efforts for their restoration. He was familiar enough with the papacy to foresee the degradation into which they would be plunged if the pope should secure his triumph. And he, accordingly, brought himself under the suspicion of the pope, who sent another legate into England, and demanded a second resignation of the crown by John, and an additional treaty, sealed with gold instead of wax.

When this demand was made, the king, already humiliated to an unparalleled degree, consented to it; but Langton protested against it, because it was apparent that the pope had by this time resolved to oppose the cause of the barons, and had promised to protect John against their demand for their ancient liberties. Langton's protestation greatly incensed the pope, who could not understand how a papal legate could espouse the cause of English liberty; but he was afraid to proceed immediately to extremities for fear of open resistance by the people, who were now beginning to learn something of the rights out of which they had been cheated by treacherous rulers, under the dictation of equally treacherous popes.

The barons were not appeased by the conduct of either the king or the pope, but renewed their league, and courageously resolved to demand the re-establishment of the charter of Henry I. When they made this demand of the king, he, backed by the pope, refused it. They then took up arms, acquired possession of London, and besieged the king in the Tower. Were they justified in this? Undoubtedly they were.

There are two kinds of government—one of law, the other of force. When the latter seizes upon and destroys the natural and inalienable liberties of a people, they have the right to re-assert them by whatsoever degree of force may be necessary to resist the usurpation. In that condition the English people were then placed. Their former freedom had been guaranteed to them by all the proper forms of law; and when kings and popes, by unrighteous combinations, had disregarded the law and set it aside, they were justified in resuming their position of independence, even at the sword's point.

And the barons showed themselves capable of performing this great work, for they soon compelled the king to sign two charters, one of which was the Charter of Liberties, or *Magna Carta*, which is yet regarded as the foundation of the present liberties of England and the United States. Being afraid to trust the king, the barons required him to take an oath to observe these charters, which he did in the most solemn form. But circumstances soon transpired to show that, notwithstanding the solemnity with which this oath had been taken, he did not intend to be bound by it. It was considered an essential part of the doctrine of the “divine right” of kings, that they were not bound by any promise made by them to the people, in whose hands none of the powers of government were lodged; and if this convenient method of escape from the obligation of an oath had not been provided, the dispensing power of the pope, as God’s vicegerent (!), was always at hand to release the representatives of absolutism from all such obligations, whenever the interest of the papacy required it.

In this particular instance King John was stimulated to the violation of his oath by the foreigners who were about his court, and who had been sent into England by the pope to aid him in oppressing the people by the exercise of ecclesiastical authority, under the canons of the Roman Church, and who were assiduous in their efforts to become the masters of the country. (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 228.) These ecclesiastics assisted the king to raise foreign troops to resist the barons, because such troops, being merely mercenaries, and having no sympathies with the English people, were always ready to enlist in any cause which promised them remuneration, whether in the form of money or booty. The king, however, while employing these means of subjugating his own people, called also upon the pope for assistance. He sent to him copies of the charters he had granted the barons, in order to show how much they encroached upon the royal and pontifical authority, and asked that he be absolved from his oath to observe them—that is, that the pope, as God’s representative, should release him from the obligation to obey a promise solemnly made to his own countrymen concerning their own domestic laws and policy!

The pope was greatly incensed at the barons for having dared to assert such liberties for themselves and the people, understanding perfectly well that such a concession would lead to a demand for others. And “in his rage he swore [by St. Peter] that, cost him what it would, he would never suffer their rashness to go unpunished.” (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 230.) He annulled the charters, absolved the king from his oath, and wrote to the barons commanding them to renounce what they had extorted from John, as the only means of escaping the pontifical wrath.

Lingard comes to our assistance again, by furnishing us the reasons which influenced Innocent III. in this additional act of interference with English affairs. After naming several, such as the violation of their fealty to the king by the barons, the fact that they had presumed to sit in judgment upon the conduct of their king, and the additional fact that John had agreed to take part in the Crusades, and was therefore entitled to protection, he proceeds to say:

“Lastly, England was become the fief of the Holy See, and they [the barons] could not be ignorant that if the king had the will, he had not, at least, the power, to give away the rights of the crown without the consent of his feudal superior [the pope]. He [the pope] was therefore bound to annul the concessions which had been extorted from John, as having been obtained in contempt of the Holy See, to the degradation of royalty, to the disgrace of the nation, and to the impediment of the Crusade.” (“History of England,” by Lingard, vol. ii., p. 181.)

Could anything show more satisfactorily the nature of the divine power over the temporal affairs of nations, exercised by Innocent III., and now re-asserted by Pius IX.? In this particular case it went to the extent of claiming plenary jurisdiction over the entire domestic policy of the kingdom, by denying to the king any power to grant additional liberties to the English people without the consent of the pope! It assumed that King John, without the consent of the nation, could make England a fief to the pope, and lay its crown at his feet, but could do no act tending to give the people the right to be consulted about the laws by which they were to be governed! It attempted to legitimate the highest crime which a king can commit—the treacherous surrender of his crown—by covering it up under the divine sanction, as if God had designed that the papacy should be built up by the sacrifice of all truth, justice, and honor! It was such an act of deep and indelible infamy as time cannot wipe out.

And why are we, in this age, justified in so considering it? Not merely because the precedent thus established has furnished a rule of action for other popes, in their attempts to subordinate all nations and peoples to themselves, but for other reasons which will readily occur to a thoughtful mind.

Magna Carta shines as a bright light in history. It was the beginning of that great uprising of the English people which enabled them to take the lead among the advancing nations. It is the corner—stone of all popular government as it now exists; and but for it, kingly and papal absolutism might be today holding its universal carnival. And yet we are told by an infallible pope that such an act, so glorious in all its consequences, was “in contempt of the Holy See!” Why? Because it tended “to the degradation of royalty,” by putting into the hands of the people rights which they derived from God and nature!

John, thus released from the obligation of his oath by the dispensing power of the pope, set on foot an army of foreigners to punish the barons and ravage the country. The barons defied the thunders of the pope and the armies of the king. The latter had no higher object than plunder, and the effect was that the country was reduced to a most deplorable condition—the private property of the barons being seized and appropriated by foreign mercenaries. The pope excommunicated the barons, merely because they were unwilling to be made slaves, and not for any violation of their religious faith. He ordered Langton, his legate, to publish the bull of excommunication in England to intimidate the barons. But Langton, though faithful to his religion, had not forgotten that he was an Englishman; and he refused to perform the degrading and disgraceful act. And for this act of devotion to his native country he was suspended by the pope from the Archbishopric of Canterbury, which was designed to stamp him with the indelible mark of disgrace. *

* *The Catholic World*, in an article on “The Spirit of Protestantism,” makes an enumeration of the “beneficent results” which have been “directly and indirectly the work of the Catholic Church.” Among other things, such as the Crusades and the discovery of America by Columbus, it points with exulting pride “to Archbishop Langton framing Magna Carta!!!—” *The Catholic World*, December, 1872, vol. xvi., p. 290. Lingard, referring to the refusal of Langton to publish the bull, and his suspension in consequence, says that he visited Rome, but failed to “mollify the pontiff, or recover the exercise of his authority.”—*History of England*, by Lingard, vol. ii., p. 182. Some papal writers set down Magna Carta itself to the credit of the Church, because the barons were Roman Catholics! Much that passes for history is made in that way.

The bull, however, was published, but the barons again defied it, because they were not particularly named in it. The pope, to remove this objection, issued another, excommunicating them by name, and

putting their lands, as well as the city of London—which took the side of the barons—under interdict. Again they refused obedience, declaring, in the spirit of true Englishmen, that “it was not the pope’s business to meddle with temporal affairs, seeing that St. Peter had received from Christ none but spiritual power: for which reason it was neither just nor right that Christians should suffer themselves to be swayed by the ambition and avarice of popes.” (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 233.)

They were Roman Catholics in religious faith, strongly attached to their Church and the traditions of its early purity and greatness, but were unwilling to surrender the independence of their country to either a treacherous king or a domineering pope. They were resolved that they would not become the mere slaves to the temporal power which Innocent III. claimed the divine right to exercise over them. And they were determined to stand by and to restore the liberties which they considered the birthright of the English people. They did this with a courage which has endeared to every lover of popular liberty the memory of these hardy but unlettered old barons, who defied not only the king, but one of the most powerful and ambitious of the popes. Their firm adherence to their demand for freedom kept the principles of English liberty alive in the minds of the people, who had never yet forgotten their ancient Christianity or the teachings of their Saxon ancestors. These principles survived every shock they received, and enabled the people to bear themselves up under every load of oppression with which kings and popes endeavored to crush them.

Pope Innocent III. and King John have passed away. Of the former, it is related by a Roman Catholic pen that, after death, he was seen in a vision by St. Lutgarde, a nun, to whom he said that “he could not enter heaven until the day of the last judgment, and after having suffered tortures incomprehensible by the human mind,” on account of the monstrous enormity of his crimes. (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 464.) The world’s greatest bard, in almost the last words put into the mouth of the latter, makes him say,

“Within me is a hell; and there the poison
Is, as a fiend, confined to tyrannize
On unreprieveable, condemned blood.”

Yet the principles of Magna Carta have lived, grown, and expanded, and will continue to live, grow, and expand until all the chains of absolutism shall have been broken, and there shall be no bands upon either the limbs or minds of men.

During the subsequent reign of Henry III.—one of the most disgraceful in English history—the liberties of the people were almost entirely destroyed. The popes, by the appointment of Italian ecclesiastics, had created in England an army of foreign priests, who were exclusively devoted to Rome, who had no sympathies in common with the English people, and who, scattered all over the country, impoverished it by their enormous exactions of money. *

* The pope, at one time, nominated three hundred Italian priests to vacant benefices in England. And so numerous did these foreigners become, that their annual income extorted from the people amounted to seventy thousand marks—over \$230,000—while the revenue of the crown, levied for the support of the Government, scarcely exceeded one—third of that sum!—RAPIN, vol. iii., pp. 349-398.

The king, obeying the pope, also made an effort to annul the Great Charter, although he had solemnly promised, at the beginning of his reign, to observe it. He excused himself for this attempt to violate his promise, upon the ground that he was a minor when it was made! The pope and the king “mutually stood by one another whenever the business was to extort money” from the people. (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 305.)

The pope made every possible effort to alienate the affections of the king from his English subjects, by causing him to call still more foreigners devoted to the papacy to assist him in conducting public affairs. (Hume, vol. ii., p. 16.) And when Parliament complained of this, the Bishop of Winchester, speaking for the pope, rebuked them upon the ground that it was an encroachment upon the royal prerogative! (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 324.) Nearly all the money of the kingdom was remitted to Rome. (*Ibid.*, p. 367.) And the pope acquired such power over Henry that, under threat of excommunication, he obtained a renewal of the concession of John, that the crown should remain in vassalage to the Holy See. (*Ibid.*, p. 371.)

The English bishops, stimulated by the pope, claimed jurisdiction over *civil* affairs, upon the pretense that there was hardly any case but what *religion* was concerned with (*Ibid.*, pp. 374, 457.)—the logical result of the papal demand that the pope shall be regarded as *infallible* upon all questions of *morals* as well as of faith. The king obtained innumerable subsidies upon promises which he violated as soon as he received the money; in all of which his perfidious conduct was approved by the pope, who was always ready to grant him a dispensation for the violation of his most solemn engagements, when their mutual interests were thereby advanced. (*Ibid.*, p. 403.)

The popes considered England as a conquered country, its kings their vassals, and its people as having no rights of any value whatsoever when they came in conflict with the demands of the papacy. (*Ibid.*, p. 454.) They entertained appeals in almost every matter of controversy, and the people were compelled to spend immense sums of money in traveling to Rome to solicit their favor. (*Ibid.*) They converted Peter —pence into a tribute to the chair of Peter, and practiced the most rigorous measures for its collection. (*Ibid.*, p. 457.) They organized a compact body of ecclesiastics, trained to obedience and submission, who, in disregard of the laws of the kingdom, took the side of the popes against the people, as if they were the absolute and only sovereigns of the country. (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 457.) They demanded that the civil courts should have no jurisdiction to try and condemn ecclesiastics, even for the most enormous crimes! (*Ibid.*, p. 458.*)

* More than a hundred murders were committed by ecclesiastics during the reign of Henry II., in which the parties were not even punished by degradation. The clergy had absolute power over their own body, and no appeal was allowed from their decisions. A layman forfeited his life by the crime of murder, but an ecclesiastic went unpunished. This was called one of the immunities of the clergy! A clergyman committed a murder in 1163, and, being tried by an ecclesiastical court, was sentenced merely to lose his benefice and be confined in a monastery! The king complained that he ought to be tried as laymen in the civil courts, but the clergy objected. The king remained firm, and it was finally agreed, among other things, that this should thereafter be done. But when the pope was informed of this, he refused his sanction, and denounced it as “prejudicial to the Church, and destructive of her privileges!”—RAPIN, vol. iii., pp. 21-26.

The process of excommunication was entirely perverted from its original meaning, and made to serve the temporal uses of the pope, upon trivial no less than upon grave occasions, being employed to punish trifling acts of disobedience, to raise money, and for almost every imaginable purpose but the advancement of the Gospel. It would be impossible to enumerate, indeed, within a compass less than a volume, the outrages and enormities practiced in England during this gloomy period by kings and popes, who considered the assertion of any single popular right as a crime which God had appointed them to punish! The power, oppressions, and vices of the papacy had nearly reached their culminating point, and the pure religion of Christ and his apostles, which was designed to purify and refine the heart and soul of man, was entirely subordinated to temporal and selfish ends, and made to play the ignoble part of ministering to the worldly ambition of the popes and their prostituted army of ecclesiastics.

The barons would have been unworthy the name of Englishmen if they had not resisted these encroachments upon the rights and liberties of the people, with whose interests and happiness their own had now become inseparably identified. The reciprocal hatred which had once existed between the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans had, like that between the native Britons and the Saxons, given way before the sense of common injuries and the threatened loss of their common liberties.

To the stubborn tenacity with which the Anglo—Saxons adhered to their Teutonic principles the country was indebted for this. They had gradually worn away the Norman prejudices, and had retained their own language, and enough of their ancient laws and customs to furnish an ultimate barrier against the encroachment of kings and popes—their common and implacable enemies. The barons realizing this, firmly maintained their ground on the side of the people, and resolved upon grappling royalty itself by the throat, if its hold upon the country could not otherwise be broken. The struggle was one which called for an exhibition of the highest and noblest qualities of English character. The ancient liberties were to be snatched from the grasp of royal and papal imperialism, and given back again to the people from whom they had been wrenched by usurpation, to be sacredly preserved, as belonging of right to every Englishman, and as the foundation of the world's future progress.

The firmness and resolution of the barons constrained the king to grant important concessions. Twenty—four commissioners were appointed—one half by the king, the other by the barons—to provide redress for the public grievances. (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 431.) These provided for the confirmation of the Great Charter, and the introduction, for the first time, of the representatives of the Commons—that is, of the people—into Parliament; (*Ibid.*, p. 433.) a measure, imperfect as it then was, which was based upon the natural and inalienable right of the people to give or withhold their assent to all laws by which it is proposed to govern them. The Parliament, thus brought under popular influence, approved what had been done by the commissioners, and provided for the execution of the articles they had drawn up.

Beneficial results immediately followed. They were first seen in the expulsion from the country of the army of foreigners, who, by the joint policy of the kings and the popes, had been imported to fill the offices, consume the wealth of the people, and keep them in bondage to the papal power. (*Ibid.*, p. 435.) This accomplished, the barons formed another alliance, and swore to maintain their liberties with their lives and fortunes. (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 435.) The city of London joined the alliance.

The king, however, in the mean time, fearing the loss of his royal prerogatives, and the consequent elevation of the people, appealed to the pope to absolve him from the oath he had taken to abide by his

compact with the barons! This absolution was readily granted by Pope Alexander IV.; but, as he died before any effective measures had been consummated, it was confirmed by Pope Urban IV., (*Ibid.*, P. 443.) who was as little scrupulous upon this subject as any of his predecessors. Thus supported by the Church, the king announced to Parliament that he would not observe his oath, and took immediate steps to recover the prerogatives he had lost by surrender to the barons. The barons were unyielding, and they and the king both prepared for civil war. To avoid this, however, if possible, the barons petitioned the king to adopt conciliatory measures, which he finally consented to do., to an extent satisfactory to them.

But the king soon broke his promise again—as he could easily do at any time, by the help of the pope—and the parties again made preparations for war. The king at last began active hostilities by surprising Dover Castle, which was in the hands of the barons. (*Ibid.*, p. 453.) Before any decisive result was reached, however, it was agreed to refer the matter to the King of France as arbiter—a measure which reflects more credit upon the peaceful disposition of the barons than it does upon their sagacity. As might have been expected, the French king fully sustained his royal brother of England, having precisely the same motive for keeping the people in subjection, and being equally under the influence of the pope. He decided that the provisions of the twenty—four commissioners were null and void, that the king should be restored to his former power, that he should appoint all the great officers of the crown, and that foreigners should be as capable of holding offices in England as the English themselves! (*Ibid.*, p. 454.) Consent to this on the part of the barons would have buried English liberty in its grave forever. Therefore, civil war became inevitable.

At the beginning of it, fortune seemed to favor the cause of the king, but he was finally taken prisoner; when the barons drew up a new plan of government for the extension and security of their liberties. By this plan conservators were appointed in each county to preserve the privileges of the people, and these were required to nominate knights to sit in Parliament as the representatives of their shires, thus laying the foundation for popular legislative representation. The Parliament elected pursuant to this plan adopted important measures of reform for the promotion of the public welfare, and greatly reduced the prerogatives of the king.

While the Government was thus conducted, it made a nearer approach to the popular form than any other that had existed in England after the popes had obtained a foothold there, and embodied many of the Teutonic principles brought there by the Saxons. The king, however, having subsequently obtained his liberty, the barons suffered a severe defeat, which changed the whole aspect of affairs. After this, the barons were persecuted “a thousand ways,” and made to “endure many hardships,” says the historian. (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 473.) Their estates were confiscated. The city of London was required to deliver up her magistrates, and pay large sums of money. The king conferred the estates of the barons upon his favorites, and left no means untried to punish them for their resistance to his authority.

Pope Clement IV., to convince the people that the barons had forfeited their claim to his protection and secured to themselves the certainty of eternal perdition, because they had struggled to regain the ancient liberties of the country, sent over a legate with a bull of excommunication against them and all their adherents, dead or alive! (*Ibid.*, p. 474.)’ And thus, with only their “lives and limbs” saved, these defenders of human freedom against the encroachments of kingly and pontifical absolutism were compelled to lay down their arms, and go back among the people, to keep alive in their minds the

principles for which they had risked so much. And they were kept alive—cherished in the hearts of the English people, until the time came for their final triumph.

We can scarcely realize now, in the midst of our own prosperity, how much we owe to these firm and courageous old heroes, who, for nearly half a century, held out against both kings and popes. But for them, the ancient liberties of England would have been lost, and the world would have been kept in the midnight of the Middle Ages. But for them, the reign of King John would have been redeemed by no such event as the establishment of the Great Charter to save it from the disgrace of treachery and imbecility. And but for them, the present civil and religious freedom of England and the United States might have had no such foundation as has enabled it, thus far, to defy assault, and stand firm against encroachment.

Truth and candor require that full justice should be done to these old Roman Catholic barons, who obeyed God and their own consciences, rather than corrupt popes and ecclesiastics. They loved their religion, but they loved freedom also; and for loving freedom they were cursed, anathematized, and despoiled by the Church of Rome! They did not believe the pope to be infallible, and for this they were consigned to eternal torment in the world to come!

But the barons made so bold a stand against imperialism, that, from the time of this memorable contest to the birth of Protestantism in England, no king dared again arouse the popular indignation by an armed assault upon the defenders of the Great Charter. The fear of the people began to manifest itself in their conduct and policy. They conceded only what they could not withhold, and, together with the popes, employed art and intrigue to accomplish, by indirection, what they dared not attempt again to obtain by force.

Edward I. confirmed the Charter at the beginning of his reign, in order to conciliate popular favor; and although he had pretended to do it “of his own accord,” he soon asked the pope to absolve him from his promise, religion and the Church being used solely to advance the temporal ends of kings and popes. The pope absolved him, of course, not merely because of his hostility to the Charter on account of its enfranchisement of the people, but because, as it is said, the king made him “a present of gold plate!” (Rapin, vol. iv., pp. 99-113.)

Edward II. pledged himself to Parliament that its provisions should be faithfully kept, and when he sought to escape the fulfillment of his promise, the barons seized him, and held him to his word. Yet he recognized himself as the vassal of the pope, and suffered him to interfere in the temporal affairs of his kingdom. This the pope did by sending a legate to England with a papal commission to make peace between that country and Scotland, to excommunicate both kings, and place both countries under interdict if they refused obedience! (Rapin, vol. iv., p. 152.) —thus assuming that all the prerogatives of both crowns belonged to him *as the vicar of Christ*! Edward III., in order to obtain a subsidy from Parliament, again confirmed the Charter, (*Ibid.*, p. 242.) and indicated a wish to curtail the authority of the pope, by subsequently repeating this act of confirmation, and by consenting to the statute of Provisors to prohibit the popes from disposing of benefices in England. (*Ibid.*, p. 255.) This statute, however, was not effective against the machinations of the popes, and, although several times repeated under subsequent kings, its terms had to be enlarged by the statute of Praemunire before any good was accomplished by it. *

* The statute of Provisors provided that no ecclesiastical living should be accepted from the pope, and that nothing should be sent to him out of the kingdom. By that of Praemunire all bulls, excommunications, etc., against the king, crown, or realm, proceeding from Rome, were prohibited.

Everything done by these kings was by way of concession to the people, on account of fear—showing that they were apprehensive that their royal rights were held by a precarious tenure, and that the people only awaited a favorable opportunity to assert their ancient liberties. During all the subsequent reigns between that time and the accession of Henry VIII., these liberties were suspended, but not forgotten: if there had been no other method of preservation, they would have been traditionally preserved in the English mind. The one hundred and thirty years embraced in that period were distinguished by many events of the most important character to England and the world. The fortunes of the people seemed sometimes to be almost overwhelmed by the combined oppression of kings and popes; but their cause was never at any time entirely lost.

Providence will shape our ends, “rough—hew them how we will;” and when the popes, as the head of the Church, grasped a temporal sword, and stained it with the blood of pious Christians, for no other offense than the worship of God according to their own consciences, they called down the wrath of Heaven upon their own heads, and aided in building up a party of reform in the Church. As early as the reign of Richard II. incipient steps were taken in this work of reform—showing that the Roman Catholic Church never was without pious and devout Christians among its members. The measures then inaugurated ultimately gave birth to Protestantism— slowly, it is true, but surely. Although, in 1381, an act was passed, in obedience to Rome, authorizing the imprisonment of heretics by the bishops, (Rapin, vol. iv., p. 394.) yet the House of Commons forced a repeal of it during the next year. (*Ibid.*, p. 397.) The passage of such an act, however, shows that Rome was ready to place her heel of iron upon the necks of any who dared consult their own consciences upon questions of religious faith. She would repeat these measures today if she again possessed the power, and, therefore, they teach us a valuable and most instructive lesson.

This inauguration of religious persecution was designed for the suppression of the Lollards, or followers of John Wycliffe, who published his reform doctrines in the year 1377, during the reign of Edward III. These new doctrines had so spread among the people in a few years, that, while Richard II. was carrying on his war in Ireland, the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of London were compelled to entreat him to return, and look after the cause of religion. The immediate cause of their alarm was, that at a late Parliament the Lollards had suggested the necessity for reform in the Church! (*Ibid.*, p. 424.) The king returned, seized upon one of the Lollards, compelled him to abjure the new doctrines, and threatened him with death if he again professed them! (*Ibid.*, pp. 424, 425.)

Now a new and powerful element began its work—one which the people readily saw would enable them to achieve their ultimate freedom. There was yet no law to punish heresy; and, therefore, Wycliffe was unmolested, and his followers among the people increased with wonderful rapidity. Even his death did not dishearten them; and as early as the year 1389 they began to separate from the Roman Catholic Church, and to appoint their own priests (Rapin, vol. iv., p. 472.)—thus beginning the Reformation.

So rapidly did they increase, that Rome had to bring forth the most fearful engines of her power to suppress their free thought, and chain down their limbs. The reign of Henry IV. was soon signalized by the enactment of a law “for the burning of heretics ” (*Ibid.*, vol. v., p. 33; Froude’s “Hist. of England,” vol. i., p. 95.)—a most Christian(!) and truly Roman mode of disposing of the Lollards. Under this act, William Sawtre, a Lollard, was immediately convicted by an ecclesiastical court, and burned to death! (Ripin, vol. v., p. 33.)— thus becoming the first English martyr, after the monks of Bangor, to the cause of religious liberty. Then Rome rejoiced, and the cruel and bloody work of persecution began. The fires were kindled which were to consume hundreds more of the best of England’s sons—of men whose only crime was that they dared assert that God had given to every man the right to worship him according to the dictates of his own conscience!

Thomas Badby, another Lollard, was burned in 1410. When offered his life if he would recant, he refused, and suffered death with heroic courage. (*Ibid.*, p. 74.)

During the reign of Henry V. the Romish clergy held a convocation to decide upon measures necessary to check the progress of the doctrines of Wycliffe; which resulted in the king’s being advised by the Archbishop of Canterbury “that fire and fagot were the only means of extirpating heresy!” (*Ibid.*, pp. 92, 93.) This was the doctrine of Rome, announced by its highest ecclesiastic in England! But the king was slow to adopt it, as the new doctrines were spreading so rapidly as to excite his fears of the people. He, however, advanced toward it as near as he thought he could safely do, by issuing a proclamation prohibiting the Lollards from holding meetings, and the people from being present at their preaching! But the Lollards held their meetings, notwithstanding the proclamation, and at one of them, held at St. Giles’s Fields, near London, it was represented that twenty thousand were present, supposed to be under Sir John Oldcastle, who had been previously convicted of heresy, and would have been burned if he had not escaped.

Being unable to suppress these peaceful assemblages of the people, the clergy adopted another method for their extermination, by persuading the king to believe that the Lollards had a design upon his life, and were conspiring against the Government—a method which it required the corrupt followers of the papacy to invent. The king yielded to their importunities, summoned a body of armed men, closed the gates of London, for fear the people there would go out to help the Lollards, surprised about eighty peaceful and praying Christians at midnight, cruelly murdered twenty of them, and made prisoners of the other sixty, some of whom were forthwith executed, and the remainder set at liberty. (Ripin, vol. v., pp. 100-103.)

During the reign of Edward IV. the clergy regained much of their lost power, and again began to press more heavily and severely upon the people. In 1462 an act was passed, under dictation from Rome, providing that they should only be tried in the ecclesiastical courts, and should not be held responsible for crimes before the civil tribunals. The king also released them from the operation of the statutes of Provisors and Praemunire. (*Ibid.*, vol. vi., p. 17.) But all these measures, while they added to the power of the Romish clergy in England, also increased their corruptions. These were so openly and unblushingly practiced as to put in striking contrast their conduct with that of the reforming Christians; and by this means the numbers of the latter continually increased, especially among those who had so long struggled to maintain the Great Charter and the ancient liberties. And thus these popular elements were consolidated into a power which persecution could not destroy, but which was destined to be

preserved until it became strong enough to control the policy of the English nation, and influence the whole civilized world.

The finger of Providence was wonderfully displayed in the events which immediately preceded and followed this beginning of the Reformation, under the inspiration of the new doctrines announced by Wycliffe; in so exhibiting to the world the ambition and corruption of the papacy as to demonstrate the necessity for the restoration of the ancient liberties in England, in order that the English people, by the aid of their cultivated reason, might discover the true teachings of the apostolic Christians, and restore Christianity to the purity it enjoyed before Constantine tempted the bishops of Rome to mingle in the temporal concerns of princes.

It was but a little while before when Pope Urban V. was shut up for “whole days” in the palace of the Vatican with the infamous Joanna of Naples, and rewarded this “crowned courtesan” for her favors by presenting her with “the golden rose” at the public ceremony of its blessing. (Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 71.)

It was during the pontificate of Gregory XI. that Wycliffe attacked the ultramontane doctrines. One of the first acts of this pope was to issue a bull against Barnabo—one of the hated Visconti, who had caused the arrest of the Bishop of Milan—denouncing him because he had refused his subjects permission to go to Rome “to purchase indulgences, benefices, and absolutions.” (*Ibid.*, p. 73.) And when Barnabo made overtures of peace to him, he refused them, saying, “No, no; it is useless for me to see them; I will spare them from perjury, and will save their souls in spite of themselves, by causing them to be interred alive if they fall into my hands.” He directed the Vaudois to be exterminated by armed troops and by his infernal Inquisitors. He wrote to the Bishop of London to put Wycliffe “to the torture,” and rejoiced as the devouring flames consumed the bodies of thousands of Christians whom he called heretics. (*Ibid.*, p. 75.)

The fourteenth century closed with three popes, each excommunicating the others; and the fifteenth began with two—one of whom caused the other to be poisoned! (*Ibid.*, p. 93.) For more than a quarter of a century there were popes and antipopes—some at Rome, others at Avignon in France, at the same time—who denounced each other, to the scandal of all Christendom, until pure-minded Christians all over Europe blushed for shame.

Gregory XII. was pope at Rome, while Benedict XIII. was also pope at Avignon. The “sacred college” of cardinals, assembled at Rome, said of Gregory that he was an “accursed pope,” because he desired to murder several of them. They called him “the coward, the drunkard, and the knave; the man of blood, the illustrious robber, the schismatic, the heretic, the precursor of Antichrist!” who had “mounted the chair of the apostle like a thief, to set fire to the four corners of the house of God, and to pull down its columns!” And of Benedict they said that he was “a worthy co-partner” of Gregory “in his work of violence and iniquity.” (Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 95, 96.) They also charged Gregory with an “incestuous amour with his own sister!” and called his chamberlains the purveyors of his “hideous lubricity!” And the Council of Pisa confirmed the iniquity of both these infallible (!) popes, deposed both of them from their sacerdotal functions, and elected another, who took the name of Alexander V.

In the sentence of the council it is declared “that these two infamous men are guilty of enormous iniquities and excesses!” (*Ibid.*, p. 97.) Alexander V. died of poison, when John XXIII. “broke the pontifical gate with a golden axe,” (*Ibid.*, p. 100.) and was crowned as pope at Rome. The Ecumenical

Council of Constance soon met, and *deposed* John, declaring that he was “the oppressor of the poor, the persecutor of the just, the support of knaves, the idol of simoniacs, the slave of the flesh, a sink of vices, a man destitute of every virtue, a mirror of infamy, a devil incarnate.” Fifty-four articles enumerating his crimes were publicly read, and “twenty other secret ones” were not read, ” so frightful were the crimes which they announced.” (*Ibid.*, p. 108.)

This council, after acquiring for itself an undesirable notoriety by condemning John Huss for heresy, elected a new pope, Martin V. Pope Gregory XII. finally submitted to the decree of deposition, and so did John XXIII., who retired to a fortress. But there still remained two successors of Peter—Martin V. and Benedict XIII. The latter lived as pope in Valencia for about ten years, and after his death his cardinals elected Clement VIII. as his successor; but he was finally induced to abdicate in favor of Martin V., and thus to put an end to the corrupt and degrading quarrels about the papal sovereignty at Rome which had made all the parties concerned, for half a century, contemptible in the eyes of the world.

No wonder that God so directed his providences that the lovers of true Christianity, within the pale of the Roman Catholic Church, should see these and other kindred enormities of the papacy. This old Church, hallowed by an existence of nearly fifteen hundred years, yet retained within her fold many thousands of devoted and pious Christians, who had escaped the contamination of the corruption which had so long prevailed among the leading hierarchy. How their hearts must have bled when they saw her led away by these debasing influences of the papal system, so far from the apostolic counsels she had once followed! How sad they must have been when, looking back through the last thousand years, they beheld her gradually descending from her high eminence down into corruptions at which pagan Rome would have blushed, and soiling her sacred and once unspotted robes with the slime and filth of worldly politics! And how natural it was for them, acting in consistency with their understanding of religious duty, to begin the work of reformation, and to desire the eradication of these abuses, and the extraction of the poison that was coursing through her veins, slowly, but steadily, consuming her strength. Many of them must have felt as one of that Church, referring to times subsequent to those of which we are now writing, expressed himself when he said:

“The fifteenth century, however, surpassed all the preceding ages in corruption; the churches became the resorts of robbers, sodomites, and assassins; popes, cardinals, bishops, and mere clerks exercised brigandage forcibly in the provinces, and employed, as was most convenient, poison, the sword, and fire, to free themselves from their enemies, and despoil their victims. The Inquisition lent its horrible ministry to popes and kings. In France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and England, it embraced in its thousand arms the victims of the cupidity of tyrants, and put them to the most frightful tortures. The country was covered with legions of priests and monks, who devoured the substance of the people, and carried off to their impure retreats young girls and handsome youths, whom they again cast out, disgraced and dishonored. The cities became the theaters of orgies and Saturnalia, and the palaces of bishops were filled with equipages for the chase, packs of dogs, troops of courtesans, minions, jugglers, and buffoons.” (Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 91.)

The reader cannot fail to have observed the causes which led to the melancholy condition of affairs, both in State and Church, shown by the foregoing detail. There was no want of patriotism on the part of the English people, or of true piety on the part of the laity of the Church. These were struggling in

every way they could to establish reform and make it effectual in both State and Church. The wrongs inflicted upon them were not necessary to the Church, or sanctioned by any of her earliest teachings. They were inherent in the papal system, arose out of the temporal power, and grew in enormity as that power increased. The doctrine of passive obedience and submission to authority, applied to the affairs of the State, prohibited the citizen from making any complaint against the conduct of the king and Government, under penalty of severe punishment. The same doctrine, applied to the affairs of the Church, prohibited the layman, however conscientious, from expressing any disapprobation of the conduct of pope or priest, under penalty of excommunication. In the one case the act was held to be a crime against the State, in the other a sin against God! To say of a king that he was a tyrant, was treason against the State; to say of a pope or a priest that he had committed murder, or adultery, or any other crime, was treason against God! This was the teaching of the False Decretals; * and to cover it up as a part of the doctrinal belief of the Church, the popes have assumed that they act on earth in the place of God, that all their power is derived directly from God, and therefore that they are infallible and cannot err!

* It has already been shown that even the celebrated Council of Trent decreed that a minister of the Church forfeits none of his authority by any sin, however enormous!

When Constantine, addressing “a company of bishops,” said to them, in the presence of Eusebius, “You are bishops whose jurisdiction is within the Church,” he intended to limit their power, and to deny them any authority over temporal affairs. But when he continued in these words: “I also am a bishop, ordained by God to overlook whatever is external to the Church,” (“Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, London, 1845, p. 193.) he asserted the divine right of kings. And when the popes, in order to gather all this external power into their own hands, built up the wonderful machinery of the papacy, and obtained the consent of kings to receive temporal crowns at their hands, they made the doctrine of Constantine a part of the religious faith of the Roman Church, so that they, as the only infallible representatives of God on earth, should become the dispensers of crowns, the regulators of the internal affairs of nations, the authors of universal law, and, consequently, the irresponsible sovereigns of the world.

With Innocent III. the crown of England was held by divine right; and as God had entrusted the Pope of Rome with the sole authority to decide what was permitted or forbidden by his law, therefore he had a divine right higher than that of the king, by the authority of which he was entitled to say who should, and who should not, wear the crown. And as he was infallible and could not err, whensoever and howsoever he decided the question, passive obedience and submission to his decision became a religious duty to the faithful; and whosoever dared to question the correctness of his decision, or challenge the legitimacy of his authority, became *ipso jure* a heretic, and liable to be cut off from the Church, and from all Christian association, by the terrible sword of excommunication!

This was the great and comprehensive power that absorbed all other powers. It held the kings in obedience to the popes, and they plotted together, in every form of intrigue, to make their united power so compact and unassailable that it should press with death—like weight upon the people, both in Church and State, that they might remain unconscious of their degradation; or where one appeared,

bolder than the rest, to fling defiance in their faces, he should be silenced by excommunication, if possible; but if not, by the rack, the dungeon, or the fagot.

We shall have occasion hereafter to see how this doctrine of the divine temporal authority and infallibility of the popes deals with the obligations of the most solemn oaths and promises, when the pope regards them as opposed to the welfare of the Church; but the readiness with which the popes released the English kings from their oaths to execute the principles of Magna Carta is too suggestive, in this connection, to be passed by without comment. It will readily be perceived that if these infallible popes acted in conformity with the law of the Church, then, by that same law, no faith whatever can be kept with heretics!

Undoubtedly the power to release from the obligation of an oath is held to be an incident to the power to absolve from the consequences of sin. In order to justify its exercise the oath must be to do something violative of the law of God and against the interests of the Church, in which case it would be considered void; or something which, lawful in itself, would, if done, lead to one or the other of these consequences, in which case it would be binding without the exercise of the dispensing power. Upon which of these grounds the popes based their action in releasing the English kings from their obligations in reference to Magna Carta is of no consequence, any further than as their conduct served to illustrate, practically, the application of a doctrine regulated by a law of the Church.

Viewed in either light, the result is the same. For example: whether they considered Magna Carta to be violative of the law of God, or against the interests of the Church, and therefore unlawful; or that if its principles were carried out in England, either or both of these consequences would ensue, their opposition to it was based upon their divine right to judge of these things; and their power to dispense the kings from the observance of their oaths was the necessary and logical consequence. That, in point of fact, they did consider it to be violative of the divine right of kings, because it conferred upon the people the right to participate in the affairs of government, is, beyond all question, true. And, being so considered, it was made a matter of religious faith that the principles of the Great Charter should not be executed in England. And why of religious faith? For the manifest reason that as the divine right necessarily included the right of kings to govern the people, and the right of the popes to govern the kings, therefore it was an essential part of the doctrine, and consequently of the law, of the Church.

Now, if the reader will examine the Charter he will see how it violated this doctrine of divine right, and wherein it was in opposition to the doctrine and law of the Church, as understood by the infallible popes of that day. In so far as it conferred any rights upon the people, its principles may be thus briefly summed up: it prohibited unlawful amercements (fines), distresses, or punishments; it gave the right to the owner of personal property to dispose of it by will; it established the right of dower; it gave uniformity to weights and measures; it forbade the alienation of lands in *moitmain* (A legal arrangement in which a property owner such as an ecclesiastical institution is barred from transferring or selling its property.); it provided against undue delays in the administration of justice, for assizes and circuits for the trial of causes, for the trial of every accused freeman by jury; and that no man's life, liberty, or property should be taken from him, except by the judgment of his peers and the law of the land.

In so far as it affected the king, it merely restrained his royal prerogative of preemption and purveyance, by which he had been allowed, by means of purveyors, to take whatever property of the citizen he needed, without his consent, and at whatever price he saw fit to pay, and to impress the carriages and horses of a subject to do his business. And, in order to show that these old barons felt keenly a sense of justice themselves, and had a just appreciation of it in others, it contained this memorable sentence: "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or delay to any man, right or justice."

Wherein, by all this, did the king surrender anything that ought, in right and justice, to belong to the crown? One would suppose that if the citizens of a country are entitled to any sort of freedom, or to have any share at all in the management of affairs, some provisions of this kind are indispensable. And yet we find those kings of England who were the mere creatures and tools of the pope resolved upon denying them to the people; and the popes, under pretense of being divinely required to do so, releasing them from their solemn oaths to observe them.

The plain and obvious meaning of all which is, that, according to the law of the papacy as it was then understood and acted on by infallible popes, the people of England were not entitled to have any share in the affairs of their own government, for the reason that, if they did, the power of the papacy would be weakened and the law of God violated! And such was the inevitable and logical result of the doctrine of divine right as understood and announced by Innocent III., and such remains today its inevitable and logical result as understood and re-announced by Pius IX. What was the law of the papacy then is its law yet. Admit the law to exist, and its consequences cannot be escaped—they inevitably follow, as effect follows cause. Streams do not more certainly find their way to the sea than it follows, from the recognition of the divine right of kings and popes, that they become the sovereign masters of the world, and all mankind their slaves.

Chapter XVI. Henry VIII.

Religious Persecution antedates Protestantism.—Lucius III. and Innocent III. persecute the Waldenses and Albigenses.—The Fourth Lateran Council.—The Third Canon provides for extirpating Heretics, and taking away their Country.—Law of the Church.—Acted upon in the Fifteenth Century by Innocent VIII.—The Practice of Innocent III. under it.—Persecution made a Religious Duty.—Reformation in Germany.—Luther and the Pope.—Henry VIII. and the Pope quarrel about Supremacy, not Faith. Protestants do not assist Him.—The Pope releases his Subjects from their Allegiance.—Their Adherents persecute each Other.—More and Fisher.—Henry VIII. always a Roman Catholic in Faith.—He persecutes Reformers and Papists.—Edward VI. the first Protestant King.—He does not persecute Papists.—Gives the Crown to Lady Jane Grey.—Mary, the Rightful Heir, proclaimed Queen.—Her Promise to the Reformers that they should not be disturbed in their Religion.—She refuses to be bound by her Promise.—The Teachings of Rome.—Mary's Measures all Papal. Her Persecution of Protestants.— Her Marriage to Philip of Spain.—The Result of the League between Pope Paul III. and Charles V.—Cardinal Pole.—Dictates Policy of the English Government.—Persecutions continue.—Hooper, Latimer, and Ridley.— Elizabeth.—She persecutes both Papists and Protestants.—Is educated in the School of Rome.—Only seeks to substitute Imperial Protestantism for Imperial Romanism.

IT was impossible, in the very nature of things, that the condition of affairs portrayed in the last chapter could long exist in England without some material change. The barons had placed themselves between the people and the king, and were the representatives of principles of civil polity which they could not now surrender without an abandonment of the best interests of the country and their own honor. The Lollards, under the lead of Wycliffe, were similarly situated, as it regarded the principles of religious belief and the affairs of the Church.

Upon one point they agreed; that is, the necessity for reform. The barons were laboring to reform the State; the Lollards, the Church. The barons were not ready to concede that the king was the State; nor were the Lollards ready to concede that the pope was the Church. Such concessions on the part of both of them would have given to absolutism a perfect triumph over all the ancient liberties, and would have left England completely subdued. She would then have been, in fact, a fief of the Holy See, with no claim whatever to an independent national existence. With her Parliament constituted as it then was, subordinated to the king, and with the king subordinated to the pope, the people would have borne the same relations to the papacy that the people of the Papal States did—that of entire dependence. The pope, as a thorough politician, could see all this, and therefore left no possible means unemployed to hold both the barons and the Lollards in subjection. For, whatever else he may have seen, it must have been apparent to him that, unless the reform sought for by each was speedily checked, they would both ultimately reach some common point of union which would make them strong enough to materially weaken both the papal and the kingly power.

As the controversy waxed warmer and warmer, the respective parties became more earnest and aggressive; the barons more determined not to yield; the Lollards more resolved upon Church reform; and the pope and the king more resolved upon keeping the Church and the State so united that their combined power would be sufficient to suppress all free inquiry, and to keep the people in a condition of vassalage.

It was an issue between power and right—the former represented by the pope and the king, the latter by the people, in civil affairs under the lead of the barons, and in the affairs of the Church under the lead of the Lollards. As in all such controversies, power has invariably resorted to force to keep itself in

place, so it did in this. This force, however, did not proceed exclusively from the King and Government of England, inasmuch as by this time the influences of the combined opposition had become too great for open resistance by the king and Parliament. But as the pope had assumed to himself the divine prerogative of governing the country, both in its civil and ecclesiastical policy, and held the king in complete subjugation, the Church was relied on as furnishing, through its ecclesiastical organization, whatsoever was necessary in that direction to accomplish the desired end.

The pope's recognized right of dictation to the king made him responsible for the oppressive measures resorted to by the latter; while his position as the infallible head of the Church made him equally responsible for the oppressive measures of the Church. It is manifestly true that the principles of Magna Carta would have gone into immediate effect in England but for the interference of the pope; for if he had not intervened between the king and the people by employing the authority of the Church to release the king from the obligation of his oath, the barons, backed by the people, would have been able to hold him to his promise. And thus we find all the measures of compulsion employed against the barons and the Lollards traceable directly to the papacy, and made effectual, as far as they could be, by means of the immense number of foreign ecclesiastics scattered throughout the kingdom, who, as the emissaries of the pope, dictated to the king whatsoever measures were necessary to keep the people in check. And hence we find also that a measure of ecclesiastical policy was adopted, and made a part of the canon law of the Church, during the pontificate of Innocent III., which makes the papacy immediately and directly responsible for all the force and persecution employed, not only in England, but elsewhere, to keep the people in subjugation, and repress reform both in State and Church.

In the year 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council was held in Rome, under the direct personal guidance of Innocent III., to whom, as already shown, King John surrendered the crown of England. This is conceded to have been the twelfth Ecumenical Council, and its enactments are, consequently, regarded as part of the canon law, equally binding upon the faithful at all times, as much so now as when they were originally passed. In one canon adopted by this council certain heresies were condemned; in another, heretics were excommunicated; and in another, it was provided that they should be exterminated.

Here we reach a point of vast importance to the present times, and ground on which it is necessary and right that we should tread with great caution, so as not to mislead ourselves or others. For if it be true that what is here alleged constitutes a part of the law of the Roman Church, having, by the action of a general council and the assent of a pope, the impress of infallibility stamped upon it, then it will not do to say, as the papal writers do, that persecution arose out of Protestantism and was of Protestant growth; for it must be observed that at the time referred to there was no such thing as Protestantism known. Wycliffe, who has been properly called the "Morning—star of the Reformation," was not born till the year 1324, and therefore the Lollards, who were his followers in England, had not arisen.

The Waldenses, or Vaudois, had been excommunicated for heresy by Lucius III., who was pope from the year 1181 to 1185; and they were afterward condemned for teaching, contrary to the practice of the Roman Church, that the unworthiness of the clergy rendered them incapable of their ministry. (Du Pin, vol. xi., p. 147.)

Pope Innocent III. inaugurated measures of his own accord in the year 1198—the first of his pontificate—to extirpate the Albigenses. The next year he ordered their estates to be confiscated. He ordered the abbots and monks not only to preach against them, but to “excite the princes and people to extirpate them, and to form a crusade against them.” Raymond, Count of Toulouse, a leader among the Albigenses, caused one of these missionaries to be assassinated, for which he was required to retract his errors, and to deliver up several of his towns to the pope as the price of his absolution—which was granted him. After this was done, as the crusaders had no further contest with Raymond, they turned their arms against the town of Beziers, where the Albigenses were fortified, besieged, took, and burned the town, and put all the inhabitants “to the edge of the sword.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 150, 151.)

The particular heresies, therefore, with which the Church had to deal during the pontificate of Innocent III. were those of the Waldenses and the Albigenses; and, consequently, it is to these that the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council were specially directed. All this antedated the existence of the Lollards and the birth of Protestantism; but when Protestantism began subsequently to arise, the law of the Church was already prepared to visit upon the Protestants the same measure of pontifical vengeance as had been visited upon the inoffensive Waldenses and Albigenses. The torch of persecution, lighted for the latter, was kept continually aflame, in readiness for the former.

The Fourth Council of Lateran being assembled to deal, among other things, with the heresies then existing, it was considered necessary that it should be so attended as to represent the Universal Church. To effect this, two years were permitted to pass between the time when it was called by Innocent III. and its meeting, in November, 1215. It contained four hundred and twelve bishops in person, eight hundred abbots and priors, and a great many deputies of absent prelates who were excused from attending. There were also ambassadors from the following courts: Constantinople, Sicily, Germany, France, England, Hungary, Jerusalem, Cyprus, Arragon, and from those of other princes. And thus it had all the power and authority which could be conferred on it by the Church. Even those who denied the personal infallibility of the pope accepted all the decrees of such a council as infallible, equally binding as if God, by a visible manifestation, had sent them down from heaven.

To say, however, of the canons of this council that they were the deliberate action of those who composed it would be contrary to the fact. Du Pin, referring to the canons upon discipline, says: “‘Tis certain that these canons were not made by the council, but by Innocent III., who presented them to the council *ready drawn up*, and *ordered* them to be read, and that the prelates *did not enter into any debate upon them, but that their silence was taken, for an approbation!*” (Du Pin, vol. xi., p. 95.) Nevertheless, they became as much the law of the Church as if they had been debated and voted on. Any violation of the doctrine of passive obedience was only another form of heresy.

The third canon of this General Council stands in history without any parallel. And in order that the reader may see this for himself, it is deemed most expedient to pass by what is said of it by Protestant writers, and quote the precise words of Du Pin, not merely on account of his great learning and erudition, but because of the conspicuous position he occupied in the Roman Catholic Church. He says:

“In the third canon they excommunicated and anathematized all the heretics who oppose the Catholic and orthodox faith, as before explained: and ’tis therein ordered that the heretics shall be delivered up, after their condemnation, to the secular powers, or to their officers, to be punished according to their

demerits, the clerks being first degraded; that their goods shall be confiscated, if they be laics (laypersons); and if clerks, then they shall be applied to the use of the Church; that those who lie under violent suspicions of heresy shall be likewise anathematized, if they do not give proofs of their innocence, and they shall be avoided tin they have given satisfaction; and if they be in a state of excommunication during a year, they shall be condemned as heretics; that the lords shall be admonished and advised by ecclesiastical censures to take an oath that they win extirpate heretics and excommunicate persons who shall be within their territories; that if they neglect to do it after admonition, they shall be excommunicated by the metropolitan and bishops of the province; and in case they persist a year without making satisfaction, the sovereign pontiff shall be advised thereof, that so he may declare their vassals absolved from their oath of fealty, and bestow their lands upon such Catholics as win seize upon them, who shall be the lawful possessors of them, by extirpating heretics, and preserving the purity of the faith in them, but without prejudice to the right of the superior lord, provided he offer no obstruction or hindrance to the putting this ordinance in execution. The same indulgences are granted to those Catholics as shall undertake to extirpate heretics by *force of arms* as are granted to those who go to the Holy Land. They excommunicated those who entertained, protected, or supported heretics, and declare that those who shall be excommunicated upon that account, if they do not make satisfaction within a year, shall be declared infamous, and divested of all offices, as well as of votes in the elections; that they shall not be admitted as evidences; that they shall be deprived of the faculty of making a will, or succeeding to an estate; and, lastly, that they may not perform the functions of any office.’Tis likewise further ordered that those who win not avoid the company of such persons as are by the Church denounced excommunicate shall be excommunicated themselves tin they have given satisfaction. But, above all, ecclesiastics are forbidden to administer the sacraments to them, to give them Christian burial, to receive their alms or oblations, upon pain of being suspended from the functions of their orders, wherein they may not be re—established without a special *indulto* from the pope. The same punishment is likewise inflicted on the regulars, and, besides this, that they be not any longer tolerated in the diocese wherein communicated who shall dare to preach without having received a license from the Holy See or a Catholic bishop. Lastly, the archbishops and bishops are obliged to visit in person, or by their archdeacons or by other persons, once or twice a year, the dioceses where it is reported that there are any heretics, and to put a certain number of inhabitants under their oath to discover to the bishop such heretics as may be detected. They are likewise enjoined to cause the accused to appear, and to punish them if they do not clear themselves, or if they relapse after they have been cleared. Lastly, the bishops are threatened *to be deposed* if they neglect to purge their dioceses from heretics.” *

* Du Pin, vol. xi., pp.96, 97. The duty of persecuting and exterminating heretics now became a part of the canon law of Rome, not merely by the previous infallible act of Innocent III. himself, but by force of this decree of an Ecumenical Council. Nearly three hundred years after the time of Innocent III., his successors found a memorable occasion for enforcing it against the peaceful Vaudois, for daring to maintain their own religion in preference to that of Rome. In 1487, Innocent VIII. fulminated against them a bull of extermination, by which he enjoined all temporal powers to take arms for their destruction. He commanded a crusade against them, “absolving beforehand all who should take part in this crusade from all ecclesiastical penalties, general or special, setting them free from the obligation of vows which they might have made, legitimating their possession of goods which they might have wrongfully acquired, and concluding with a promise of the remission of all sins to every one who should slay a heretic. Moreover, he annulled all contracts subscribed in favor of the Vaudois, commanded their domestics to

abandon them, forbade any one to give them any assistance, and authorized all and sundry to seize upon their goods.”—*History of the Waldenses*, by Muston, vol. i., p. 31.

When we remember that Innocent III. based his right to interfere with the domestic policy of the nations upon the ground of the possession of divine power, we shall be the better enabled to appreciate the character and understand the scope of this extraordinary part of the canon law of Rome. His power being divine, obedience to it, both on the part of nations and individuals, was the inevitable consequence. Therefore, this decree of the Third Lateran Council proceeds upon the idea that the obedience of the nations had been already secured; but that if it should be refused the papacy possessed the same power to punish them that it did to punish individuals for their disobedience.

Accordingly, the decree provides for the extirpation of all heretics by force of arms, the confiscation of their goods, the forfeiture of all their rights of property and country, the seizure of their territory by whomsoever of the faithful shall think proper to do so, and requires them to be hunted down by spies and detectives, against whose accusations they are required to defend themselves by proving their innocence! It stands alone in the world in enormity; and even now it chills the blood to read of the horrible sufferings inflicted upon the poor unoffending Waldenses and Albigenses, by virtue of it, merely because they would not bow down before the papacy, and agree to consider as virtues the shameless corruptions and vices of its court.

As it will be necessary to refer to this decree again, it will be well to inquire, at this point, what position it occupies in the present canon law of the Roman Church, which Pius IX. is now laboring to make the universal law of all the world. Since the council which enacted it there have been eight ecumenical councils and over eighty popes, embracing a period of over six and a half centuries, and yet no decree has been enacted by any one of these councils, and no bull, or brief, or encyclical has ever been issued, by anyone of all these popes, wherein it has been declared that the Third Lateran Council transcended its authority, or that its third canon was not a part of the existing canon law of the Church. Undoubtedly, therefore, it remains a part of that law today, to be executed whensoever the pope shall think it necessary to the welfare of the Church to do so, and he shall possess the necessary power.

In 1839 a controversy was carried on in the columns of *The Charleston Courier*, in South Carolina, between the Rev. Richard Fuller, a Baptist minister, and the Right Rev. John England, Roman Catholic Bishop of Charleston, who was greatly distinguished for his learning and piety. In the course of it Mr. Fuller charged that, by the enactment of this canon by the Fourth Lateran Council, the Roman Catholic Church had made it a part of the law of its organization, that heretics should be persecuted. Bishop England admitted that the canon had been enacted, and set it forth substantially as it is copied above from Du Pin, but endeavored to break the force of the admission by insisting that, having been “a special law for a particular case,” it is not now, therefore, “a canon of the Church.” He also insisted that as the Fourth Lateran Council “was not merely a council of the Church, but it was also a congress of the civilized world,” therefore this canon was not “concerning the doctrine of the Church,” but was “a civil enactment of the temporal power against persons they looked upon as criminals.” *

* Letters concerning the Roman Chancery,” by the Rev. Richard Fuller, of Beaufort, South Carolina, and the Right Rev. John England, Bishop of Charleston. Published under the auspices of the latter, pp. 196-200.

This is puerile (silly), as will appear to any reasoning mind upon a moment's reflection. This council was one of the great general councils of the Church. Its provisions in reference to heresy and heretics are both special and general. Its canons were not enacted to meet special cases only, but all cases covered by them. The assemblage was ecclesiastical, solely and entirely, so far as it possessed power to pass enactments. The ecclesiastical authorities of the Church were alone summoned by Innocent III. to attend it. All the ambassadors from the civil powers who were present were there by courtesy, not by right. They were not members of the council, so as to be entitled to vote upon questions of either Church discipline or doctrine. They did not vote upon these questions, but, as Du Pin says, the measures were drawn up by the pope and acquiesced in by the bishops. Therefore, to say that a canon enacted by such a council, under the direct auspices of Innocent III., did not become a part of the doctrine of the Church and take its place in the canon law, is the exhibition of a degree of absurdity into which nothing but sheer necessity could have driven such a man as Bishop England. But if there were any doubt about it when he attempted this impotent apology, there is none now, since the decree of infallibility is broad enough and goes back far enough to embrace this enactment as the infallible word of God. It takes in, as we have seen heretofore, all that has been done by the popes in all the past centuries, all that may be done now, and whatsoever may be done in the future.

Was not Innocent III. an infallible pope? No papist will deny that. Then, without the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council, he prescribed extermination as the remedy against the heresy of the Waldenses and Albigenses, and, consequently, against all heresy. Thus this method of persecution became a part of the canon law, and therefore a part of the doctrine of the Church, by his infallible act alone. And when afterward he compelled this general council to affirm and ratify what he had done and declared by a solemn decree, unanimously passed by the representatives of the whole Church, persecution became so embodied in the law of the Church that no earthly authority can remove it. Whether he alone, as he claimed, and as Pius IX. now claims, possessed all the divine power; or whether, as the Gallican Christians insisted, it was in his hands when acting jointly with the council, does not change the question. According to either, the decree as enacted was the exercise of a divine power, and therefore became part of the faith. Consequently, if there had even been an attempt made to repeal, vacate, or set it aside, it must have failed for the want of power; for the law of God is unchangeable. There having been no such attempt, however, this persecuting decree is as binding upon the faithful today as it was the day it was enacted.

The "temporal powers" had nothing to do with its enactment. They were held by the pope to be the mere instruments to secure its execution. He used them for that purpose; and that is what is meant by the theory which permits the Church to teach the State its duty—in the domain of faith and morals! They neither enacted any such laws themselves, nor authorized their ambassadors at this council to legislate in reference to their domestic and internal policy. The council dealt with the affairs of the Church, and the laws it passed were considered above those of the states. Whatever nation disobeyed them was heretical, and forfeited its right to exist! Whatever individual disobeyed them was cut off by excommunication! The fact, therefore, cannot be escaped by any sophistry that the persecution of heretics is commanded by the canon law.

And thus we are enabled to understand the condition of things existing in England after the pontificate of Innocent III., who set the example of persecuting heretics, or of causing them to be persecuted, which his successors were very willing to follow. And the imbecile kings of England were quite as willing to obey them; for, not only by the letter of this law of the Church, but by the action of the infallible Innocent III., they were taught to foresee that an act of disobedience to the pope would be construed into heresy, and cost them their crowns and kingdom. And looking back, through the lapse of years, to the condition in which England must have been placed by the prevailing policy at that time, we cannot fail to see how necessary it was for the barons to demand and to adhere to the provisions of Magna Carta as the means of securing civil liberty, and for the Lollards to demand reform in the Church as the means of securing religious liberty.

But we can see, too, that it was impossible for Protestantism to rise immediately out of this condition of affairs. It had to await the slow progress of events elsewhere, especially in Germany. Both there and in England the load of papal oppression was too heavy to be thrown off at once. Therefore we are enabled to account for the fact, that in its first forms, during its terrible struggles for existence, it retained somewhat the impress left upon it by the papacy; and never, in fact, reached the point of full development until it obtained a new field of operation in the United States. Reforms are never the result of sudden impulses. Like the plant which enlarges by accretion, they are wrought out by the force of opinion gradually developed.

It is well understood that in Germany, as well as in England, for many years before the Reformation, the ecclesiastical and political alliance between the reigning monarchs and the papacy had been complete, and comparatively undisturbed. Owing to the imbecility of some of the monarchs and the inordinate ambition of others, the German people were reduced, through instrumentalities like those employed in England, to dependence upon the popes, who claimed that they possessed divine authority to regulate their domestic affairs also. By virtue of their conceded power to appoint all the prelates of the Church, and to exact from them oaths of fidelity to themselves, they had succeeded in building up an ecclesiastical empire, which they maintained among the German people in entire independence of the Government and its laws—a state of things precisely similar to that which Pius IX. is now trying to bring about. The hierarchy which composed this independent body was freed from all responsibility to the German authorities, no matter what enormity its members perpetrated upon society, or what the nature and extent of their usurpations. They looked alone to Rome for the approval or disapproval of their conduct. Whatsoever the pope commanded them to do, they did—peaceably, if the people submitted, but forcibly if they did not. Such enormous power as this naturally bred arrogance and covetousness; and as the popes have at all times required large sums of money to maintain the splendor and magnificence of their courts, they employed it for the accumulation of large wealth, not only at Rome, but among themselves. With this wealth in their possession, these prelates became more and more exacting—knowing that they were esteemed by the popes in proportion to the extent of the contributions they levied upon the people.

It is not at all to be wondered at that the Germans, like the English, became restless and dissatisfied under the crushing pressure of such a burden as this. All the tendencies of their minds were toward freedom, in the defense of which they had always been in the foremost rank. But on account of their devotion to the Roman Catholic Church, and the belief, constantly inculcated in their minds by the

clergy, that they were indebted to it for all the Christianizing and civilizing influences they possessed, they patiently endured their submission till they could bear it no longer. They at last came to realize that the question was simply one of life or death to their nation—that it was impossible for Germany ever to acquire an independent and commanding position among the other nations so long as this hierarchical power was permitted to maintain its ascendancy. And herein we undoubtedly find the real origin of the Reformation in Germany—according to Hallam, “its predisposing cause.” (“Constitutional History of England,” by Hallam, vol. i., p. 137.)

Luther quarreled with the pope about matters of religious faith, and when the people of Germany saw this vast power, with all its ecclesiastical weapons drawn, threatening him with the terrible vengeance of the papacy, they took sides with him, not at first on account of his religious opinions merely, but because the time had come for them to assert their true German manhood, and to throw off the yoke of temporal bondage which the papacy had placed upon their necks. And thus a single brave and unterrified man was enabled to multiply his army of reformers into an unconquerable host, whose ultimate victory over the pope consisted, not alone in the introduction of the Reformed religion, but in marking out new paths for the modern nations—paths which pointed, with marvelous precision, toward that grandest achievement in history, the American Revolution.

The Reformation in Germany did not immediately extend itself into England; for Henry VIII., who was a bigoted papist, occupied the throne at a time when he had the power to resist its influence, and, in order to keep himself in favor with the pope, wrote a reply to Luther, for which he was flattered with the title “defender of the faith.” It was his greatest pride to keep in existence in England the same exacting and ambitious hierarchy against which the German people were getting ready to rebel. Between these ecclesiastical princes and himself there was perfect accord in this: that each should sustain the power of the other, at every hazard, in order to keep the people in subjection, and prevent them from having any voice in the management of public affairs. They were held together by the cohesion of a common faith, which taught, as had always been taught by the papacy, the divine right of kings and the divine right of popes above that of kings, which latter enabled the popes, as “vicegerents of God,” to sit in judgment over all the earth, with the right to command whatsoever should augment their power, and to forbid whatsoever should curtail it. Like the people of Germany, those of England were held down by an oppressive weight of tyranny at the beginning of their Reformation.

Henry VIII. was a vicious and unprincipled monarch, consistent in only two things—the constant indulgence of his evil inclinations, and an equally constant adherence to the chief doctrinal dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church. He was never a pious Christian except nominally; no more so when he broke the alliance between the Church in England and that at Rome, than when he sought to win the favor of the pope by hurling his royal and poisoned shaft at Luther’s head. And he was never a Protestant except only so far as he resisted the papal encroachments upon the authority and prerogatives of the English crown.

Upon this subject, much of what is called history abounds in error and misstatement. It has led many honest minds into the belief that this profligate king was at the head of the Protestants of England. The papal writers are indefatigable in maintaining this belief, in order to hold the Reformation responsible for his vices; whereas the “truth of history” is, that he never professed to be, and never was, a Protestant, in any proper sense of that term, but lived and died in the faith of the Roman Catholic

Church! His quarrel with the pope had nothing to do with the faith of the Church. It began about the divorce, but soon involved the question of ecclesiastical investitures, by means of which he found the pope could maintain in England a power rival to his own, if not more formidable. Upon these questions each supported his position with stubborn tenacity, until the breach between them became so wide that it could neither be healed nor bridged over. The parties were about equal in pertinacity and ambition, neither of them having the slightest respect for the people, or regard for their political rights. As none of the religious dogmas of the Church were assailed by Henry, the controversy was simply a struggle for supremacy between two sovereigns, one of whom was the lawful king, and the other claiming dominion over the kingdom in right of divine appointment; and each of whom, to have secured his triumph, would have made galley—slaves of all the English people. *

* John Milton says: "Henry VIII. was the first that rent this kingdom from the pope's subjection totally; but his quarrel being more about supremacy than other faultiness in religion that he regarded, it is no marvel if he stuck where he did. The next default was in the bishops, who, though they had denounced the pope, they still hugged the popedom, and shared the authority among themselves, by their six bloody articles, persecuting the Protestants no slacker than the pope would have done."—*Prose Works of John Milton*, Philadelphia ed., vol. i., pp. 3, 4.

The final triumph which Henry VIII. did win over the pope only changed the form of English tyranny, by concentrating all the absolute power of imperialism in the hands of one despot, instead of leaving it to be shared by two. It remained papal tyranny in substance, if not in name, by the preservation of that nefarious union between Church and State which had its origin at Rome in the time of Constantine, and which, wherever it has existed, has held the people in vassalage.

Henry VIII. and Pope Julius II. were both children of the Church of Rome, educated in the same religious faith, and disciplined under the same papal system. With each of them Innocent III. was infallible, and the persecuting decree of the Fourth Lateran Council was a part of the law of the Church.

When Henry felt the pressure of the papal power upon himself, he called upon the Protestants of Germany for assistance to enable him to resist it; but they refused the alliance, because they had no sympathy with his cause, and despised his iniquities. Julius, finding him thus unsupported, followed the example of Innocent III., in the exercise of divine power, hurled at his head the thunders of excommunication, and released all the English people from their allegiance to the crown, impiously pretending also that he stood upon earth in the place of God, and that obedience to him, in both spirituals and temporals, was necessary to secure admission into heaven.

The demon of persecution was unchained among the followers of these Roman Catholic contestants, each letting loose his own blood—hounds; and if the distinguished More and Fisher were cruelly murdered for their resistance to the English oath of supremacy, which did nothing more than place the king above the pope, their triers and executioners were their own brethren, reared, educated, and nurtured in the same religious faith. No drop of their blood stained the hands of a single Protestant Christian. The children of Rome shed the blood of each other with a ferocity akin to that of wild beasts. And even after all this, and before the blood of the victims had become dry, Paul III., who, while cardinal, had taken the side of Henry VIII., made an effort to reconcile Henry with the papacy, there yet being no important difference of religious faith to separate them. And a like effort at reconciliation was

made by the Roman Catholic king of France; at the suggestion, doubtless, of the pope. The question, however, being one of mere supremacy in the government of England, Henry was not disposed to give up any of his royal prerogatives, and no compromise could be arranged.

The Protestant Christians stood aloof from the contest, awaiting the result with anxiety, of course, and hoping that it would contribute to the strength of their own cause. Their religious faith received no encouragement from the king, and had the curse of the pope resting upon it; so that when the final expulsion of the papal power from England was accomplished, the English Church, under Henry VIII., still retained the leading tenets of faith it had learned from Rome. It continued to maintain the doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist. It did not regard communion in both kinds as at all essential. It forbade the marriage of priests. It preserved the Romish custom of encouraging vows of chastity. It continued private masses for the dead. It enforced the duty of auricular confession. It was, in fact, as much Roman Catholic under Henry VIII. as it had been under Pope Julius II. or Pope Paul III., except that it denied the temporal authority of the pope, and his right, divine or otherwise, to interfere with and regulate the domestic affairs of either the English Church or nation. *

* “*History of the Church of England*,” by Short; Appendix B to ch. v., p. 79; “*History of England*,” by Macaulay, vol. i., p. 46; “*Constitutional History of England*,” by Hallam, vol. i., ch. ii.; “*History of England*,” by Rapin, vol. viii., pp. 20, 21; “*History of England*,” by Hume, vol. iii., p. 311; “*History of Religious Thought in England*,” by Hunt, vol. i., p. 10. This last author, speaking of the “Six Articles” of 1539, says, “They are purely Roman Catholic.”

The following eminent Roman Catholic authorities are directly upon this point: Lingard says, “The publication of ‘the Articles’ showed that the king was not disposed to dissent from the pontiff on doctrinal matters.” LINGARD’s *Hist. Of Engl.*, vol. v., p. 58.

Hearing of the death of Anne Boleyn, Pope Paul III. said: “I have long besought God to open his majesty’s eyes. It is impossible that Heaven should have abandoned a prince who is endowed with so many virtues, and who has rendered so many services to the Christian republic. Heaven will surely enlighten him. Now is the time for Henry to finish the noble work which he has commenced in defense of Christianity. If he return to the bosom of the Church, who is there among the princes of Christendom that will be able to resist him? With Rome as his ally, the peace of the world will be secured. I will unite with Henry, and we will join our efforts to pacify the world..... Let him not doubt the affections of my heart.” AUDIN’s *Life of Henry VIII.*, p. 322.

The late Archbishop Spalding, of Baltimore, says: “Notwithstanding his defection from the Church, Henry was still attached to the ancient faith, and he decided to retain its principal articles, as well as the ancient worship. In 1536, he compiled, with the assistance of his theologians, a book of “Articles,” which Cromwell presented for signature to the convocation, and which the members, of course, subscribed without a word. These articles declare that a belief in the three ancient creeds—the Apostles’, the Nicene, and the Athanasian—is necessary to salvation; that the sacraments of baptism, penance, and the holy Eucharist are the ordinary means of salvation; and that the use of masses, the honoring and invoking of saints, and the usual ceremonies of the public service “are highly profitable, and ought to be retained.” The lay vicar—general accordingly issued his injunction to the bishops and clergy, requiring that these articles should be explained to the people, should be accepted by all, and reduced to practice. This was followed by a fuller exposition of doctrine, entitled “The Godly and Pious Institution of the Christian Man,” issued by the convocation on the command of the king. This document strongly denies the possibility of salvation out of the Catholic Church; and it inculcates slavish passive obedience to the king in the same breath with which it denounces the papal supremacy. “—Hist. of the Prot. Ref., by M. I. Spalding, D.D., 5th ed., vol. ii., pp. 103, 104, citing Wilkins’s “*Council*,” iii., 804; *apud* Lingard, vol. vi., pp. 272, 273.

And Henry, to prove how faithful he was to his Roman training, turned his persecution against the English reformers, who were disposed to favor the principles of the Protestant religion, the influence of which was beginning to be transferred from Germany to England, and to unite with similar influences already existing there.

The torch and the rack, so familiar to Rome, were no less terrible in the hands of the English than they were in those of the Roman pope. The difference was this only, that Henry VIII., having learned their use from Rome, employed them, after he established his English pontificate, in the torture of both Roman Catholics and Protestants! Who does not remember the account of three of each, coupled two and two, who were carried out to execution upon the same hurdles? *

* Archbishop Spalding refers to this incident in strong terms.—History of the Prot. Ref., by Spalding, vol. ii., p. 105. Macaulay says, Henry VIII. “sent to death, on the same hurdle, the heretic who denied the real presence and the traitor who denied the royal supremacy.”—MACAULAY’S Miscellanies, article *Nare’s Memoirs of Lord Burleigh*, Philadelphia ed., p. 147.

In a like spirit he employed his royal power to prevent the teachings of Luther from taking hold of the English mind, and punished those who openly advocated them, or were suspected of doing so. The circulation of pamphlets and tracts written by Luther was prohibited. He forbade his subjects to import, sell, or keep in their possession Tyndale’s translation of the New Testament, “and ordered the chancellor and the courts to prosecute any one that should disobey his commands; and to punish, with the utmost rigor of the law, the abettors of the new opinions ” (*Life of Henry VIII.*, by Audin, p. 313. This is a Roman Catholic author.)—that is, the Protestant opinions that were taking deep root in England and Germany.

And if before his death he abated these persecutions, it was only because he courted an alliance with the Protestants, so as to make his power more effectual in his contest with the pope. He cared nothing for religion, but struggled hard for royal authority and supremacy. But death, which strikes alike both the high and low, laid its unsparing hand upon him before he could accomplish such an alliance, before Protestantism had become firmly planted in England, and while he was yet, in all the religious faith he ever had, a Roman Catholic! True, he has extorted some praise from portions of the English people, and the poet Gray called him

“.....the majestic lord
Who broke the bonds of Rome!”

but these praises were bestowed because “they saw in him, not indeed the proselyte of their faith, but *the subverter of their enemies’ power*, the avenging minister of Heaven, by whose giant arm the chain of superstition had been broken and the prison gates burst asunder.” (*Constitutional Hist. of England*, by Hallam, vol. i., ch. i., p. 49.)

Although Henry VIII. manifestly designed to build up an independent Church in England, with himself as its head, which should be freed from the spiritual and temporal authority of the pope, and the influence of the new doctrines of English and German Protestantism, yet it is undoubtedly true that he gave important, though undesigned, aid to both. By his persecutions he demonstrated that neither could

be suppressed by that means. But as he had learned these from Rome—whose dogmas have, since the False Decretals, long before the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council, always embraced, as a part of the faith, the doctrine that the Church was bound to maintain its organization and power by force, if necessary—he continued them throughout his reign, seemingly unconscious that the papal power was too strong to be immediately broken, and that, while he could torture the bodies of the Reformers, he could neither take away from them the right to think, nor subdue their courage.

The immediate assistance he gave to Roman Catholicism was rendered by maintaining the leading principles of its faith. The English people, as we have seen, had been sufficiently subdued by the power of the hierarchy to become passively submissive to all their commands. Being deprived of the use of the Bible, and shut out from all the advantages of intellectual culture, the masses, though clinging to their ancient liberties with intense affection, had not yet acquired that sense of personality which is absolutely necessary both to the establishment and preservation of popular liberty. They remained, therefore—many from choice, but a larger number from fear—still submissive to the dictation of Rome; while the nobility vacillated from side to side, accordingly as their interest and safety dictated. Those remote from the cities—where the papal exactions were not so directly realized—were the most submissive, because they were the most ignorant, and were kept under the more immediate influence of the monks. Mr. Hallam says that the citizens of London and other large towns “had begun to acquire some taste for the Protestant doctrine;” and continues:

“But the common people, especially in remote countries, had been used to an implicit reverence for the Holy See, and had suffered comparatively little by its impositions. They looked up also to their own teachers as guides in faith; and the main body of the clergy were certainly very reluctant to tear themselves, at the pleasure of a disappointed monarch, in the most dangerous crisis of religion, from the bosom of Catholic unity.” (*Con. Hist. of Engl.*, by Hallam, vol. i., p. 93.)

Upon the minds of this class Henry VIII. made but little impression favorable to his new theories. The belief very properly entertained by them, that the divorce was sought only for the gratification of his passions, rendered them disinclined to acknowledge his supremacy. And the monks, taking advantage of this, were able to keep them comparatively steadfast in their fidelity to the pope. The king having thus left the fundamental features of their religious faith undisturbed, they remained at the close of his reign still under the influence of the monks; while the nobility and many of the higher clergy remained as before, ready to take the strong side—whether papal or Protestant. And thus Henry VIII. did not do to Roman Catholicism half the injury that its advocates pretend; for it cannot be disputed that he left it possessed of great vigor and strength.

What he did for Protestantism may be briefly summed up. He taught the nation that the papal scepter could be broken, and that the power and influence of the hierarchy could be checked, if not terminated, by compelling it to submit to the civil laws of the kingdom, as all other citizens were required to do. He put a stop to the enormous accumulation of wealth in the monasteries, which had so long kept the people in poverty and dependence. He opened the way, without intending it, for the further introduction of German influence and of free thought. He inaugurated measures which led to placing the English Bible in the hands of the people. He taught the people the necessity of not forgetting that they were Englishmen, and entitled to an English nationality without being passive subjects of the “King of Rome,” either by temporal or divine right. And he established a system of measures which, in the end

—how ever designed—steadily led them forward to a point of national greatness never surpassed by any people upon earth, ancient or modern.

Protestantism gained strength by these measures, and ultimately gave rise to many of the most cherished and important provisions of the British Constitution. It still holds the people of England true to their own national fame and greatness; and if they have not yet marched fully up to the side of the people of the United States in demanding the control of their own affairs, they have advanced so far toward it, that they no longer fear to threaten royalty with their power, to hold the lash of public rebuke over their aristocracy, and to assert their right to that full and complete protection which now belongs to every free—born Englishman, whether he be a peer in Parliament, a mechanic in his workshop, or a laborer in the field.

But a little while ago, the leading newspaper in England, and of the world, expressed this thought: “There can be no union between the people and the possessors of unjust privileges, and the fight between them must go on until the people have won.” (*London Times*, October 29th, 1871.)

It is the right to utter sentiments such as this that Protestantism has vindicated, and to which the policy of Henry VIII., unconsciously to him, has led. To this extent, then, has he been made the instrument in the hands of Providence of serving England and the nineteenth century; and because of this his memory should not be held wholly in execration. The elements of character were singularly mixed up in him. His training and education as a papist led him into errors, excesses, and vices which we may condemn, even while crediting him with whatever of good he did. Providence often permits beneficent results to be educed from the evil designs of men. Protestantism would have lived and grown without Henry VIII.; but God raised him up within the pale of the Roman Catholic Church, so that, becoming familiar with its policy and persecutions, he might the more effectually employ its own weapons to destroy its power to harness down the freedom of religious thought.

But Protestantism in England had to gain strength by the gradual progress of the Reformation, which at every step was resisted by the papists with desperate energy. During the reign of Edward VI., son and successor of Henry VIII., several measures were adopted which aided materially the cause of reform, and proportionately weakened that of the papacy. They were far in advance of any existing at the death of Henry. Masses were abolished, and the cup was given to the people in communion. (Ralpin, vol. viii., p. 33.) The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was abridged. (*Ibid.*) Priests were allowed to marry. (*Ibid.*, p. 47.)

But these and other kindred measures only incensed the papists to greater violence; and, to avenge themselves, they engaged actively in stirring up insurrections against the Government. The insurrectionists in Devonshire, moved by the priests and monks, set forth their demands in fifteen articles, and insisted upon the consent of Edward to them. In these they required—what is now required of the people and Government of the United States—“that all the general councils and the canons of the Church [of Rome] should be observed;” the immediate object of which was to restore the temporal power of the pope. They also desired that the mass should be in Latin; that images should be set up; that the priests should pray for souls in purgatory; and that “*the people should be forbidden to read the Bible!*” (*Ibid.*, pp. 58, 59.)

All these demands being refused, the rebels marched upon and besieged Exeter, which was relieved by the king's troops, under Lord Russel, when the insurgents were dispersed. (*Ibid.*, p. 60.) Another rebellion was also begun by the papists in Northampton, which was suppressed by the Earl of Warwick. (*Ibid.*, p. 62.)

Edward VI. did all in his power to promote the cause of the Reformation by promptly resisting all these revolutionary measures of the papal party; and so far succeeded that the celebrated Confession of Faith—consisting of forty—two articles—which was the foundation of the present Church of England, was drawn up by Cranmer and Ridley during his reign. (Rapin, vol. viii., p. 85.) This, says the historian, was the last mortal wound given to the *old* religion.

To Edward VI., therefore, justly belongs the honor of having been the *first Protestant King of England*; and all true history assigns to him such honesty in the administration of affairs, and such purity of personal motive, that, although he died at the early age of sixteen, and reigned but seven years, he was enabled, by his consistent policy, to leave an illustrious record of his virtues; and it must ever be spoken to his praise, that, youthful as he was, he succeeded in holding in check the bad passions which had held their carnival during the reign of his father, and in putting his foot firmly upon the monster of persecution. The rack and the thumb—screw—infernal instruments of the papal Inquisition—were cast aside, and papists were allowed to maintain their religious faith without fear of torture or the scaffold.

Although religious differences may have led to the conviction and execution of his maternal uncle, the Duke of Somerset, yet the young king was constrained to consent to his death because, upon the record of his trial, he appeared guilty of the design to seize upon his own person and the administration of the Government, and for these purposes to raise an insurrection in the city of London. (*Ibid.*, p. 92.)

When he placed his signature to the death—warrant of the Anabaptist Joan Bocher—who was convicted of heresy—he did so with tears in his eyes, yielding rather to the persuasions of Cranmer, who had been trained in the school of Henry VIII., than to his own convictions. And it may be fairly inferred that his assent to the subsequent execution of Van Pare for heresy was obtained by the same influence. But of these executions the papists did not complain on their own account, saying merely that “the Reformers were only against burning when they were in fear of it themselves,” (*Ibid.*, p. 55. (note)) and availing themselves of them to stir up disaffection and insurrections against the Government. *

* Lingard admits that the Reformers were persecuted under Henry VIII., and charges against Edward VI. only that he prepared to burn the papists, but not that it was actually done. He says: “It might perhaps have been expected that the Reformers, from their sufferings under Henry VIII., would have learned to respect the rights of conscience. They had no sooner obtained the ascendancy, during the short reign of Edward, than they displayed the same persecuting spirit which they had formerly condemned, burning the Anabaptist, and preparing to burn the Catholic at the stake, for no other crime than adherence to religious opinion.”—LINGARD'S *Hist. of Eng.*, vol. v., p. 227, sixth London ed.

If they remain as blots upon his reign, they still leave it white as snow compared with that of his Roman Catholic father, and only go to prove that in times so stamped as those were with the intolerance of Rome, the principles of Protestantism were necessarily of slow growth; that they had to contend against such combinations as, without providential protection, they could not have resisted;

and that when in the end they did supplant the antagonistic principles of Romanism, they removed the most crushing weight of tyranny which has ever rested upon mankind since the beginning of the Christian era.

Edward VI. was supposed to entertain some fears that his sister Mary—daughter of Henry VIII. by Catherine of Arragon, and heir to the throne—would, after his death, lend her influence to the papists, on account of her mother's influence upon her education. The Duke of Northumberland, taking advantage of this, and probably being the first to suggest it, induced him to set aside the succession of both Mary and Elizabeth—also daughter of Henry VIII. by Anne Boleyn—by the formal assignment of the crown to Jane Grey, daughter of the Duke of Suffolk, who, by the will of Henry VIII., was made next in succession after Elizabeth. This act was manifestly without authority of law; and while it resulted from the ambitious desire of the Duke of Northumberland to get the control of the Government during the minority of Jane Grey—who was his daughter—in-law—the motive, on the part of Edward, was to save the Reformation from overthrow. (Rapin, vol. viii., p. 106.) The result, however, was not what either anticipated.

Lady Jane Grey was one of the most accomplished women in England of her age, only sixteen. She was wholly without ambition, and devoted exclusively to her studies and domestic pursuits. At first she declined the crown with befitting modesty, but finally yielded to the entreaties of the Duke of Northumberland, and suffered herself to be proclaimed queen. This was not considered a triumph by the Protestants, who had no confidence in the duke, he being, as they supposed, influenced entirely by his personal ambition, (Rapin, vol. viii., p. 119.) and ready to rejoin the papists if he could thereby promote his temporal interests. And, besides, he was unpopular with the people, on account of his agency in procuring the death of the Duke of Somerset, who was greatly esteemed. And besides, also, there existed a general impression that the assignment of the crown by Edward was illegally made. The papists, of course, took advantage of all this, and zealously pressed the claims of Mary, on account of her known devotion to the pope and her support “of the most extravagant things in the Romnish religion.” (*Ibid.*, p. 121.)

Mary was proclaimed queen at Norwich, and was furnished with troops by the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk, to maintain her right. Many, if not a large majority, of these were Reformers who, before they espoused her cause, obtained from her a solemn promise that, while she would reserve to herself the liberty of professing her own religion, she would leave the religion of the kingdom as she found it, that is, as it was at the close of the reign of Edward VI. *

* Mr. Froude refers to the same promise made by Mary, through Renard, the ambassador of Charles V., a promise of which Renard considered it necessary to remind her before she reached London, in order to defeat her purpose of having the funeral ceremonies of Edward VI. conducted according to the Roman Catholic forms. In his letter to Mary, Renard says: “The country dreaded any fresh convulsions, and her majesty should remember that *she had instructed him to tell the council that she was suspected unjustly, and had no thought of interfering with the existing settlement of the realm.*” — FROUDE'S *Hist. of Eng.*, vol. vi., p. 53.

Whatever may have been her secretly cherished design, they know but little of the history and teachings of the papacy who do not know that it has always regarded such promises as carrying with them no obligation of obedience, but as absolutely void. Innumerable instances are recorded where

popes have violated their most solemn promises upon the flimsiest pretexts, and authorized others to do so, alleging, by way of apology, that the interest of the Church demanded it, and that no covenants injurious to that interest were binding.

We have seen this in the cases of the kings who swore to obey Magna Carta. The Council of Constance disregarded the promise of “safe—conduct” given by the emperor to John Huss, although the pope, by the strongest implication, knew of and assented to it. The Third Lateran Council, in one of the canons enacted by it, declared that “*they are not to be called oaths, but rather perjuries, which are in opposition to the welfare of the Church and the enactments of the holy fathers.*” *

* Letter from Bishop England (Roman Catholic), late of Charleston, South Carolina, to Rev. R. Fuller, in their published controversy, entitled “Roman Chancery,” p. 159. This frank concession of Bishop England would seem to render any additional evidence of this statement unnecessary. But there is abundantly more. These are the words of the canon law:

“An oath contrary to the utility of the Church is not to be observed.

“These are to be called perjuries rather than oaths which are attempted against ecclesiastical utility.”—Decret. Gregory IX., vol. ii., p. 358, lib. 2, tit. 24, cap. xxvii., *apud* CUMMING, in his *Lectures on Romanism*, p. 72.

That Queen Mary yielded her royal assent to this doctrine is beyond all question. Whether she did it of her own volition, or in obedience to the universal sentiments of the partisans of the papacy, is of no consequence; it is the fact alone that is important. Her first step in that direction was a proclamation qualifying her promise by declaring that she should use no force to compel the adoption of the Roman religion “till all was regulated by the authority of Parliament;” thus indicating the purpose of shielding herself behind that body. (Rapin, vol. viii., p. 134.) This proclamation excited the apprehensions of the people to whom she had made the promise, and they immediately sent to her a petition, praying her “to remember a promise which she had made them with her own mouth.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 137, 138.)

The manner in which this petition was received shows not only the perfidious character of this queen, but how completely she was controlled by the unprincipled hierarchy of Rome, and the low state of morals which prevailed among them. It was haughtily rejected as offensive to royalty, because it reproached the queen with failure of her word! The petitioners were told that “subjects were not to control the action of their sovereigns;” and Dolbe, one of the number who had borne the petition, was set in the pillory. (Rapin, vol. viii., p. 138. Lingard fails to give any account of this transaction probably from prudential motives.)

The mask was then unblushingly thrown aside, and from that time the reign of this false queen was distinguished by some of the most bloody and cruel acts of persecution of which English history gives any account. She did not even spare the innocent Jane Grey, whose head fell beneath the axe of her executioner, for what others had done in her name. A Protestant judge was fined a thousand pounds sterling for ordering the justices of Kent to conform themselves to the laws of Edward, not yet repealed. (*Ibid.*, p. 139.) The prisons were filled with the victims of papal vengeance, and it was soon made apparent that they were to be forced to disavow their Protestantism. Steps were taken, without delay, to provide for the abrogation of “all laws which had been made in favor of the Reformation, and to restore the ancient religion.” (*Ibid.*, p. 142.)

With a view to this, it was resolved to prohibit a free election of the Commons, in order to prevent the return of a majority of Reformers; and thus to avoid any Parliamentary action which should reflect the will of the people. The whole power of the queen was employed for this purpose, and, says Rapin, “all sorts of artifices, frauds, and even violence, were put in practice to carry the election in favor of the court.” (*Ibid.*, p. 142.) Protestant magistrates were removed and Romanists put in their places. The people were intimidated “by menaces, by actions, by imprisonments on the most frivolous pretenses.” (*Ibid.*) Protestants were not allowed in some places to participate in the election assemblies; false returns were made without scruple; and thus a majority of the Commons favorable to the queen and the pope was obtained.

It did not, of course, take a Parliament thus elected long to repeal all the laws of Edward, and to legalize the persecutions against the Protestants. This accomplished, the queen, through the intrigues of Charles V., was afterward married to Philip of Spain, his son, in order to put the throne of England in a more complete state of dependence upon the pope, and to introduce the system of persecution so long practiced by the Spanish Inquisition, and with which the English people had not yet become familiar. The sequel proved that the real object was, not to convert the Protestants, but to overwhelm and *exterminate* them. (Rapin, vol. viii., p. 212.)

The whole reign of Mary was, consequently, one of blood. In the last year before her death thirty—nine Protestants suffered martyrdom; and four of these about a week before she died! It is difficult to arrive at a true estimate of the number of her Protestant victims—it being variously stated at from two to eight hundred! (*Ibid.*, p. 213, and note.)

That the object of Philip in becoming the husband of Mary was to obtain control of the English Government, so as to subject the people to the complete dominion of the papacy, there is no earthly doubt. His ruling passion was ambition, and there was no surer method of gratifying it than to become master of England. (“Hist. of Eng.,” by Hurne, vol. iii., p. 410.) “He inherited his father’s vices, fraud and ambition,” and “united to them more dangerous vices of his own, sullen pride and barbarity. England seemed already a province of Spain, groaning under the load of despotism, and subjected to all the horrors of the Inquisition. The people were everywhere ripe for rebellion, and wanted only an able leader to have subverted the queen’s authority. No such leader appeared.” (“Modern Europe,” by Russell, vol. ii., p. 346.)

And why did no such leader appear? All candid historians give the answer. The nobility had become so corrupted that they cared for nothing but to retain their power, which they were ready to do by conforming to the royal will, no matter at what sacrifice of character or conscience. The few of them who dared to maintain their independence, or to defend the right of the people to adopt their own form of religious belief, paid for it with their lives, or escaped miraculously. The bishops who had favored the Reformation were removed, and Romish bishops put in their places; and these last, in a short time—true to the papal policy—became “a power behind the throne, greater than the throne itself.” They were the fit tools of the papacy—filly prepared and ready, not only to dictate to Philip and Mary the bloody work which Rome required to be done, but to do it with untiring alacrity.

A few years before, during the reign of Henry VIII., the pope, Paul III., had entered into an alliance with the emperor, Charles V., the father of Philip, for the extermination of heresy in Germany; or, “in

other words,” says Mr. Russell, “for oppressing the liberties of Germany, *under pretense of maintaining the jurisdiction of the Holy See.*” (Russell, vol. ii., p. 296.) This league—one of the most infamous and accursed in all history—was understood by both the contracting parties to involve the necessity of applying *force* to put down the hitherto unresisting Protestants, to totally destroy them! That the pope so understood it, is shown by the fact that it bound him to furnish the emperor with twelve thousand foot, five hundred horse, and two hundred thousand crowns, for carrying on the war. He also gave the emperor one year’s revenue of the benefices in Spain, with power to alienate a hundred thousand crowns’ worth of Church lands, to defray his expenses! (Rapin, vol. vii., p. 684; Fox’s “Book of Martyrs,” Philadelphia ed., pp.602, 603.)

Trained in such a school as this, and with such examples for his imitation, no wonder that Philip felt himself charged with the obligation to inaugurate a reign of terror in England—one transcending all the outrages and enormities of Henry VIII. Under the pressure, therefore, of such a system, far the larger part of those who were concerned in the management of the Government and Church in England sunk into ignominious subjection to the joint power of the crown and the papacy; and the people, without some master spirit to guide them, were compelled to submit to the same degradation. Those from whom they had a right to expect encouragement and protection either suffered death at the hands of the public executioner, or were engaged in contriving plans for their greater humiliation. These latter, both peers and bishops, labored “how to qualify and mold the sufferance and subjection of the people to the length of that foot that is to tread on their necks; how rapine may serve itself with the fair and honorable pretense of public good; how the puny law may be brought under the wardship and control of lust and will.” (Milton’s Prose Works, vol. i., p. 17.) And their efforts were successful, according to the most sanguine anticipations of the pope, of Charles V., of Philip, and of all those who were thirsting for Protestant blood, and were ready to engage in exterminating its possessors.

Cardinal Pole, who had been driven out of England, and had received the protection of Charles V., and who was thoroughly devoted to the papacy, was recalled, and placed in such relations to Queen Mary that he was allowed to mold her policy in reference to both temporal and ecclesiastical affairs. He was governed by instructions from Rome, which, of course, required him to reduce England to the low condition of becoming again a papal province.

In an oration, delivered before Philip and Mary and the whole Parliament, this cardinal, as legate of the pope, spoke of the great love of the pope for England, on account of its having been the first island converted to Christianity; reminded them that this affection was so strong in the mind of Pope Adrian IV. that he gave to King Henry II. “the right and seignioly (the power, rank, or estate of a feudal lord) of the dominion of Ireland, which pertained to the See of Rome;” referred to his conference with the Emperor Charles V., who, he said, “hath travailed most in the cause of religion;” and avowed the purpose of his mission to be the bringing of England into unity with Rome. This, said he, required that all should adhere to the pope as “vicar of God,” who derives his power not from man or the consent of governments, but “from above;” and whose power is both “imperial and ecclesiastical!” And he told them that, in order to bring the nation into subjection to the pope, they must “revoke and repeal those laws and statutes which be impediments, blocks, and bars to the execution of my [his] commission!” (Fox’s “Book of Martyrs,” pp. 309-312.)

“The pope never interferes with temporal affairs!” constantly declare his followers. But here he stood before the whole nation of England, in the person of his legate, who spoke by his command, and directed such legislation by Parliament as should concentrate all dominion in his hands! Not interfere with temporal affairs!—when he causes his legate to tell the people of England that they ought to become his slaves, because his predecessor, Adrian IV., had given Ireland to them, and made the Irish people their slaves! Not interfere with temporal affairs!—when he points out the very acts and statutes which are to be abrogated and repealed! Not interfere with temporal affairs!—when this great legate, at one of the most critical points in English history tells the king, queen, and Parliament that the power of the pope over the nation comes directly from God, and that it is therefore “imperial and ecclesiastical,” and that it will be for the welfare of their “souls and bodies” that they should obey him!

The legate was obeyed; the pope had his own way; the obnoxious statutes were all repealed; the people were subdued by threats, persecution, and bloodshed; and Philip and Mary did all they could to carry out the infernal league between Charles V. and the pope. No matter what else a man did, if he acknowledged the supremacy of the pope, he was rewarded by royal and papal favor. No matter how faithful a Protestant was to all the obligations of citizenship, his religion was crime enough to subject him to torture or death. Philip had brought with him from Spain the passion for torture which the Inquisition had incited there; and the war of extermination was carried on with a thirst for blood such as fills alike the mind of an untutored savage and an intolerant pope.

John Rogers and other martyrs were burned to ashes for the crime of denying the doctrine of transubstantiation, and calling the Church of Rome the Church of Antichrist. (Fox’s “Book of Martyrs,” p.330.) When Bishop Hooper was carried to the stake, the process of burning was so tardy that he died by slow degrees of torture, knocking his breast with his hands until one of his arms fell off, and then with the other till it stuck fast to the hot iron! (*Ibid.*, p.350.) Latimer and Ridley had to be burned to gratify the vengeance of that “papistical monster,” Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester and Lord Chancellor of England. (*Ibid.*, p. 382.) And so horrible were the innumerable cruelties practiced upon the multitude of papal victims, that the blood almost curdles as we read, at this distance of time, the narratives of them. As they stand without example in all history—except in the pagan persecutions of the early Christians, and the Romish persecutions in the valleys of the Vaudois—so there is nothing to save them from universal execration. All that even Lingard can say for them is that “it was the lot of Mary to live in an age of religious intolerance, when to punish the professors of erroneous doctrine was inculcated as a duty no less by those who rejected than by those who asserted the papal authority ” (Lingard, vol. v., p. 227.)—overlooking the important facts that up to the reign of Mary there had been no persecution in England in behalf of Protestantism; that Henry VIII. had persecuted both papists and Protestants, and was never a Protestant in religious faith; and that no single drop of Roman Catholic blood had been shed during the Protestant reign of Edward VI.!

But we have already learned that the persecutions of Protestants in England did not begin with either Mary or Henry VIII. The examples heretofore enumerated show that it was learned by both of them, not alone from some of their Roman Catholic predecessors, but from the direct teachings and faith of the Church at Rome, which were supported by the False Decretals and the additions made to them from time to time, after the adoption of the original forgeries. But these forgeries merely conferred the power to persecute when necessary for the Church: the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council made it a duty,

and fixed a penalty for its non—performance. This was manifestly the interpretation given to it by Pope Gregory IX. in his subsequent attempt to execute this canon with all the terrible vengeance it invited. With a view to the extortion of money, he exacted, in England, a tenth part of all the movable goods of the kingdom. (Rapin, vol. iii., p. 303; Cormenin, vol. i., p. 409.) Because the Emperor Frederick hindered the persecution of the Albigenses, and for other reasons, he excommunicated him, and released all his subjects from their allegiance;” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 471.) which proves incontestably that the duty to persecute and exterminate heretics was not only a part of the canon law, but of the doctrinal faith of the Church!

To give the utmost possible strength to the injunction, this same pope, Gregory IX., announced (infallibly[!], of course) the impious doctrine, that “Christians should not regard the sanctity of an oath toward him who is the enemy of God, and who tramples under feet the decrees of the Church!” (Cormenin, vol. i., p. 470.) Claiming, as he did, in the most unequivocal manner, the right to govern the world, temporally and spiritually, by virtue of power derived from God, it is not to be doubted that when he sent the code of canon laws into England, during the reign of Henry III., the decree of the Lateran Council constituted a part of it; and that, interpreted by the persecutions of the Albigenses, it was designed to place *the duty of exterminating heretics* upon the ground that he who did so would thereby serve God and will his way to heaven! It was so understood by Henry IV. more than a hundred years after Gregory IX., when he assured a convocation of the papal clergy, in London, that he was ready to join them in whatever means should be judged proper to extirpate heresy and punish obstinate heretics!(Rapin, vol. v., p. 15.)

Now, when it is considered that this Lateran decree became the canon law in England three hundred years before Luther; that it was enforced against the Lollards more than a hundred years before that time, and when those in favor of reform in the Church were too feeble to attempt persecution in any form; and when it is remembered that it became the law of the Church of Rome by the solemn action of the Twelfth Ecumenical Council and the approval of the infallible pope, Innocent III., and was expressly recognized by another infallible pope, Gregory IX.;* and that the Church of Rome requires every act thus performed to be held as unerringly right as if done by Christ himself; then the whole responsibility for the introduction of religious persecution into England unquestionably rests with the popes of Rome and their ecclesiastical and royal subordinates, all of whom, under the influence of such teachings, learned to rejoice when the muscles of their victims cracked under their torture, and their bodies were consumed in the flames!

* By the highest Roman Catholic authority it is said: “In the Fourth Council of Lateran, in 1215, held by his [Innocent’s] authority, the discipline of the Church was regulated by seventy wholesome decrees, or canons, very famous in the canon law.”—BUTLER’S *Lives of the Saints*, Sadlier & Co.’s ed., vol. x., p. 56 (note).

And thus we see that the persecution of Protestants became legitimated and sanctified in the eyes of the popes, princes, and hierarchy of the Romish Church; and thus did that Church give its high sanction to the persecutions of Mary. And it will ever stand so written in history, whatsoever ingenuity may be resorted to, or falsehood employed, to deny or disguise it. The canons of the Lateran Council still remain the law of the Roman Catholic Church! The pope who made the infamous compact with Charles V. was infallible (!), and therefore could not err! The recent decree of infallibility makes all that

he did, and all that every other pope has done in the domain of faith and morals, as unerring as if done by God himself! But the nineteenth century has reason to thank God that there are no more such rulers upon the thrones of Christendom as Charles and Philip and Mary. If there were, the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX. would soon find bloody work for them to do in their dominions.

No royal marriage ever occurred in England more fatal to the happiness and prosperity of the kingdom than that of Philip and Mary. That it was plotted by the pope and Charles V., and that they employed Cardinal Pole to accomplish it, there seems no reason to doubt. It was in manifest opposition to the wishes of the English people, who desired the marriage of their queen to a native prince. It could never have been accomplished, for there was no pretense of affection about it, had not Mary been completely under the control of the papacy and the papists. She was a religious bigot, to so great an extent that she had no will of her own in opposition to the commands of the pope or other authorities of the Church. She may have been sincere in the conviction that it was best for the people that they should be governed in obedience to these authorities, rather than by laws of their own making; but, however this was, she did govern them as if England still remained a Roman province. She permitted the pope, by his legate, to dictate what should and what should not be done. No law was enforced against the wishes of the pope, and everything commanded by him was blindly and faithfully executed. He governed England as if he were the occupant of its throne.

Cardinal Pole was an Englishman, it is true, but the papacy never had a more zealous defender of all its usurpations and oppressions than he was. As the presiding, genius and guiding spirit of the court, he was the papal manipulator of all who had anything to do with the affairs of the Government. He represented the pope directly and immediately, kept him regularly advised of whatever transpired, and obeyed all his edicts with a fidelity and zeal that challenged the admiration of Rome. So that by means of his and the influence of Philip over Mary, her reign was as completely papal, in all its leading features and characteristics, as if the English crown had lawfully rested upon the head of the pope. In all this she was unjust to the nation, and must ever be regarded as a betrayer of its trust. ("History of England," by Froude, vol. vi., p. 489, etc.)

There is no reason for disguising the fact that Elizabeth, after the death of Mary, persecuted the papists. She, too, had been educated and trained under Romish influences, and before the commencement of her reign had professed the Roman Catholic religion. It is hard to get rid of the influences of education, especially when they have produced intolerance; and in such times as she lived, when everything tended to extremes, but few endeavored to do so; and these few were hidden in the multitude, who floated along with the current, rather than assert any counteracting principles.

If Elizabeth had any special ideas of the duties of a sovereign, beyond those which involved the simple administration of the Government, she acquired them as a sort of family inheritance from her father, and by immediate personal intercourse with Mary. If she had any conception of church discipline or church organization, or of a system of religious faith, it was likewise acquired in the same way. Having learned by such means as these, with the influence of the papal clergy super-added to them, that it was the duty of the custodians of any religious organization to maintain it by *force* when necessary; this, in other words, being an essential part of the Romish system of religion, when she reached the throne it is not to be wondered at that whatever she felt it her duty to do was done under these influences and according to these principles.

She had to deal with ambitious and proud ecclesiastics, whose hands were yet red with some of the best blood of England, and who had inculcated the necessity of exterminating heretics, according to the Lateran decree, in order to secure the protection of the Church in this life, and eternal happiness in the next. And if, when she found them to be her own enemies and the persecutors of those of her subjects with whom she sympathized, and saw them relaxing none of their efforts to keep the crown of England subject to the disposal of the pope, she struck back at them with their own weapons, what is there very surprising about it, considering all the circumstances and the times? She did persecute papists, cruelly and wrongfully, but she persecuted Protestants also, like her father. She found the papal system relying for its chief strength and support upon the State; and had not advanced so far toward the results designed by the best Protestant reformers as to understand how a new system could be established without the preservation of this principle. Like the papal advocates of the old system, she, too, derived the right to govern directly from God, and not from the people; and, in common with them, desired the union between the Church and the State to be preserved, in order that imperialism should not be endangered. And hence, led on by existing complications, and by motives thus engendered, she aimed her blows at all the enemies of her civil as well as ecclesiastical authority—at Protestants as well as papists. If, therefore, there are victims of her cruelty who will rise up in judgment against her when they shall meet her at the final bar, she can say, as can also Henry VIII., that, unlike the persecutions of her sister Mary, they were not all of one Church—that both Roman Catholics and Protestants fell beneath her royal vengeance!

Let the true distinction be observed. She persecuted Roman Catholics because they denied her ecclesiastical supremacy, and endeavored to snatch the scepter of the kingdom from her hands and lay it at the feet of the pope. She persecuted Protestants because they denied both her ecclesiastical supremacy and her divine right, and inculcated a doctrine which she and her courtiers saw, at a glance, would ultimately dispense with the agency of kings in the management of public affairs. And she entered, with her strong will and unconquerable resolution, upon the task of building up a new system and a new Church, which, while it should gather up the fundamental principles of the old British Christians—almost buried beneath a load of oppression which had existed for nearly a thousand years—should, at the same time, preserve enough of modern Romanism to keep the people in complete subjection to the dominion of kings.

Hence it is easy to see that her persecuting spirit antedated all the Protestantism she had, and was the natural fruit of the papal intolerance to which she had, all her life, been accustomed. She was trained, by both precept and example, in the religious belief that it was ordained of God that the Church and the State should remain united; and, as the undoubted Queen of England, she demanded the recognition, by all her subjects, of her right to govern both. She did not intend that their fealty should be divided between her and the Pope of Rome, or the army of foreign ecclesiastics he had imported into her dominions; but, woman as she was, resolved that the crown should rest exclusively upon her own brow, and that the scepter of absolutism should be grasped by her own hand. When she began her persecutions against the papists, she, like Henry VIII., might have been reconciled to Rome but for the question of supremacy.

But between her and the Puritans there was no point of reconciliation, for the plain reason that their Protestantism struck directly at the foundation of her royal right to govern the conscience and hold it in

passive obedience to authority. The Protestantism she desired to build up was mere antagonism to the papacy, mere resistance to the right of the pope to govern England. She understood it to involve, necessarily, the existence of an English episcopacy,—hierarchical, but not Roman—and the maintenance of a Church organization attached to the State, but, unlike that of Rome, subordinate to its laws. Upon these questions there was no common ground of union between her and the Protestantism then struggling for existence, which was striving to unshackle the conscience, and to establish, upon the basis of the old English liberties, the right of free thought and free speech. She, possibly, might not have been disposed to quarrel with the Presbyterians, Anabaptists, Puritans, or Lutherans, upon many of the fundamental principles of their faith, had they been willing to concede her ecclesiastical as well as temporal supremacy; but with her the denial of this was an unpardonable violation of obedience to the crown, although she knew that it had led to the separation from Rome.

In so far as she was influenced by religious motives at all, her chief object was to re-establish the National Church organization of Edward, either upon the basis of the articles then adopted, or such new ones as should give it strength and efficiency enough to cope successfully with its powerful antagonist, the papacy. Her courage, more than her piety, was tried at every step. Multitudes of difficulties and embarrassments crowded into every hour of the controversy. Those immediately around her—with some honorable exceptions—by whom her ecclesiastical policy was directed, were, in the main, governed by inordinate selfishness, and were ready to sacrifice even religion itself to obtain the possession of wealth, power, and station. In these respects they were no improvement upon the Romish hierarchy, to whom the most of them had belonged. They were papists or Protestants, according to circumstances; passing from one to the other with the ease and facility of time—serving politicians. They were Protestants under Edward, papists under Mary, and again Protestants under Elizabeth.

Surrounded by such influences, it is altogether probable that Elizabeth might have been prevailed on by her clergy to accept either a Roman Catholic or a Protestant creed, accordingly as their own personal fortunes were advanced; and that the creed adopted, in so far as herself and her courtiers were concerned, was assented to from no higher motive. As with Henry VIII., so with her—the question of supremacy merged all others; which shows her persecutions, even more than his, to have grown naturally out of the times and the affairs of her kingdom, as they had been molded by the policy of the papacy. She fell back behind the reign of Mary upon the issue made by Henry VIII. with the papacy; and this led her to abrogate everything that Mary had done concerning religion. And as Henry VIII. had not gone so far as to deny the fundamental principles of the Romish faith which she could not preserve without defeating the project of a National Church in England—she adopted that form of religion which had been established by law during the reign of Edward VI. This was merely Protestantism in an imperfect and undeveloped form; not that which Luther and his adherents had established in Germany, nor that which the Presbyterians, Anabaptists, Puritans, and other non-conformists maintained in England, nor that which now exists in England, Prussia, and the United States. It was a religious system established by law, like the papal system it was designed to supplant, in opposition to the liberalizing tendencies of true Protestantism—of that which has been since developed. It was, in a word, an attempt to constitute a system of *imperial Protestantism*, constructed after the model of *imperial Romanism*, its authors being seemingly unconscious of the fact that it contained elements altogether too incongruous for reconciliation and harmony.

Not only, therefore, did Elizabeth strive hard to throw off all the influences left upon the country by the reign of Mary, but she strove equally hard to prevent all those who desired a further and fuller development of Protestantism from disseminating their doctrines among the people. Having to maintain her own supremacy against the papists, and her divine right to govern against the more advanced Protestants, her persecutions, consequently, embraced both these classes. She found ready at hand a system of persecution regularly organized by the hands of the papists, after the Roman and Spanish methods, which came to her as a family inheritance from her sister Mary. And she employed this more furiously, it is true, against the papists than the Protestants, because they were her most powerful and formidable adversaries, and were supported by a Church which had made itself almost omnipotent by ruling the nations and peoples of Europe with imperial grandeur for hundreds of years.

Such a contestant could not be successfully resisted, except by hard blows; and as this Church had made itself great by employing such blows against all its antagonists, Elizabeth did not hesitate to retaliate upon it with its own weapons, to employ its own instruments of torture, to light the fagots around the bodies of its children with the same torch which it had set on fire when the body of William Sawtre was burned under the reign of Henry IV. Hence, her persecutions of the papists were precisely such as were practiced by the papists themselves against the Reformers under Mary and some of her papal predecessors. Hence, also, her persecutions of the non—conforming Protestants were less excusable, because less provoked, and were therefore cruel and merciless. By the former she broke the papal power, and provided thereby for not only the triumph, but the subsequent elevation, of her kingdom, and to that extent was a public benefactor. By the latter she failed to destroy the courage and true nobility of character which belonged to the English people, or to eradicate from their minds the principles of Anglo—Saxon liberty. These principles were providentially preserved, until a system of fully developed Protestantism, as it now exists in the United States, has grown out of them; and this, reacting upon the English mind, is rapidly leading, in that country as it has done in this, to an abrogation of the divine right of kings, and a full recognition of the right and capacity of the people to govern themselves.

Chapter XVII. Coercive Power of the Church

Coercive Power of the Church.—Parties and Factions.—Quarrel between Rome and Avignon.—Philip of France and Boniface VIII.—Power claimed by his Bull *Unam Sanctam*.—Promise of Clement V. to Condemn Boniface VIII.—John XXII. and Nicholas V.—Benedict XII. Corruption of the Fourteenth Century.—The Beginning of the Fifteenth Century.—Three Councils called by Gregory XII., Benedict XIII., and the Cardinals.—Council of Pisa.—It condemns both Popes, and deposes Them.—Alexander V. elected.—He confirms all the Decrees of the Council.—Three Popes.—Balthasar Costa becomes Pope, as John XXIII.—Council of Constance.—Tries and Condemns Gregory XII., Benedict XIII., and John XXIII.—The Latter found Guilty of Enormous and Scandalous Crimes.—He is deposed, and the Doctrine of the Pope's Infallibility condemned.—Difficulty in maintaining the Succession of the Popes.—May be two Infallible Popes at same Time.—Corruption in the Council.—John Huss and Jerome.—Their Trial and Death.—Effect in Bohemia.—Martin V.—His Policy.—Violation of his Promise to Alphonso.—His Bull against the King of Arragon.—His Letter to his Legate. Becomes sole Pope.—His Letter to the King of Poland for exterminating the Hussites.—His Death.—Effects of his Reign.

THE interference of the popes with the domestic civil affairs of the nations was, undoubtedly, superinduced by their possession of temporal power in Rome. The fact of having acquired this power by means so totally different from any employed by the apostles, or by the Christians of the first centuries, naturally tended to destroy their Christian humility, and to implant in their minds ideas of personal and official grandeur. Under such influences many of the popes became mere politicians, and were mixed up for several centuries in controversies with kings and princes. They neglected the spiritual affairs of the Church, and seemed to think that God was sufficiently served by an enlargement of their own temporal authority.

The number of bulls, briefs, and encyclicals issued by them concerning temporal matters greatly exceeded those which involved the interest of religion. Having in this way separated themselves from the influence of the apostolic example, and finding the world, on account of its ignorance, in a condition to acquiesce in the imposture, they did not hesitate to set up the claim of divine power, sufficiently broad and comprehensive to embrace within it the right to govern the kings and princes, and, through them, the people. When they succeeded in obtaining a practical recognition of this power, as pertaining to the organization of the Church, they found it necessary to go one step farther in order to preserve it. This was the introduction of the doctrine, as a part of their religious system, that this immense power must be maintained, it necessary, by force. Hence, the persecution and extirpation of heretics; and also the doctrines now avowed by Pius IX. in his Syllabus.

Although, by these means, they were enabled to secure several centuries of success, during which the world was held in complete subjugation and darkness; yet, in the course of time, the light began to break in upon the minds of men, and to disclose the fact, in spite of the reigning ecclesiasticism, that this entire system of oppression was the offspring of usurpation and fraud. Then, like the possessors of all other ill—gotten power, the leading and most ambitious popes became adepts in all the arts and practices of political intrigue and diplomacy, and in the pursuit of whatsoever means were necessary to maintain their authority, without any regard whatever to the morality or immorality of their acts. And thus it is that they themselves created the combination of influences out of which the Reformation arose. Had they been content to employ their spiritual power for the legitimate uses of the Church, the

Church would have possessed within itself sufficient power to have applied the necessary corrective to all abuses in its government. But when they went beyond this, and claimed the right to universal dominion, as derived directly from God and as a part of “the patrimony of Peter,” it became necessary to the world that this claim should not only be resisted, but, if possible, absolutely destroyed. It could not undergo any abatement merely; for, according to the papal theory, the power of the papacy is plenary (unlimited), and can be nothing less; and therefore the contest, in so far as the papacy was concerned, became a death—struggle.

And thus we have seen that, in point of fact, the Reformation in England—as the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth sufficiently demonstrate—was not so much a protestation against the faith and just authority of the Roman Church as against the abuses of the hierarchy, and the gross corruptions practiced by them under papal sanction and toleration. There were many intelligent and devout Roman Catholics who, before that time, had been sagacious enough to understand, and honest enough to declare, that the papacy had departed from the apostolic teachings and the practices of the first centuries of Christianity. Their efforts—preceding, the great Protestant Reformation—to save their ancient and time—honored Church were heroic, but unavailing. They are brilliant lights in these former centuries, and attract no less our admiration than our wonder. They convince us—if anything were necessary to do so—that there was yet enough in the true faith of the Roman Catholic Church, even in the worst days of Rome, to give consolation to the Christian mind, and to excite its liveliest Christian hopes; and that much that is essentially true and consistent with the teachings of the Saviour and his apostles has been preserved in its shifting creeds during all the years of its existence. The genuine love and veneration they felt for the Church to which their affections clung so tenaciously, stimulated them to desire and to labor for its reform, for the lopping—off the decayed branches, that the trunk of the old tree which had withstood so many storms might continue to bear good and wholesome fruit.

We cannot withhold from Anselm and Abelard, and Arnold of Brescia—all devout Roman Catholics—the concession of sincerity for their bold appeals to reason against the unjust assumptions and usurpation of authority by the popes. They were not of the number of those commonly classed with the Reformers; but when they asserted the right of free inquiry and free thought, they brought themselves under the ban of the papacy, which feared an open exposure of its enormous offenses against religion and society; and the controversy thus inaugurated necessarily incited such inquiries as could never thereafter be suppressed or silenced.

Nor can we fail to appreciate the integrity and manliness of Savonarola when he stirred up the people of Florence to intense excitement by his denunciations of papal infallibility—declaring that the constitutions issued by some popes had been annulled by others; that the opinions of some are contrary to those of others; and that the prevalent doctrines of the papacy led to “evil doings—to waste in eating and drinking, to avarice, to concubinage, to the sale of benefices, and to many lies, and to all wickedness.” *

* “Predica,” by Savonarola; *apud* Dean Milman, in his “Essays,” Essay 1., pp. 37, 57; “Life of Lorenzo de’ Medici,” by Roscoe, Bohn’s ed., p. 347.

It should increase our admiration of this intrepid priest to know that for the avowal of his honest convictions he lost his life. Arrested by violence, tried by authority of Pope Alexander VI. with “true Inquisitorial mercilessness,” and put to death by his persecutors, his courage, exhibited in the midst of the flames, imparted itself to his defenders, and gave fresh impulse to the work of reform. (Milman’s “Essays,” p. 66, etc.)

If the reforms sought for by these and other faithful Christians had been obtained within the Church, the Christian world would have been disinclined to rebel against the *spiritual* authority of the popes, being content to regard it as indicating the unity of the faith. But the authorities of the Church—including popes, prelates, and the inferior clergy—had become so corrupt that practical reform became impossible. The long residence of the popes at Avignon, in France—brought about by the political intrigues carried on between popes and princes—so demoralized those who conducted the affairs of the Church, both there and at Rome, that with them religion became a matter of secondary importance, if not of utter indifference. The Church was divided into parties and factions, each accusing and anathematizing the others as heretics and schismatics, and visiting upon them the curse of excommunication.

We have heretofore seen that Boniface IX. was pope at Rome, while Clement VII. and Benedict XIII. respectively claimed the pontificate at Avignon. This state of things manifestly grew out of the quarrel between Philip of France and Boniface VIII., which was conducted with great asperity on both sides, and reduced the election of a pope to a mere matter of temporal expediency, the real interests of the Church or of religion having little or nothing to do with it. The celebrated bull of Boniface—*Unam Sanctam*—where in he asserted that the pope holds in his hands both the spiritual and the temporal sword, led him into such direct conflict with the temporal power, that, without resistance on the part of the nations, he would have reduced them all to the condition of entire dependency upon the papacy. Hence we find Clement V. securing the pontificate, as the successor of Boniface VIII., by taking an oath to Philip, “by the body of Jesus Christ,” that he would “*blot out the memory of Pope Boniface!*” and proceeding soon after his election to revoke several of the bulls of Boniface, and, especially, to declare “that the bull *Unam Sanctam* should do no prejudice to the king or kingdom of France, and that all things should remain in the same posture they were in before that bull;” (Du Pin, vol. xii., p. 11.) notwithstanding which, the faithful are now instructed that this same bull continues to be, even at the present day, a part of the canon law!

Hence, also, we find that, after the death of Clement V. the discord prevailing among the cardinals occasioned so much delay in the election of his successor, that the people became so disgusted as to “set fire on the conclave,” (*Ibid.*, p. 21.) and disperse the cardinals. The terrified prelates could not be assembled again until after the death of Philip, and “the chair of Peter” remained without an occupant for two years!

John XXII. was then elected at Lyons and took up his residence at Avignon, and Nicholas V. was elected at Rome. But the Italians, though backed by the King of Bavaria, were unable to protect their pope, and he ultimately fell into the hands of John XXII., who imprisoned him till he died. (*Ibid.*, p. 24) So prostituted had the papacy become under such influences, that heresy consisted in disobedience to the pope in the merest trifles, and punishments were inflicted on account of them, without the slightest remorse.

John XXII. caused four Gray Friars to be arrested because they would not wear their gowns in the shape prescribed by his pontifical bull *Quorundam*! They were condemned to be burned as heretics, and were executed! A fifth one was degraded and imprisoned for life for the same offense! (Du Pin, vol. xii., p. 25.)

Benedict XII., successor of John XXII., was himself a heretic, in this; that he maintained that “the souls of those who die in mortal sin descend actually right into hell, where they suffer the pains of the damned;” (*Ibid.*, p. 29.) in express violation of the doctrine of purgatory, which the General Council of Florence, at its twenty-fifth session, in 1438, declared to have always been the doctrine of the Church.

Such a condition of affairs as thus existed at Avignon, aided by what occurred during the subsequent pontificates of Clement VI., Innocent VI., Urban V., Gregory XI., and Urban VI., surrounded the papacy, in the fourteenth century, with an amount of corruption which had no parallel in all the previous history of the world. The good men of the Church, of whom there were many, were made heart-sick at the spectacle. They desired reform, but were overpowered by the prevailing corruption.

The fifteenth century opened with demands for three councils: one summoned by Gregory XII.; another by the rival pope, Benedict XIII.; and the third by the cardinals. The latter, which assembled at Pisa, was the most numerous—attended, having, besides a number of cardinals, ambassadors from France and England. That this council did not believe in the doctrine of papal infallibility is perfectly certain; for, soon after it convened, it caused both popes, Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII., to be called at the gate of the Church; and neither of them appearing, proctors were appointed, in the name of the Universal Church, to consider what steps were necessary to be taken against both of them, in order to put an end to the schism and restore the peace of the Church. After they had been several times called, and had failed to appear by themselves or legates, the council unanimously adopted a sentence against them to the effect that they were both “contumacious (obstinately disobedient) of faith and of schism.” Here was an issue directly and explicitly made between the cardinals and these two contumacious popes, as to where the controlling authority of the Church was lodged; whether in a general council representing the whole Church, or, as Pius IX. and his Jesuit defenders now say, in the pope alone, as the infallible vicegerent of God.

The settlement of this great question by the Council of Pisa assures us that if Pius IX. had then been pope, he would not have been considered infallible; or if the cardinals of Pisa had been at the late Lateran Council at Rome, the decree of infallibility would not have been enacted. It was decided that the cardinals had power to call the council, that it was lawfully assembled, and that it had power to proceed to a definitive sentence against both popes. The trial was, therefore, entered upon with all necessary solemnity. The popes remaining contumacious, although duly summoned to appear, commissioners were appointed to appear for and defend them.

After all the evidence had been heard and duly considered, the council decided, by a solemn and deliberate vote, that both Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. had violated their oaths by continuing the schism, and that all Christians were released from the obligation of obedience to them! Benedict XIII. was accused of heresy upon the authority of the universities of Paris, Angiers, Orleans, and Toulouse, and three hundred doctors of that of Bononia. And all the accusations against him and Gregory XII. being fully sustained, a decree was unanimously passed declaring that they were both “manifest

schismatics, favorers of schism, heretics, guilty of perjury and of the violation of their oaths; that they give a scandal to the whole Church by their manifest obstinateness and contumacy; that they are unworthy of all honor and dignity, and particularly of the pontifical; and that they are fallen from it, deprived of it, and separate from the Church, *ipso facto*.” The See of Rome was declared vacant; all Christians were forbidden to obey either of the popes; and all their judgments and sentences were declared null and void! (Du Pin, vol. xiii., D. 5.)

Now, when it is considered that this council was composed of one hundred and forty cardinals, archbishops, bishops, and mitred abbots, of twenty—six doctors of divinity, of three hundred doctors of civil and canon law, and of ambassadors from France, England, Jerusalem, Sicily, Cyprus, Poland, Brabant (a province of Belgium), Austria, Bavaria, and from a number of lesser powers, including some of the princes of Italy, it must require more than a common amount of assurance to pretend, as all the Jesuit and ultramontane writers now do, that infallibility was always and everywhere the universal doctrine of the Church! For although it has suited the purposes of the papacy to deny that the Council of Pisa was an ecumenical council, and to disguise its proceedings as much as possible, yet that it did represent the real sentiments of the Church is abundantly attested by the history of those times. There could not then have been assembled in Europe any considerable concourse of Christians who would not have denounced the infallibility of the pope as impious and unchristian. And of this we shall soon see more satisfactory proof than that furnished by the Council of Pisa.

After Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. had both been deposed, the Council of Pisa proceeded to the election of a new pope; when Alexander V. was chosen, and, being present, presided over the council and approved all its sentences and decrees. After a few more sessions the council adjourned, and another general council was ordered to meet in 1412, to provide for reform in the Church. Pope Alexander V. afterward published a bull in 1410, confirming all that the Council of Pisa had done, against which bull many ultramontane maledictions have since been hurled.

In the mean time, Gregory XII. assembled his council in Aquileia, but it was attended by very few prelates. He, however, caused it to decree that his election was canonical, as had been also that of Urban VI., Boniface IX., and Innocent X.; and that the elections of Clement VII., Benedict XIII., and Alexander V. “were temerarious (reckless), unlawful, and sacrilegious, and that they were schismatics and usurpers.” He, moreover, caused it to be announced that he would resign the pontifical dignity, in order to restore harmony, if Benedict XIII. and Alexander V. would do so; for it must be remembered that there were now *three* popes, each claiming to be the successor of Peter!

But Alexander V. was disposed neither to surrender his dignity nor to carry on the work of reform which was expected of him by the Council of Pisa. He was under the control of Balthasar Costa, who directed the measures of his pontificate with the sole view of making himself his successor, in which he succeeded. Yet he was, says Du Pin, “acknowledged for pope by all Christendom, except Apulia and some part of Italy which had not yet abandoned Gregory, and the kingdoms of Arragon, Castile, and Scotland, and the states of Count Armagnac, who acknowledged Benedict.”

At his death, which occurred in 1410, Balthasar Costa was elected his successor, and took the name of John XXIII. He made war upon the King of Naples with a view of wresting his dominions from him, and placing the Duke of Anjou upon his throne. The king, however, finally drove him from Rome,

where he was hated by the people in consequence of his having “drawn great sums of money from the richest men in the city.” He took refuge at the Court of the King of Hungary, where he went to consult about the meeting of a council. He sent his legate to France with a bull, whereby he assured the French clergy that he desired that a council should be held at the time agreed on at Pisa, to endeavor to bring about a union between the Greek and Latin churches, to make peace between France and England, and “to reform the Church both in its head and members.” He finally succeeded, by obtaining the protection of Sigismund of Hungary, in getting his views so generally acquiesced in that he at last called the Council of Constance to meet in 1414—the time fixed at Pisa. This council, although thus convened by a pope who had participated in the proceedings of the Council of Pisa, and had, by acquiescing in them, committed himself to the doctrine that a council can try, condemn, and depose a pope, and, therefore, that popes are not infallible, is regarded by all the Church as the Sixteenth Ecumenical Council. Whatever it did, therefore, carries with it the highest sanction of the Church, and has all the authority of law.

At this council the means of restoring peace to the Church by terminating the schism were much discussed by the fathers. Deputies attended from Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII., the former of whom proposed his resignation. The fathers, however, although they declared that the Council of Pisa was lawfully celebrated, were mostly of opinion that the best way to put an end to the schism was to require that all three of the popes—Gregory XII., Benedict XIII., and John XXIII.—should resign! They held that, notwithstanding John XXIII. was a lawful pope, yet the Universal Church might constrain him to resign, and that the council was the representative of the Universal Church. John endeavored to defeat this measure by sowing divisions among the members of the council; but all his exertions in that direction were without avail, the vote being unanimous.

In the mean time an Italian bishop accused John XXIII. of having committed “all sorts of crimes,” which were not immediately made public. The prelates from Germany, England, and Poland thought they ought not to be published, because it “could only serve to disgrace the Holy See, to scandalize the Church, and throw it in confusion.” John at first thought he would defy the council, and deny their power to depose him, except for heresy; but he was persuaded by his friends not to make this attempt. Before the investigation of the charges was begun, the council proposed to him his resignation, according to the plan they had previously adopted. Embarrassed as he was, he had no other method left which seemed to open the door of escape; and he accepted the plan with apparent pleasure, proposing that he would voluntarily resign if Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. would also agree to do so. This contingent proposition was not acceptable to the council, and he made another, equally unsatisfactory for the same reasons. A third one was drawn up which, through fear of the Emperor Sigismund, he agreed to accept. He then pronounced the declaration, and the next day repeated it in the presence of the council. He vowed, and swore to God, to the Church, and the Holy Council, that he would resign so soon as Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. should do so, or should be deprived of their claims to the pontificate by death or otherwise. He offered to visit Benedict XIII. himself and procure his abdication; but the council would not consent to this, suspecting that his only object was to get away from Constance, and thus break up its sessions. This suspicion was not without foundation; for soon after, notwithstanding he had promised the emperor that he would not leave, he escaped in disguise, and took shelter in a castle several leagues distant, followed by only five or six cardinals, four of whom returned in a few days.

This absence of the pope led immediately to the consideration in the council of the question whether the pope was above the council, and, therefore, infallible, or was inferior to it, and consequently not infallible. There were only six cardinals who maintained the first of these propositions, and who insisted that the council was dissolved in consequence of the absence of the pope. But the council answered them “that the pope was not above the council, but inferior to it,” thus directly and emphatically condemning the doctrine of papal infallibility! The ill—fated John XXIII., finding his efforts to break up the council ineffectual, fled to another castle, where he summoned a notary, and made solemn protestation against all that he had promised to the council, and sworn to because, as he said, he was “forced to it by violence and fear,” so little did the popes in those days regard even their most solemn oaths, though taken in the presence of an ecumenical council.

The council, in order to counteract the influences which John XXIII. was trying to invoke in his own behalf, then proceeded to pass several important decrees. In one of these it is declared that the Council of Constance was “lawfully assembled in the name of the Holy Ghost;” that it “represented the whole Catholic Church militant; had its power immediately from Jesus Christ; and that every person, of whatsoever state or dignity, even the pope himself, is obliged to obey it in what concerns the faith, the extirpation of schism, and the general reformation of the Church in its members and its head:” * Other decrees were passed, declaring that those who refused to obey the council, “even the popes themselves not excepted,” should be punished; that if the pope, when required by the council to renounce the pontificate, failed or delayed to do so, he had thereby forfeited his dignity, and no obedience was due him; and that if John XXIII. did not return to Constance, “they would proceed against him as a favorer of schism, and suspected of heresy.”

* The ultramontane writers pretend that the words, “in what concerns the faith,” in the above decree, were afterward added by the Council of Basil. They do this in order to break the force of this decision of a general council against papal infallibility. But Du Pin, from whom the above facts are taken, shows the falsity of this pretense, and also that, even without these words, the decree sufficiently affirms the supremacy of a council over the pope.—Du PIN, vol. xiii., pp. 14, 15.

John XXIII. resorted to many subterfuges to escape his impending doom. He endeavored to apologize for his secret departure from Constance by pretending that it was necessary on account of the condition of his health; and even went so far as to propose the second time to resign. But the council had no confidence in him or his promises. Having already committed perjury by the violation of a most solemn oath, the fathers could put no other estimate upon him than that he was capable of any kind of treachery—was both base and false—hearted. They therefore proceeded with his trial, and, after the most careful examination of the evidence and full deliberation, found him guilty of crimes before which the iniquities of the basest of modern criminals dwarf into insignificance. Du Pin thus enumerates them:

“Lewdness and disorders in his youth, the purchasing of benefices by simony; his advancement to the dignity of a cardinal by the same means; his tyranny while he was legate at Bononia; his incests and adulteries while he was in that city; his poisoning of Alexander V. and his own physician; * his contempt of the divine offices after he was pope; his neglecting to recite the canonical prayers, and to practice the fasts, abstinences, and ceremonies of the Church; his denying justice, and oppressing the poor; his selling benefices and ecclesiastical dignities—to those that bid most; his authorizing an

infinite number of dreadful abuses in distributing of preferments, and committing a thousand and a thousand cheats; his selling bulls, indulgences, dispensations, and other spiritual graces; his wasting the patrimony of the Church of Rome, and mortgaging that of other Churches; his maladministration of the spiritual and temporal affairs of the Church; and lastly his breaking the oath and promise he had made to renounce the pontificate, by re tiring shamefully from Constance, to maintain and continue the schism.” (**)

* The accusation against him was that he had caused his physician to poison Pope Alexander V., in order that he might obtain the papal chair, and then poisoned his physician to prevent detection.

** Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 17.

Cormenin gives the decision of the council somewhat more in detail, thus:

“The General Council of Constance, after having invoked the name of Christ and examined the accusations brought against John XXIII., and established on irrefragable proof, pronounces, decrees, and declares, that Balthasar Costa [the pope] is the oppressor of the poor, the persecutor of the just, the support of knaves, the idol of simoniacs, the slave of the flesh, a sink of vices, a man destitute of every virtue, a mirror of infamy, and devil incarnate; as such it deposes him from the pontificate, prohibiting all Christians from obeying him and calling him pope. The council further reserves to itself the punishment of his crimes in accordance with the laws of secular justice; and his pursuit as an obstinate and hardened, noxious, and incorrigible sinner, whose conduct is abominable and morals infamous; as a simoniac, ravisher, incendiary, disturber of the peace and unity of the Church; as a traitor, murderer, Sodomite, poisoner, committer of incest, and corrupter of young nuns and monks!” *

* Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 108. This author also says that only a portion of the articles were publicly read; and that there were, besides these, secret ones too frightful to be announced. In a recent work it is said that these latter were “dropped for the sake of public decency. —*The See of Rome in the Middle Ages*, by Reichel, part iii., p. 484. This last —named author publishes some of the charges, and the sentence of the council, taken from Labbe’s collection, in the original Latin.—*Ibid.*, note 5, and p. 485, note 1; see also *Life and Times of John Huss*, by Gillett, vol. i., pp. 515-517.

Few men have reached so low a point of infamy and degradation as that reached by John XXIII., who is recognized by all the Church historians as having been lawfully elected pope. On account of the enormity of his crimes, he was deposed and disgraced by the council, and all persons were forbidden to recognize him thereafter as pope, or to obey him. Thus reduced, and abandoned by the few friends who had previously adhered to him, he humiliatingly announced to the council that he had no defense to offer, declared the council to be most holy and infallible, and approved of all its decrees up to his deposition at the twelfth session, thus entitling that decree which declared that a general council was superior to the pope, and, therefore, that the pope was not infallible, to take its place in the canons and to become a part of the law of the Church!

The Jesuit defenders of infallibility, with all their cunning and ingenuity, have been sorely puzzled over this part of the history of the Church. They have found it exceedingly difficult to make the links in the

chain of regular apostolic succession interlock each other. In whatsoever way they attempt it, they run afoul of numerous palpable facts which, when fully understood, upset all their theories.

In the “Catholic Family Almanac for the United States,” for 1870, there appears a chronological table of the Roman pontiffs, beginning with St. Peter and ending with Pius IX. (“Catholic Almanac,” 1870, pp. 47, 48.) This is intended for the instruction of the faithful. Referring to the forty years of disputed succession which followed the close of the pontificate of Urban VI., in 1389, it carries down the Roman line of succession as follows: Boniface IX., from 1389 to 1404; Innocent VII., from 1404 to 1406; Gregory XII., from 1406 to 1417; and then follows it with Martin V., from 1417 to 1431—thus making the line unbroken. Within these same years it puts down as “rival popes,” Clement VII., Benedict XIII., Alexander V., and John XXIII.

A recent “History of the Catholic Church,” published also in the United States in 1870, and highly commended for its accuracy, contains also a chronological table of the same kind. Covering the period given above, it makes the line as follows: Boniface IX., from 1389 to 1404; Innocent VII., from 1404 to 1406; Gregory XII., from 1406 to 1409; Alexander V., 1409; John XXIII., from 1409 to 1413; and then follows Martin V., from 1413 to 1431—with the additional statement, indicated by the letters “*abd*” opposite their names, that Gregory XII. abdicated in 1409, and John XXIII. in 1413. (“History of the Catholic Church,” by Rev. Theodore Noethen, p. 577.)

Now, without stopping to comment upon other facts connected with the great schism of forty years, during which the right to the chair of Peter was continually and obstinately contested, to the disgrace of all the parties and the injury of the cause of Christianity, it may be well asked, how are the faithful to decide between contradictory statements like these? One places Alexander V. and John XXIII. among the “rival popes,” and the other places them in the regular line of succession! One continues the pontificate of Gregory XII. in the regular line down to 1417, and makes no mention of Alexander V. and John XXIII. in that line; while the other represents Gregory XII. as having abdicated in 1409, and continues the regular line down to Martin V., with both Alexander V. and John XXIII. One represents Martin V. as having been made pope in 1417, and the other in 1413—four years before.

But the puzzle will become more difficult of solution to an intelligent investigator when he finds out, as he would do, that neither of these tables represents the precise truth. Gregory XII. was not pope from 1406 to 1417. He was elected at Rome in 1406, while Benedict XIII. was yet pope at Avignon, where he had held his pontifical court since 1394 as the successor of Clement VII. At the time of his election he promised the cardinals at Rome to resign if Benedict would do so, but afterward equivocated to such an extent that all his cardinals except four withdrew from him, and appealed from his authority to that of the Council of Pisa. This council deposed him in 1409, as they also did Benedict XIII., and elected Alexander V., who was regarded as the legal pope. Alexander V. was not, therefore, a “rival pope;” nor was John XXIII. Gregory XII. did not abdicate in 1409; but after he was then deposed by the Council of Pisa, claimed still to be pope as against Benedict XIII., Alexander V., and John XXIII. up till the fourteenth session of the Council of Constance, in 1415, when he resigned his right to the pontificate and recognized the validity of the council. The council then approved of what he had *canonically* done; (Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 18.) that is, what he had done before he was deposed by the Council of Pisa. This broke his fall somewhat by recognizing him as legal pope at Rome against Benedict XIII. at Avignon, from 1406 to 1409—only three years out of the twelve which he claimed. And this was perhaps more a

matter of policy and necessity than principle; for if Gregory XII. was not the lawful pope from 1406 to 1409, then Benedict XIII. was; and he is properly put down as a “rival pope” in one of the above tables, and does not appear in the other at all. And if Gregory XII. was a lawful pope after he was deposed by the Council of Pisa, then Alexander V., who was elected by that council, was not. As the Council of Constance decided that at Pisa to have been regularly and legally held, and recognized Alexander V. and John XXIII. both to be legal popes, they could not stultify themselves by approving of what Gregory XII. had done after he was deposed; for that would have been equivalent to deciding that Peter had two successors at the same time!

But, apart from this confusion in tracing out the line of regular apostolic succession, this complicated condition of affairs suggests this most pertinent inquiry: where, during all this time, was infallibility deposited? Was Gregory XII. infallible? He was deposed by the Council of Pisa, and the Council of Constance recognized the act as valid. Was Benedict XIII. infallible? He also was deposed by the same authority. Was John XXIII. infallible? He was deposed by the Council of Constance, after having been found guilty of the most outrageous offenses. Was the Council of Constance infallible? That it claimed infallibility is certainly true; that the whole Church assented to this claim is also true, and yet to affirm now that it was would be heresy, under the decree of the late Lateran Council. By it the faithful are taught that the pope is alone the possessor of infallibility, and is the source from which all others receive it. Therefore they are driven to the necessity of deciding that Gregory XII., or Benedict XIII., or John XXIII. was infallible. If they select Gregory XII., the Council of Pisa stands in the way to condemn them. If they select Benedict XIII., they meet the same difficulty. If John XXIII., the Council of Constance, and his tremendous catalog of crimes, stare them in the face. If they pass by all three of them, and lodge infallibility in the General Council of Constance, they are pronounced heretics by Pius IX. and his Jesuit and ultramontane prelates, and cut off from the Church by excommunication.

What, then, are the faithful to do in the midst of all these complications? To a common—sense mind this question would be hard to answer; but the defenders of the papacy are equal to the occasion. See how admirably this difficulty is disposed of by St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who wrote shortly after the schism. He says:

“It is possible for one to have belonged to either party in good faith and with a safe conscience, for, although it is necessary to believe that there is but one visible head of the Church, if it should nevertheless happen that two sovereign pontiffs are elected at the same time, it is not obligatory to accept either as the legitimate pope; but only to acknowledge as the true pope the one who has been canonically elected; and the people are not expected to determine which is the pope, but can follow the opinion and guidance of their pastors.” *

* History of the Catholic Church,” by Noethen, p. 404. This author gives an account of the great schism in three pages, and without even mentioning the name of Gregory XII., Benedict XIII., or John XXIII. He quotes the above with approbation.

That is to say, “it is necessary to believe that there is but one” pope at a time, but “not obligatory.” Peter can have but one legitimate successor occupying the pontifical chair; but if there should be two, it is no matter, as it is “not obligatory” upon the faithful to select between them. All that is necessary is to

believe that one or the other is the pope, no matter which. “The people” are too ignorant and simple-minded to “determine” anything about matters of so much intricacy. All they are required to do is to “follow the opinion and guidance of their pastors!” to avoid all thoughts of their own, all investigation of the facts, and passively submit to whatsoever commands shall be given them. Even though, as was the case in the instances referred to, one set of the faithful should be taught by their pastors to support one pope, and another class another pope, still no matter! for notwithstanding each should denounce the other as a heretic and guilty of all sorts of crimes, still, as infallibility must be somewhere, one or the other must have it!

Until the Council of Pisa deposed Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII., the faithful were permitted to believe that either was infallible as taught by their pastors. And the only effect of the election of Alexander V. by the council was to add to the list another representative of infallibility. The necessary effect was, each was infallible to those who followed him, so that infallibility became triplicated, existing, in three places at the same time.

The Church had not so many heads as Briareus, yet it had so many that nobody then and nobody now can tell which was the true head! And yet this book, designed for the edification of American readers, after admitting that “the obstinacy of the popes” divided the Christian world, “increased the schism, and caused all the subsequent evils” to the Church; and that as “God has promised his Church that he will not forsake her in time of extreme peril,” his providence selected the cardinals as the agents for convening a council in defiance of these schismatic popes, and thus saving the Church from overthrow—after admitting all this with every appearance of candor, does not hesitate to tell us that each of these popes was infallible to his followers; that each was in the line of regular apostolic succession; that each wore the crown and held the sword of St. Peter, provided only that the pastors who paid obedience to each so commanded their several flocks to believe, as they undoubtedly did! And this is put forth with apparent sincerity in this intelligent and investigating age, as if mens’ minds were still encased in an impenetrable coat of ignorance and stupidity, and bold and unblushing dogmatism were alone possessed of impunity.

But it will not do to pass by the Council of Constance without further comment. When it is remembered that it is regarded by all the Church as ecumenical; that the pope found guilty by it of the most infamous crimes belongs to the regular line of succession from Peter; and that he was the pope at Rome; some of the impending difficulties in the way of reform in the Church may be seen and appreciated, even at this distance of time. It was claimed that the “chair of St. Peter” was at Rome, and that the Church there was, consequently, “the mother and mistress of all the Churches.”

As pagan Rome was the chief imperial city of the world, so the popes, in imitation of the emperors, had endeavored to make Christian Rome the sole representative of ecclesiastical imperialism. It was so in the person of John XXIII., an Italian, who was in possession of the Vatican, of all the holy churches of Rome, of the triple papal crown, of the fisherman’s ring, of all the relics of the saints, part of the true cross, of the thorns in the cross of Christ, and of the garments worn by the Virgin Mary, and the thousands of other things which the ignorant and superstitious are still taught to worship. And, more than all that, was he not infallible, so that he could not err in matters of faith or morals?—though steeped in crime and villainy sufficient to contaminate the whole atmosphere of Rome. The festering and consuming sore of corruption was, therefore, more violent at the heart of the Church than at the

extremities; it was viler and more filthy there than the world ever saw anywhere else, in any of the departments of society, since Sodom and Gomorrah were overwhelmed by the wrath of God. And such was the solemn and deliberate decision of an ecumenical council, pronounced without a single dissenting voice!

There were some good men in the council who desired to make it a reform council—the ostensible object for which it was convened. But the ideas which prevailed with the majority limited the work of reform to the pope alone: they desired to reform him, but not themselves. If the cardinals and higher prelates of the Church had been willing to practice such virtues as they demanded of the pope, and of the inferior clergy, results very different from those which did ensue might have been brought about. But, so far from this having been the case, a large number of them were as corrupt as the pope, and habitually practiced the very vices they condemned in him, thus influencing the lower clergy to a still greater degree of degradation. And such is the undeniable voice of all impartial history. John Huss, after the conviction and disgrace of John XXIII., thus spoke from his dreary prison at Gottlieben:

“The council has condemned its chief—its proper head—for having sold indulgences, bishoprics, in fact, everything; and yet among those who have condemned him are many bishops who are themselves guilty of the shameful traffic!.... O profligate men! why did you not first pull out the beam from your own eye?.... They have declared the seller to be accursed, and have condemned him, and yet themselves are the purchasers. They are the other party in the compact, and yet they remain unpunished.” (Life and Times of John Huss,” by Gillett, vol. i., p. 524.)

The learned Clemingis, who lived in those days, whose Christian fidelity was unquestioned, and who, together with Gerson and D’Ailly, shed luster upon the University of Paris, spoke of the members of the council as “carnal, for the most part bent on their pleasures, not to say their lusts;” and said:

“These carnal sons of the Church do not only have no care or apprehension of spiritual things, but they even persecute those who walk after the Spirit, as has been the case from the days of just Abel, and will be to the end of time. These are the men who fly together to the Church merely to seize upon temporalities; who lead in the Church a secular life, conspire, covet, plunder, rejoice in pre-eminence, not in profiting others; oppress and rob their subjects; glory in the honor of promotion; riot in pomp, pride, and luxury; who count gain godliness, sneer at such as wish to live holily, chastely, innocently, spiritually, calling them hypocrites..... Of such men the Church is full this day, and scarcely, in whole chapters or universities, can you find any others..... Are men like these the ones to exert themselves for a reformation of the Church—men who would account such a reformation the greatest calamity to themselves? (*Apud Gillett, ibid.*)

The Council of Constance, controlled by men of this sort, and subject to such influences as would naturally emanate from them, while its action, like that of the Council of Pisa, was a blow at the ambition of the papacy and the infallibility of the pope, did as much as lay in its power to advance the cause of ecclesiastical absolutism, and to crush out the rising and growing spirit of inquiry which had been excited by Anselm, Arnold, Savonarola, and Wycliffe, of former times, and by John Huss and Jerome of Prague, who then lived. The trial, condemnation, and execution of Huss and of Jerome will remain a reproach to it as long as history is read—will forever convict it of injustice, cruelty, intolerance, and persecution. Whatever amount of ingenuity may be expended, and however the facts

may be perverted and distorted by Jesuit art and cunning, it cannot be disguised that the cruelty practiced toward them was designed as a condemnation of free thought, and an attempt on the part of the highest authority of the Roman Catholic Church to perpetuate the corruption and vices which then prevailed at the expense of all that was sanctified in the former history of the Church, and that purity of faith and practice which it had derived from the teaching and example of the apostolic Christians. No language is fertile enough in words of denunciation to express what all intelligent and thinking minds must feel in relation to it.

Both Huss and Jerome had always led pure and Christian lives. No charge of vice or immorality was ever made against either of them. The Bohemian Christians venerated and followed them, not merely on account of their eloquence as preachers, but because no breath of suspicion ever rested upon their integrity as men or upon their fidelity as Christians. But they were accused of favoring the doctrines of Wycliffe, which pointed to reform; and that was an unpardonable sin, because they struck at the multifarious forms of vice and corruption which were then sanctioned by the example of such popes as John XXIII., and such prelates as constituted the majority of the Council of Constance. This pope and these prelates were their accusers, triers, and executioners, and it should surprise no one to know with what alacrity they hastened to their conviction, and how their hearts leaped with gladness when the torches that consumed their bodies were lighted by their emissaries.

John Huss had a “safe-conduct” from the Emperor Sigismund, under whose influence John XXIII. consented that the council should be held. He was promised full protection both in going and returning to the council, where he was summoned to answer the charge of heresy. Yet this promise of protection was violated, to the damning disgrace of all the parties concerned in the treacherous and dastardly act. Whether it was justified by the perpetrators of the wrong upon the declared ground that “faith should not be kept with heretics,” is no matter, since it is undoubtedly true that such was the doctrine which then prevailed among the popes and the leading members of the hierarchy, and *which yet prevails*, as there are volumes of evidence to show. Both upon this and less satisfactory grounds, innumerable contracts, agreements, and promises have been violated and disregarded without the slightest compunctions of conscience; and in all these matters the popes themselves were far ahead of all others.

Whether John XXIII. or Sigismund was most to blame for the betrayal of Huss is of no consequence now, since the pope is shown to have been capable of that or any other enormity, and the emperor was ready to do whatsoever was necessary to the protection of his imperial authority. The council was equally guilty with either or both of them, for, knowing that the “safe-conduct” had been given by the very authority under which it convened, if it had not been insensible to shame it would have scorned to maintain a jurisdiction acquired over a defenseless adversary by such base and cowardly means. Du Pin says, “The pope and the emperor invited John Huss to come thither,” and “the emperor granted him a safe—conduct.” (Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 120.) This invitation, if it did not expressly engage the pope to good faith, implied it so strongly that any man less infamous than John XXIII. would have protested against its violation. And if the council had entertained any respect for the pope, and had not been influenced by the loose principles of morality which then prevailed, the blood of John Huss would not yet be clinging to its skirts.

The next morning after Huss arrived at Constance, two noblemen, who had accompanied him, visited the pope to notify him of his arrival. They inquired of him whether he could safely remain without ally

risk of violence. The pope replied: "Had he killed my own brother, not a hair of his head should be touched while he remained in the city." ("History of the Council of Constance," by L'Enfant; apud Gillett, vol. i., p. 329 (note 1).) So that, if the pope was not a party to the "safe-conduct," he gave his solemn promise that it should be observed. Either would have bound an honest man, but neither would have bound John XXIII.! Even his oath, taken before the council with a solemn appeal to God, could not bind him, *infallible* as he was!

Infamous as John XXIII. was, he was not destitute of ability or cunning. Having reached Constance some time before the emperor, he endeavored to shape the policy of the council so as to divert attention from his own crimes. He had already distinguished his pontificate by emptying the vials of his wrath upon the head of King Ladislaus of Naples for no other offense than his having been an ally of Gregory XII., which, as we have just been taught by Noethen, quoting from St. Antoninus, was no offense against the law of the Church. Harmless as this preference of Ladislaus is now pretended to have been, yet for it alone he was declared by this infallible pope to be "a heretic, a schismatic, a man guilty of high treason against the majesty of God;" a crusade was proclaimed against him, and those who should take part in it were promised that all their sins should be forgiven, upon repentance and confession. (Gillett, vol i., p. 181.)

His success in bringing the hierarchy to adopt his views in reference to Ladislaus, and his promptness in dealing with heresy, led him to believe that if he could turn the attention of the council to inquiries of that kind, he might himself escape. Accordingly, "the foil he used was the heresy of Huss," which he hoped would give him the opportunity of showing how faithfully he guarded the faith of the Church! To effect his purpose the more certainly, he caused his bull of convocation to be read, wherein, in order to establish the legitimacy of his own pontificate, he claimed that the Council of Constance was but a continuation of that of Pisa, and then announced, through one of his cardinals, that the council would be expected to direct its attention especially to some prevalent errors of doctrine, and "pre—eminently to those which were originated by Wycliffe," knowing that Huss had been accused of maintaining them. He succeeded in part of his plan, that is, in inciting the persecution of Huss, but not in escaping the doom which he himself so richly merited. (Gillett, vol. i., p. 342.)

Huss, when summoned before the council, was told that he had been charged with disseminating "errors of the gravest kind" in Bohemia, but they were not specifically stated. He was only notified that they were "manifestly opposed to the Catholic Church." To this indefinite accusation he replied, like an honest man, "If any one can convince me of any error, I will unhesitatingly abjure it." (*Ibid.*, p. 345.) Specific articles of accusation were, however, afterward drawn up against him, by which it was charged, 1st, that he rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation; 2d, with maintaining that a priest in mortal sin cannot administer the sacraments; 3d, that by the Church is not to be understood the pope, clergy, or members of the hierarchy; 4th, that the endowment of the Church by secular princes is unwise; 5th, that all priests are equal, and it is false that bishops alone have the right to consecrate and ordain; 6th, that the entire Church has no power of the keys, when the whole clergy is in gross sin; and, 7th, that he had contemned his excommunication by saying mass everyday on his journey to Constance. (*Ibid.*, p. 347.)

He was immediately arrested and held in custody as a prisoner, to answer this indictment. His place of imprisonment was a nauseous and unhealthy apartment, "through which every sort of impurity was

discharged into the lake”—of Constance. When the emperor, who had not yet arrived, heard of this, he sent forward ambassadors to demand the release of Huss, but he was not discharged. On account of his sickness, occasioned by the foul air he was compelled to breathe in his filthy and poisonous dungeon, he was at last removed to more healthy apartments. This is said to have been done by the pope, “lest Huss should die in prison, and the cause of orthodoxy lose the incense of a burning heretic.” (*Ibid.*, p. 357.) His failing health admonished him of the necessity of having an advocate to defend him, and he asked that one might be appointed. But this was refused; and he was told “that, according to the canon law, no one could be allowed to take the part or plead the cause of a man suspected of heresy;” an act of tyranny worthy only of the most heartless despotism.

Weak and feeble as he was, however, his defense of himself was a masterly exhibition of his great powers of mind, and of his unflinching courage. But it was of no avail. All sorts of evidence were admitted against him; everything he said was tortured into heresy; and, after a mock trial of a few days, he was pronounced by this great ecumenical council to be guilty not of any crime, but of *daring to think!* He had ventured to say that immoral priests could not administer the sacraments, and this was considered by a majority of the council as an impeachment of themselves. He had endeavored to lower the pride and diminish the authority of the pope and hierarchy, and had thus brought himself under the ban of these corrupt officials. Of course he was convicted—that had been predetermined—for no victim could be furnished so likely as Huss to satisfy the world of the orthodoxy of the council and the pope!

There was but a single mode of escape for this intrepid champion of free thought; that was, to admit the errors charged against him, and to retract them. Unconscious of error, he could not in his conscience admit it; and therefore he had nothing to retract. He appealed to reason and the enlightened judgment of the council; but that body refused him the right to address himself to any motive higher than that which grew out of its own selfish and partisan passions, and demanded unconditional submission. It would allow no debate, no inquiry; every one of its assumptions had to be accepted as infallibly true. Huss, then, when he demanded to be heard in defense of his own opinions, was the representative of the free spirit of the present age—the champion of that intellectual and moral freedom upon which the central column of Protestantism is now resting. How much fairer and nobler a place does he occupy in history than the infamous pope whose victim he became, or any of those members of the council who aided in producing his conviction! Their names are scarcely known except to the readers of history, while his is lisped by almost every schoolboy throughout Christendom.

Jerome met the same fate. He and Huss were burned at the stake—martyrs in the cause of truth and freedom. Neither of them exhibited the slightest fear of death. No quivering muscle displayed the cowardice of conscious guilt. They were heroes in the highest sense, and left behind them influences which were not long in producing fruits, not expected by their persecutors, but which laid the foundation for some of the grandest results in history.

To pretend that the Roman Catholic Church is not guilty of the death of Huss and Jerome, as the papists do, is worse than idle. The Council of Constance was its highest authority. It represented the entire Church, and in this capacity tried, convicted, and turned them over to the secular authorities for execution. After their conviction, and before they were removed from the council chamber, paper

crowns were placed upon their heads. These were covered with “pictured fiends” with flames around them, to signify that they were devoted to death by burning. (Gillett, vol. ii., pp. 65, 255.)

When this was placed upon the head of Huss, his persecutors exclaimed, “We devote thy soul to the devils in hell,” which was more the language of a fiend than of a Christian. The council knew what the result of the conviction would be. The Church at that time shaped the domestic policy of the nations, in so far as it concerned the Church or dealt with heresy. Wherever there was an emperor or king who refused to enact laws against heretics consistently with the decree of persecution enacted by the Fourth Lateran Council, he was cursed and excommunicated, and his subjects were released from their allegiance. Hence the law under which Huss and Jerome were executed was the result of that obedience which the nations then paid to the Church, which the Church required of them, and for the failure or refusal to pay which it visited its severest punishments upon them. The blood, therefore, of these murdered Christians is still crying out against the hierarchy of the Church, and will not be washed away until they learn to exchange their persecuting intolerance for the mild and forbearing teachings of the Gospel.

Soon after the vengeance of the Council of Constance had spent itself in the flames which consumed the bodies of Huss and Jerome, avengers begun to spring up on every side to proclaim anew the truths uttered by them, and more especially to assert the right to challenge the oppressions and usurpations of imperialism. The contest became one between reason and authority—between the papacy, wielding all the power of the Church in maintaining its demand for absolute and uninquiring submission, and in denying to its followers free access to the Scriptures, and the right of free inquiry into the truths of religion, philosophy, and science.

In order ignobly to maintain its authority, and thus to perpetuate the existing corruptions, every artifice was employed. Bulls of excommunication and ecclesiastical interdicts—employed far more frequently in reference to secular than spiritual affairs—were the common resort of the popes, who, forgetting that God still reigned over the world, impiously claimed that they could open or close the gates of heaven and hell at their pleasure, and could withdraw the thunder and the lightning from the sky to scathe and blast the opponents of their ignominious and debasing vices. What wonder is there, then, that these avengers arose *within* the Church, when they remembered how much it had done to Christianize and civilize the world, and how much of apostolic purity there was yet retained in its cherished faith? They saw clearly that the struggle involved the life of Christianity and the dearest hopes of the Christian world; and the inspiriting thought that they were the champions of such a cause gave them a courage and heroism which the world will never cease to admire. The oceans of blood which papal imperialism caused to be shed throughout the beautiful plains and valleys of Europe have not been sufficient to wash from the pages of history the bright record of their virtues and their courage. The flames could consume their bodies, but other flames were enkindled which could not be extinguished; and from out of these flashed forth the light of truth.

The Bohemians were very much attached to Huss and Jerome, and their cruel murder produced intense excitement among them. The King of Bohemia observing, one day, a nobleman, named John Zisca, deeply wrapped in thought, inquired of him what he was thinking about; when he replied: “I was thinking on the affront offered to our kingdom by the death of John Huss.” The king replied: “It is out

of your power or mine to revenge it, but if you know which way to do it, exert yourself.” (“Church History,” by Fry, London, 1824, p. 261.)

And he did exert himself in such a way as to bring down terrible revenge upon the heads of the persecutors. With the assistance of Nicholas de Hussinetz, he raised an army of forty thousand men, and a war immediately ensued between the emperor, as the representative of papal imperialism, and the Bohemians, which lasted for thirteen years. Inhuman cruelties were practiced on both sides, and the termination of the struggle was marked by a concession to the Bohemians which they considered of the utmost importance in maintaining their faith and mode of religious worship. This was the allowance to their laity of the use of the cup in the sacrament, which the Romanists had denied to them, *because it gave too much importance to the common people*. The introduction of this concession in the treaty of peace was, to some extent, the recognition of the fact that the laity were not a mere *canaille* (riffraff); and it resulted, ultimately, in bringing about a union between the Waldenses and the Hussites, and in giving new impetus to the cause of the Moravian Christians. And although the Hussites were banished from Moravia some time afterward, they had two hundred congregations in Bohemia and Moravia at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Martin V. was elected pope by the Council of Constance, and having finally succeeded, after much difficulty, in getting rid of his rivals, was also anxious to get rid of the council—for, like other popes, he desired to govern alone. He was afraid to break it up, and endeavored to keep in its favor by continuing to execute the Hussites, making for that purpose “a magnificent *auto-da-fe* (public execution)!” Unable to accomplish his wish in this way, he announced his intention of leaving Constance, but was opposed in this by the emperor, who desired to have the relations between them satisfactorily arranged. Martin, dreading the possibility of being cited to a new council, in case of disagreement with the emperor, thought to put an end to the proceedings by resort to a pontifical bull, wherein he maintained that “a pope was the absolute judge of his own actions, in all circumstances, and that he could *annul the promises he had previously made!*” (Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 111.) And he adopted this principle in practice.

He endeavored to establish the papal rule over the cities of Genoa, Venice, Florence, and Naples, which had freed themselves from the tyranny of the popes. He found the husband of Joanna, Queen of Naples, driven out in consequence of his cruelties; and, taking advantage of the existing disorders, he offered the crown to Louis of Anjou, on condition of his assisting him to re-acquire the papal possessions, thus claiming the divine right to dispose of crowns and kingdoms. Joanna, to defeat this, obtained assistance from Alphonso, King of Arragon; and as the pope’s army was upon the eve of being defeated, the wily pope had recourse to the cunning expedient of making another agreement with Alphonso, to the effect that if he would dethrone Joanna, he would obtain the renunciation of Louis of Anjou, and give the crown to him. Alphonso consented, and seized the government of Naples, requiring an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants. Joanna fled, and Alphonso became master of Naples. He called on the pope for the fulfillment of his promise, by deposing Joanna and conferring the title of king upon him. But as the pope, when he made the promise, had not the slightest idea of complying with it, he replied, very deliberately, that “*he had never intended to fulfill the promises he had made him!*” (*Ibid.*, p. 113.) that the crown of right belonged to Louis, who had bought the investiture of it from Popes Alexander V. and John XXIII.; and that, besides, he would not aid a prince who had given shelter to a rival pope, as

Alphonso had done to Benedict XIII. His solemn promise did not weigh with him the weight of a feather.

Alphonso determined to avenge the insult, and Martin V., seeing that he was likely to do it effectually, sent to him a legate to sue for peace. But Alphonso, having learned his perfidy and hypocrisy sufficiently, declined any intercourse with the legate, and published an edict forbidding the reception of any of the pope's bulls in Spain. This was purely a temporal matter, yet the pope issued a bull against the King of Arragon declaring him an enemy of religion, a supporter of schism, and as such deprived him of his dignity and kingdom; not, it will be observed, for any sin against God and the Church, but for daring to rebuke him, an infallible pope, for his perfidy and want of truth.

The pope now gathered an army of Italian, French, German, and English soldiers, and sent them into Bohemia, under the command of one of his cardinals, to exterminate all who embraced the doctrines of Huss. The Bohemians were not easily overcome, and drove the papal troops out of their country. But the pope, although thus defeated, was gratified that he had succeeded in stirring up a civil war in Germany, from which he hoped great gains to the papal cause. Therefore he wrote to his defeated legate:

“You will immediately recruit new troops to recommence hostilities, and to wash out, in the blood of the Hussites, the opprobrium with which your name is covered. Let no consideration arrest you; spare neither money nor men. Believe that we are acting for religion, and that God has no more agreeable holocaust than the blood of his enemies! Strike with the sword, and when your arm cannot reach the guilty, employ poison, burn all the towns of Bohemia, that fire may purify this accursed land; transform the country into arid steppes, and let the dead bodies of the heretics hang from the trees in greater number than the leaves of the forest.” (Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 115, 116.)

Benedict XIII. having died, and Clement VIII. having resigned his claims to the pontificate, Martin V. became the sole possessor of the tiara, in 1429, thus ending the great Western schism, which had for more than fifty years enabled the chief actors to exhibit themselves as “ambitious, avaricious, vindictive, debauched, and cruel; solely occupied with duping men, and changing the holy water into a stream of gold.” This gave to Martin V. more leisure to prosecute his war of extermination of the Hussites; and we have still further insight into the character of this war, and the policy of this infallible pope, by the following letter, addressed by him to the King of Poland, endeavoring to procure his aid in bringing back the Bohemians to the true faith:

“Know that the interests of the Holy See, and those of your crown, make it a duty *to exterminate the Hussites*. Remember that these impious persons dare proclaim principles of equality; they maintain that all Christians are brethren, and that God has not given to privileged men the right of ruling the nations; they hold that Christ came on earth to abolish slavery; they call the people to liberty, that is, to the annihilation of kings and priests. While there is still time, then, turn your forces against Bohemia; *burn, massacre, make deserts everywhere, for nothing could be more agreeable to God, or more useful to the cause of kings, than the extermination of the Hussites.*” (Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 116, 117.)

Martin V. did not live long enough, after issuing this bloody edict, to witness its desolating effect upon the Bohemians. The gallant Hussites, invigorated by the consciousness that they were defending an inalienable right which God had given them, rallied, like true soldiers, to the defense of their principles

and their homes, and cut the papal army to pieces, driving it back in dismay and disgrace. At their hands liberty won another triumph over imperialism, and the cause of free conscience was, under the protecting providence of God, still preserved. The shock which the pope sustained when this sad news reached the Vatican was too great for him. Finding himself thus defied, and with an army routed and dispirited, he was seized with a fit of apoplexy, and died, disappointed in his hopes, and despised by all except those who were united with him in the effort to keep the people in degradation and perpetuate the reign of papal and imperial absolutism. But he lived long enough to show the world that the canon of the Fourth Lateran Council, which commanded the extermination of heresy by force, was still the law of the Church, and that from it the papacy derived the leading and governing principle of its action. With a view to the enforcement of this law, he proclaimed his infallibility, that he might the more readily grasp sufficient temporal power to unsheath the swords of princes, and send forth their armies, with torch and fagot, to murder, to destroy, and to desolate some of the fairest portions of Europe. What impious blasphemy it is to say that God was on the side of the fiendish and infernal work prescribed by this pope for the defenders of papal sovereignty!

But the healing of the schism to which the pontificate of Martin V. led did not put an end to the corruptions of popes, prelates, or priests. God seems to have permitted these to continue during the remainder of the fifteenth century, and into the sixteenth, in order that the Christian world might realize how far the papacy had departed from the teachings and practices of the apostolic age, and be prepared for the ushering—in of the Protestant Reformation. Notwithstanding that torrents of blood were shed, and the fires of the terrible Inquisition were kindled, and gibbets and scaffolds were erected wherever the papacy had power, God did not design that the world should be longer ruled by depraved popes and priests; and, therefore, by the consummation of that great event, he marked out for it new roads to happiness and prosperity, and to Christianity fresh triumphs in more peaceful fields. And thousands who had before felt the crushing weight of papal oppression, and groaned under the burden, enlisted under the banner of religious freedom, which has been borne onward and upward, through terrible trials, until at last it floats in front of the Vatican at Rome, despite the curses and anathemas of Pope Pius IX., who, that it might again be trailed in the dust before him, invites another crusade, revives the canon of the Lateran Council, and gnashes his teeth in desperate rage, because there is no king upon any throne to do his bidding, and because mankind will not tamely submit to the pressure of his heel upon their necks.

By the proclamation of his sovereignty, his infallibility, and his omnipotence, he leaves no room to doubt that he desires to turn the Christian world back from its progressive advancement into the terrible condition from which the Reformation raised it, and by the substitution of terror, hatred, and intolerance, for love, charity, and toleration, to will again universal supremacy for the papacy. To do this, he would enslave all peoples who will not obey him, destroy all governments wherein the people have power, abrogate every law in conflict with papal enactments, restore the universal reign of kings, and establish a Holy Empire, with ecclesiastical supremacy, upon the ruins of all popular government.

Chapter XVIII. Resistance to Civil Power

Adrian IV and the grant of Ireland to England.—Ireland brought within the jurisdiction of Rome in the twelfth century.—Enlargement of the papal power.—Secular power administered by commission from the Pope.—Gregory VII and Innocent III.—The Fourth Lateran Council establishes the faith that institutions prejudicial to the Church should not be observed.—Papal doctrine in regard to oaths. Urban VI, Eugenius IV, and Innocent III.—Nature of the oath exacted by Innocent III from King John.—Subjects all governments to the Pope.—Effect in the United States.—Constitutional oath of allegiance.—Its obligation.—The papal theory on that subject.—Oaths opposed to the welfare of the Church not binding.—Unlawful oaths not binding.—What are lawful, and what are unlawful.—The papal principle applied to the government of the United States.—The papal argument by Balmes. Resistance to civil power usurped.—When it is usurped.—When legal, and when illegal.—Governments *de jure* and *de facto*.—Obedience to the last not obligatory.—May be recognized from prudential motives.—Government of the United States is *de facto*.—The monarchies of Europe, when obedient to the Pope, are *de jure*.—The doctrine of consummated facts denied.—Illegitimate authority cannot become legitimate by time.—Rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar's only requires obedience to legitimate governments.—Legitimate governments are only such as are based on the law of God.—That of the United States is not legitimate.

The dignity and power acquired by the Roman Church by means of the exercise of its spiritual jurisdiction, however great, was not sufficient to answer the ends and gratify the ambition of the medieval popes. The frequent efforts of the Italian people to establish republican institutions, which were often attended with the expulsion of the popes from Rome, were not intended as a denial of that jurisdiction, in the proper sense, but as the means of limiting it to its own ecclesiastical sphere.

But the popes were not satisfied with this. With them, republicanism was synonymous with heresy, which they resolved to uproot with all the power necessary to that end. They denied, totally, the right of any people to make the laws or mold the institutions under which they were to live. Therefore, when Arnold of Brescia preached at Rome against their temporal power, and in favor of a republican form of government, the people were so incensed against Adrian IV that they drove him out of the city. And when he was afterward restored to his see by the army of Frederick Barbarossa—who delivered Arnold to him, in consideration of his coronation as emperor—he consigned his patriotic victim to death at the stake and held the Roman people in subjugation by force.*

* "History of Germany," by Menzel, Bohn's ed., vol. i., p. 459; "*History of Germany*," by Lewis, p. 189; "*Medieval Kings*," by Busk, vol. i., p. 358; "*Temporal Power of the Papacy*," by Legge, p. 49.

Thus, also, we find this same pope authorizing the like subjugation of Ireland by the English king, and consigning its peaceful and Christian people to the merciless cruelties of Henry II., upon the ground that it was a portion of "the patrimony of St. Peter and the Holy Roman Church;" and this, too, notwithstanding the Irish Church had grown up independently of Rome; had derived its faith from the canons of St. Patrick, and not from those of the Roman Church; had appointed and consecrated its own bishops and priests; had held its own synods; and had received the pallium from the pope only three years before the commencement of Adrian's pontificate. *

The pallium is an ecclesiastical vestment in the Catholic Church, originally peculiar to the pope, but for many centuries bestowed by the Holy See upon metropolitans and primates as a symbol of their conferred jurisdictional authorities, and still remains a papal emblem. – From Wikipedia



Pallium

* The pallium is the universal “symbol of ecclesiastical union and dependence,” the “insignia of investiture,” by which alone the pope imparts “a portion of his own primatial authority.”—*Universal Church History*, by Alzog, p. 693, and note (3) by American translators. Malachy, the Irish Archbishop of Armagh, solicited the pallium, for the first time, from Innocent II., but he refused it. It was afterward granted by one of his successors, and was carried to Ireland, in 1151, by his legate—so that the union of the Irish Church with that of Rome was nearly a hundred years after the conquest of England by the Normans, and nearly seven hundred years after the death of St. Patrick. The transfer of Ireland to England was the first jurisdictional act of the pope, after the ecclesiastical investiture which followed the granting of the pallium; and it was done under such circumstances as to authorize the conclusion that it arose from a combination between Henry II., the pope, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, his primate in England, that the pallium should be granted for the express purpose of bringing the country under the papal jurisdiction, in order to give—according to the prevailing belief—the divine sanction to the subjugation of the Irish people, and the exaction from them of tithes for the support of the popes and the maintenance of their royalty.—*History of Ireland*, by M. F. Cusack, Nun of Kenmare, pp. 231, 232; *Norman Conquest*, by Thierry, vol. ii., pp. 143, 189; *History of England*, by Hume, Harper & Brother’s ed., vol. i., p. 329; *History of England*, by Rapin, vol. iii., pp. 50-54; *Latin Christianity*, by Milman, vol. iv., p. 264; *Eccl. Hist.*, by Jones, London ed., vol. ii., pp. 70, 71, citing M. Paris’s history, p. 67; *History of England*, by Lingard, vol. li., pp. 89, 90.

The idea that all this enormous and comprehensive power was derived from the pretended donation of Constantine was fast becoming obsolete, for the reason that if that were its only foundation, it would be circumscribed within too narrow limits. To enlarge rather than curtail it was what the popes of that age

specially sought for. Hence they maintained the more steadily the idea of their own personal infallibility, in order by means of it to engraft upon the faith of the Church the doctrine that their temporal power was derived from Christ through Peter; and therefore, having that origin, was not confined to the Papal States, but extended to the entire world, and subjected all nations and peoples to their dominion, within the domain of morals no less than that of faith. This domain was considered as almost without limitation, or, at all events, as broad enough to include, not only the entire conduct of individuals in their public and private intercourse, but all such secular action of nations as involved questions of public or private morality. Thus, monarchs were to hold their crowns and exercise their royalty at the will of the reigning pope; nations were to execute only such laws as he considered in conformity to the divine law, and to abrogate those which were not so; and he was to intervene between them and their citizens at his own discretion, and release them from their allegiance, and turn over their territorial possessions to the dominion of those who would obey his commands and execute his will. "Secular power was only to be tolerated, as secular princes avowedly exercised it, by commission from the pope." (Legge, p. 50.)

This doctrine had continued to grow and strengthen from the time when Gregory VII., the great Hildebrand, had excommunicated and deposed Henry IV., Emperor of Germany, and released all his subjects from their allegiance to him. Each of the succeeding pontiffs of the eleventh and twelfth centuries had avowed it whenever they could safely venture to do so. But it remained for Innocent III., one of the leading and ruling spirits of the age, to make it a part of religious faith, by ingrafting it, by virtue of his infallibility, upon the dogmas of the Church. His towering and unsatisfied ambition stimulated him to use it as the means of making himself "the general arbiter of differences and conservator of the peace throughout Christendom." ("Middle Ages," by Hallam, Harper & Brothers' ed., chli. vii., p. 287.)

His proud spirit chafed at the thought that any earthly potentate should equal him either in greatness or authority. Therefore he required that "all disputes between princes" should be referred to him; and if either party should refuse "to obey the sentence of Rome, he was to be excommunicated and deposed," and a like penalty was to be visited upon those who refused to attack whatsoever "refractory delinquent" he should point out. (*Ibid.*)

Forfeitures, interdicts, excommunications, and every other form of ecclesiastical censure and punishment, were of almost daily occurrence. Even such monarchs as Philip Augustus and Henry IV. quailed before him, and Peter II. of Arragon and John of England—as we have seen—ignominiously consented to convert their kingdoms into spiritual fiefs, and to hold them in subordination to him, upon the condition of paying an annual tribute. By virtue of the claim of infallibility, the power of arbitrary papal dispensation was carried to its extremest limit, even to the assertion and exercise of the right to infringe the canons of the Church. "Innocent III. laid down as a maxim, that out of the plenitude of his power he might lawfully dispense with the law;" (*Ibid.*, p. 293.) and caused the Fourth General Lateran Council to insert among its canons one which provided "that the constitutions of princes which are prejudicial to the rights of the Church shall not be observed;" *—thus establishing this as a fixed principle of the canon law, and, consequently, as a part of the religious faith of the Church.

* "Eccl. Hist.," by Du Pin, vol. xi., p. 100. This is the same council referred to in a former chapter, by one of the canons of which it was provided that heretics should be extirpated, and that whenever, upon proper notice, any prince

should fail or refuse to do so, his dominions should be forfeited to the pope, who should turn them over to some one who would perform that duty.—See Du Pin, vol. xi., p. 96.

It did not take long to carry this doctrine of dispensation to the extent of applying it to the observance of oaths, and to find in the Decretals this provision: “That an oath disadvantageous to the Church is not binding; and that one extorted by force was of slight obligation, and might be annulled by ecclesiastical authority.” *

* “Juramentum contra utilitatem ecclesiam praestitum non tenet.” Hallam, p.293 and note; “Church History,” p.201, by Fry, London. It has undoubtedly become the settled law of the Roman Church that the pope may dispense with any promissory oath by withdrawing the promise or prohibiting its performance. The doctrine is thus laid down by an author greatly distinguished in the Church for his learning. In answering the objection that the obligation of an oath is of natural and divine right, and therefore that it cannot cease to be binding through dispensation, commutation, or veto, he says: The consequence is denied, because through dispensation, etc., it is brought about, that that which was included under the oath, by withdrawing, prohibiting, etc., is not included under the oath, and so there is nothing done contrary to the oath. (“Neg. cons. quia per dispensationem, etc., efficitur, ‘ut id, quod sub juramento cadebat, sub juramento non cadat subtrahendo, prohibendo, etc., et ita non fit aliquid contra juramentum.’—S. Th. 2, 2, q. 89, a. 9, ad. 1.”)—*Theologia Moralis et Dogmatica*, by Peter Dens, Dublin ed., 1832, vol. iv., No. 177, p. 216. The same author goes one step farther, and says: “And then in every oath there is this condition: ‘the right of the superior is reserved.’” (“Deinde omni juramento inest haec conditio: ‘salvo jure superioris.’”)—*Ibid*.

Instances are numerous to show the effect of these teachings upon the lives and conduct of the popes, and Mr. Hallam gives two memorable ones by way of illustration—that of Urban VI., who promulgated a solemn and general declaration against keeping faith with heretics; and that of Eugenius IV., who, acting upon this principle, annulled compacts with the Hussites by releasing those who had sworn to them, and made the King of Hungary break his treaty with Amurath II., absolving him from his promise “on the express ground that a treaty disadvantageous to the Church ought not to be kept.” (Hallam, p. 293 (note), citing Sismondi, t. ix., p. 196, and Rymer, t. vii., p. 352.)

These instances are dwarfed before the more flagrant exercise of the same power by Innocent III. in the advancement of his schemes of temporal policy. At the very beginning of his pontificate he required the Roman prefect to take the oath of allegiance to himself, when it was his duty to take it to the emperor, from the obligation of which duty he released him. He asserted the right to punish offenses against the civil law, and “to interpose with his judgment and annul the decisions of the civil tribunal.” He reminded the inhabitants of the Tuscan States, who owed allegiance to the emperor, “that there were two great lights in the social heaven, having their seat in Italy, the lesser of which, the imperial authority, received its light from the greater, the Papal See.”

He fulminated against Otho, Emperor of Germany, a bull of excommunication; released his subjects from their allegiance to him, and stirred up a rebellion against him and in favor of Frederick, the youthful son of Henry VI.

As we have seen at another place, he released King John from the oath he had taken before the barons at Runnymede, to observe and enforce the salutary provisions of Magna Carta; and, concentrating, as it were, all his enormous claim of power in a single expressive thought, he proudly announced the

maxim, that “the pope, in virtue of the plenitude of his power, might dispense even with rights.” (Legge, pp. 53-56.)

The very nature of the oath exacted by Innocent III. of King John shows the inordinate ambition of the one and the pusillanimity of the other. Lingard says, “He swore that he would be faithful to God, to the blessed Peter, to the Roman Church, to Pope Innocent, and to Innocent’s rightful successors.” (Lingard, vol. ii., p. 165.) This oath was extorted by the papal interdict, which closed all the churches in England and left the dead to go unburied, and by the terrible thunder of excommunication. It placed the English king at the feet of the pope, and the entire destiny of the English people in his hands, to be disposed of, not as their wants and interests demanded, but as the wants and interests of the papacy and the welfare of the Roman Church required. What wonder, then, that, at the very beginning of the Reformation in England, an earnest protest was made against this absorption by the pope of all the civil power of the Government, and this plotting to destroy the last vestige of popular authority. This protest might have been heard in the mutterings of discontent among the body of the people; but it was unavailing, except as the measures already narrated grew gradually out of it.

Wycliffe, a hundred years after the papal conquest of England, and two hundred years before Luther, maintained, in the face of all the powerful and persecuting prelates in the kingdom, that the nation had forfeited her dearest rights by so long consenting that the crown should be held as a fief of the See of Rome; and that the king could properly and rightfully administer the government, even though, at the same time, he refused any tribute to the Pope of Rome. Pointing out the life and example of Christ, who was “unwilling to become a ruler in civil matters,” and did not teach his disciples to seek after civil dominion—he declared, “Therefore it behooves us to require that the pope should be observant of his religious obligations after this pattern. It is clear,” said he, “that we are bound to resist him in the exaction of a condition which call not be proper to him, as being purely civil.” (“Day of Rest,” London, vol iii., part v., p. 238.)

Wherein does the difference consist between the claim of papal power and prerogatives in the time of Wycliffe and the present? The infallibility of the pope means now just what it did then, with whatsoever has been done and said by all the popes and in all the centuries since superadded, as the means of overcoming the increased power of resistance among the people of the advancing and progressive nations. The doctrine runs back to the remotest times so as to include every assertion of pontifical power made by any of the popes from the beginning, and concentrates it all in the present. If any single pope, by virtue of “the primacy of St. Peter,” struck nations out of existence, dethroned monarchs, released subjects from their oaths of allegiance, appointed rulers for the people without their consent, extirpated heretics by fire and sword, dispensed the obligation of the most solemn oaths on the part of others, and violated their own, then may the present or any future pope do any or all of these things infallibly, whensoever it shall seem to him that the interests of the Roman Church require it. There is no word in any language more comprehensive than the word *infallibility*. It embraces everything in the past, the present, and the future. Even while its earthly possessor remains in the world, it elevates him above the world, and makes him a co-partner with God in the exercise of divine power.

Keeping these things in mind, we shall be the better enabled to apply the doctrines of the papacy to the condition of things in our own country, and to understand what the present pope expects and requires of

those citizens who recognize him as a “*domestic prince*” within the territorial limits of the United States. We have nothing to do, now, with the question how far and how many of these citizens will render obedience to any demands he shall make: it is but just to assume that multitudes of them will not, when they may be pressed to the extremity of impairing any of the fundamental principles of the Government. But we have directly and immediately to do with the papal doctrines he is now so assiduously laboring to re-establish, so that we may fully comprehend them, in all their length and breadth, and understand wherein, if successfully established, they will assail the integrity of our institutions.

The people of the United States, appreciating the advantages and distinctive features of their Government, have wisely and unselfishly provided a mode by which those born in other countries may enjoy, to a like extent with themselves, all these advantages. They have provided by their naturalization laws that an alien may become a citizen; and, in return for this valuable privilege, have required of him only that he shall take an oath of allegiance to the Government, whereby he shall swear that he “doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever.” Such an invitation to citizenship in a free government, extended to those who have felt the burden and pressure of absolutism, commends itself to the admiration of mankind. It stamped our Government, from the beginning, with a degree of liberality hitherto unknown among the nations.

That oaths of allegiance are sometimes taken by those who regard them as mere form, and as having no binding obligation upon their consciences, is unquestionably true. There are very few who have not realized the truth of this, in their own experience and observation. But it is equally true that a large majority of those who become naturalized citizens of the United States become so with a full and proper appreciation of the binding nature of the allegiance they assume, and with the determination to discharge, faithfully and honestly, all the obligations which attach to their new relations. Innumerable considerations combine thus to influence them, apart from the mere integrity of personal motive and conduct. Chief among these is the fact that, by coming here, they have sought to escape the consequences of monarchical rule, and to better their condition by enjoying the protection of civil institutions which recognize the people, and not a monarch, as the authors of the law; and where they, by also becoming law—makers, may increase the sense of their own personal dignity and importance in society, and thus elevate themselves and their posterity. It is altogether natural that, after obtaining privileges of so much personal and social importance, they should be unwilling to forfeit or lose them by any act of their own.

But, while this is readily and cheerfully conceded to the bulk of our naturalized citizens, the fact cannot and should not be disguised that there are some among them whose minds are impressed, or liable to be impressed, with the belief that, although they have improved their condition by coming to this country, it may be yet further improved by the establishment of an independent ecclesiastical hierarchy, with authority to subordinate the Government to such laws and regulations as they, under the direction and dictation of the pope, shall consider necessary to bring the people under subjection to the Roman Catholic Church. Their liability to this impression is the result of their education, which is called religious, because it is received alone from priests, acting as officers of their Church. One of the first principles taught them is the belief that as the laws of God are higher than the laws of man, and the

eternal welfare of their souls of more importance than all secular and temporal things, therefore the State must obey the Church, and not be permitted to enact or enforce any law which the Roman Catholic Church, or the pope, as its infallible head, shall consider inconsistent with the divine law, the faith of the Church, or good morals.

Under the influence of this teaching, it is difficult for them to realize the wisdom and virtues exhibited by our fathers in resorting to revolution to throw off the authority of the British crown, and substituting for it the authority of the people. They have a sort of undefined idea that the people should be permitted to make the laws by which they are to be governed; and this idea, which arises naturally in all minds, might be developed into positive belief in theirs, and probably would be, if it were not that the faith and teachings of their Church, as interpreted and explained to them by their priests, forbid it. For fear that they may be influenced by it, they are held under the strictest surveillance by these priests, who employ every opportunity to remind them that they owe higher allegiance and duty to the Church than to the State, and must obey the pope at every and any cost, even though, by doing so, all human governments and laws should be destroyed. They are required to believe that this obedience to the pope is obedience to God, because God has placed the pope above all human governments and laws, with power, as his only infallible representative on earth, to require and command obedience to all his decrees upon matters of faith and morals. And the utmost precaution is observed by the papal hierarchy to exclude such impressions as would naturally arise in their minds from the contemplation and enjoyment of our liberal institutions, and especially from their participation in the management of public affairs.

In this their vigilance is extreme, and exhibits itself most strikingly in prohibiting them from permitting their children to mingle with ours in our common schools, because they are provided by the State; and because, in order that they may comprehend and understand the structure of the Government, the pupils are taught that the people are the primary source of all our laws, and not the pope or the Church, and that every citizen of the United States is bound to pay obedience to them; the pope, the Church, and all the kings and princes of the earth to the contrary notwithstanding.

Few things are so wonderful as the readiness with which many of the Roman Catholic part of our population, especially among those who are naturalized, accept these teachings and act upon them; while, at the same time, they are unwilling to admit, or are too ignorant to realize, their inevitable tendency—which is, that they are training and educating their children in the belief that our Government is altogether wrong in separating Church and State; that our fathers were wrong in resorting to revolution to get rid of monarchy; that it is wrong for the people to make their own laws; and that the only form of government upon which the blessing of God can rest is that wherein the Church shall govern the State, and the pope the Church. They fail to see that, by these means, they are aiding in the erection of a “State within the State,” whose authority will be sufficient, if its exercise be permitted, to regulate the Government and society by its laws, and to compel obedience to them by force, whenever it shall become necessary to resort to it. They fail also to see that this state of things cannot exist so long as our form of government shall stand, and that those who require them to aid in producing it would not hesitate to sacrifice the Government itself if by that means they could establish their hierarchical system.

And, since such is the position in which many of our Roman Catholic population stand, it is in every possible sense important that the country should realize to what point their present subserviency to the

papal hierarchy may by possibility lead them, unless something be done to counteract its influence. In order to do this intelligently, it is necessary to understand how far their oath of allegiance is considered by the Roman Catholic hierarchy as standing in the way of their complete obedience and submission to the pope, whenever he shall consider that the interest of the Church requires any change in our plan of government, or disobedience to any of our laws.

The obligation of an oath is understood to arise out of the law authorizing it. Although it binds the conscience, in a moral sense, in whatever form it may be taken, yet if not taken pursuant to law its violation does not amount to perjury. An invalid law is universally held as no law at all, although it may possess the ordinary forms. Hence, if an oath is required by a law which is null and void, on account of its violation of constitutional or fundamental principles, no legal consequences attach to its violation—the violator being left to settle the matter with his own conscience. Hence, also, if our naturalization laws require allegiance to institutions which oppose the fundamental principles of Christianity as maintained by the papacy, and are therefore, in the opinion of the pope, invalid, the papal hierarchy readily infer that the violation of this allegiance would involve no crime whatever, but, on the contrary, would arise out of the obligation of duty to God and the Church. And hence, again, if this violation be merely a matter of conscience, and the pope possesses the power—as standing in the place of God—to dispense with all merely conscientious obligations, then a dispensation from him would place all Roman Catholic violators of the oath of allegiance right before God and the Church. To comprehend properly the results which might ensue from this mode of reasoning, it is necessary to inquire into the doctrines and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church in relation to oaths—their nature and obligation.

The reader will remember the reference heretofore to a controversy carried on, some years ago, between the Right Rev. John England, Roman Catholic Bishop of Charleston, South Carolina, and the Rev. Richard Fuller, a Baptist minister of Beaufort, in the same State. * Being afterward published in book form, under the auspices of Bishop England, it is proper to assume that what he has there said is a just and fair exposition of the doctrines of his Church.

* Ante. This book, entitled “Concerning the Roman Chancery,” etc., was published in 1840, by Fielding Lucas, Jun., of Baltimore, and by John P. Beale, Charleston.

A book was published as late as 1874, at Rome, with the special endorsement of Beckk, the General of the Jesuits, and with the approbation of the Propaganda Fide, and therefore of the pope, wherein the obligation of a promissory oath is thus stated: ” Nunquam obligatur juramento, qui rem malam juravit; imo dupliciter peccat, si juramentum adimpleat, nempe contra religionem, et virtutem, cui opponitur materia juramenti.—S. Lig., n. 176.” TRANSLATION: One is never bound by an oath who has sworn to do an evil thing, for he sins doubly if he shall perform his oath against religion and virtue, to which the substance of the oath is opposed.— *Theologia Moralis*, P. Joannis Petii Gury, S. J., Rome ed., vol. i., p. 310.

Among other accusations made against this Church by Mr. Fuller, this was a prominent one, which could not fail to arrest public attention and excite inquiry: that the Third Lateran Council, held in 1179, made not only falsehood, but perjury, a virtue when practiced in behalf of the Church. So grave a charge as this greatly excited Bishop England, and drove him, after some ingenious equivocation, to an explanation of the doctrines which had been established by his Church. He endeavored at first to parry, with true hierarchical adroitness, the home-thrusts of Mr. Fuller; but the latter was too able and learned

a disputant to allow this, and the bishop was at last driven to a degree of particularity which, in all probability, he did not contemplate at the beginning of the controversy. His language should command the most serious attention. He said:

“Among Catholics, sir, perjury is the violation of a lawful oath, *or the taking of an unlawful one*. Thus, if we swear to declare the truth, and do not declare it, it would be perjury; and should a man attempt to bind me by the form of an oath to declare a falsehood, I would be guilty of perjury, in going through the form to tell a lie, but I am *obliged to go against the words by which I appeared to be bound*, because it is no oath, but a perjury. An oath cannot be a bond of iniquity. A conspirator who has sworn with his fellows to commit robbery or murder is not bound by his oath. In fact, it is no oath; to be an oath it must have three qualities, viz., truth, judgment, and justice: *the defect of either renders it no oath*.” (“Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery,” p. 157.)

Here the distinctive principle is announced that an *unlawful oath* cannot be taken without perjury; but if taken, he who takes it must go against it, because it is no oath in the opinion of the Roman Catholic Church. With this as his postulate, Bishop England proceeds to explain what the direct action of this Church has been upon this important subject. He quotes Canon XVI. of the Third Lateran Council, which he calls “the legislature of the Church,” wherein this sentence is found:

“For they are not to be called oaths, but rather perjuries, which are in *opposition to the welfare of the Church and the enactments of the holy fathers*.” *

* “Non enim dicenda sunt juramenta, sed potius perjuria, que contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam et sanctorum patrum veniunt instituta.”—*ibid.*, p. 158.

Then, addressing himself directly to Mr. Fuller, the bishop defends these principles as follows:

“I need not inform you that the first obligation of every citizen is the law of God; the second is the constitution of his State; and as no form of oath could bind him to the violation of the divine law, so, *except the constitution of his State should conflict with the divine law*, no form of oath could bind him to violate that constitution; and should there be such a conflict, he is bound to the State in every other point save that in which the conflict exists: and his *exemption in this instance* arises from that sound maxim of legal interpretation that where two laws are in irreconcilable conflict, *that of the first or highest authority must prevail*. These are the principles which I have been taught from Roman Catholic authors, by Roman Catholic professors; they are the principles which I find recognized in all enactments and interpretations of councils in the Roman Catholic Church, from the council at Jerusalem, held by the apostles, down to the present day.” (“Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery,” pp. 162, 163.)

To make the matter so clear that no room for misapprehension should exist, he quotes from chapter xix. of the Roman Catholic catechism the following questions and answers:

“Q. What else is commanded by the second commandment?

“A. To keep our lawful oaths and vows.

“Q. What is forbidden by this commandment?

“A. All false, rash, unjust, and unnecessary oaths; also cursing, swearing, blaspheming, and profane words (Matt. v., 34; James v., 12).

“Q. Is it ever lawful to swear?

“A. It is: when God’s honor, our own or our neighbor’s good, or necessary defense, requires it.

“Q. What do you mean by an unjust oath?

“A. An oath injurious to God, to ourselves, or to our neighbor.

“Q. Is a person obliged to keep an unjust oath?

“A. No; he sinned in taking it, and would sin also in keeping it.

“Q. Is a person obliged to keep a lawful oath?

“A. Yes; and it would be perjury to break it.

“Q. What is perjury?

“A. The breaking of a lawful oath, or the taking of an unlawful one.

“Q. Is perjury a great crime?

“A. It is a most grievous one.” (“Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery,” pp. 190, 191.)

And then, summing up his argument and putting the doctrine in the most compact form, he says:

“My argument, sir, would have been more fairly put in this way: Man’s first duty is to observe the divine law; but the divine law requires that an oath shall bind when it is taken in truth, in judgment, and in justice, and that it shall not bind when either of these conditions is wanted. *The divine law is paramount to every other law, constitution, tribunal, or authority.* Therefore, no law, constitution, tribunal, or authority can allow a man to swear falsely, to swear in support of injustice, or to swear rashly, or injudiciously, or profanely. No tribunal, civil or ecclesiastical, can do what God himself could not do!—he cannot do what is incompatible with his divine attributes: the sanctioning of perjury would be incompatible therewith, and therefore no tribunal could sanction it.” *

* *Ibid.*, pp. 194, 195. This argument is found, as set forth in the text, in all Roman Catholic publications on the subject; but the manner in which Bishop England makes it is preferred on account of the authority which his name and office carry with them.

The language here employed by this distinguished prelate has the merit of simplicity and frankness, and it requires no critical analysis to understand its meaning. It lays down the following propositions as settled and established by the Roman Catholic Church:

1. An *unlawful* oath cannot be taken without perjury.
2. He who takes an unlawful oath is not obliged to observe it, but should go against it.
3. An oath cannot be a bond of iniquity; that is, in opposition to the divine law.

4. To be a binding oath it must have the three qualities of truth, judgment, and justice; the absence of either renders it no oath.
5. They are not oaths, but perjuries, which are *in opposition to the welfare of the Church, and the enactments of the holy fathers*.
6. The *first* obligation of every citizen is the law of God; the second is the Constitution of his State.
7. The obligation of a citizen to the constitution of his State is *only* binding when it does not conflict with the divine law.
8. The obligation of a citizen to the constitution of his state is *not binding* when it does conflict with the divine law.
9. The divine law is of higher authority than the law of the State, and must always prevail when they come in conflict.
10. A person is not obliged to keep an *unjust* oath; he sinned in taking it, and would sin also in keeping it.
11. An oath is not binding when it lacks the element of either justice, judgment, or truth.
12. No law, constitution, tribunal, or authority can bind a man to act unjustly; God cannot even do it.

From this recapitulation it will be seen that in order to determine upon the binding obligation of an oath, it is necessary, in any given case, to understand its character. If it is unlawful, it is not binding. To this, as an abstract proposition, there may be no special objection; but the difficulty lies in agreeing upon what is lawful and what unlawful. Let us give the doctrine a practical application as it is understood by those whose minds are trained in papal polemics.

Having separated the Church from the State, and made the latter entirely independent of the former, we have provided in our National Constitution that it and all the laws passed pursuant to it are “the supreme law of the land,” binding alike upon all citizens. In order, therefore, to decide whether the oath of naturalization is or is not lawful, we look to the Constitution and the powers it confers upon Congress as the legislative department of the Government. By that instrument it is provided that Congress shall have power “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization”—thus leaving, in the legal or common mind, no sort of doubt about the legality of the oath of naturalization under our laws. Hence, in view of our Constitution and laws, such an oath is both lawful and of binding obligation. But, according to Bishop England, the Roman Catholic Church does not reason in this way. It goes behind the Constitution in order to inquire whether it violates the divine law or not; whether it is just or unjust; whether or not it is in opposition to the welfare of the Church and the enactments of the holy fathers; whether it is consistent, or inconsistent, with truth; and if it finds the Constitution lacking in any of these essential elements, whatever oath it shall authorize, looking to any of these ends, or in any way bearing upon them, is unlawful, and not binding. Recognizing no other form of government as consistent with the divine law, except that which keeps the State and the Church united, it, of course, measures all laws by the standard of the divine law, and regards as invalid and not binding all such as do not come up to that standard. It receives the divine law from itself—that is, from the pope as God’s only infallible representative upon earth; and whatsoever constitution or law shall be found opposed to

its welfare is unlawful, and must not be obeyed. It searches the enactments of the holy fathers for precedents by which to decide upon the character of all existing institutions; and whatsoever they shall not sanction and approve must fall before its supreme authority. Let us apply these principles and rules more particularly to the subject in hand—our naturalization laws.

The oath of allegiance implies, necessarily, the obligation to support the Government and maintain its principles. In direct and express terms, it requires the support of the Constitution as the fundamental law; and the oath, in this form, is taken by every naturalized citizen. How does the Roman Catholic Church, with the pope as its expounder of the divine law, look at this oath? Taking up the Constitution, it finds the following principles of government distinctly and emphatically set forth: the separation of Church and State, and the Church subordinated to the State, and required to obey its laws; the people made the source of all laws and of all political authority; the prohibition of any law respecting an establishment of religion, or interfering with the free exercise thereof; and the freedom of speech and of the press fully secured. How does it regard these provisions? In every form in which it can authoritatively speak, and especially through the mouths of a multitude of its most illustrious popes, it has declared that the divine law requires the Church and the State to be united, and the State to be subordinated to the Church, being required to obey its commands as the only mode of obeying God; that the people are incapable of self—government, and that it must declare what laws they shall, and what they shall not, obey; that the law of God commands “an establishment of religion,” with the pope at its head, with sufficient power and authority to govern the world; that Christ established the Roman Catholic Church, and founded it upon the apostle Peter, making all other forms of religious belief heretical and sinful; and, therefore, that the “free exercise” of religious belief is violative of the divine law; and that the freedom of speech and of the press are “in opposition to the welfare of the Church,” and tend to irreligion and infidelity, by giving license to free discussion, by inviting the exercise of individual reason and judgment in the formation of religious faith, and by stimulating the people to revolution, which is against the law of God, because violative of the “divine right of kings” to govern mankind. Looking upon the foregoing provisions of the Constitution of the United States in the light of these authoritative teachings, the Roman Catholic Church must, of necessity, regard each one of them as opposed to the divine law, the welfare of the Church, and the teachings of the holy fathers: such is the logical result of its mode of reasoning.

Hence, the Constitution of the United States, in so far as these principles are involved, is not binding upon the conscience of any who adhere to those doctrines of that Church which are dictated by the papacy. Hence, also, an oath to support these principles of the Constitution is perjury, and no oath at all, because it enjoins disobedience to the divine law. Hence, again, our naturalization oath is not binding upon the supporter of papal infallibility, because it obliges him to support principles which are opposed to the teachings of the pope and the Church, and which he is commanded to resist as the only mode of securing the favor of God. And, still further, it is the inevitable consequence of these papal doctrines—as announced by Bishop England, and involved in the recent dogma of papal infallibility—that not only these principles of our Constitution, but all other constitutions and laws which the pope shall declare to be in opposition to the law of God, “the welfare of the Church, and the enactments of the holy fathers,” must be resisted by all who hope for the approbation of the Church, and expect salvation in the world to come; thus making all human institutions dependent upon the will of a single man—upon whomsoever shall, for the time being, be the “King of Rome!”

It is altogether probable that Bishop England did not foresee the ultimate tendency of the doctrine he defended with so much learning and ability; for at the time of his controversy with Mr. Fuller, the doctrine of papal infallibility was not recognized as a part of the faith of the Roman Catholic Church, and its hierarchy in the United States had not become sufficiently bold to avow their support of it, or openly to assume, as they now do, a defense of the principles and enormities of the Jesuits or ultramontanes of Europe. They were “biding their time”—waiting for the accumulation of such strength as would afford some promise of ultimate victory, and therefore spoke upon all the delicate subjects touching the papal power and prerogatives with suppressed voice and “bated breath.”

But there were observant eyes in Europe constantly watching the progress of events in the United States; for it has become almost a proverb that Jesuitism never sleeps. Those who possessed a vision keen enough to see that the American hierarchy were well versed in the law of obedience, served a valuable purpose to the pope by influencing him to advance his claims and pretensions, so as to educate the whole Roman Catholic world up to the position it now occupies.

Books setting forth these claims and pretensions, some covertly, others openly, multiplied in every direction. Among the authors of these none won more distinction than the Rev. J. Balmez, a Roman Catholic priest of Spain, who was the author of a work which exhibits great power, learning, and erudition, by which he designed to show that the world is far more indebted to “Catholicity,” as he calls it, than to Protestantism for its present advanced civilization. This work, originally in Spanish, was soon translated into French, and then into English, so that a large circulation should be secured for it. It was published in the United States by the Roman Catholic publishing houses, and was commended in the highest terms by the authorities of the Church. In the preface to the American edition the author is spoken of as one who “has supplied the age with a work which is peculiarly adapted to its wants, and which must command a general attention in the United States.” The Roman Catholic is especially referred to it as furnishing reasons why he should “admire still more the glorious character of the faith which he professes;” and the Protestant is kindly informed that it “will open his eyes to the incompatibility of his principles with the happiness of mankind.” *

* “Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmez, p. v. of Preface to the American edition. Published by John Murphy & Co., Baltimore, and by George Quigley, Pittsburgh, 1851. It is worthy of note that Archbishop Bayley, of Baltimore, who has deemed an effort to break the force of Mr. Gladstone’s late pamphlet necessary in this country, as Archbishop Manning did in England, has referred to this author as uttering authoritatively the true doctrines of the Church. In his letter of November 17th, 1874—published in most of the leading papers—he says: “When I find time I will write to you more at length, and recommend to you certain works to read which will show you more fully how little our theologians or political writers, like De Maistre, or De Bonald, or Balmez, have entertained any of the nonsense which Mr. Gladstone falsely attributes to us.”

This book was written in order to counteract the “pernicious influence exerted among his countrymen by Guizot’s lectures on European civilization.” (*Ibid.*, p. ix.) But there were special objects designed to be accomplished by it, which were very distinctly and emphatically avowed. It is said, for example, that the pope “is the best guide of men in the path of liberty and progress,” and that the present pontiff, Pius IX., “shows a profound knowledge of the evils which afflict society.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity

compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, p. xi.) It was manifestly intended to aid in laying the groundwork upon which the structure of papal infallibility was to be erected.

In a work so highly commended as this is to American readers, one would scarcely expect to find a labored effort to prove that the oath of allegiance to our Government, taken by a Roman Catholic, amounts to nothing, and has no binding obligation, *when the welfare of the Roman Catholic Church requires it to be disregarded*. But those who prepared it for publication here understood perfectly well the character of the persons into whose hands it would mostly fall, and that their minds were easily impressed by anything, however extravagant or preposterous, put forth authoritatively in behalf of their Church. And they did not miscalculate, as we may infer from the fact that in the United States the dogma of infallibility has been accepted with greater unanimity and more readily than in any other country in the world—a fact which renders an exposition of the teachings of this book, and others like it, not only interesting and instructive, but of more than ordinary importance, as well as significance.

This author has a chapter upon “Resistance to the Civil Power,” in which, after the necessary preliminary discussion, he begs his readers to “bear in mind the general principles at all times inculcated by Catholicity, viz., the obligation of obeying legitimate authority.” (*Ibid.*, ch. liv., p. 325.) In order to make the desired application of this principle, and to explain what he means by legitimate authority, he puts and answers a most pertinent question, as follows: “In the first place, *Are we to obey the civil power when it commands something that is evil in itself? No, we are not*; for the simple reason that what is evil in itself is forbidden by God: now, we must obey God rather than man.” (*Ibid.*, p. 326.)

He does not stop here to explain what is and what is not evil, but proceeds as follows: “In the second place, *Are we to obey the civil power when it interferes in matters not included in the circle of its faculties? No*; for with regard to these matters it is not a power.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. liv., p. 326.)

In order that there may be no misapprehension of his meaning, he then points out the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual power, and insists upon the independence of the latter with respect to the former. In his view, the Church must be left by the State perfectly free to act for itself, in all matters within the spiritual jurisdiction. It must in no sense be subject to the laws of the State, because that would impair its freedom. And whenever the State undertakes to subject the Church to its laws, it passes beyond “the circle of its faculties.” He then continues:

“Ever since the foundation of the Church, this principle of the independence of the spiritual power has at all times served, by the mere fact of its existence, to remind men that the rights of the civil power are limited; that there are things beyond its province—cases in which a man may say, and ought to say, *I will not obey*.” (*Ibid.*)

Satisfied with his argument to maintain and enforce these propositions—and it undoubtedly displays great ingenuity and ability—he reverts to his original question, and repeats what he had already said, but in more expressive terms, thus: “It remains, then, established that we are to be subject to the civil power so long as it does not go beyond its proper limits; but that the Catholic doctrine never enjoins obedience when the civil power oversteps the limits of its faculties.” (*Ibid.*, p. 328.)

He adopts the general and commonly accepted definition of unjust laws, such as are against the common welfare, public policy, etc., in regard to which nobody would enter into controversy with him. But he goes beyond this, and finds other laws equally unjust, because of their opposition to the divine law. He says: "Laws may also be unjust in another point of view, when they are contrary to the will of God; as the laws of tyrants enforcing idolatry, or anything else contrary to the divine law. With respect to such laws, it is not allowable under any circumstances to obey them; for, as it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, 'We must obey God rather than man.'" ("Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe," by Balmes, ch. liv., p. 328.)

Having thus established his premises, he lays down, as the logical result of the doctrines maintained by the Roman Catholic Church, these rules: "1. We cannot, under any circumstances, obey the civil power when its commands are opposed to the divine law. 2. When laws are unjust, they are not binding in conscience. 3. It may become necessary to obey these laws from motives of prudence, that is, in order to avoid scandal and commotions." (*Ibid.*)

These are the principles upon which he is rejoiced to know that "the admirable institution of European monarchy was founded;" principles which he thinks it the duty of the Roman Catholic Church to maintain throughout the world, because, as he says, they constitute "the moral defenses by which that monarchy is surrounded." He thinks the minds of men are already sufficiently "wearied with foolish declamations against the tyranny of kings," and would bring back to these salutary principles all such governments as have departed from them. (*Ibid.*, p. 330.)

These principles are the same, substantially, with those laid down by Bishop England, and, if applied in this country, would test all our civil institutions by their conformity to the divine law. We have established our Government upon the theory that God recognizes the personality of each individual, and will deal with him accordingly. Therefore the conscience of every man is left free, that he may maintain whatsoever religious belief it shall approve. Necessarily, in order to establish and preserve this great principle, every individual and all Church organizations are required to obey the laws of the State. The spiritual power is not made independent of the temporal, but, in so far as the authority to enact the necessary laws for the public good is concerned, the temporal power is made independent of the spiritual. In all else the spiritual power is left unimpaired; that is, it is left independent within its proper spiritual sphere.

But according to the papal doctrine, as announced by this distinguished author, this places our Government in the condition of having transcended the proper "limits of its faculties," of having violated the divine law, and of requiring certain obligations of obedience from every citizen which cannot be yielded by those who obey the papacy without disobedience of the fundamental principles of their Church organization. He insists that the Government shall be arraigned at the bar of the papacy, where it shall be judged by the divine law; that the pope alone, as God's vicegerent, is the only proper and infallible interpreter of that law, and that whatsoever principle of the Government he shall declare to be unjust or heretical shall have no binding obligation upon the conscience of any Roman Catholic.

Already the present pope has declared that, in order that a government shall conform to the divine law, the State and the Church must be so united that the State shall obey the Church; that the ecclesiastical or hierarchical body must govern itself by its own laws, and not be governed by, or answerable to, the

laws of the State, even for crime; that there must be but one form of religion, and that the religion of Rome; that all other forms of religion except that of Rome, including the Protestantism of the United States, are heretical, and ought to be annihilated; that freedom of speech and of the press and of conscience are all inconsistent with the “divine right of kings” to govern, and, therefore, should not be tolerated or allowed; that the present “progress” of the nations, which we attribute greatly to the influence of our example, must be arrested, and the world turned back to the medieval times; that he must be recognized as the only just and infallible expounder of the Word of God, and as incapable of error in all matters of faith and morals; that all mankind must obey him, in faith and morals, because he stands upon earth in the place of God; and that the Church, whose tremendous power is concentrated in his hands, may employ *force* whenever he shall deem it necessary to exact obedience as the means of reaching these results.

All these things are openly and distinctly avowed in his Encyclical and Syllabus; are set forth in books, pamphlets, newspapers, and tracts of immense circulation; and are foreshadowed by the persistent movements of the Roman Catholic hierarchy all over the world. And it requires but an ordinary amount of intelligence to see that if the time should ever come when these principles shall obtain the ascendancy in the United States, it must be, necessarily, at the expense of the fundamental and most cherished principles of our Government, the very principles whose protection the Roman Catholic emigrants from Europe professedly desired to secure when they abandoned their citizenship among the effete monarchies of the Old World and hopefully acquired it in the New.

But, in order to demonstrate the legitimate use of the right of resistance to civil authority, this Jesuit author explains the “Catholic doctrines” in relation to *de facto* governments, that is, governments existing by what he calls a “consummated act,” whether of revolution or otherwise, and in the actual possession of all necessary power. That these doctrines may be comprehended, it is necessary to keep in mind that, according to the teachings of Rome, governments *de facto* are those which have been established by the people upon the overthrow of the kingly authority—which is considered the only legitimate authority. Governments *de jure* are such as are based upon the law of God, with kings at their head, who shall obey the pope as the highest authority upon earth. In this view, all Roman Catholic monarchies are governments *de jure*, and therefore legitimate; while all popular republics are governments *de facto*, and therefore illegitimate. Kings must always rule; *the people*, never.

Hence, the old Roman Catholic monarchy of Spain, overthrown a few years ago, was a government *de jure*, to which implicit and passive obedience was due. Hence, also, the Government of the United States is a government *de facto*, because it was the offspring of revolution, and was substituted in place of a monarchy. And hence, again, the latter is an illegitimate government, borne with by the papal hierarchy for a while, only “from motives of prudence,” but subject to resistance and overthrow, to make room for a government *de jure*, or a legitimate government, whenever the interest and welfare of the papacy shall require it, and the result can be made certain. It is wonderful how surely all Roman Catholic authors and publicists who adopt the Jesuit or ultramontane views argue within such circles as bring them inevitably to these conclusions. This author shows that they are the only logical deductions from their mode of reasoning.

Asking the question, How far do “Catholic doctrines” extend on the subject of resistance to the civil power “by physical force?” he proceeds at once to combat and deny the proposition that “obedience is

due to a government from the very fact of its existence.” This he calls unsound doctrine, “which is contrary to right reason, and has never been taught by Catholicity.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. lv., p. 330.)

Whenever, according to him, the Roman Catholic Church speaks of obedience “to the powers that be,” it has reference to “powers that have a legitimate existence.” Why? Because, says he, “the absurdity that a simple fact can create right can never become a dogma of Catholicity;” (*Ibid.*) that is, the papacy asserts the right to go behind the fact that a government exists, and inquire whether it is or is not legitimate; whether, in other words, it is *de facto* (existing in actuality, especially when contrary to or not established by law.) or *de jure*; (according to law) and if it is found to be *de facto* merely, it may be resisted, because otherwise it would be the concession to an illegitimate government of “a right to command,” which would be to legitimize usurpation. (*Ibid.*) Therefore he argues “that no reasonable man can seriously accept” such a doctrine as that “of consummated facts” as applied to governments. Yet, remembering what he had just said about not resisting existing governments “from motives of prudence,” he continues:

“I do not deny that there are cases in which obedience, even to an illegitimate government, is to be recommended; when, for instance, we foresee that resistance would be useless, that it would only lead to new disorders, and to a greater effusion of blood: but in recommending prudence to the people, let us not disguise it under false doctrines—let us beware of calming the exasperation of misfortune by circulating errors subversive of all governments, of all society.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. lv., p. 331.)

It is a favorite idea with all the supporters of the papacy—most persistently maintained—that whenever society gets from under the influence and control of the Roman Catholic Church, it necessarily runs into heresy, infidelity, anarchy, and all that sort of thing. They repudiate everything like middle or conservative ground, and seem to be utterly unconscious of their intolerant and partisan excesses, as well as of the fact that it is only the progressive influence of Protestantism which has lifted the nations out of the darkness and superstition into which they were sunk during the Middle Ages. We ought not to be surprised, therefore, at finding this recognized and authoritative propagator of “Catholic doctrines” falling into this error, and talking about the subversion of all governments and of all society, whenever they refuse obedience to the pope and his hierarchy.

The standard he sets up recognizes only Roman Catholic governments and society!—for from them alone does he suppose all human advancement and prosperity to spring. All else is evil—and that continually. Yet he prudently recommends that this evil, terrible as it is in its consequences both in this life and that which is to come, be endured, wherever “resistance would be useless,” because such resistance would be but “the exasperation of misfortune.” Still, however, this “prudence” must not be practiced at the expense of truth—it must not be disguised “under false doctrines”—but the true “Catholic doctrines” should be proclaimed, so that the power shall be preserved by the papacy to upturn and destroy all illegitimate governments whenever resistance can be successfully resorted to, and establish legitimate governments in their places! This was the real design of the publication of this book in Europe in two languages; a design manifestly sympathized with, if not openly avowed, by its American publishers, when they professed to regard it as having “supplied the age with a work which is

peculiarly adapted to its wants.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, Preface to American edition, p. v.)

He finds no difficulty in arguing out of the way the Scriptural teaching that the civil authority must be obeyed: this merely furnishing him a field for the display of Jesuit ingenuity. “Illegitimate authority,” says he, “is no authority at all;” because “power involves the idea of right,” and where no right exists, there is only force. Therefore, he argues, “when the Scriptures prescribe obedience to the authorities, it is the *lawful* authorities that are implied.” (*Ibid.*, ch. lv., p. 332.)

Again, the kind of civil power to which the Scriptures enjoin obedience upon us is that “ordained by God himself,” that which “is the minister of God himself,” which a usurped and illegitimate government can never be, and which none but a Roman Catholic government can be! And, again, the obedience to the civil power prescribed by the Scriptures is the same as that prescribed “to the slave in relation to his master;” it exists only where there is a “legitimate dominion.” If the slave is unjustly held in servitude, he may rebel against the authority of his master; but if justly held, he may not. So, if the civil authorities be not lawful—that is, “ordained by God himself”—as the pope shall declare his law—no obedience to them is required, except that “which prudence would dictate;” and they must, therefore, be endured as a “misfortune” until resistance can be made successful! Whatever process of reasoning he adopts, he reaches always the same conclusion. He keeps always within his prescribed circle; but, whether it be large or small, he never fails to terminate at the point most prominently before him, and most indelibly fixed upon his mind—the illegitimacy of all governments not based upon the divine law—meaning, of course, the divine law as the infallible pope shall declare it!

Conscious of the opposition to these “Catholic doctrines” of the practice of the early Christians, who always submitted to the ruling authority of the Government without concerning themselves about the temporal power, he endeavors to point out the “futility” of their position, by insisting upon a distinction between the state of things existing then and that existing in our day. In these early centuries, according to him, “all that upright men could do was quietly to resign themselves to the calamitous circumstances of the times, and by fervent prayer to implore the Almighty to take compassion on mankind.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. lv., p. 332.)

But now, since the number of Christians has increased so that they have become a controlling power in the world; since they have, in many instances, overturned governments, and may do so again whenever circumstances make it prudent to attempt it, he admonishes the faithful adherents of the papal cause to husband their resources, and submit prudently, for a while, to illegitimate rule; but, in the mean time, to prepare to strike when the proper hour shall arrive! He cautions them, first, to be sure that the government at which they strike is illegitimate—a question which now, since the dogma of infallibility, belongs to the pope alone to decide. Then, second, they should have in view the substitution of a lawful power, which, of course, the pope also decides. And, third, they “should count besides on the probability of the success of their enterprise;” a matter which involves prudential considerations alone. In the absence of “these conditions,” there would be “no object” accomplished; it would be “a mere fruitless attempt, an impotent revenge;” it would only cause “bloodshed,” only incense and “irritate the power attacked,” and have no other result than “to increase oppression and tyranny.” (*Ibid.*, ch. lv., p. 332.)

An Archbishop of Palmyra had published a work upon the Church Militant, in which he maintained that when Christ commanded his followers to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,” he meant “that the mere fact of a government’s existence is sufficient for enforcing the obedience of the subjects to it;” that is, he established the doctrine “of consummated facts.” But this he calls a “fallacy,” and declares that this work of the archbishop “was forbidden at Rome” by the “Sacred Congregation!” a decree, he says, in which “every man who is jealous of his rights”—that is, all the defenders of papal infallibility—will acquiesce. (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. lv., p. 333.)

Keeping in mind his prudential argument, and suggesting that “the interference of Christians in political disputes” would only bring their holy religion into disrepute, in the event that they should fail of success, he surmounts the difficulty arising out of “consummated facts” by repeating his argument that they must be legally consummated before the obligation of obedience can arise out of them. And then, by way of a practical application of these “Catholic doctrines,” he continues:

“Hence, in a political and social sense, we designate consummated facts a *usurpation*, completely overthrowing the legitimate power, and by means of which the usurper is already substituted in its place; a measure executed in all its points. Such is the suppression of the regular clergy in Spain, and the confiscation of their property to the treasury; a revolution which has been triumphant, and which has entirely disposed of a country, as was the case with our *American* possessions.” (*Ibid.*, ch. lv., p. 334.)

This is the culmination of this distinguished author’s theory—of the “Catholic doctrines” of which he is the able and eloquent expounder. It reaches the point to which everything is now pressed by the defenders of papal infallibility—that is, to the point of revolution. Recognizing no other form of government except the monarchical as consistent with the divine law, Pope Pius IX. and his hierarchy do not hesitate to declare, in the face of the world’s progress, that every other form of government is revolutionary and usurpation. Therefore these “Catholic doctrines” are put forth by one of the most eloquent men in the Church, to show that all revolutionary governments are *unlawful*, and that although prudence may dictate obedience to them for a season, yet that, as they confer no *right* whatever, they may be destroyed, and *lawful* governments erected in their places whenever it can be done without the infliction of too much harm upon the attacking party! And therefore, in order that the prudential submission to a revolutionary government for the present may not be disguised “under false doctrines,” the teachings of this author are translated into English, published in the United States, and circulated among our Roman Catholic population, avowedly upon the ground that they are “peculiarly adapted” to the wants of the present age!

The Government of the United States had its origin in revolution. Our fathers cut with the sword the cord which had bound the American colonies to one of the monarchies of Europe. Believing their cause to be just, they appealed to God for the protection of his providence, and we believe that they won their success under that protection. They snatched liberty—civil and religious—from those princes of the Old World who had managed to keep their feet upon the necks of all who desired to enjoy it, and thus elevated the inhabitants of this country to a condition of prosperity and happiness which has no parallel in all the ages of the past. They built up a government which secures, in a higher degree than any other government on earth, all the rights and immunities of citizenship. They recognized the common

brotherhood of man, and opened their arms to the oppressed, persecuted, and down-trodden of the world, inviting them to come and share with them the blessings of free and popular institutions. Millions of them, who were the slaves of political and ecclesiastical tyranny in the countries of their birth, are now in this country, and have already experienced the improvement of their condition—have acquired a new and more invigorating manhood. Of these there are thousands who love our Government with fervid intensity—who have defended its honor and its flag when they have been attacked, and are ready to do so again, to the very death, if necessary.

But there are others—no matter whether they may be counted by hundreds or thousands—who accept, with seeming acquiescence, the idea that they shall subordinate their patriotism to the Government to their devotion to the papacy; and who appear content to be recognized as maintaining, with their hierarchy, that the Church is higher and more potent than the State—even within the constitutional domain of the State. They are invited, by the most earnest and pathetic appeals, to love the Church first, the State second, and then only as the Church shall decree; and to merge their responsibility to the laws in their responsibility to the pope.

The laws of this country do not interfere with the religion of any of these; nor can they do so. They leave each individual conscience free, so that the citizen shall act upon his own responsibility to God. All our Protestant institutions assume that each of us may enjoy a pure Christian faith without ingrafting upon it any of the principles of civil polity which are confided to the State. They will not allow the State to invade the rightful jurisdiction of the Church, and declare what the faith shall be; nor will they submit to any impairment of the legitimate functions of the State by the Church. The line which separates these jurisdictions cannot be obliterated without marring the beauty of the one and assailing the integrity of the other. The Church and State must be kept apart—each in its own proper sphere.

Therefore, our Roman Catholic fellow—citizens, for themselves as well as Protestants, have the deepest interest in having these questions properly and satisfactorily solved: What is the design of those hierarchs who claim to be their sole and exclusive teachers, no less in the domain of social and political morality than in that of religious faith? Are they endeavoring to extend their spiritual jurisdiction beyond the limits fixed by our laws, and to trench upon the civil jurisdiction as marked out and defined? Does the pope claim for himself a jurisdiction over them, as citizens, superior to and above that of the State? Does he or not recognize as a legitimate fact our separation of Church and State? Does he expect of them to resist those principles of our Government which he shall declare to be contrary to God's law, or against the welfare and interest of the Church? Does he demand of them, by virtue of his asserted infallibility, to enlarge the circle of their religious faith, so as to include within it any of the essential principles of our civil polity? Does he require them, as any part of their religion, to test their obedience to our laws by their conformity to the Constitution, or to his will? Which does he command them to obey, the civil laws of the State or the canon laws of the Church, in case of conflict between them? Which allegiance does he consider the highest, that which they owe to the Government of the United States, or that which they owe to the ecclesiastical government constructed by the Roman pontiffs?

In so far as the pope is concerned, every intelligent man who has taken the trouble to investigate understands the answers to all these questions. In so far as they are concerned, the time has come when they can no longer defer to answer them for themselves.

Chapter XIX. The Claimed Rights of the Papacy Over Governments

The Rights of the Papacy not lost by Revolution.—No Legitimate Right acquired by it.—Revolutions always Iniquitous.—Christopher Columbus.—He takes Possession of the New World in the Name of the Church of Rome.—He thereby expands its Domain.—The Popes claim Jurisdiction in Consequence.—Illegitimate Power obtained by Revolution cannot destroy this Right of Jurisdiction.—Exercise of the Power in England by Alexander II., and in Germany by Gregory VII.—Defense of Gregory VII.—Direct and Indirect Power.—Doctrine asserted by Peter Dens. Bellarmine the Author of the Theory of Indirect Power.—Doctrine of St. Thomas.—That of Cardinal D'Ostia.—Infidels can have no Just Title to Governments.—The Pope may dispose of Them.—Gregory III., Stephen II., and Leo III. all justified.—Also Gregory VII., Innocent III., Adrian IV., and Boniface VIII.—The Late Lateran Council makes them all In fallible.—They claim the Direct Power.—The Doctrine of Indirect Power an After—thought in Answer to the Objection of Protestants.—The Papal Jurisdiction in America the Same under Either.—Alexander VI. divides America between Spain and Portugal.—Resumption of this Authority defended by Jesuits.—Obedience to Governments *de facto* not enjoined by the Church of Rome.—Effect of this Doctrine upon the Oath of Allegiance.—Doctrine of “Mental Restrictions,” and “Ambiguity and Equivocation” in Oaths.—Jesuit Teachings on this Subject.—The Object of the Second Council of Baltimore to introduce the Canon Law.—What it is.—Its Effect if introduced in the United States.—Punishment of Heretics.—Extirpation of Infidelity.—Heretics rightfully punished with Death.—All Baptized Protestants are Subjects of the Pope.—May all be rightfully punished for Disobedience.

THE author of “Protestantism and Catholicity Compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe” must be followed still further, in order that the full import of his teachings may be understood. His eminent ability, and his distinction as an expositor of the true faith in so far as it involves the dealings of the papacy with the nations, give an unusual degree of prominence and importance to what he says.

Assuming, as his premise, that the “American possessions” of Spain were separated from the mother country by “usurpation,” and that thereby illegitimate was substituted for legitimate authority, he reaches the next step in his argument, as a logical conclusion: that the new government thus formed can impose no absolute obligation of allegiance—it may be submitted to as a measure of prudence, but not obeyed on the ground of right. Manifestly he had a twofold meaning: first, to assert the existing right of Spain to retake possession of such portions of America as she had lost by revolution; and, second, the right of the papacy, also subsisting, to re-assert and maintain the spiritual jurisdiction and authority it once exercised in America. The application of this doctrine designed by him is readily seen.

Mexico sundered her allegiance from Spain, as the United States did theirs from Great Britain. In both cases new governments were established and became “consummated facts”—so recognized by other governments. But, in his view, these new governments became “usurpations” by the fact that they were the result of illegitimate, or revolutionary, resistance to legitimate authority. To such governments he does not consider any obedience due, as of right; because, says he, a government which has “abolished legitimate rights cannot justify its acts by the simple fact of its having sufficient strength to execute these *iniquities*.” (Balmes, p. 334.)

Therefore, according to the “Catholic doctrines” as announced by him, the rights of Spain and Great Britain in America are in no way legitimately impaired by consummated acts of revolutionary resistance; but remain intact—as complete and perfect as they were before the revolutions began. Therefore, also, Mexico belongs, rightfully and legitimately, to the old Spanish monarchy, under its old

de jure form of government, and the United States to Great Britain; subject, of course, in both cases, to the papal claim of primacy and superior right, recognized by both countries when they had the legitimate right to do so. Neither Mexico nor the United States has acquired any legitimate and valid right, as against the legitimate authority they defied, or as against the papacy, rightfully acknowledged by that authority, by reason of the mere fact of having had “sufficient strength to execute” the *iniquitous* purpose of establishing revolutionary governments. Hence, he reasons that, as the original obligation of obedience to the old monarchies—the only form of government which he considers as known to the divine law—has not been impaired by “these iniquities” or “consummated facts,” and cannot be impaired by the substitution of new and illegitimate allegiance for it, the papacy, as the representative and divinely appointed guardian of the monarchical power, has the legitimate right to sweep out of existence, whenever it shall become *prudent* to attempt it, everything that shall stand in the way of this original and primary obedience. And hence, also, the oath of allegiance to the United States, with those who accept thy doctrine of papal infallibility, has no other than a temporary binding force, because, being illegitimate and unjust, it is perjury, and no oath at all!

Thus always reasons the papal monarchist, who invariably argues so as to make everything center in the proposition that the bulk of mankind are fit only to be governed—not to govern. He and the political monarchist start from this same stand-point. They do not differ in their process of reasoning, except in this: that the former never fails to concentrate everything in the papacy as the legitimate source of all power, because it is the only authorized interpreter of the divine law, to which all mankind must become subject; and is sufficiently comprehensive to include the temporal or civil power, as the greater includes the lesser.

Those who defend the claim of papal supremacy in this sense see, or pretend to see, in the discovery of America by Columbus, the act of God consummated only through the instrumentality of the Roman Church, specially chosen for that purpose. They have always considered this fact as having conferred jurisdiction upon the pope to govern the new continent in whatsoever concerns the faith and the divine law including, necessarily, in their view such direction of temporal affairs as is required to make them conform to that law. These ideas, somewhat remitted heretofore from necessity and prudence, have acquired additional strength from the dogma of papal infallibility. They are now avowed with great emphasis and vehemence by the ultramontane authorities at Rome, who are, seemingly, the more pertinacious in their advocacy in proportion to the resistance of them by the progressive nations.

A new life of Columbus has lately appeared. It was written in French by De Lorgues, but has been translated, and published in this country. Anyone who will carefully read this book will see that one design of it is the inculcation of the idea of papal supremacy in America. Speaking of the preparation of Columbus for his work of discovery, by penance, prayer, and the meditation of divine things, the author says:

“His expedition takes the religious character of its origin and object: he gives the name of the Blessed Virgin to his ship, and hoists the cross in her; he departs on a Friday, and commands the sails to be unfurled in the name of Jesus Christ.

“It is in the name of Jesus Christ that he takes possession of the lands he discovers. It is to honor the Redeemer that he erects crosses everywhere he lands.” (“Life of Christopher Columbus,” translated by Dr. Barry, p. 570.)

He is described, not only as the first who carried the cross to the New World, but as “the herald of Catholicity, and the tacit mandatory of the papacy.” (*Ibid.*, p. 571.) It is said that “he presents the Holy See with an opportunity, or occasion, of showing the spirit of *infallible sagacity* that perpetually inspires the Church, etc.” (*Ibid.*) Events are recited to establish for him “the character of apostolic legate, with which he showed himself invested in his acts and by his intentions.” (*Ibid.*, p. 573.) It is declared that “evidently God chose Christopher Columbus as a messenger of salvation.” (*Ibid.*)

And treating the discovery of America as a fact accomplished in accordance with the divine decree, it is said that by means of it he “enlarges the known surface of the earth, brings nations, as it were, nearer each other, and *expands the domain of the Catholic Church.*” (*Ibid.*, p. 590.) He is called a saint, even without canonization, because, as “a hero of the Gospel” and “a great servant of the Church,” the “messenger of the cross is found, as regards history,” in him. (“Life of Christopher Columbus,” translated by Dr. Barry, p. 596.) And, finally, in assigning the discovery to “the infallible wisdom of the Church,” he sums up by saying that “the history of Columbus contains the glorification of the Catholic Church; it shows the spirit of light which always guides the papacy in the government of intelligence;” (*Ibid.*, p. 616.) which assigns all the honor and glory of the discovery to the papacy alone, and treats the agency of Ferdinand and Isabella as merely secondary to it.

The papist who by this process of reasoning argues himself into the belief that this enlargement of “the domain of the Catholic Church” conferred higher jurisdiction upon the papacy than that acquired by Ferdinand and Isabella by virtue of the right of discovery and the law of nations, because the papal rights were divine, and the royal rights human only, has no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the pope obtained by means of it a degree of authority within the new “domain” which cannot be impaired by the employment of illegitimate power, or a resort to revolution and usurpation, which with him are convertible terms. Undoubtedly, the popes have thus reasoned in reference to the jurisdiction they acquired over all nations once submitting to their authority; and when this jurisdiction has been suspended or disturbed for a time by forces they could not resist, they have not hesitated to re-assert it when occasion offered, and to insist upon resuming it when these forces were overcome or withdrawn. They have maintained that neither time nor circumstances, of whatsoever nature, could operate in bar or limitation of their right, for the reason that it is derived from God; and that, therefore, everything in conflict with it is wrong and usurpation. They have never been known to abandon any jurisdiction, and the rights arising out of it, exercised by them over any nation, however remote may have been the period of its exercise.

In the case of Great Britain, for example, their theory supports, and in their view justifies, the claim that as Gregory I. introduced the Roman faith there, and the early Saxon kings became converts to it and submitted to the jurisdiction of the pope, and other kings did the same thing, especially John, who consented to hold the crown and country as a fief of the pope, therefore they acquired a spiritual supremacy there, which, whatsoever “consummated facts” may have since transpired, has lost none of its original validity or legitimacy. They do not acknowledge that the statute of limitations or any analogous principle of the law of nations can run against the papal rights over either nations or

individuals, because they have the stamp of the divine sanction. Their reasoning is based upon the ideas that Christ entrusted to them the keys, giving to them thereby the power to bind and loose in heaven and upon earth; that this power is necessarily plenary, and confers upon them the right of spiritual government over all nations and peoples brought under the influence of Christianity.

The extraordinary nature of this claim is not more startling than the manner of its exercise, whenever there have not been sufficient means of repelling it. Examples already referred to in a different connection, as illustrating other aspects of the papal question, bear directly on this point.

It was by virtue of this jurisdiction that Alexander II. blessed the banner of William the Conqueror, and gave him pontifical permission to dispossess Harold, the legitimate King of Great Britain, and occupy the country in the name of the papacy. In support of it, he and his successors sent an army of legates and Italian monks into the country, in order to extend the pontifical dominion, and, according to the historian, “they carved and clipped ecclesiastical matters as they pleased.” (Rapin.)

It was under the same claim of authority that Gregory VII. pronounced his anathemas against the Emperor Henry IV., and stirred up against him an insurrection in favor of Rudolph, without any regard to the wishes or desires of the German people. And the papists, not being disposed to attempt a direct justification of his enormous pretensions, in an age of so much enlightenment as the present, have resorted to various subterfuges to escape the consequences of his bold and defiant demands.

An effort has been made by a learned papal writer—which has the merit of great ability—to show that Gregory VII. “did not pretend to ground himself merely on the divine power of binding and loosing, but on the laws both of God and man.” (“The Power of the Pope in the Middle Ages,” by Gosselin, vol. ii., p. 106.) He does not by any means make this clear. On the contrary, his shifting of position merely suggests the impossibility of drawing the line, in ascertaining the extent of papal power, between the laws of God and those of man; for if the power is divine in any sense, it must be plenary, and not dependent upon human consent.

Bellarmino, with more ability, called it *indirect* power—distinguishing it from direct; the ground also taken by Cardinal Antonelli in his letter to the French ambassador, heretofore alluded to. (*Ante.*) What is meant by this, however, is that in the Papal States the power of the pope is direct, whereas outside their limits, and elsewhere throughout the world, it is indirect. But there is no difference in degree, it being the same wherever it exists. Thus we find it laid down by Peter Dens in these words:

“Bellarmino, Sylvius, and others say that the pope has not by divine right *direct* power over temporal kingdoms, but *indirect*; that is, when the spiritual power cannot be freely exercised, nor his object be attained by spiritual, then he may have resource to temporal means, according to St. Thomas, 22, q. 10, a. 12, et q. 12, a. 2, who teaches that princes may sometimes be deprived of their rule, and their subjects be liberated from the oath of fidelity; and thus it has been done by pontiffs more than once.” *

* “Bellarmino, Sylvius, alique dicunt Pontificem non habere jure divino potestatem directam in temporalia regna, sed indirectam; hoc est, quando potestas spiritualis exerceri libere non potest, nec suum finem assequi per media spiritualia, tunc ad temporalia recurrere possit, juxta S. Thom. 22, q. 10, a. 12, et q. 12, a. 2, qui docet Principes interdum privari posse dominatione et subditos a fidelitatis juramento liberari; et ita a Pontificibus non semel est praedicatum. “Theologia Moralis et Dogmatica, by Dens, vol. ii., No. 98, p. 164.

The Jesuit Bellarmine is supposed to be the author of this doctrine; but as he lived in the sixteenth century—five hundred years after Gregory VII.—the latter, of course, had no idea of any other than the direct power, and being an infallible pope, the opinions of a mere cardinal, however distinguished, cannot be set up against his. Nor do they avail much against the opinions of St. Thomas, who is regarded as one of the foremost of the fathers. As represented by Dens, St. Thomas merely refers to the exercise, but not to the origin, of the power. When, however, he does refer to the origin of it, he says, “that according to the institution of God himself, the King of kings, the pope possesses the highest degree of both powers, the *spiritual* and the *temporal*.” (Gosselin, vol. ii., p. 365, and note.)

And Cardinal D’ Ostia makes a more practical application of the doctrine when he asserts that “since the coming of Jesus Christ all the dominion of infidel princes was transferred to the Church, and is vested in the pope as the vicar of Jesus Christ, the King of kings; whence he infers that the pope can, *by his own authority*, grant the kingdoms of infidel princes to any of the faithful whom he may think proper to select.” (*Ibid.*, p. 362.)

But although St. Thomas sustains the direct and Bellarmine the indirect power, they agree in its application according to the principle laid down by D’ Ostia. In justifying Popes Gregory III., Stephen III., and Leo III. in seizing upon a number of Italian provinces after the emperors of the East had separated from the Roman Church and united with the Eastern Christians—thus becoming heretics—they both “maintain that the Church and the pope could have declared the pagan emperors of Rome, and especially Julian, *deposed from the empire, and their subjects absolved from all obligation toward them*, if such a declaration had been consistent with prudence.” (*Ibid.*, p. 367.)

The fact is, this theory of indirect power is an after-thought. It had no existence in the minds of the ambitious popes who laid the foundation of papal power, and under whose administrations that power was made to overshadow the world. With them—Gregory VII., Innocent III., Adrian IV., Boniface VIII., and all the rest—the pontifical power was direct, full, plenary, omnipotent, derived immediately from God. They denied that it was in any sense indebted to human grants or concessions, or that it could be enlarged or diminished by them.

When, however, Protestantism began its work, and the papacy reeled and tottered under the blows of the great Reformers, it required the genius and ability of Bellarmine to conceive and promulgate the idea of indirect power, so that the assailants of the direct power might be answered with an argument that was at least plausible. It is said that he was “driven to the theory of the indirect power by the desire of vindicating the popes and clergy of the Middle Ages against the attacks of Protestants and of the more ancient heretics,” and that he “believed that he struck the middle and proper course, between the excesses of heresy and the opinion of the direct power, which he considered to be manifestly extravagant.” (Gosselin, vol. ii., p. 368 (note).)

If the great popes who originated, maintained, and acted upon the doctrine of the direct power were infallible—and the dogma of the late Lateran Council makes them so—then this doctrine became an essential part of the faith of the Church, which it would now be heresy to deny or change. It is a vain pretense, therefore, to talk about the indirect power, as Cardinal Antonelli does, it being merely the ingenious argument of a Jesuit of the sixteenth century, not promulgated by authority as a part of the faith, but as a mere shelter for the enormities practiced under the claim of direct power. If it be that the

faith of the Church is immutable, and the popes all infallible and incapable of error, then the doctrine of the indirect power is heresy. Or, if the promulgation of it from the Vatican, under the official auspices of the present pope, makes it a necessary part of the faith at this time, then the popes who maintained the direct power were heretics. Let the papist take either horn of the dilemma, and his theory falls to the ground as utterly untenable, alike opposed to the divine and human law and the best interests of mankind.

It is apparent, therefore, that Gregory VII. did not pretend to shelter himself behind any indirection, and that in asserting his primacy and supremacy he required it to be recognized as a part of the faith, that the power of the pope over both spirituals and temporals was derived directly from God, and was not susceptible of any human limitation.

This is the fair and only import of his language, previously quoted, (*Ante*, ch. iii.) and of all his official acts when dealing with the European kings. Even in dealing with Philip, King of France—the favorite “Son of the Church”—he forbade him lay investiture, and addressed a letter to the French bishops, declaring that if they did not obey him, and not the king, to whom by the law of France they owed allegiance, “he would, with God’s help, use every means to wrest the kingdom of France from his hands.” (Reichel, p.205.) And his labored exertions to establish a holy empire or ecclesiastical state, in the form of a revived Jewish theocracy, indicates how completely, if he had succeeded, he would have absorbed all the spiritual and political power of the world. (*Ibid.*, p.282.)

Nor did Adrian IV., Innocent III., or Boniface VIII., up to the beginning of the fourteenth century, pretend to rest this supremacy upon any other ground than that asserted by Gregory VII. The blight of the Middle Ages was resting upon the world during their pontificates, and there was no necessity for moderation or disguise. Reason was not then free to expose or combat their errors or usurpations. There was no free thought or free press in those days. Protestantism was not then born. The iron weight of the papacy rested upon all the nations, and even kings so crouched at the feet of these great pontiffs as to cause Dante to exclaim,

“How many now hold themselves mighty kings,
Who here like swine shall wallow in the mire,
Leaving behind them horrible dispraise!”

When Adrian IV. granted Ireland to King Henry II. and authorized him to subjugate the Irish people, he did so expressly upon the ground that it “belonged to the Holy See” by a divine right, and that he could dispose of it as seemed right to him; asserting, at the same time, the right in all the popes to dispose of every country where Christianity had been received. Innocent III. declared that his power came directly from Heaven, and was based “on a divine ordinance;” and that the authority of princes was derived from him; wherefore he gave away crowns, disposed of governments, and transferred peoples from one allegiance to an other, in the name of God and the Church. And Boniface VIII., in his bull *Unam Sanctam*—which remains a part of the canon law—set forth the doctrine that temporal governments should be conducted “for the Church,” and that “for every human being subjection to the pope was necessary for salvation;” deriving the tremendous power he asserted directly from God alone.

All the popes who at various times before the sixteenth century claimed this supremacy asserted the direct power over all nations. They universally regarded it as an attribute attached to the papacy by

Christ, descending to them from the apostle Peter, and reaching out to the utmost bounds of the earth, in order that all mankind may in the end be saved. Whatever may have been said by others for them since then is no part of the original argument by which the power was sustained, but merely the invention of such limitations upon it as prudence and expediency have dictated. The original argument remains the same. If it does not, the power does. Its comprehensiveness is in no way lessened by shifting the method and grounds of its defense.

While, since Bellarmine, a vast amount of ingenuity has been displayed in the discovery of various arguments, often conflicting, to reconcile the world to its exercise, the popes themselves, even when it has been held in abeyance, have treated it as a part of the faith—unalterable and forever the same. And Pope Pius IX. is not behind any of them in asserting it to be all—absorbing, and in denouncing and anathematizing everything which stands in its way. His infallibility being now established, the Church has assigned to him the incapacity to err, and the same incapacity to all his predecessors. Hence it binds itself, and requires all its members to recognize the doctrines and principles advanced by any and all of them as the true “Catholic doctrines.” And these doctrines being true, the inevitable and logical result, from which no ingenuity can contrive a loop—hole of escape, is that the divine and *legitimate* authority which the pope has at any time acquired over any government or country by virtue of discovery, conquest, or compact, cannot be displaced by any act considered as usurpation, or by any *illegitimate* act, no matter in what way it may have been consummated.

As “the domain of the Catholic Church” was extended by the discovery of America by Columbus, acting for and in the name of the reigning pope, Alexander VI.,* and spiritual jurisdiction was thereby acquired over this continent in obedience to the providence of God, that jurisdiction, though disturbed for a time by revolution and usurpation, exists yet in all its original vigor! As temporal jurisdiction necessarily follows the spiritual, that also exists in a like degree, to be resumed whensoever by possibility it may be done, and it shall become *prudent* to attempt its recovery! The resumption of both these jurisdictions is commanded by Almighty God in order to secure the universality of the only true Church, against which “the gates of hell shall not prevail!”

* It seems little less than profanation to assign infallibility to such a pope as Alexander VI., when all history assigns to him a multitude of crimes among them an incestuous intimacy with his own daughter, Lucretia Borgia—as inconsistent with the life of a professing Christian as they are shocking to the moral sense of mankind.

It was to this pope that the kings of Spain and Portugal referred the question of boundary between the American possessions each of them claimed by virtue of discovery. If he had merely decided what was submitted to him, it might be claimed for him that he was a mere arbitrator. But he went further, and “traced a line from pole to pole, through the Azores, or Western islands, and decreed, by virtue of his universal omnipotence, that all countries which were beyond this line—that is, the West Indies or America—should belong to the King of Spain; and those on this side—that is, the East Indies and the shores of Africa—to the King of Portugal.” The only conditions were the payment of a large sum of money to him, and the conversion of the inhabitants to Christianity, by force if necessary.—CORMENIN, vol. ii., p.154.

Thus has the Jesuit reasoned ever since the wonderful system of Loyola was contrived in aid of the papacy; and thus must necessarily reason all who accept the dogma of papal infallibility. The author of “Protestantism and Catholicity Compared,” etc., understood all this when he wrote his book, as also did

his American publishers when they recommended it as “peculiarly adapted” to the wants of this age, because it sets forth “the glorious character of the faith;” and he and they manifestly contemplated the occurrence of such events as would bring the world into a condition for the practical application of these doctrines.

At all events, he felt it to be the duty of the papacy, in whose behalf he wrote, to keep them fresh in the minds of its devotees, so as to hold them in readiness for such a time, whensoever it should arrive. And, consequently, his work would have been left in complete if he had failed to point out the ultimate results to be expected from these “Catholic doctrines;” that is, if he had not indicated “how the civil power may be lawfully resisted.” To this special subject, therefore, he has devoted a chapter, which begins thus:

“From what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it follows that it is allowable to resist illegitimate power by force. The Catholic religion does not enjoin obedience to governments existing merely *de facto*; for morality does not admit a mere fact unsupported by right and justice.” (Balmes, ch. lvi., p. 336.)

And then, referring to the teachings of St. Thomas, which we have already seen, in support of his proposition that “an equality of social and political rights “is impossible, he passes on to define what is meant by papal interference in the affairs of governments, and to show that it is nothing less than the direct interposition of God himself! He says:

“For many centuries there has been inculcated in Europe a doctrine much criticized by those who do not understand it, the intervention of the pontifical authority between the people and their sovereigns. This doctrine was nothing less than *Heaven descending as an arbiter and judge*, to put an end to the dispute of the earth.” (*Ibid.*, p. 340.)

And this remarkable chapter is wound up by pointing to the times when the tempest of revolution has burst upon the world, and thrones have been overturned, and royal heads cut off “in the name of liberty;” to all of which he declares the Church says “this is no liberty, but a succession of crimes; the fraternity and equality which I have taught were never your orgies and guillotines” (*Ibid.*, p. 343.)—thus placing all political revolutions along-side of each other, and seeming not to know that it was only that of Roman Catholic France where “orgies and guillotines” were substituted for law and order.

What man is so ignorant as not to understand all this? “The Catholic religion does not enjoin obedience to governments existing *de facto*!” that is, governments not founded on the law of God. No such thing as “an equality of social and *political* rights” is possible! “The intervention of the pontifical authority between the people and the sovereigns,” or between them and their governments, is only “*Heaven descending as an arbiter and judge*,” in the person of the pope, to hold them to the line of duty! The liberty which allows thrones to be overturned and kings to be dispensed with, “is no liberty, but a succession of crimes!” *

* It should not be forgotten that this is one of the authors to whom Archbishop Bayley, of Baltimore, referred his friend for the true teachings of the Church. Should it not command the most serious attention, when the fact is thus openly avowed that American citizens are trained in such a school?

This author was not disposed to shield the papacy behind any disguise whatever, but marched bravely up to the work he had in hand. He felt himself too secure in Spain to practice any deception upon a point of doctrine so absolutely essential to the maintenance of the ultramontane party, of which he was a distinguished member. He was too truthful for subterfuge. And, therefore, he could do no less than declare that the power of the pope over both spirituals and temporals is derived directly from God, and that its exercise over the world is *the act of God himself*!

We all concede that whatever is derived from God must be just and right: he is infallible. Whosoever shall be persuaded to believe that these doctrines are according to his teachings, to him they necessarily become just and right. No defender of papal infallibility is permitted to deny them— excommunication and anathema have already been decreed against him if he does. With all such, then, their duty to the Church is higher and more obligatory than any duty they can owe to human governments, either in the United States or elsewhere. And if the pope shall tell them, in an official bull or brief, that there are principles of government prevailing here which are condemned by the law of God; that this country belongs of right to “the domain of the Catholic Church” by virtue of the discovery by Columbus; that this right, being divine, can never be destroyed or impaired by revolution; that the papal jurisdiction has been wrongfully and criminally displaced by lawless usurpation; that the Government existing here is *de facto*, and not *de jure*, because it is merely human, and not such as God’s law requires; that it does not recognize the temporal power as subordinate to the spiritual, which God commands, but the spiritual, in its exterior organization, as subordinate to the temporal, which God forbids; that it has disunited the State and the Church, and tolerates different forms of religion, which is heresy; that all such institutions as ours, being Protestant, are infidel, because they deny to the papacy the right to measure our laws by the papal standard—if he shall tell them any or all of these things, and enjoin upon them that, in view of all this wrong, injustice, and crime, it is a duty which the papacy owes to God to re-assert its jurisdiction here, to restore again the true apostolic Christianity, to banish all this heresy, and to build up a *lawful* government constructed according to the divine plan; with all these and other kindred propositions before their minds, pressed and urged upon them by cunning and adroit priests, trained for the purpose in Jesuit schools, what will those who believe that the pope is infallible do and say? Will they obey or disobey the pope?

That is the question which no ingenuity can evade. He who accepts papal infallibility, and with it the ultramontane interpretation of the power of the pope over the world, and thinks that by offending the pope he offends God, will obey passively, unresistingly, uninquiringly. Such a man, whether priest or layman, high or low, is necessarily inimical to the Government and political institutions of the United States. With him his oath of allegiance would be worth no more than the paper upon which it is written. It would not stand a single moment before the all-absorbing absolutism of the pope, whose commands are equivalent with him to those of God. Or if, for a moment, he should stop to consider the extent of its possible obligation, the pope would be ready to assure him that, as it required him to do what the welfare of his Church and the will of God forbade him to do, it was null and void from the beginning. Or if still there should be some little unrest in his conscience, some slight misgivings as to the true line of his duty, the power of dispensation would be ready at hand to release him from the obligation of his sworn allegiance, and snap the cords that bind him to the Government, as the same kind of cords have been snapped by other popes and in other countries. To this end do the papal teachings inevitably lead: it is their natural and logical result.

The law of the Church is in its canons. These are made by the decrees of popes and councils. One of the greatest of the popes, Innocent III., asserted for himself such plenitude of power as gave him the right to dispense with any law. The Fourth General Lateran Council, with the approval of this same pope, enacted a canon wherein it is declared that constitutions which are prejudicial to the rights of the Church shall not be observed; thus, by the use of imperative language, making the non—observance of them obligatory. The Decretals, which are the body of the canon law, contain provisions to the same effect. The Third General Lateran Council, with the approval of Alexander III., decreed that an oath in opposition to the welfare of the Church and the enactments of the holy fathers is not to be called an oath at all, but rather perjury. Peter Dens, the great commentator on the laws and moral theology of the Church, lays it down as the law of the Church that the right of the pope, as the ultimate superior and sovereign, is reserved in every oath; which, of course, includes the oath of allegiance. He also instructs the faithful that the pope has the power of withdrawing or prohibiting what is included in an oath, and that when he does so it is no longer included. And Bishop England, driven to the wall by an ingenious and learned adversary, from the point of whose lance he could not escape, was compelled to admit the law of the Church yet to be as it was established by the Third Lateran Council.

Under such a law the papacy has but to demonstrate to its followers that a constitution or law of the State is opposed to the welfare of the Church, when it becomes their religious duty to treat the oath to obey such constitution or law as no oath at all, but rather perjury. And if this provision were not so plain and emphatic as to be insusceptible of misunderstanding, the papacy, ever on the alert, has provided its doctrines of “mental restrictions” and “ambiguity and equivocation,” as the final means of escape from almost every imaginable promise or oath, except where the party is bound to the papacy itself.

Its adroit training of its subjects in the school of dissimulation shows how completely the practice of falsehood may be systematized into a science. Of course, the abstract proposition that it is unlawful to lie in any event is laid down in general terms; but in each special case as it arises rules are furnished by which to decide what is and what is not a lie.

“Mental restrictions” are of two kinds: purely mental and real. In the first, falsehood is not excused, because there is no external sign to signify that which is restricted in the mind. In the second, there is no falsehood, because the external circumstances signify that something is secretly understood. Thus, as to real restriction, it is said: “Real restriction occurs when the declaration is false, if we regard the words alone; but circumstances concur which signify that something is to be secretly understood, which the speaker keeps in his mind, and which, being secretly understood, the declaration is true.” *

* “*Restrictio realis occurrit, dum enuntiato, spectatis solis verbis, falsa est, sed circumstantia concurrunt, quoe significant aliquid esse subintelligendum, quod loquens in mente tenet, et quo subintellecto, enuntiato est vera.*”—DENS, vol. iv., No. 244, p. 309.

It is almost impossible to procure in the United States a copy of this work of Peter Dens. I have seen it advertised by at least two Catholic publishing houses, and have made the effort to obtain it from them, but failed. I succeeded, at last, in getting a copy from London. It is in Latin, in eight volumes—manifestly designed as instructive to the priesthood alone, by whom laymen are to be impressed with its teachings. Messrs. Lippincott & Co. have recently published a “Synopsis” of it, translated by Professor Berg, which contains the most material parts of it, except what relates to confessional, etc., which is too indecent for translation. I have used this translation, except in the case of

oaths—which it does not include—and have given the original along with it, that the classical reader may test its accuracy. He will find it both literal and faithful.

This rule had the sanction of one of the infallible popes, Innocent XI., which, of course, adds greatly to its influence. In a proposition laid down by him, he said:

“If any, either alone or before others, whether asked or of his own accord, or for the purpose of sport, or for any other object, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, by understanding within himself something else which he has not done, or a different way from that in which he has done it, or any other truth that is added, he does not really lie, nor is he perjured.” *

* “*Probatur etiam ex damnatione hujus prop. 36., Innoc. XI.: ‘Si quis vel solus vel coram aliis, sive interrogatus, sive sponte propria, sive recreationis causa, sive quocumque alio fine, juret se non fecisse aliquid, quod revera fecit intelligendo intra se aliquid aliud, quod non fecit, vel aliam viam ab ea, in qua fecit, vel quodvis aliud additum, revera non mentitur, nec est perjurus.’*”—DENS, vol. iv., pp. 309, 310.

It will be readily observed how wide these rules open the door for falsehood and perjury—how completely they tend to destroy all confidence between men, and all faith and integrity. But as if this abominable doctrine of “mental restriction” were not sufficient to enable the order of Jesuits to triumph over the world by the system of fraud which it is designed to legitimate, that of “ambiguity and equivocation” is superadded to give it both efficiency and completeness. It amounts to this: that if a proposition is susceptible of two meanings, one may be expressed when it is not meant, and the other, which is meant, may be reserved in the mind. Hence it is said:

“An equivocation of this kind does not contain a lie, in whatever sense it may be received; because the external words truly signify that sense which the speaker has in his mind, and thus differs from a purely mental reservation, in which the external words do not contain the mental sense.” *

* “*Hujusmodi oequivocatio non continet mendacium, in quocumque sensu accipiatur, quia verba externa vere significant illum sensum, quem loquens in mente habet, et sic differt k restrictione pure mentali, in qua verba externa non continent sensum mentalem.*”—DENS, vol. iv., p. 311.

That these rules are part of the Jesuit system of “mental reservations,” is undoubted. Sanchez, one of the fathers, says: “A man may swear that he never did such a thing (though he actually did it), meaning within himself that he did not do so on a certain day, or before he was born, or understanding any other such circumstance, while the words which he employs have no such sense as would discover his meaning.” (“The Provincial Letters,” by Pascal, letter ix., p. 277.)

The reason given by him and Filiutius, another father, is that “it is the intention that determines the quality of the action.” (*Ibid.*) And they give a surer method of avoiding falsehood: “After saying aloud, I swear that I have not done that, to add in a low voice, today; or after saying aloud, I swear, to interpose in a whisper, that I say, and then continue aloud, that I have done that.” (*Ibid.*)

The same rule is also expressed in these words: “No more is required of them to avoid lying than simply to say that they have not done what they have done, provided ‘they have in general the intention of giving to their language the sense which an able man would give to it.’” (*Ibid.*)

And Escobar, another and greater of the Jesuit fathers, lays down the following lax and demoralizing rule in reference to promises not confirmed by an oath: “Promises are not binding when the person in making them had no intention to bind himself.” *

* *Ibid.*, p. 278. The great Bossuet condemned all this doctrine as “pernicious in morality,” and for that and other reasons was a Gallican Catholic, and not a Jesuit.

Now, with the believer in the ultramontane doctrines which prevail at Rome, and which, since the decree of papal infallibility, have become the only doctrines which the pope will allow to be accepted as true, it is quite certain that the oath of allegiance will not stand, for a single moment, in the way of his obedience to any command of the pope for the promotion of the welfare and interest of the Church. In taking the oath, how easy was it for him to have renounced his allegiance to some civil monarch; yet, at the same time, to have reserved in his mind his allegiance to the pope, not as a civil monarch in the same sense, but as the spiritual head of the Church, whose power, divinely granted, included authority over all temporal affairs within its jurisdiction!

But if he did not have this reservation, the other modes of escape are equally effective. Possibly, there are not very many who have made this reservation, but these will labor assiduously to increase their number. The Jesuits, and those upon whose minds they have impressed their teachings, understand it perfectly well; and their struggles to obtain the mastery over the world are unrelenting. They have the unabating ardor of an army held together and inspired by the promise and expectation of victory.

It is fair to assume that a majority of those Roman Catholics who have taken the oath of allegiance had no such mental reservation. But these well—meaning and good citizens are relied on to acquiesce, by their silence, in what may be done by such as had. These seem to have no conception of the extent to which this passive submission may carry them. They may well pause at this point for reflection and self-examination, while they are protected by institutions which allow this to them. If they shall do so, they may readily see how completely they have become entangled in the meshes of the Jesuit net, and realize the nature of the efforts their hierarchy are now making to bring them under the government of the canon laws of Rome, whenever the existing laws of the United States shall conflict with them. Perhaps not one in a thousand is aware of these efforts.

The proceedings of “the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore” were referred to in the second chapter, to show the preference of the American hierarchy for the Catholic over the Protestant system of government, and their opposition to certain laws of the United States. From what was there said it would appear, very satisfactorily, that their purpose was to bring about that condition of things which shall result in governing this country by the canon law of Rome—some of the principles of which, as they affect the obligation of allegiance, have been explained. If there was left any doubt upon that subject, it may be easily removed. Since that chapter was written, a work has appeared entitled “Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore.” The preface thus begins:

“The desire of gradually introducing in this country, as far as practicable, the ecclesiastical discipline prevalent throughout almost the entire Church, was strongly and repeatedly expressed by the fathers of the late National Council of Baltimore. *Its decrees tend both avowedly and implicitly to promote the accomplishment of this object.*” (“Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore,” by Smith, Preface, p. iii.)

The author professes to propound the Decrees of Baltimore, because they are designed to establish “the same hierarchy, and, in consequence, substantially the same relations between bishops, priests, and laity,” as exist elsewhere in the same Church. (*Ibid.*, Preface, p. vii.)

In defining the canon law, he calls the Church a perfect and sovereign society, which possesses “a three-fold power—legislative, judicial, and coercive or executive,” and which cannot be subordinate to any other society. (36) There are but two perfect societies—the Church and the State; the Church is “*absolutely supreme*,” the State “*but relatively supreme*.” The State, when emancipated from the Church, “stands in open revolt against God himself;” there should, therefore, be such “close union” between them that they should “assist each other.” (*Ibid.*, p. 7.) He calls the canon law the “common law” of the Church, which “is obligatory on all the faithful spread throughout the world;” and makes it comprise, in so far as it is written, “The Constitutions and Decretal Epistles of the Sovereign Pontiffs,” and the “Decrees of Ecumenical Councils.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 8, 9.) He then defines the principles of the common law, among which are those which follow:

The pope can dispense with any law. (*Ibid.*, p. 17.) The constitutions and decrees of the popes are explanations of the divine law, and are, therefore, binding as soon as known. (*Ibid.*, p. 21.) The Church does not recognize the right in any government to say whether or not the pontifical decrees shall be enforced: “She is supreme and independent, and therefore can admit of no intermeddling with her authority.” (*Ibid.*, p. 27.)

The Isidorian Decretals, although now known to be spurious and false, were looked upon as genuine for seven hundred years, or until their fraudulent character was discovered by Protestants in the sixteenth century; (*Ibid.*, p. 32.) yet they aided materially in building up the papal system, and there is no pretense that the popes have abandoned such provisions of them as increase their power. The pope alone is the interpreter of the divine law, and his temporal power is necessary to the free exercise of his spiritual authority. (“Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore,” by Smith, p. 47.) He derives his jurisdiction immediately from God, and imparts a share of the plenitude of his power to his bishops. (*Ibid.*, pp. 77, 78.) Ecclesiastical property must be governed by the laws of the Church. (*Ibid.*, p. 144.) The State ought to recognize and carry into effect the laws of the Church. (*Ibid.*, p. 149.) By these laws, laymen have no right of property in the Church, and it is against the law of God that they should dispose of its revenues. (*Ibid.*, p. 150.) Where the mother of a child is a Catholic, and the father a heretic, or Protestant, the child may be baptized at the request of the mother, and against the wishes and consent of the father. (*Ibid.*, p. 178.) Children of heretics may be baptized against the will of both their parents; because all heretics are “*per se* subject to the laws of the Church.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 178, 179.) Religious books, including Bibles, shall not be printed without the consent of the priesthood; and all such as have not their approbation are forbidden to be read. (*Ibid.*, pp. 354, 361, 362.) The coercive power of the Church includes the power “to punish the insubordinate and repress the lawless;” which

extends to any punishment short of shedding blood, such as imprisonment in monasteries, and other chastisements. (*Ibid.*, p. 372.)

These provisions fall very far short of the whole body of the canon law, which is set forth in the papal and consular decrees, many of which have been noticed; but they distinctly show the purpose of the hierarchy to be the introduction of the whole into this country, gradually, but as rapidly as they can, either by the exercise of direct power, or because of the inattention and toleration of the American people. All the power they can now control is directed to, and concentrated in, this object. It will be observed that one reason assigned for the jurisdiction they seek to establish over this country, is that all heretics are “subject to the laws of the Church.” And inasmuch as infidels, who have always denied the faith, are included among the heretics along with Jews and pagans, this jurisdiction is made so complete and broad as to include the entire population of the country. Not only, therefore, do these hierarchs consider themselves entitled to possess the country and govern it, in the name and by virtue of the divine right of the pope, but to act as the masters and superiors of all classes of the people—only awaiting, prudentially, the opportunity to assert and exercise this high ecclesiastical prerogative.

In the mean time, while this tremendous authority is held in abeyance by our civil institutions, the papacy stands ready with its armory full of ecclesiastical weapons prepared for use. If these are somewhat dulled by the length of time they have lain idle, the dogma of infallibility has created a necessity for resharpening and burnishing them up again. Therefore, we find the faithful instructed in the law of the papacy as to the manner in which it would deal with the host of its enemies and persecutors. Thus, it is said, infidels “are not to be tolerated; because they are so bad that no truth or advantage for the good of the Church can be thence derived.” *

* “Ritus aliorum infidelium, nempe paganorum et hareticorum, per se non sunt tolerandi; quia ita sunt mali, ut nihil veritatis aut utilitatis in bonum Ecclesie inde derivetur.”—DENS, vol. ii., No. 53, p. 83.

And they are to be dealt with without trial or proof, on the ground of being incorrigible and rebellious from the beginning. Infidelity “*is not to be tried or proved, but extirpated*,” subject only to this condition—that this extirpation may be suspended where “there may be reasons which may render it advisable that it should be tolerated;” for example, where the power to extirpate is not possessed. *

* “Unde tentenda non est vel probanda, sed extirpanda, nisi adsint rationes, quae illam tolerandam esse suadeant.”—DENS, *Ibid.*

Heretics as such are to be dealt with under special provisions of the law, made to fit their case on account of their crime and impiety practiced in the act of setting up a false faith in opposition to that of Rome. Baptized heretics are to be visited with the greater excommunication by the pope, as in the case of the bull of Pius IX., a few years ago, excommunicating all Protestants. They are to be considered as infamous; and their temporal goods are to be confiscated. (“Bona eorum temporalia sunt ipso jure confiscata.”—DENS, vol. ii., No. 56, p. 88.)

They are to be subjected to *corporal punishment, to exile, and imprisonment*. (“Denique aliis paenis etiam corporalibus, ut exilio, carcere, etc., merito afficituntur.”—*Ibid.*, p. 89.)

And then, to complete the work, in case they shall remain obstinate, and not heed the warnings of the Church, they are to be dealt with as John Huss and Jerome were under a decree of the Council of Constance—that is, they shall suffer death.

Let not the Protestant reader be alarmed; this is only the law of the papacy, which the infallible pope with his hierarchical auxiliaries is trying to enforce here, and which they would enforce if the world could be carried back by them into the gloom and superstition of the Middle Ages. See, however, the emphatic and plain language in which this death penalty is recorded in question and answer:

*“Are heretics rightly punished with death? St. Thomas answers, Yes, because forgers of money, or other disturbers of the State, are justly punished with death; therefore also heretics, who are forgers of the faith, and experience being the witness, grievously disturb the State.” **

* “An heretici recte puniuntur morte? Respondet S. Thomas, 2, 2, quaest. 11, art. 3, in ‘Corp.’ affirmative: quia falsarii pecuniam, vel aii Rempublicam turbantes, juste morte puniuntur: ergo etiam heretici, qui sunt falsarii fidei, et experientia teste, Rempublicam graviter perturbant.”—DENs, p. 89.

It must not be supposed that the baptized heretics who are thus to be dealt with are only those who have been baptized into the Roman Catholic Church. The class is much larger, and includes all baptized Protestants as well, provided the ceremony has been performed with reference to the ordinary essentials. These are not required to be re-baptized upon reception into the Roman Church; and are, therefore, proper subjects of excommunication and punishment. Since the time of St. Augustine, more than fourteen centuries ago, the doctrine on this subject has been as laid down by him, as follows: “For in all points in which they [heretics] think with us [Catholics] they are also in communion with us—are severed from us only in those points in which they dissent from us. What they have retained of the teaching of the Church, they do not lose by severance from her; hence, the power of conferring baptism may be found outside the Church. Moreover, it is Christ himself who baptizes. The grace of the Sacrament is wholly independent of the qualification of him who administers it.” (Alzog, p. 424.)

Thus it is manifest that all Protestants who have been baptized are held to be in “communion” with the Roman Church for the purpose of punishment for the crime of heresy, and, consequently, they are now, *in the papal view, under sentence of death—the executioner merely waiting for sufficient power to enforce the decree*, which has stood unrevoked and unchanged since the Lateran Council of Innocent III. provided for the extermination of the Albigenses.

Founded upon this enlarged and extraordinary jurisdiction and the subtle reasoning employed to maintain it, the law of the Church distinctly lays down the power of the pope to compel obedience from us all, from the millions of Protestant people in the United States who have vainly supposed themselves to be outside of his jurisdiction. It says: “Baptized infidels, such as heretics and apostates usually are, also baptized schismatics, may be compelled, even by corporal punishment, to return to the Catholic faith and the unity of the Church. The reason is, because these by baptism have become subject to the Church; and therefore the Church has jurisdiction over them, and the power of compelling them through appointed means to obedience, and to fulfill the obligations contracted in baptism.” *

* “Infidelis baptizati, quales esse solent Hoeretici et Apostate, item Schismatici baptizati cogi possunt, etiam puenis corporalibus, ut rever’tantur ad Fidem Catholicam, et unitatem Ecclesie.”

Ratio est, quod isti per Baptismum subditi facti sint Ecclesix: adeoque Ecclesia in eos jurisdictionem habet et potestatem eos compellendi per media ordinata ad obedientiam, et ad implendas obligationes in Baptismo contractas.”— DENS, vol. ii., No. 51, p. 80.

It is easy now to understand what the pope, in his Syllabus, and Archbishop Manning, in his pastoral, mean by the right of the Roman Church to employ force to coerce obedience to its decrees. With them the jurisdiction of the papacy is limited only by the boundaries of the world, and professing Christians of every creed are brought within the sweep of the pontifical saber, by a system of ecclesiastical law and ethics, which, built up in ages of superstition and ignorance, they are now seeking to revive. They admit no compromise and practice no moderation. Whatsoever stands in the way of their success is visited with the pontifical wrath; and anathemas and curses, in the name of God, are scattered broadcast over the world, as if God did not delight to exhibit himself more in the sunshine than in the lightning and the storm.

How many of the multitude of criminals upon whom the sentence of condemnation has been already pronounced are destined to pay the penalty of their disobedience, and how many shall escape, are matters concealed in the womb of the future. It is no trifling and idle thing for nations and peoples to find themselves thus plotted against. Nor is it a trifling and idle thing for the people of the United States to find such an enemy, with drilled and disciplined troops, in the very midst of their peaceful institutions. Heretofore they have not failed to meet the necessities of every crisis to which this country has been subjected, and it seems impossible that they can remain listless and indifferent with so formidable and dangerous an adversary at their very doors.

Chapter XX. Papal Infallibility

Infallibility formerly in General Councils and the Popes conjointly.—Efforts made to prove this in England and the United States.—Books published on the Subject in both Countries.—Extracts from Several of Them. Doctrine of French Christians on that Subject.—They deny the Infallibility of the Pope.—Proceedings in England to obtain Catholic Emancipation.—The Doctrine denied both in England and Ireland.—The Pope's Infallibility a new Doctrine.—Denied in the Catechism.—Distinction between the Church and the Papacy.—Infallibility in the Church during the Early Times.—The Greeks never admitted the Infallibility of the Pope. The First Seven Councils mainly Greek.—They concede Primacy of Honor, not Jurisdiction, to the Pope.—The Council of Nice.—The First Council of Constantinople.—The Council of Ephesus.—The Council of Chalcedon.—The Second Council of Constantinople.—The Third Council of Constantinople.—The Second Council of Nice.—The Fourth Council of Constantinople.—Subsequent Councils held by the Latins.—The First Lateran Council.—The Second Lateran Council.—The Third Lateran Council.—The Introduction of Papal Constitutions.—Adding them to Decrees of Councils.—More Effort to make Law for the Church by the Force of Precedent.—The Fourth Lateran Council.—Blindly obedient to Innocent III.—The Primacy of the Church, not of the Pope, established. Constitutions of Heretical Princes not Binding.—Part of the Canon Law.—The First Council of Lyons.—The Second Council of Lyons.—The Council of Vienne.—None of these Councils declare the Pope Infallible.

IT ought not to be considered as asking too much of those who support the absolutism of the papacy, when we insist that they shall address themselves to our consciences in furnishing a solution of the problem involved in the claim of the pope's infallibility. It concerns the present age of the world too much, to let it rest upon the mere assertion that because it has been dogmatically avowed by a number of popes, therefore it is true. Such persons as have been trained in the school of submission, and accept whatsoever is told them by their superiors, may be satisfied with this; but to those who recognize no obligation of this nature, something more is due if they are expected to acquiesce in it. "No man," said Archbishop Tillotson, "can be under an obligation to believe anything who hath not sufficient means whereby he may be assured that such a thing is true."

Yet, when the objection is urged that this dogma places the papacy in direct antagonism to the domestic policy of the progressive nations, we are told—as if it were a complete answer—that there is nothing new in this; that it is a part of the ancient faith, descending from Peter, and which has known no variation from the beginning. Thus the whole question is rested; and we are required to give our assent, or remain under the pontifical curse if we do not. *

* The whole substance of Archbishop Manning's reply to Mr. Gladstone is centered in his second and third propositions, set forth in his letter to the editor of the *New York Herald*, to wit, "that the Vatican Council announced no new dogma, but simply declared an old truth," and that the civil allegiance of Roman Catholics, "since the council, is precisely what it was before."—*New York Tablet*, December 21st, 1874, p. 405.

It has been elsewhere asserted that before the late council the infallibility of the Church was generally recognized by its lay members, especially in the United States, as lodged in the whole body of the Church, acting, according to the unvarying custom, through general councils and the popes conjointly. Even if the hierarchy thought otherwise, they studiously avoided any open declaration to that effect, leaving those to whom it was their duty to teach the whole truth in ignorance and delusion. There were even some of them who were not only guilty of this unpardonable sin of omission, but actually misled

their flocks into the acceptance of a fatal error. And others, who did not go so far, silently acquiesced in the imposture.

About twenty years ago there was published and extensively circulated in the United States a work devoted to the discussion of the question of “Church authority”—the precise question involved in the dogma of papal infallibility. It was written by a former clergyman of the English Church, who had gone over to the Roman, as an explanation of his reasons for so doing. Starting out by defining the word *ecclesia* to mean *any combination of men*, he insists that in that sense the Church was established by Christ with the office of deciding what is human and what divine, and of interpreting the system of which it is the depository. *

* The Greek word *ecclesia* was in use in that language before the birth of Christ. Liddell and Scott, in their lexicon, define it to mean “an *assembly* of the citizens summoned by the crier, the legislative assembly.” Potter says it was “an assembly of the people met together according to law to consult about the good of the commonwealth. “—*Antiquities of Greece*, ch. xvii., p. 81. In the “*Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*” it is said to denote “an *assembly* called together upon business, whether lawful or unlawful.” Thucydides used it to signify an assembly.—Bloomfield’s Thucydides, bk. vi., viii., p. 19, and bk. lxix., p. 338, vol. iii. It occurs frequently in the New Testament, and is generally translated church. But a different rendering is given to it, both in the Douay (Roman Catholic) and Protestant Bibles, where it occurs in Acts xix., 32, 39, at both of which places it is translated assembly. In several of the earlier versions of the New Testament, the translation given it in Matthew xvi., 18, was congregation: “Upon this rock I will build my congregation.” But this was not satisfactory to the Romanists, because it did not sufficiently convey the idea of an ecclesiastical organization with external authority. They therefore repudiated this translation, and adhered to the meaning attached by Jerome to the Latin word *ecclesiam*, when he introduced it into—his “Vulgate” edition. When the revision was made in the reign of King James, he seems to have had some fear that the translators would introduce *congregation* instead of *church*, and thus favor the popular idea in opposition to ecclesiastical authority. He therefore caused to be drawn up a series of rules for their direction, in one of which he instructed them as follows: “The old ecclesiastical words to be kept, viz.: *the word church not to be translated congregation*,” etc.—*History of the Bible*, by Westcott, ch. ii., p. 151.

It would thus seem that the word *ecclesia*, though translated church, was intended by Christ to mean a body of believers assembled together at a particular place, or the whole body of Christians in general assembling by representation, as they did at Jerusalem when Paul and Barnabas went up from Antioch. To say, therefore, that it is composed of an organization with external powers, and that Christ’s design in establishing his Church was that there should be a pope and a body of privileged ecclesiastics to govern it, is a manifest perversion of its original meaning.

He then proceeds to instruct us what the Church is, where it is that the Holy Ghost is always present, and where this power of interpretation is lodged. He proves by Ireneus, Origen, and other fathers that “the divine spirit” which directs the Church “has its dwelling in the collective body,” which “is our sole guide in the things of God.” (“Principles of Church Authority,” by Wilberforce, pp. 27, 47, 61, 65.) He defines “the collective episcopate” to be “the medium of Church authority,” and insists that Christ provided for the Church, “as the law of its organization, that the same persons [the bishops] who were individually the dispensers of grace should collectively be the witnesses to doctrine.” (“Principles of Church Authority,” by Wilberforce, pp. 77, 84, 89, 92, 98.)

And then, in flat denial of papal infallibility, if not of the primacy of Peter, he declares that this principle of Church organization “proceeds on the supposition that the gift bestowed upon the apostles, and which had been inherited by their successors, had been given to them as a body; that no bishop or

bishops could possess it apart from the communion of the whole; that as grace and truth lay in Christ our Lord, and afterward in the college of apostles, so it had been inherited by the whole episcopate as a trust, in which they had a common share.” (*Ibid.*, p. 103.)

That this principle has received the approbation of all the ages since Christ, he considers “manifest from the weight attached to general councils.” He quotes this language from Cyprian:

“The episcopate is a single trust administered collectively by many individuals.” And this from the Apostolic Constitutions: “For the confirmation of you who are put in trust with the universal episcopate.” This episcopate he calls by the equivalent names of the “one Church” of Christ, “the federal union,” and “the sacerdotal college.” And then, summing up, he says:....these principles evidently imply that the interpretation of doctrine was lodged as a perpetual trust in the episcopate, but the exercise of this function implied the co-operation of all bishops as a collective whole.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 103, 104, 107, 108.)

It would be hard to find language more directly condemnatory of the doctrine of papal infallibility than this. Not only does it show that no such doctrine prevailed in the early ages of the Church, but that it is in express conflict with “the law of its organization” as ordained by Christ. The writer was highly complimented for the manner in which he performed his task, and for the learning he displayed. He was considered as a valuable acquisition to the Church, and, doubtless, one object in circulating his book was to influence hesitating Protestants, if they could be found, by his argument.

Another object undoubtedly was to disprove what many Protestants considered the tendency toward papal infallibility in the Church. And still another, to quiet any apprehension that might exist among the lay men of the Church in regard to the threatened concentration of all the power of the Church in the hands of the pope. It may be readily called to mind, by almost anybody, how flatly, and even spitefully, it was denied that any such concentration was designed; as it may now be realized how this denial served to mislead many who find themselves deluded. This book was only one of the many instrumental ties employed to carry on this work. Having performed its task, it is now consigned to obscure places where the dust and cobweb may settle on it; while the faithful are instructed that the very doctrine it denied and condemned has always been the doctrine of the Church!

Another book was published a few years ago, written by a priest, designed to show that “the father of lies” had circulated misrepresentations and calumnies against the Church in this country. In reference to “new additions” to the faith, he says, it would be “damnable” to believe otherwise than as Christ teaches, although it “should be defined and commanded to be believed by ten thousand councils.” And, answering the accusation that the pastors and prelates are held to be infallible, he classes it along with other “misrepresentations” of which “the father of lies” is the author, and says: “The papist, truly represented, believes that the pastors and prelates of his Church are *fallible*; that there is none of them but what may fall into error and heresies, and consequently liable to be deceived.” And he assigns infallibility only to “the whole Church.” (“A Papist Misrepresented and Represented,” by Rev. John Gother, pp. 44-46.)

Coming at last to the pope, he says that it is an exhibition of the “black art” which the devil practiced in paradise, to charge the papist with believing that he has taken the place of Christ, “and that whatsoever he orders, decrees, or commands is to be received by his flock with the same respect, submission, and

awe as if Christ had spoken it by his own mouth,” or that he is “no longer liable to error, but is infallible.” He indignantly repels the insulting and impious falsehood, as the devil’s work, and declares that the pope is the head of the Church only as “every father of a family owns himself to be master of it under Christ;” and that, while God assists the popes in the administration of their office, no man is “obliged to believe them *infallible*,” because no such doctrine has ever been defined by the Church. (“A Papist Misrepresented and Represented,” by Rev. John Gother, pp. 49-51.)

There was yet another book of this same kind, published with the official endorsement of Bishop Fitzpatrick, of Boston, who certainly was fully instructed in the doctrines of his Church. The author of this book meets the question of papal infallibility squarely, and disposes of it without equivocation; manifestly intending to put it at rest, so that his adversary should have no excuse for again referring to it. That there may be no misconception of his meaning, the whole of what he said is given as follows:

“I shall therefore tell the gentleman, once for all, and in the clearest terms I am able to express myself, that when you speak of the Roman Catholic Church, and maintain it to be that infallible Church which Christ has established upon earth, and to which all his promises of perpetual assistance were made, we mean not the particular Church or diocese of Rome, which, as a diocese has its jurisdiction limited, and is no more the Universal Church than the diocese of Paris or Toledo—because a part is not the whole; but we mean the whole body of Roman Catholics, whatsoever country or diocese they belong to, professing the same faith, and living in communion with the Bishop of Rome, whom they acknowledge to be their supreme pastor, or head of their Church on earth. This is plain English; and, if the gentleman will not understand it, but persists in his real or pretended ignorance, and to impose upon his reader with a manifest equivocation, I can say no more to render him sensible of his mistake.

“I observe, fourthly, that the gentleman has sometimes a great itching to shift the state of the question from the infallibility of the Church to that of the pope. Nay, he tells his lordship in plain terms that not to place the infallibility in the pope is giving up our whole foundation.’ I am sorry he understands the doctrine of our Church no better, which he ought to have done before he wrote against it. For, as a controvertist, he ought only to dispute against articles of our faith *fairly stated*, and not against *private opinions*. Now, the infallibility of the pope is one of these. Some Catholic divines write for it, and many against it, without any breach of communion with the See of Rome. And therefore the gentleman shall have the liberty of talking by himself upon that subject as much as he pleases; for I am not bound to answer anything wherein the article of faith which I pretend to maintain is not concerned.” (“The Shortest Way to end Disputes about Religion,” by the Rev. Robert Manning, Boston, 1855, pp. 189, 190.)

Language more expressive could scarcely have been found. It will be observed that he not only lodges infallibility in the whole body of the Church, but denies flatly the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility. Some divines favor it, he says, but many oppose it; clearly signifying that the latter constitute the majority. When it is considered that all this was specially approved by a distinguished prelate of the Church, it may be regarded as a sufficient set-off against the contrary assertions now so frequently and dogmatically made.

But there is abundant evidence, equally conclusive and satisfactory, to show that this question was met and dealt with in Europe in the same way, from the very earliest efforts of the Jesuits to keep the popes

on their side by its persistent and pertinacious advocacy. A thesis was published in Paris, in the seventeenth century, wherein it was claimed that Christ had communicated his own infallibility to the pope, both in questions of right and of fact. This thesis was immediately laid before all the bishops of France; it being well understood that it came from the college of the Jesuits. Another soon after appeared from the same source, not merely affirming what the first contained, but insisting that the system of Copernicus, as defended by Galileo, should be considered as battered down, because “the Vatican has also thundered against it, and the sentence delivered by the congregation of the Cardinals of the Inquisition has overthrown by its just censure the hypothesis, or rather the thesis, of Copernicus in the person of Galileo.” The avowed purpose was to carry the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility to the extent of requiring “some mathematicians, more bold than religious,” who accepted the Copernican theory and the teachings of Galileo, to “submit to the authority of this censure.” This thesis was submitted to the learned Faculty of Divinity of Paris. The Parliament of Paris also took the matter into consideration. It was thus brought directly before the whole country, and presented in such form as to invoke all the best intellects of France in its consideration. The result was a strong and decided affirmance of the doctrines set forth in the ancient decrees of the Faculty of Divinity, which were embodied in six distinct propositions.

1. It is denied that the pope has any indirect power or authority over the temporalities of the king.
2. That the king has no other superior in temporals than God alone.
3. That subjects owe such allegiance to the king that it cannot be dispensed with upon any pretense whatsoever.
4. That the pope cannot depose bishops against the rules of the canons.
5. That the pope is not above a general council.
6. That the pope is not infallible, when he has not the concurring consent of the Church. *

* 1. “Non esse Doctrinam Facultatis quod Summus Pontifex aliquam in temporalia Regis Christianissimi auctoritatem habeat; imo Facultatem semper obstitisse etiam iis qui indirectam tantum esse illam auctoritatem voluerunt.

2. “Esse Doctrinam Facultatis ejusdem, quod Rex Christianissimus nullum omnino agnoscit nec habet in temporalibus superiorem praefer Deum; eamque suam esse antiquam Doctrinam, k qua nunquam recessura est.

3. “Doctrinam Facultatis esse quod subditi Fidem et Obedientiam Regi Christianissimo ita debeant, ut ab iis nullo pretextu dispensari possint.

4. “Doctrinam Facultatis esse non probare, nec unquam probasse Propositiones ullas Regis Christianissimi Auctoritate aut germanis Ecclesie Gallicanae libertatibus, et receptis in Regno Canonibus contrarias; v. g., quod Summus Pontifex possit deponere Episcopos adversus easdem Canones.

5. “Doctrinam Facultatis non esse, quod Summu.w Pontifex sit supra Concilium (Ecumenicum. 6. “Non esse Doctrinam vel Dogma Facultatis, quod Summus Pontifex, nullo accedente Ecclesiae consensu, sit infallibilis.”— Ecclesiastical History, by Du Pin, vol. xvii., pp. 146-150.

The opinion of these leading minds of France, so clearly and strongly expressed, shows, beyond all controversy, what was the opinion of the Gallican Christians on this subject. The Jesuits were not able to drive them from their position, and, therefore, when Bossuet, the great Bishop of Meaux, who stood

at their head, undertook to define the relation between sovereigns and the popes, he said “that kings and princes are not subject in the temporal order to any ecclesiastical power by the order of God; that they cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by virtue of the keys of the Church; finally, that by virtue of that power, their subjects cannot be absolved from their fidelity, obedience, and oath of allegiance which bind them to their prince.” (“Defense of the Declaration, ” by Bossuet, lib. i., s. i., ch. xvi., pp. 272, 273. *Apud* Gosselin, vol. ii., pp. 299, 300.)

The oath of supremacy and allegiance which the English law, during the reign of James I., required Roman Catholics to take, made it necessary they should swear that, in their opinion, the pope had no power to depose the king, or to dispose of the kingdom, or to authorize its invasion, or to discharge the citizens from their allegiance. With them it became a question whether, in view of their obligations to the pope, they could lawfully take this oath. They were not left in doubt long, in so far as the pope, Paul V., was concerned; for he addressed to them a brief which condemned “the oath as unlawful, and containing many things manifestly contrary to faith and to salvation.”

He addressed them also a second brief of the same tenor; and Innocent X., after the death of Paul, condemned the oath anew. In this perplexed condition, arising out of their divided loyalty, they consulted the Faculty of Divinity of Paris whether they could, in their opinion, take the oath without prejudice to the faith, and this after two infallible popes had declared solemnly and officially, *ex cathedra*, that they could not. The sixty doctors of the Faculty declared, against these popes, that they could take the oath without prejudice to the faith; and they did take it.

The Jesuits, of course, were not satisfied at this direct and powerful opposition to their favorite theory of the pope’s infallibility; and they had no difficulty in having this opinion of the French doctors placed upon the Index at Rome, so as to stamp it with pontifical condemnation and censure. (Gosselin, vol. ii., pp. 252, 253 (note).)

The same question arose afterward in England, at a period nearer our own times. When, toward the close of the last century, the question of Catholic emancipation was pending before the British Parliament, it was doubted by many whether it would be safe to confer full political privileges upon Roman Catholics because of the doctrines of the papacy in regard to their allegiance. Strong efforts were made to remove this doubt, and, as the most efficient means of doing so, the opinions of learned divines and foreign universities were solicited directly upon the questions of the power of the pope to depose monarchs, and to release their subjects from allegiance, and the obligation of papists to keep faith with heretics.

Three questions, embracing these points, were sent to the universities of Louvain, Donay, and Paris, in France; and Alcala, Valladolid, and Salamanca, in Spain. The answers were all condemnatory of the doctrine of papal infallibility. In that from Douay, taken as a specimen, it is said: “That no power whatsoever, in civil or temporal concerns, was given by the Almighty either to the pope, the cardinals, or the Church herself; and consequently that kings and sovereigns are not, in temporal concerns, subject by the ordination of God to any ecclesiastical power whatsoever; neither can their subjects, by any authority granted to the pope or the Church from above, be freed from their obedience or absolved from their oath of allegiance.” And they declared that they were bound to keep all oaths, whether pledged to “Catholic, heretic, or infidel.”

These doctrines were also asserted, in 1792, by a Roman Catholic committee in Ireland, acting for and in the name of all their countrymen of that faith. And when, long afterward, in 1826, the three Irish bishops, Murray, Doyle, and Kelley, were examined before the British House of Commons on this same subject, they also unanimously affirmed the doctrines set forth by the universities. *

* “Papal Conspiracy Exposed,” by Dr. Edward Beecher, pp. 36-40. Mr. Gladstone gives the evidence of Bishop Doyle. When asked by the committee whether the obligation of the Roman Catholic to obey the pope, divided his allegiance so as to interfere with that he owed to the State, he replied:

“I do not think it does in any way. We are bound to obey the pope in those things that I have already mentioned—[that is, in matters concerning “religious faith” and “ecclesiastical discipline”]. But our obedience to the law, and the allegiance which we owe the sovereign, are complete, and full, and perfect, and undivided, inasmuch as they extend to all political, legal, and civil rights of the king or of his subjects. I think the allegiance due to the king and the allegiance due to the pope are as distinct and as divided in their nature as any two things can possibly be.”—New York Tribune, November 24th, 1874.

If the question then to be decided had been, whether or not the popes themselves had claimed and asserted their own infallibility, these inquiries would have been entirely useless. That a very large number of them had done so, directly and most explicitly, was well understood. The object of the inquiries, however, was to ascertain whether or, not the claim they set up was recognized by the Church as a part of its faith—whether or not their frequent repetition of the claim gave it the binding force of law to the whole Church. Like all other aspiring and ambitious rulers, they endeavored, at all times, to extend their power, and omitted no argument necessary to maintain it. Nor were they ever known to abate their pretensions. On the other hand, by including the deposing power in the spiritual, they had enlarged the limits of their jurisdiction so as to embrace the world. Hence, it became necessary to know to what extent the faith of the Church had been influenced by these exorbitant demands; for the plain reason that if the assertion of this enormous power, frequently repeated, by any number of popes, had ingrafted the doctrine of papal infallibility upon the canons of the Church, so that the whole membership were bound to accept it as a necessary part of the faith, then it was undoubted that the obligation of allegiance to the pope was higher and more binding than that to any nation on earth. Therefore it was necessary to ascertain whether the Roman Catholics of England and Ireland adopted or repudiated this kind of faith, so that Parliament could decide advisedly whether they should or should not be allowed to share in the management of public affairs.

It would be unjust, in the absence of all evidence to that effect, to say that they acted with duplicity by concealing their real belief. However this may have been, the answers were satisfactory, and the bill for Catholic emancipation ultimately became a law. The object they desired was accomplished. (Any body who will examine the doctrines of the Gallican Church in France will see that the opinions here expressed agree precisely with them.)

If we are to decide upon the existence of facts not within our personal knowledge, by the settled and common—sense rules of evidence, it must be accepted as established, beyond contradiction, that, at the times referred to, the Roman Catholics of the United States, France, England, and Ireland not only did not accept papal infallibility as a part of their religious faith, but positively denied it. They constituted a

very large portion of the Roman Catholic world; so large a portion that it would be absolute folly to talk about the universality of any dogma of faith which was rejected by them.

In France especially, notwithstanding Protestantism was tolerated, the Government was Roman Catholic; and to say that it could remain so, and reject so important a dogma as this, would amount to the impeachment of the integrity of the pope for not condemning it, and of the intelligence and piety of those who did so.

And in Ireland, as is well known, there has been, for several centuries, such devotion to the true faith, that no shadow of doubt has ever rested upon the loyalty of its Roman Catholic people to Rome. Shall we not accept all these people, then, as denying the pope's infallibility? If they truthfully declared the doctrine of the Church on this subject, has not the dogma of the late Council prescribed a new article of faith?

Manifestly, it has declared that to be the faith which, before its passage, was not the faith. Then it was not heresy to deny it; now it is. Then a Roman Catholic could believe it or not, as seemed fit to him; now he is anathematized if he does not believe it. It has changed his relations to the Church, and to the country in which he resides. It superadds to his obligation of allegiance to his country the obligation of a higher allegiance to the pope. It subordinates his national citizenship to his citizenship of a great ecclesiastical empire. It changes the orthodox faith into heresy. It takes away the right of individual opinion upon the very question involved, and denies any further exercise of reason. And carrying along with it all the consequences which the popes have claimed as involved in their infallibility, it requires the Church to accept, for the first time, as an absolutely necessary part of its faith, the equality of the pope with God in the government of all human affairs, within the extensive domain of faith and morals.

Is not all this new? We may readily agree that it is not so to the popes, who, like other ambitious men, are ever ready to assert doctrines designed to increase and consolidate their power. That is not the question, any more than it is now a question to decide whether kings, by the persistent assertion of the "divine light" to govern, have established a principle of law by which all mankind are to be, now and forever, held in subjugation by them. The question is, whether it is not new as the doctrine of the Church. How can it be otherwise, when the Universal Church never assented to it—when no council ever declared it as it is now declared—and when at least one ecumenical council has expressly asserted precisely the reverse? The claim is not new, for the popes and the Jesuits have repeatedly asserted it—but the doctrine is; and it is only as doctrine that it becomes part of the faith. If, then, it is faith for the first time, it is new faith, necessarily.

But is it faith for the first time? The catechisms of the Church answer this. Previous to the late Lateran Council, there was an authorized version of catechism circulated in England which had the sanction of the highest authorities of the Church, including Dr. Manning, the great Archbishop of Westminster, wherein the following question and answer are found:

"Q. Are not Catholics bound to believe the pope in himself to be infallible?"

"A. This is a *Protestant invention*, and is no article of the Catholic faith." (*Apud* Bishop Coxe, of Western New York, in his pamphlet entitled "Catholics and Old Catholics," p. 15.)

And confirmatory of the fact that it was not an article of faith before the enactment of the dogma to that effect, it is well understood that a considerable number of the bishops petitioned the pope not to submit to the council his infallibility as a dogma of faith. Of these there were five archbishops and twenty—two bishops from America. *

* While the council was in session, Archbishop Purcell, of Cincinnati, addressed to Archbishop Dupanloup, of Orleans, France, a letter, wherein he says: “The American prelates have especial reason to hesitate upon the question of pontifical infallibility. Neither Catholics nor Protestants in our country admit that the popes have the right to depose sovereigns, to release subjects from their oath of allegiance, and to transfer, when they please, the kingdom of one prince to another. Our citizens of Irish nativity, who are the majority and chief support of the Catholic Church in the United States, will have much difficulty—*de la peine*—in admitting that Pope Adrian IV., who was an Englishman, was infallible when he gave Ireland to Henry II., King of England; on the other hand, the bulls of the popes upon this subject are so clear and positive that the defenders of pontifical infallibility in general believe themselves forced to admit the temporal sovereignty of the pope over the universe.

“Adrian IV. said most especially: ‘Ad cujus (Romane ecclesie) jus eam insulam, aliasque omnes quod documenta fidei cepissent pertinere, nemini dubium esset’—” to which (the Roman Church) belong that island and all others which have received the faith, as no one will ever doubt.’

“That donation of Adrian IV. was confirmed by his successor, Alexander III. It is also remarkable that the modern authors who speak so high—*parlent si haut*—of the privilege of pontifical infallibility, preserve at present a profound silence upon the other privilege, which their predecessors estimated as important, and as well proven. Until now we have been permitted to say that the Catholic Church has nothing to do with these transactions, and that it is not responsible for all that the popes have done or may do. But if these pontifical decisions become articles of faith, the Archbishop of Baltimore will be placed in an embarrassing position, as well as all that has happened lately in the matter of the liberty of worship—*de la liberte des cultes*. The explanations which your lordship believed yourself obliged to give have calmed and appeased a petite tempest which threatened the Church. If our memory does not deceive us—the proof we have left behind us in the United States—it appears to us that the Archbishop of Baltimore esteemed himself happy to be able to subscribe to your explanations when adopting them.

“The Archbishop of Baltimore tells us in his letter that he has never doubted the general belief of the Church relative to the infallibility of the vicar of Jesus Christ. In that case will it not be better to ask nothing more, and leave things where they are and where they have always been? Why does he ask for new definitions which do violence to the conscience of several of his colleagues in the episcopate? Many of us believe that ecclesiastical history, the history of the popes, the history of the councils, and tradition of the Church, are not in harmony with the new dogma, and that is why we believe that it is very inopportune to wish to define as an article of faith an opinion which appears to us to lack any solid foundation in Scripture and tradition—*dans l’Ecriture et la tradition*—while it is contradicted by many irrefragable monuments. It would be out of place to continue any longer a discussion which is the business of the council; but before concluding we cannot refrain from expressing our profound regret that the friends so devoted in appearance to the Holy See have raised by their indiscreet zeal many painful questions where religion has nothing to gain.”

This letter, written in French, was translated for and published in the Cincinnati Commercial of May 22d, 1870, and the above extract republished in the same paper of December 18th, 1874.

We shall fail to reach correct conclusions upon this subject, unless by observing the true distinction between the Church, as such, and the papacy. The former conveys the idea of universality, and includes the whole body of membership—the pope, cardinals, all the hierarchy and laymen. The latter excludes laymen from any participation in the management of Church affairs; and, if the pope’s infallibility be

conceded, places the entire power and authority of the Church in his hands without any responsibility either to the Church as an organization, or to the lay members.

In the former sense, the Church has held nineteen ecumenical councils before that recently held at Rome; and from the opening of that at Nice down to the last—a period of over fifteen hundred years—it was universally understood, except by the popes themselves who succeeded Gregory VII., that whatever of infallibility it possessed was lodged in the whole body, acting through the episcopate assembled in general council, or through them and the pope acting conjointly. There is nothing in the early history of the Church contrary to this, but everything to confirm it. All the dogmas of faith express this idea in one or the other of these forms.

The seven first councils were almost entirely composed of Greeks, and were assembled by the Eastern emperors—not by the bishops of Rome. The aggregate number of bishops attending them at their different sessions was 1486, and only *twenty—six* of all these were Romans. There were only *three* Roman bishops in the Council of Nice; only *one* in each of the first of Constantinople and Ephesus; only *three* at Chalcedon; only six at the second of Constantinople; only five at the third of Constantinople; and only seven at the second of Nice. (Debate between Campbell and Purcell,” p. 45.)

The Greeks never admitted the primacy of the Bishop of Rome over the Patriarch of Constantinople. The most they ever agreed to was to concede to him primacy of honor, but not jurisdiction. This was a point of perpetual controversy and disagreement, which continued up to the final schism. And therefore it falsifies all history to say that any of these early councils established or recognized the infallibility of the Pope of Rome. The pretense has no shadow of foundation. The Council of Nice did not even consider the assent of the pope as necessary to the infallibility of its action, and therefore did not submit its decrees to him for approval. They were communicated to him and the other absent bishops by Constantine, the emperor, “by a letter in his own handwriting.” Constantine tells him that he is to receive them as a “divine injunction,” because “whatever is determined in the holy assembly of the bishops is to be regarded as indicative of the Divine will.” And Eusebius, in explanation of the universal Christian sentiment of the fourth century, says that the decrees of the council were confirmed and sanctioned by the emperor. *

* “Life of Constantine,” by Eusebius, pp. 127, 132, 135. Dr. Hefele, Roman Catholic Bishop of Rottenburg, and a member of the late Lateran Council, admits that the emperors presided “at some of the first eight councils.” He says, “Pope Stephen V. himself writes that the Emperor Constantine presided at the First Council of Nice, and the ancient acts of the synods frequently refer to a presidency of the emperor or his representatives.”—*History of the Christian Councils*, by Hefele, Edinburgh ed., p. 28.

He does not mention the Bishop of Rome as having anything to do with them, except that, like all the other bishops, he was required to accept them as the infallible action of the council.

The First Council of Constantinople conceded to the Bishop of Rome the “place of honor” in the council, on account of the superiority of Rome over Constantinople; but did not extend his jurisdiction or concede to him any power not equally possessed by other bishops. It defined the jurisdiction of each bishop with great particularity, confining each one to his own diocese. The Bishop of Alexandria was to govern Egypt only; the bishops of the East were to govern the East, saving the ancient privileges and

prerogatives of the Church at Antioch; those of Asia, their own dioceses; those of Thrace, the churches of Thrace; and those of Pontus, the churches of Pontus. Each one was expressly forbidden to interfere with the affairs of another diocese. Each province was to regulate what concerned itself. And when a bishop was accused, the accusation had to be carried to the bishops of his own province. If they could not decide, the case was to be taken to the synod of the diocese. No appeal to the Bishop of Rome is spoken of; there is not a word on the subject. (“*Eccl. Hist.*,” by Du Pin, vol. ii., p. 273.) If there had existed any such idea as that he had supreme jurisdiction over all the churches and was infallible, these provisions would have been perfectly idle and useless.

Nothing can be inferred in favor of the pope’s infallibility from the proceedings of the Council of Ephesus; but directly the contrary. That council was called by the Emperor Theodosius, without any conference with Pope Celestine I. The object of it was to deal with the heresy of Nestorius, Bishop of Constantinople. This prelate and some of his priests had insisted that the Virgin Mary ought not to be called the Mother of God; and the heresy having reached the Egyptian churches, Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria, called a council of the bishops of his province to condemn it. After this was done the Church became much agitated, and both Nestorius and Cyril corresponded with the Bishop of Rome upon the subject. His opinion was solicited, more as an arbitrator than anything else; certainly not as a final judge. He decided against Nestorius, who appealed to a general council, which was called by the emperor. The council affirmed the decision of Celestine I. and deposed Nestorius. In this there was not a single element of infallibility recognized as being possessed by the pope. Nor was his primacy recognized. If he had possessed either, his judgment would have been executed without a general council. But it had no validity until ratified by a council, which he did not call, and over which he did not preside, either in person or by his legates, and which his legates did not attend until after Nestorius had been tried and deposed. This council reaffirmed what the first of Constantinople had done in reference to jurisdiction, by confining the bishops to their own provinces. (Du Pin, vol. iv., pp. 191-217.)

The Council of Chalcedon gives no more support to papal infallibility than any of the three preceding. Eutyches, a priest, and abbot of the monastery of Constantinople, was found guilty of heresy by a provincial council assembled in that city, and excommunicated. He appealed to a general council, and wrote to Pope Leo I. asking him not to decide the question in dispute between him and his diocesan bishop, but to give his judgment about the point of doctrine alleged to be heretical. Nor did he ask Leo to summon the council: this he solicited of the Emperor Theodosius. It was done by the emperor, who caused all the bishops, including the pope, to attend. The pope did not know of it until after it was summoned, but sent his legates. It was presided over by Dioscorus of Alexandria, by order of the emperor—the chief legate of the pope having the second place.

Its decision corresponded with that of Pope Leo in reference to the heresy of Eutyches, who had denied the two distinct natures, human and divine, in Christ; and its final result was the enactment of thirty canons. By none of these is any jurisdiction conferred upon the pope which had not already been conferred by the former councils. On the contrary, by one of them, the twenty—eighth, there were expressly conferred upon the Church of Constantinople “the same privileges with old Rome,” and jurisdiction given to it over the dioceses of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace, and the churches “out of the

bounds of the emperor,” together with “the right to ordain metropolitans in the provinces of these dioceses.” (*Ibid.*, vol. iv., pp. 218-242.)

Here, it will be observed, there is no recognition of the primacy of the Bishop of Rome over the other churches. The First Council of Constantinople had conferred upon him only “the place of honor,” without interfering with the jurisdiction of any of the bishops, except to define it. This council leaves that honorary distinction undisturbed; but, when it comes to speak of “privileges” and “jurisdiction,” places Rome and Constantinople upon a footing of perfect equality; thus absolutely repudiating the idea of the pope’s infallibility or supremacy.

The Second Council of Constantinople was called by the Emperor Justinian, to settle the controversy about “the three chapters.” Pope Vigilius exhibited some inconsistencies during its proceedings, not being inclined to go to the whole extent of condemnation demanded by the emperor, but he finally yielded his assent to what was done. It included, however, nothing concerning his jurisdiction; for, although he was present in Constantinople during the session of the council, its proceedings were directed almost entirely by the emperor. (Du Pin, vol. v., pp. 131-146.)

The Third Council of Constantinople grew out of the controversy about the two wills of Christ, and was called by the emperor, Constantine Pogonatus, with a view to reconciling the disagreement between the Eastern and Western Christians. The emperor himself presided, although the pope had three legates present. The heresy condemned by the council had been professed over forty years before by Pope Honorius I., and, consequently, in finding Sergius, Theodorus, and others guilty of it, they included Pope Honorius by name. Its decrees were approved by Pope Agatho, who has been made a saint by the Church. So that the proceedings of this council have always been wonderfully perplexing to the advocates of papal infallibility, instead of being available to them in support of that doctrine.

How Honorius could have been infallible and yet a heretic, at the same time, is not a little puzzling. Baronius, the annalist, brought all his learning and ingenuity to bear on the question, but, as Du Pin says, his “fancy must pass for a matchless piece of rashness.” (*Ibid.*, vol. vi., pp. 66-74.)

While the Jesuits have been taxing their ingenuity to escape the effect of this decree of a general council that Pope Honorius was a heretic, and its approval by Pope Agatho, the common sense of mankind has long since settled the difficulty by deciding that neither of these popes was infallible. Manifestly, the Third Council of Constantinople thought so.

Constantine Copronymus, the emperor, called a council at Constantinople to settle the dispute about the worship of images. It was afterward removed, and became the Second Council of Nice. The pope, Adrian I., sent his legates, to whom he entrusted a letter setting forth the necessity and orthodoxy of image—worship, which he traced back, of course, to Peter. The letter was addressed to the emperor, in the nature of a petition; and, among other things, entreated the emperor “to cause St. Peter’s patrimony to be restored to him,” and “to maintain the Church of Rome’s supremacy.” He exhibited the accustomed papal presumption in asserting his superiority. But, unfortunately for the cause of papal infallibility, his legates did not venture to lay this insolent demand before the council. Referring to these propositions, Du Pin says, “The pope’s legates durst not, perhaps, present them to the synod in which Tarasius [Patriarch of Constantinople] presided.” The council passed twenty—two canons, but

none of them interfered with the jurisdiction of the churches, as previously fixed. (Du Pin, vol. vi., pp. 131-148.)

The Fourth Council of Constantinople, during the pontificate of Adrian II., was called by Basilius, the emperor, in consequence of the controversy between Ignatius and Photius, after the deposition of the former and the appointment of the latter as Patriarch of Constantinople. The pope took the side of Ignatius, and his decision was affirmed by the council. Twenty—seven canons were enacted, but one of them, however, having any bearing on the question of the pope's supremacy. This, the twenty—first, provided, "That the pope of old Rome ought to be honored and respected in the first place, and next to him the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem."

It provides that no obloquy should be cast "against St. Peter's Holy See, the prince of the apostles," and that whosoever shall do so shall be condemned for heresy. Also, that he shall not be deposed by princes. And then it also provides as follows: "But if a general council being met, there happens any difference with the Bishop of Rome, he ought to be conferred with about the matter, and his answers be had, to make the best of it on either side, and no rash judgment to be passed against the supreme bishop." (Du Pin, vol. vii., pp. 92-98.)

Careful observation of this language will show its whole import. In the first place, following the First Council of Constantinople, it assigns the chief place of honor merely to the pope; and then, in the second place, gives as the reason for it that this precedence of honor was conferred upon Peter when he was made "prince of the apostles." But all this falls very far short of infallibility, which, besides honor, includes power and jurisdiction. And the council did not pretend, either that Peter had any superior power and jurisdiction beyond that conferred upon the other apostles, or that the pope had them in any greater degree than the other bishops. On the other hand, they, in the final clause of the canon, exclude any such idea by providing that differences existing between the pope and others may be settled by general councils, both parties being heard.

How could there be any such differences, or how could a council have jurisdiction over them if the pope was infallible? And this council, it should be observed, met in 869, long after the temporal power of the popes had begun to grow under the patronage of Pepin and Charlemagne, and just after the pontificate of Nicholas I., who had augmented the power of the papacy by means of the False Decretals. Even then the council was unwilling to surrender its supreme jurisdiction over the pope.

After the close of this council no other general one was held for nearly two hundred and fifty years. In the mean time, events of the greatest importance, bearing upon the increase of the papal power, had transpired. By the agency of Pepin and Charlemagne the popes had severed their allegiance from the emperors, and had become the acknowledged head of the Western or Latin Church, as distinct and separate from the Eastern or Greek Church. They had also succeeded in building up an immense fabric of papal power by means of false and forged decretals, which were manufactured as occasion required, to suit each exigency as it arose. And being thus separated from and independent of the Greeks, the remaining councils, covering the whole period of the Middle Ages, were held by the Latin Church, and under the immediate auspices of the popes.

True to the purpose of acquiring every possible degree of power, and of establishing their supremacy over the world, they began these Western councils at Rome, where the pope, by means of Italian

influence, could generally have his own way. We shall see, however, that, with all these advantages, slow progress was made toward papal infallibility. It took all the time from 869 to 1870—a thousand years—to find a general council with so little self—respect as to place the whole power of the Church in the hands of the pope.

The First Council of Lateran, called the Ninth Ecumenical, met during the pontificate of Calixtus II., but made no enactment in reference to the power and jurisdiction of the pope. It passed twenty—two canons, having reference to other matters. (Du Pin, vol. x., pp. 33, 34.)

The Second Council of Lateran, under Innocent II., confined itself mainly to the regulation of discipline. There seems to have been, by this time, a necessity for providing, as it did, that priests who kept concubines should not hear mass. But it also secured to them immunity from public censure by subjecting to anathema those who should abuse a clergyman. (*Ibid.*, p. 206.)

The Third Council of Lateran, under Alexander III., was professedly a reform council, designed “to reform a great number of abuses that had crept into the Church,” and also to condemn heresies. By this time the power of the papacy had nearly reached its culmination, and Alexander III. was not the kind of pope to permit any abatement of it. Not one of the twelve popes between him and Gregory VII. equaled him in ambition or strength of will; and not one among all his predecessors was more fitted than he to prepare the way for those events which were soon to transpire under Innocent III.

While this council asserted nothing in reference to the pope’s supremacy, it enacted twenty-seven disciplinary canons, some of which were pointed at existing abuses. It went somewhat farther than that immediately preceding, in the recognition of principles asserted in the False Decretals. It anathematized those laymen “who exact duties and lay taxes on the churches, and on ecclesiastical persons;” and those who should dare to “summon clergymen before their judges” in the secular courts. It relaxed nothing whatever in the work of establishing, papal supremacy, while it omitted any avowal of it. (Du Pin, vol. x., pp. 207-209.)

The practice of publishing what are called “papal constitutions” along with the proceedings of councils, seems, how ever, to have been then introduced. These consist of the briefs, bulls, and encyclical letters of the popes, wherein they asserted their own supremacy, and occasionally their infallibility. They were designed, of course, to maintain “the immunities of the Church,” by making the power of the popes, in its government, superior to all other.

The object to be accomplished by their publication in this form was, manifestly, to give to them a sort of consular sanction, in order that the Church might, in the end, be brought to the point of accepting them as of equal obligation with the canons of councils. The process was simple, and the argument plain. The False Decretals had furnished the claims of authority set up by the popes from Clement to Siricius, and these “constitutions” were such as the popes had made since then; and as they all claimed supremacy and infallibility, therefore they were supreme and infallible! Hence we find annexed to the proceedings of this council “a large collection of divers constitutions of Alexander III. and of the popes who preceded,” and, subsequently, of those also who “succeeded him,” which are published “as a sequel to this council.” (*Ibid.*, p. 209.)

The proceedings of the Fourth Lateran Council exhibit the unbounded ambition of Innocent III., under whose pontificate it was held. There we find the celebrated third canon, which makes the persecution and extirpation of heretics a religious duty, which yet remains the law of the papacy. By this time the claim of supremacy made, and so frequently repeated by the popes, was considered to have the sanction of the Church, because there was no formidable resistance to it. Acquiescence was inferred from silence.

Innocent III. availed himself of this, in order that the practice of asserting this claim in papal “constitutions” should become ripened into the force of law. He, accordingly, is the first pope who boldly and openly struck at the independence of a general council; and he was not accustomed to aim his blows ineffectually. Seventy canons were passed without debate, which “were already drawn up” by him when the council assembled in Rome. There was no deliberation or debate about them. They were laid before the council by the pope, who “ordered them to be read;” but they were not acted on. But because the prelates did not openly resist and denounce them, “their silence was taken for an approbation;” a rule of procedure yet adhered to.

Among these canons we find it avowed, for the first time in the proceedings of a general council, that “the Church of Rome” has “the primacy over all other churches according to the appointment of our Saviour;” that they all owe “obedience to the Holy See;” and that the pall received from Rome is “the ensign of the plenitude of the pastoral power.” This bold avowal was not made, therefore, till the thirteenth century; but even then, when the world was enveloped in the thick mist of the Middle Ages, it stopped somewhat short of the claim of the pope’s personal infallibility. Innocent III. was undoubtedly ready to carry it to that extent, but, with all his daring, he was not prepared to ask of a general council a direct decree to that effect.

It will be perceived that the primacy asserted was alleged to be in “the Church of Rome,” not in the pope. It manifestly designed to consider the Church to be, according to the invariable custom, the whole body of Christians, as represented by the universal episcopate in general council; and that the pope, in asserting this primacy, should act within the limitations fixed by the Church. Otherwise, many of the canons would have been useless—especially the forty—fourth. This canon solemnly declares, “That the constitutions of princes which are prejudicial to the rights of the Church shall not be observed, whether they be for the alienation of fiefs, or for the encroaching on the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, or for any other goods.”

If the council had intended to change the deposit of infallibility from themselves, as representing the Church, to the pope alone; or if the pope had thought it expedient to have his personal infallibility distinct from that of the council openly acknowledged, there would have been no necessity for this canon. The principle asserted in the canon was considered necessary to the Church, and as requiring the stamp of infallibility upon it, in order that it should stand throughout all time. To give it this, the consent of the council was necessary; and that not having been withheld, this canon is one of those which the present pope is desirous of enforcing, and with reference to which the late council must be considered to have acted. (Du Pin, vol. xi., pp. 95-103.)

The principal object of the First Council of Lyons, under Innocent IV., was to decree a general crusade. And although much may be inferred from its silence, under the then existing state of affairs, yet it made

no decree about primacy, supremacy, or infallibility. It, however, gave its sanction to the bull of the pope which deposed the Emperor Frederick and released his subjects from their allegiance; from which it is fair to suppose that both the pope and the council considered this sanction as necessary to give that act the ratification of the Church. Be this as it may, the stamp of infallibility was also given in this mode to the right of deposing monarchs and releasing their subjects from their allegiance, and that principle, with the approbation of this council, took its place among the canons of the Church, where it has ever since remained. (*Ibid.*, pp. 6-8, 114, 115.).

The Second Council of Lyons, under Gregory X., was called with reference chiefly to a reunion with the Greek Church; which fact will sufficiently account for its silence in reference to papal infallibility, primacy, etc. Its doctrinal decrees had reference to the procession of the Holy Spirit, though it passed a number of a disciplinary character and upon general subjects. (*Ibid.*, pp. 123,124.)

The Council of Vienne was assembled under Clement V. This pope had reached the pontificate by a corrupt bargain with Philip, King of France, by which he solemnly pledged himself that, if elected, he would cause Pope Boniface VIII. to be declared infamous. He was one of those who held the corrupt papal court at Avignon, in France, and who contributed his full share toward causing it to be esteemed the most prostituted place in Europe; so much so that Bishop Durandi said of it that it was “the retreat of dragons, the place of resort of satyrs, and the kingdom of demons.”

Clement V. called this council to avoid, if possible, the fulfillment of his promise to Philip, as he hoped to find shelter behind its unwillingness to defame a former pope. He succeeded so far as to pacify the king by issuing a bull to the effect that all the former bulls of Boniface against him should be held void. The council did nothing but pass some canons concerning the faith, and others condemning and anathematizing some heretics. With its proceedings, however, there were published a number of “papal constitutions,” after the practice introduced by other popes, all tending to increase the power of the papacy. Some of these by Clement V. himself only go to show how entirely impossible it was for such a man to be infallible: it is scarcely possible they could ever have been accepted by the Church, or that any general council would have allowed them a moment's consideration.

Among those given by Du Pin are such as these: that as man may reach perfection in this life, when he has done so, he “may freely allow his body what he pleases;” that he is not then “obliged to obey, or tied to practice, the principles of the Church;” “that to kiss a woman is a mortal sin, but the carnal knowledge of her is no sin,” etc., etc. This latter papal precept was probably designed as a shield for his intercourse with the beautiful Countess de Foix. *

* Du Pin, vol. xii., pp. 95, 96; Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 39-44. Weninger is not content with referring to the claim of infallibility made by Pope Clement V. in his own behalf, but refers also to these “Clementine enactments,” or constitutions of Clement V., to show that he was infallible!—WENINGER, pp. 143, 144.

This Council of Vienne was the fifteenth recognized as ecumenical, and the last which preceded that at Constance. Neither by any of its decrees, nor by any of those assembled before it, was there any direct averment to the effect that the pope was infallible. With all of them infallibility was lodged in the collective Church, and nowhere else. But so frequently had some of the most ambitious and pretentious popes endeavored to assert it for themselves independently of the Church, acting as an organized body,

and by this means to enlarge the circle of their admitted spiritual primacy so as to make it broad enough to include jurisdiction over temporals, that it became absolutely necessary to the peace and welfare of the Church, that the Council of Constance should grapple directly with the question and put it at rest.

It did endeavor to do so, as we have already seen, by deposing one pope and declaring the superiority of a general council over all of them. This was undoubtedly the voice of the Church, declared in the only recognized mode, and was accepted as such by all but the popes themselves, and their special adherents in Italy, where their power was omnipotent. They were not disposed to rest long under this direct censure of a general council; for even Martin V., who accepted from it the place of the deposed pope, so soon as he could get away from its immediate influence, commenced a series of measures designed expressly to reverse its decisions and bring it into disrepute. In this he was sympathized with by Eugenius IV., his immediate successor, under whose pontificate the Council of Florence was held, only seventeen years after the Council of Constance.

To this council we are now referred by all the defenders of papal infallibility, in proof that this doctrine has always been recognized by the Church as a part of its faith. From that time they trace it down to the present, through the councils of the Fifth Lateran and of Trent, to show that the late council—the Sixth Lateran—did not introduce any new dogma, but only gave expression to the faith which had always and everywhere existed. This pretense requires a minute examination, somewhat more in detail; but in order to see that it is a pretense, and nothing more, it is only necessary to observe the manner in which the Jesuit writers dispose of the Council of Constance. Whether in doing this, mendacity or ingenuity prevails the most, the reader must judge for himself.

Passing by the equivocations of Weninger—from whose book repeated quotations have already been made—and his flagrant suppression of important facts necessary to a correct understanding of the Council of Constance, let us come directly to the important points of his explanation. He says that in condemning the heresy of the Wycliffites, the council “did not pronounce new ecclesiastical censures against them, but contented themselves with reminding the faithful that the sect and its infamous doctrines had been previously condemned by the decisions of the Holy See. These decisions are irrefragable, remarks the council, because it is impossible that the Apostolic See—that is to say, the pope—should err.” (“Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope,” by Weninger, pp. 145, 146.)

It requires but a moment’s thought to see that it was impossible, in the very nature of things, for the fathers of Constance to have stultified themselves by any such declaration as this. It would have been as diametrically opposed to what they actually did, as darkness is to light. They had tried, condemned, and deposed John XXIII., a lawful pope, for innumerable crimes, including heresy; and to have followed such an act with the assertion that it was impossible that “the pope should err” would have made them the laughing—stock of all Europe.

But it is not necessary to argue upon general principles to show how entirely this assertion of Weninger is without any fact to support it. Du Pin says, the decree of the Council of Constance “concerning the authority of the council above the pope did plainly decide the question, and subjected the pope, as well as to faith as manners, to the judgment of a general council;” which applied not only to times of schism, or where there were rival popes,” but generally in all other cases.” And he gives the reason for

this decision: “Because they deduce the authority of the council above the pope from its representation of the Church, and from its infallibility.”

And when speaking of the bull of Martin V. against the errors of the Wycliffites, he says also, that, in the forty—first decree, “the authority of the Universal Church is distinguished from that of the pope; and there it is ordained that the Universal Church, or the General Council, have a *sovereign authority indefinitely*; whereas ’tis only said of the pope that he hath a primacy over other particular churches, which amounts to the same thing with the decision of the council.” (Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 15.)

This same author asserts, moreover, that, after Martin V. had been elected by the Council of Constance, and while it was yet in session, he issued a bull prohibiting all appeals from the pope to any other tribunal, and that it was approved by the council. The words of this bull given by him are these:

“It is not lawful for any person to appeal from the Roman pontiff, who is the supreme judge and the Vicar of Christ on earth, or by subterfuge to elude his judgment in matters of faith.” (Weninger, p. 147.)

This statement is untrue, or else Du Pin did not understand, or has perverted the facts—neither of which is probable. When the Council was nearly drawn to a close, a question arose about which there was so much disagreement that the ambassadors of Poland talked about appealing to a future council—a remedy in entire accord with the common sentiment of the time. Martin V., like some of his predecessors, was disposed to avail himself of every opportunity to resist this idea, so as to concentrate all the power of the Church in his own hands, and accordingly issued the bull alluded to, notwithstanding, as was then declared, it was directly contradictory of what the council had decreed. But it did not receive the sanction of the council, as Weninger asserts. On the other hand, if the council had acted upon it, there can be no reasonable doubt that it would have been not merely rejected, but sternly condemned. Du Pin says: “However, the bull of Martin V. containing the prohibition of appealing to the council was not read, nor approved, in this session of the council, but published in a private assembly of the cardinals;” (Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 24.) that is, sent out as the popes have generally promulgated their “constitutions,” with the hope that, in the course of time, their custom of asserting universality of power would ripen into the force of law. They understood full well the nature and import of that principle of their Church organization which construes silence into acquiescence—as do also the hierarchy of the present day. And they acted upon this principle, if not with impunity, at least with courage, until at last it has come to be a part of the settled faith of the Church that no layman has any right to inquire by what authority a papal decree has been issued, or to what extent it goes, or what it commands to be believed or done, but is bound to accept it as true and obey it accordingly, without any regard to whatsoever human power and authority it may defy.

Notwithstanding the contrary assertion of Weninger and other Jesuits, no man can study the history of the Council of Constance without seeing that the infallibility of the pope was directly contradicted by it—not merely by the act of deposing an obnoxious and heretical pope, and electing another in his place, but by the enactment of a decree to that effect, which was approved by Martin V. And if it be true, as alleged, that Martin V., after approving this decree, endeavored to counteract its effect by a papal bull—of which there seems to be no doubt—he is presented to all impartial minds in the attitude of having played a double part—of having misled the council by the pretense of approving what it did, while, at the same time, he cherished the purpose of resisting it at the earliest opportunity.

But this is nothing new in the conduct of the popes, who, in building up the wonderful system of the papacy, have taken care to reserve to themselves the right of doing whatsoever they may suppose the interest of the Church requires, without any regard whatever to what they themselves or any others may have done or said. Martin V. found ample justification for his duplicity in the example of many of his predecessors, and only increased the number of those popes whose conduct has since added to the significance of the precedent.

Chapter XXI. Disputes About Papal Authority

The Condition of the Church at the Time of the Councils of Basel and Florence.—Council at Pavia fixed by that of Florence.—Approved by Martin V.—Transferred to Basel.—Meets there, and is presided over by Legate of Eugenius IV.—It is Ecumenical—Agrees with that of Constance about its Power over the Pope.—Eugenius IV. endeavors to defeat It.—His Proceedings against It.—Organizes a Factious Assembly at Ferrara.—Proceedings of the Council against Him.—He pretends to yield, and approves its Decrees.—He violates his Pledge.—He draws the Greeks to Florence, and calls the Meeting there a Council.—It is not Ecumenical; the Council at Basel is at first, when its Decree against the Pope's Infallibility is passed.—It represents a Majority of Christians.—The Council at Florence is mainly Italian.—The Pope's Agreement with the Greeks about his Primacy.—Limited by Decrees of Councils and Canons of the Church.—The Greeks reject the Agreement, and it falls.—This is called a Decree.—Its Terms.—Misrepresentation of Them.—Do not make the Pope Infallible.—Give Him the Primacy conferred by Decrees and Canons.—Primacy of Honor, not Jurisdiction.—The Fifteenth Century, after the Council of Florence. —The French Church.—Charles VII.—Council at Bourges.—Pragmatic Sanction.—Opposition of the Popes to it. Revoked by Louis XL.—Parliament resisted.—Council of Pisa.—The Fifth Lateran Council in Opposition to it.—The Former renews the Decrees of Constance and Basel—The Latter factious at Beginning.—Afterward assents to.—Concordat of Bologna agreed to by Francis I. and Pope Julius II.—Rejected by France.—French Bishops do not attend the Council.—It is not Ecumenical.—No Deliberation in it.—Submissive to Leo X.—Council of Trent.—Does not assert the Pope's Infallibility.—Does not deny the Validity of the Decree of Council of Constance.—Concedes merely Power of Pope to interpret the Canons, not to set them aside.—Pius IV. does this only in his Profession of Faith.

IT is so positively and dogmatically asserted that the pope's infallibility was recognized by the Council of Florence, that, in order to know whether it is to be accepted as a fact or rejected, we must understand the character of that council, the circumstances which led to it, and the nature of its decrees.

The Church at the time of the two Councils of Basel and Florence was fearfully rent by a most disgraceful schism. The Council of Constance, only a few years before, had appointed a council to meet at Pavia, which had the sanction and approval of Martin V. This fixed its ecumenical character; and when it did afterward meet, in 1423, and was attended by five legates of the pope, and by deputies from France, Germany, and England, it, of course, retained this character. It was, therefore, an ecumenical council at the beginning, according to the principles then and now universally recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It was subsequently transferred to Basel, where it was presided over by a legate of Pope Eugenius IV.—his immediate predecessor, Martin V., having, in the mean time, died.

One of the first questions that came before it was that which had been decided by the Council of Constance, involving the relative powers of popes and councils. It became apparent, at once, to the pope that the council would decide, as that at Constance had done, in favor of its own and against his authority; in other words, that it possessed the rightful power to settle and prescribe the faith, independently of the pope, and that the pope had no such power without its consent, because it alone represented the Universal Church. To prevent this, Pope Eugenius IV. immediately began a most disreputable war against the council, intending, if possible, at whatever cost or injury to the Church, to defeat this action. He did not hesitate to inaugurate a war between the Church and the papacy; the former represented by a regularly organized ecumenical council, and the latter by the pope alone. He undoubtedly supposed that the times were favorable to the recognition of the claim of papal supremacy and infallibility; a supposition well warranted by the condition of affairs then existing.

The long residence of the popes at Avignon had corrupted the highest authorities of the Church to so fearful an extent, and the disgraceful schisms existing but a little while before had so rent the Church into factions, that it only required a bold and courageous pope to bring the bishops into obedience, especially when they were assured that they would be the sharers with him of whatsoever power he should acquire over the lay members of the Church. Therefore, Eugenius IV., in the very first step taken by him, exhibited a determination to take advantage of the times, and bring the whole Church to his feet at a single blow. He was determined to lose nothing by equivocation, and, accordingly, as if he were already dictator, commanded his legate to transfer the council to Bologna, where he could preside over it in person, and thus direct and control its action.

Acting under the protection of the Emperor Sigismund, the legate refused to obey this insolent command; whereupon the pope, greatly incensed, published a bull dissolving the council—a course of proceeding both factious and disorganizing. In the mean time, and before this bull was issued, the council had passed a decree to the effect that “every person, of whatsoever state or dignity, even the pope himself, is bound to obey it in what concerns the faith,” and another denying the right of the pope to dissolve it. The issue was thus distinctly made—the pope on one side, representing himself alone; the council on the other, representing the whole Church. One or the other had to recede, or divide the Church—separate its body from its head!

The council, backed by the emperor, sent a deputation to the pope earnestly desiring him to recall his bull for its dissolution. He refused. Whereupon the council renewed their former decrees, and declared that, as they were abandoned by the pope, it was their duty to provide for the necessities of the Church, “as the Holy Spirit should dictate to them.” They summoned the pope to attend in person. This he also refused, and was declared contumacious. He was then notified that unless he appeared at a fixed time he would be proceeded against. The council declared, also, that no prelates should attend a council at any other place, under the penalty of excommunication. It manifestly did not desire to press matters to an extremity with the pope, unless, by his conduct, he rendered it impossible for them to do otherwise. They accordingly deferred any final action several times, to give him every possible opportunity of seeing that the welfare of the Church required the restoration of the pacific relations between them. The pope, however, when he found the council resolved to treat him as contumacious, and to deal with him accordingly, solicited ten more days of delay, which were readily granted him. He thus acknowledged the jurisdiction of the council over him, and again asked for additional delay of ninety days, which was also granted.

During the third year of the council, the pope sent to it his pontifical bull, wherein he declared that the council was lawful; that it ought to continue, without dissolution; that he annulled and revoked his bulls dissolving it; that he approved it, and would do nothing prejudicial to it. Earnestly desiring conciliation, it accepted this bull as satisfactory; and admitted the pope’s legates, upon their taking an oath to approve the decrees of the Council of Constance. And thus peace was seemingly restored upon the basis of the superiority of a council over a pope—the pope having, by his last bull, proposed and agreed to this as the basis of an adjustment.

But it was only *seemingly* restored. The pope soon made up his mind to falsify his own promise, and to get rid of the troublesome fathers of Basel in some way, it mattered little to him how. He was playing the game for empire, and, like other pretentious potentates, considered himself entitled to do with

impunity what the universal law of ethics forbids without dishonor. Accordingly, while the fathers were engaged in faithful exertions to bring about a union with the Greek Christians, he, by his emissaries, was constantly engaged in plotting against them.

He issued a bull to transfer the council, this time to Florence. Baffled again in this, he issued another transferring it to Ferrara. Here, at last, “some Italian bishops,” with a single cardinal, met and organized a rival council, which immediately proceeded to enact that the council at Basel was illegal, and its acts void. It will be seen at once that such a council as this was schismatical, unless the whole power of the Church were taken away from its legitimate and only representative body, and transferred to the pope. Two councils could not lawfully sit at the same time; and as that at Basel had been legally called and organized, this assemblage at Ferrara was manifestly irregular and factious. In so far as the pope himself was concerned, it was fraudulent; for in the act of convening it he violated the promise made in his bull sent to the Council of Basel. But the two councils did sit at the same time, each having its own representative character: that at Basel representing the Church; that at Ferrara, the pope. The former remained almost entirely unaltered in numbers, being deserted only by the pope’s legate and four prelates. These followed their master and the few other Italian prelates to Ferrara; while all the other prelates, with the ambassadors of princes, remained at Basel, representing nearly the entire Church.

The Council of Basel, driven at last to extremities by the factious and malignant conduct of the pope, proceeded with his trial. He was accused by it, among other things, of simony and breaking his oath; and, being found guilty, a decree was adopted which “declared Eugenius suspended from all kind of administration of the papal power, as well in spirituals as temporal, which had now devolved on the council; decreed that all he did should be null; and forbade all sorts of persons to obey him, under pain of excommunication.”

Measures of resistance were adopted by the pope, who caused the prelates at Ferrara to declare all these proceedings void. And he issued another bull to that effect, commanding those at Basel to come to Ferrara, and pronouncing excommunication against those who did not. He enjoined the magistrates and inhabitants of Basel “to force them away under pain of excommunication, and an interdict; and in case they should not do it, he forbade all persons to enter within the city, under the same pains, and enjoined all merchants to withdraw from it.”

What a mild and Christian temper did this infallible pontiff display! In dealing with the Baselian fathers, who represented the Church, he exhibited that malignity which bad men always show when balked in the pursuit of unworthy enterprises. But the council at Basel was not intimidated, and retaliated by decreeing that that at Ferrara was illegal, and all its proceedings null. There seemed to be no oil of Christian charity to pour upon the troubled waters. Everything was cursing and anathema.

In the mean time, the Greeks, who had been invited by the Council of Basel to attend it, were on their way to the West, and the pope inaugurated measures to draw them away from Basel to Ferrara, upon the pretext that the prelates at Basel were schismatics because they had opposed him. In this he succeeded, and negotiations were commenced for settling the terms of union between the Greek and Latin Christians. These lasted for some time. The pope insisted that the primacy denied him at Basel should be recognized, but the Greeks refused. The controversy was attended with a great deal of violence, but no compromise was agreed upon at Ferrara.

The pope issued another bull transferring his council from there to Florence, where it could be more directly surrounded by Italian influences, and, consequently, more subject to his dictation. After it reached Florence, much time was consumed in discussions about the procession of the Holy Ghost, and the phraseology to be used in expressing the nature and extent of the pope's power. He desired an unqualified expression of his primacy over both spirituals and temporals—the very opposite of what had been declared at Constance and Basel. His object was to have it so broadly set forth as to show that his power was plenary over everything, including councils, and even the canons of the Church. To this the Greeks were unwilling, because such a concession by them would admit the inferiority of the Church at Constantinople to that at Rome; whereas they had always maintained that each of them possessed equal authority within its own jurisdiction. They would not consent to go farther than the First Council of Constantinople had gone, more than a thousand years before, which was to concede to Rome the first rank of honor, on account of its having been the old imperial city. This they insisted would be sufficiently indicated by a decree which should provide for the primacy of the pope, within the limitations fixed by the decrees of the ecumenical councils and the canon law—that is, that in the exercise of his primacy he should obey these.

The issue was a very plain one, and required the employment of an unusual degree of diplomatic skin on the part of the pope and his adherents. He was dealing exclusively with those who had been cut off from the Roman or Latin Church by the sword of excommunication, and were therefore heretics; and his manifest object was to entrap them into an agreement as to the extent of his power, which he could fling into the faces of the Latin Christians. These latter were then regularly assembled in the council at Basel, from which he had been able to draw off only the Italian prelates and a few others, leaving the great bulk of the Church still faithful to the decrees of the Council of Constance. And the pope understood perfectly well that, if the sentiment of the Latin Christians were honestly expressed, it would remain thus faithful. Therefore he employed the utmost skill and assiduity in procuring such an act of assent from the Greek heretics as would enable him to set up some claim of right to resist this sentiment, and to disregard the decrees of Constance and Basel. In other words, he desired to employ the Greeks only for the purpose of subverting one of the fundamental principles of faith in the Latin Church, that he might be enabled thereby to bring the whole Church to his feet, and make the pope alone, as its infallible head, the sole custodian of all its authority, the sole guardian of all its rights, and the sole dictator of its faith. How far this papal artifice succeeded will appear in the sequel.

As furnishing one of the best modes of interpreting the result, it is necessary to observe that the chief action of this Council of Florence was in the nature of a treaty between the pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople, and their followers, with reference alone to a union between the Latin and Greek Christians, and not for the settlement of questions of faith. Certainly, it cannot be pretended by anybody that the Greeks had any authority whatever to decide upon matters of faith, so as to bind the Latin Christians, until they had first made such atonement as would remove the sentence of excommunication, and restore them to Christian fellowship. Their visit to the West, and all these negotiations, had this principal object; and therefore what they did or assented to cannot, in any just sense, be considered as a part of the faith, unless also assented to by such regularly constituted authorities of the Church as were then recognized as having the right to bind the Church.

The parties had no special difficulty in agreeing to such general terms as would express the primacy of the pope, and his headship over the Universal Church. They, however, understood these terms differently. The pope considered them as a concession of his infallibility, along with that degree of spiritual power which included jurisdiction over temporals; while the patriarch and the Greek Christians understood them as conferring the utmost degree of honor, but no such authority as should justify the pope in invading their local jurisdiction.

The Greeks not being disposed to make the concession in the former sense, it became necessary to insert some terms of limitation or qualification which should serve to interpret the meaning of the treaty, in order to obtain their assent. The pope proposed to insert, after the words declaring his primacy, and power to feed, rule, and govern the Church, these words, "According to Scripture and the writings of the saints." ("Latin Christianity," by Milman, vol. viii., p. 46 (note).) But to this the Greeks could not, of course, consent without surrendering everything. They could easily see that the proposition had the stamp of trickery about it.

Finally, however, a treaty was agreed to wherein the words proposed by the pope were so changed as to express the idea that the pope had the power, as the head of the Church, to govern it, according to the acts of ecumenical councils and the canons of the Church. To this we must refer presently, in order to see what its precise meaning is, since it is the basis of the papal claim of infallibility; but, whatever its meaning is, it was the best the pope could do. It may be fairly supposed that he was only reconciled to it in that form, because he saw the possibility of so perverting its terms as to base the claim of infallibility upon it and his own superiority to councils; especially if the Greeks should withdraw from it, and he should be left alone as the only contracting party authorized to interpret its meaning. At all events, he soon found himself in this position; for the Greek Christians at Constantinople, when they learned what had been done, disagreed to and repudiated the treaty of settlement, and thus the effort at union proved abortive, and the compact made at Florence fell to the ground. This left it, of course, entirely worthless for all practical purposes, unless the pope could secure influence enough to gather up its repudiated provisions and impose them upon the Latin Christians as the law of the Church, in opposition to the decrees of Constance and Basel; in other words, unless he could reduce the Latin Christians to such a degree of submission and obedience as to compel them to accept their faith, not from their own legally constituted and assembled councils, but from the heretical Greeks, merely because, by all sorts of art and intrigue, they had been enticed into an agreement which, if it did elevate the pope, most certainly humiliated the Latin Church.

There is nothing to justify the assertion that the Latin Christians assented to these proceedings at Florence. Those of them who attended the council held there under the auspices of the pope, were only such as he had succeeded in drawing away from Basel. The agreement made there took the form of a consular decree only because it was signed by those who followed the pope. Of the Latins, these were, besides the pope, only eight cardinals, two patriarchs (of Jerusalem and Grado), two bishops, ambassadors of the Duke of Burgundy, eight archbishops, forty—seven bishops, four heads of orders, forty—one abbots, and the Archdeacon of Troyes, ("Latin Christianity," by Milman, vol. viii., p. 47.) only *one hundred and thirteen* in all; while the council at Basel was attended by the recognized representatives of all the remainder of the Latin Christians, and had the sanction and approval of the Roman Catholic princes.

Consequently, when the Greek Christians refused to be bound by the treaty, the only support it had left, in all Christendom, was this schismatical faction of the pope. The Council of Basel still represented the Church, and continued its sessions. It reaffirmed its previous decree, and that of Constance, wherein it was declared that a council was superior to the pope, and more formally than before deposed Eugenius IV. When this formal act of deposition was passed, there were thirty—nine prelates and nearly three hundred ecclesiastics present about three times as many as signed the decree at Florence! They declared him “disobedient to the commands of the universal Church; one that persists in his rebellion, a *violator and contemner* of the Holy Synodical canons; a disturber of the peace and unity; one that gives open scandal to the whole Church—simoniacal, perjured, incorrigible, schismatical, heretical, etc.” This was, undoubtedly, the act of a large majority—in fact, of nearly the whole—of the Latin Christians, speaking in the only mode then known to their Church organization.

Du Pin says that at that time “some prelates” were with the pope at Florence, and we have seen that their number was insignificant compared with that of those who remained at Basel. Consequently, the Baselian fathers, after having deposed Eugenius IV., were compelled to elect a successor to him. They did elect Felix V. The combat now thickened, and bulls and other papal weapons were hurled, from side to side, with no less fierceness than velocity. Pope Eugenius flung his bull at the head of Pope Felix, declaring him heretical and schismatical, and excommunicating all his supporters—that is, condemning to eternal perdition all the Baselian fathers and the bulk of the Christian world—for daring to deny to him the right to clothe himself in the robes of deity. The Council of Basel retaliated by declaring the bull null, and signified their contempt of it by consecrating Felix as pope.

The struggle waxed warmer and warmer. Deputies from each party were dispatched to secure the approbation of the princes. The Kings of France and England hesitated, and desired a compromise. Arragon, Hungary, Bavaria, Poland, and Austria took the side of Felix and the Baselian prelates. The universities of Paris, Germany, and Cracow wrote theses acknowledging Felix, and maintaining the authority of councils above popes. Another general council was suggested, but neither party would agree to it. And the consequence was that the schism thus created by Eugenius in attempting to force the recognition of his infallibility upon the Church, and to destroy a legally convened ecumenical council, lasted until his death, which occurred after the councils of Basel and Florence had both terminated their sessions.

Nicholas V. was elected pope by those who espoused the cause of Eugenius. Being of a meek and peaceful temper, he agreed to the suggestions of the princes with a view to compromise. The final result was such an accommodation of the difficulty upon the conditions that Felix should resign and be made chief cardinal, that all the excommunications and censures on both sides should be revoked, and that “also the decrees, dispositions, and regulations they had made should be confirmed.” This arrangement was carried into effect, and Nicholas V. issued a bull accordingly, approving the decrees of both the Council of Florence and that of Basel!

What there was, in all these proceedings, indicating the presence and special direction of the Holy Spirit, it would be hard to find. The conduct of Pope Eugenius was characterized by violence, passion, malevolence, and perfidy—an entire absence of Christian charity and love. If he had lived, the schism would, in all probability, have inflicted still greater injury upon the Church. But it was healed, for the time being, by the pacific temper of Nicholas V., and comparative quiet was restored. *

* Du Pin, vol. xiii., pp. 28-56; Cermenin, vol. ii., pp. 118-120; "Church of France," by Jervis, vol. i., pp. 94- 98; "Latin Christianity," by Milman, vol. vii., ch. xii., vol. viii., chh. xiii., xiv; "Mosheim's Church History," by Maclaine, vol. i., pp. 416-418.

The Roman Catholic Church rejects the Council of Basel, and accepts that of Florence as ecumenical. The latter, manifestly, has no just claim to that character; or certainly less claim to it than the former, which undoubtedly represented a majority of the Latin Christians. It has been suffered to acquire this character, however, because the popes and those passively obedient to them have been permitted to make up the history of the Church; and they, favoring their own infallibility, and desirous of the power it gives them, have rejected the Council of Basel, which really represented the Universal Church, and the sentiments of the Christian world, far more than did the papal faction at Ferrara and Florence. The assembly at Florence can not be called ecumenical in any proper sense, because there is nothing to show that it represented the Universal Church.

That at Basel was ecumenical for a time, at all events, even according to the papal rule. When Eugenius solicited delay in its proceedings, and agreed, in consideration of its being granted, that he would sustain its action and approve its decrees, he knew that the decree declaring the council above the pope had been passed. He must be understood, therefore, as having by this act made that decree a part of the law of the Church, according to the recognized forms of procedure. True, he supposed he could change it, and resorted to falsehood and intrigue to do so. But having failed in this, the only course left him was to assemble a seceding faction of his own, entice the Greeks to join it, cause it to enact a new decree, and then employ all the authority of the papacy to bring the Church to accept it as an ecumenical council. Even this, however, does not help the supporters of the pope's infallibility out of the difficulty—for Pope Nicholas V. afterward approved the decrees of the Council of Basel, which, according to their theory, makes them a necessary part of the faith, whether the council enacting them was ecumenical or not. But he also approved those of Florence, which, of course, had been also approved previously by Eugenius.

What then? There is but one common—sense view of it: if Florence decreed in favor of the pope's infallibility and Eugenius approved it, Basel decreed against it and Nicholas approved that! Were they both infallible? If so, then the act of one was what the lawyers would call a set-off against that of the other. If neither was infallible, then the act of Nicholas, being the last in point of time, must be held to be of more weight than that of Eugenius; or else Nicholas must be put in the singular attitude of having approved two decrees directly in conflict with each other! This would certainly require infallibility—though the integrity of such an act might well be questioned.

But if it be conceded that the Council of Florence was ecumenical, and that it did regularly enact a decree in reference to the primacy of the pope, as the advocates of papal infallibility now insist, we are brought to the point of inquiring what that decree in point of fact was—whether it went to the extent asserted, or stopped short of it.

If the reader will keep in mind the circumstances already detailed explaining the difficulty the pope encountered in bringing the Greeks to enter into the treaty in reference to his primacy, it will materially aid him in satisfactorily interpreting what follows.

The Jesuits regard what they call the decree of the Council of Florence as furnishing one of the strongest arguments in favor of their theory of infallibility; and Weninger, true to their cause, gives the whole of it in these words:

“We define that the Apostolic See, that is, the Roman pontiff, has the right of primacy over all the churches of the world; that the Roman pontiff is the successor of St. Peter; that he is the very vicar of Christ, the head of the whole Church, the father and teacher of all the faithful; that in the person of Peter he was entrusted by our Lord with full power to feed, direct, and govern the whole flock of Christ. Such is manifestly the doctrine taught by the acts of the general councils, as well as by the sacred canons.” *

* “Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope,” by Weninger, p. 148. He gives the Latin thus: “Definimus sanctam Apostolicam sedem et Romanum Pontificem in universum orbem terrarum primatum tenere, et ipsum Romanum Pontificem successorem esse Beati Petri, principis Apostolorum, et verum Christi vicarium, totiusque ecclesie caput, et omnium Christianorum patrem et doctorem existere, et ipsi in Beato Petro pascendi, ret gendi et gubernandi universalem ecclesiam a D. N.J. C. plenam potestatem traditam esse, quemadmodum etiam in gestis (Ecumenicorum Conciliorum et in Sacris Canonibus continetur.” See, also, “Delineations of Romanism,” by Elliott, London ed., by Hannah, p. 607 (note).

Weninger’s book is so full of errors and misquotations as to excite suspicion against the integrity of much that he has said; and where we find him differing with such an author as Du Pin, if the question rested alone between them, the preference should be given to the latter. There is no difficulty about that part of the decree which precedes the power to feed, etc. Du Pin makes it confer the primacy, with “power to feed, to rule and govern the Catholic Church, as it is explained in the acts of ecumenical councils, and in the holy canons;” thus confining it within the limitations prescribed by the latter. But Weninger goes further, and represents the decree as conceding the primacy as an independent and substantive power, with no limitations whatever upon it; and then, beginning with a new sentence, makes it declare that “such is manifestly the doctrine taught by the acts of the general councils, as well as by the sacred canons.”

This rendering of the decree is false at the very point upon which its whole meaning turns. The decree is in a single sentence, as the Latin in the last note will show. To be understood correctly, all its parts must be taken together, not detached. But Weninger very deliberately divides it into two sentences. He takes out the *comma* after the words “traditam esse,” in the original, and substitutes a *period* for it—thus closing the sentence. And then he translates the remainder (“quemadmodum etiam,” etc.), so as to make it mean, independently of what had preceded, that the same degree of primacy which the first sentence conceded was conferred by the councils and the canons. A school-boy ought to detect this false translation, as almost any one would with the original before him. The words “quemadmodum etiam” mean “as also,” and cannot be tortured into such a meaning as Weninger has given them.

Retaining the comma, then, in its proper place, and leaving the decree one continuous sentence, as it is in fact, the last clause should be rendered, “as also is contained in the acts of the ecumenical councils and the sacred canons;” making the two clauses dependent upon each other, and the last referring to and qualifying what precedes it. This meaning is equivalent to that given by Du Pin, “as it is explained

in the acts of the ecumenical councils and in the holy canons;” and substantially like that given by Milman, “according to the canons of the Church.” (Milman, vol. viii., ch. xiv., p. 46.)

The true meaning undoubtedly is this: that the power and primacy of the pope exist just in that degree which is expressed by the councils and in the canons. To have declared the pope infallible, and to have followed it up with the assertion that he was also so declared by the councils and in the canons, would have been false in point of fact—for the very last preceding ecumenical council had decreed precisely the reverse, and there was no existing canon to that effect outside the “constitutions” of the popes themselves. And, besides, the Greeks, who were jealous of Rome, would manifestly not have agreed to a treaty of union with the Latin Church if it—had been understood that they thereby surrendered their independence within their accustomed jurisdiction, and subjected themselves entirely to the dominion of an infallible pope at Rome.

Construing the treaty in the light of the actual relations then existing between the two churches, it must be understood that the Greeks intended to concede nothing more than they had conceded at the first Council of Constantinople; that is, that the Roman Church had the primacy of honor, and nothing more, except such authority as had been from time to time granted by the councils and the canons. *

* A distinguished British prelate, Monsignor Capel, in defending the Church against the attack of Mr. Gladstone, quotes this decree of the Council of Florence to prove that the pope’s infallibility was established by it. He shows the falsity of Weninger’s translation, and substantially confirms that of Du Pin, by giving the words “quemadmodum etiam” their true rendering. He thus quotes the latter part of the decree: “the full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the Universal Church: as also is contained in the acts of the ecumenical councils and in the sacred canons.”—New York Tablet, December 12th, 1874, p. 450. But he commits an error also in this: that he, like Weninger, takes out the comma, but substitutes a colon for it thus designing to show that the words which follow have no necessary dependence upon the previous part of the sentence. He does not pretend to any such translation as that given by Weninger, although, by this introduction of a colon, he evidently intends to convey the same idea, which does violence to the language of the original.

The Rev. Dr. M’Glynn addressed a large audience in the hall of Cooper Institute, New York, December 27th, 1874, in what is called an “eloquent answer to England’s fallen statesman!” After such reckless statements as, that the pope presided, by his legates, over the Council of Nice; and over all subsequent councils, either in person or by his legates, he quotes the decree of the Council of Florence in the precise words of Weninger—from whose book he probably took it, without looking to see whether it was truly or falsely given. He also refers to the language of the pope’s legate in an address to the Council of Ephesus, in 430, to show that the legate claimed infallibility for the pope, and that the council acquiesced in it; whereas the fact is that the Council of Ephesus was convoked by the Emperor Theodosius, was presided over by Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria, and decided the controversy upon which it was called to act by deposing Nestorius, before the arrival of the pope’s legates!—Du PIN, vol. iii., pp. 195-201.

During the remainder of the fifteenth century, after the proceedings at Florence had ended, the popes were undisturbed both in the claim and exercise of authority, except as they brought themselves in contact with princes. But their efforts to have it accepted as universal were in no manner slackened. Under the influences exercised by them the discipline of the Church had become so relaxed that, in 1512, the Fifth Lateran Council was convened by Pope Julius II. to provide, in some effective mode, for its re-establishment. And this brings us to the inquiry whether or not papal infallibility was so decreed by this council as to make it binding upon the whole Church. This cannot be decided

satisfactorily without understanding also the true character of that council, and the circumstances which led to it.

At the time of the Council of Basel the French Church occupied an anomalous position toward the papacy. Realizing that the popes were endeavoring to encroach upon its ancient liberties, and that to concede to them superiority over general councils would enable them to do so, it moved with as much caution as possible, consistently with the preservation of its boasted independence. Therefore, the King of France, Charles VII., instead of giving an open adhesion to the Baselian decrees, favored a compromise of the disagreement between the two councils—Basel and Florence rather than an open rupture. At the same time, he was unwilling to concede to the pope his asserted supremacy. Finding, however, that both parties were driven to extremities—each anathematizing the other as schismatical and heretical—no other course remained to him but independent action. Accordingly, he assembled a national council at Bourges, in 1438, by which was promulgated the “Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges,” which not only asserted the right of councils to legislate for the Church and to control the pope by its canons, but went even further, and insisted upon the authority of a national council of France to legislate for the French Church. Thus, upon the vital question out of which the issue between the two rival councils had arisen, the French Christians took the side of the Baselian fathers, maintaining the decrees of the Council of Constance; but from motives of expediency merely they refused to recognize the—deposition of Eugenius, and rejected the claims of Felix V.

These contradictory movements had their origin in state policy far more than in the necessities and interests of Christianity. These latter were of secondary consideration both with the pope and the king—the principal motive with each being the acquisition of temporal power. The pope, of course, was deadly hostile to the “Pragmatic Sanction,” while the king was determined to maintain it. The former and his adherents insisted that, by virtue of his supremacy, he had the power to revoke the authority of the Council of Basel, and that, although it was ecumenical at the beginning, all its decrees passed subsequent to his act of revocation were void. On the other hand, the king claimed that the pope’s approval of its decrees previous to the calling of the council at Ferrara made valid that which asserted the superiority of councils; and that as the council was assembled with the assent of the pope, his sanction related to all the decrees passed by it during its entire session. And hence, as the “Pragmatic Sanction” was but a re-affirmance of the decree passed at Basel, therefore it also had the implied, if not express, sanction of the pope. (Jervis, vol. i., pp. 97-99.)

The “Pragmatic Sanction” became the statute—law of France by enactment of Parliament. It was fiercely denounced by several popes in the language of denunciation so familiar to them. But all their efforts to get it out of the way were unsuccessful during the reign of Charles VII. Under that of Louis XI. they were attended with better results so far as the papacy was concerned. This arbitrary monarch, influenced by both papal flattery and threats, revoked the sanction by an imperial decree, utterly disregarding the will of the French Christians and the dignity of France.

Upon the question of his authority to do this, he and the pope were fully agreed—each maintaining the “divine right” of kings and princes to rule without regard to the wishes of the people. But they disagreed upon another point: Louis supposed that the rescission of the Sanction would give him the whole power, as king, to control the Church in France; whereas, as soon as the act was consummated, the pope claimed all this power for himself, and so exercised it as to sow the seeds of corruption

broadcast all over France, and to cause both him and the king to be held in contempt by the French Christians. Parliament now interfered, and declared the king's act of revocation illegal, which left the principles of the "Pragmatic Sanction" in force.

Yet the restoration of the papal authority consequent upon the conduct of the king had produced such results that the French Church became paralyzed by the blow. This paralysis continued until the reign of Louis XII., who formally re—established the Sanction. Julius II. was then pope, and immediately assumed a hostile attitude toward the king. This led to remonstrances on the part of the French clergy, who insisted upon a general council to settle over again the points of disagreement. To this Pope Julius would not consent, fearing a repetition of the decrees of Constance and Basel. His refusal induced the King of France and the Emperor of Germany to take steps on their own responsibility to have a council convened.

Having obtained the acquiescence of nine cardinals, these latter called a council to meet at Pisa in 1511. The pope now became both embarrassed and incensed, and, like his predecessor, Eugenius IV., immediately inaugurated measures to prevent, if possible, the re-enactment of the decrees of Constance and Basel the question what was, or was not, the true faith being of far less concern to him than the gratification of his ambition. For this purpose he called a council at Rome, which would be more under his control than that at Pisa, and summoned the prelates who had appointed the latter council to attend his, at his Palace of the Lateran, in 1512. He threatened to degrade them of their dignity, and deprive them of their benefices, if they did not attend. Disregarding both his summons and threat, they opened the council at Pisa, asserting their right to do it, under the protection of the princes at whose instance they had acted, independently of the pope. It was attended by four cardinals in person, the procurators of three others, two archbishops, thirteen bishops, five abbots, several doctors of law and divinity, and the deputies of the universities of France. This council renewed the decrees of the councils of Constance and Basel, concerning the authority of councils over the pope, and adjourned to meet at Milan, where they endeavored to have the pope to meet with them, in order to decide upon the necessary measures of reform. This he refused, and they at last proceeded to declare him contumacious and schismatic, and to suspend him from the administration of the papacy.

The Council of Pisa then came to an end. And although it had not at any time any authority as an ecumenical council, and only serves to show how large a portion of the Christians of Europe refused to admit the supremacy claimed by the pope, yet its decree suspending the pope was accepted in France, where the king, Louis XII., forbade his subjects any longer to regard Julius II. as pope, or to pay any attention to his bulls. The pope replied by excommunicating the king, putting France under an interdict, and releasing his subjects from their oath of allegiance. And thus the contest between these royal representatives of the "divine right" waxed to an exceeding degree of warmth. (Du Pin, vol. xiii., pp. 17—19; Jervis, vol. i., pp. 100-103; Fleury, livre cxxii., 115—117; *apud* Jervis.)

The council called by Julius II.—the Fifth Lateran—met in Rome in 1512. It was certainly not ecumenical at the beginning, having no juster claim to be so considered than the assemblage at Pisa, unless the pope's claim of supremacy is primarily conceded. The word "ecumenical" has but one meaning—that of universal. Ecumenical councils are designed to give expression to the universal faith, and, therefore, in all the early ages of the Church, they constituted "the highest courts of judicature in all dogmatic discussions." (Alzog, p. 677.) But they obtained that character only by virtue of the fact

that they represented the entire Church; that is, included all the episcopate. If they did not do this, they had no just jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the Universal Church; or, in other words, could not decide questions of faith.

Measured by this rule, the Fifth Council of Lateran was certainly not ecumenical at its commencement, because the whole Church was not represented there. There were no prelates from England, France, Germany, Spain, Austria, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, or any other part of the Christian world outside of Italy; and only those who lived alone upon the favor and patronage of the pope. Du Pin says they were “all Italians,” except some abbots. Thus far, then, it was entirely factious, like that at Ferrara; both factions having their origin in precisely the same motive. Did it afterward become ecumenical? Its original character was not changed during the life of Julius II., although, with it that time, it had declared annulled all the proceedings at Pisa, confirmed the bull against the King of France, and fiercely attacked the Pragmatic Sanction. It had also summoned all its supporters to appear and show cause why it should not be revoked.

At this point, the death of Julius II. occurred, and Leo X. became pope. Being of the princely family De' Medici, of Florence, he entertained more enlarged views than Julius II., and the King of France was encouraged by hopes of a satisfactory reconciliation with him. Accordingly, he sent his ambassadors to the council, and renounced the proceedings at Pisa. The King of Spain and the Emperor of Germany did the same; and the prelates who had assembled at Pisa also attended the council. The French bishops had not yet done so. The king stipulated that they should, but the time was postponed in the latter part of the year 1516, when the council was to hold its eleventh session. Before that time arrived, Louis XII. died, and Francis I. became King of France. With him and the pope the question now became one of diplomacy, the interests of the Church still remaining secondary.

A diplomatic ambassador was sent to Rome, and finally came to a compromise with Leo X., by abrogating the Pragmatic Sanction and substituting the celebrated Concordat of Bologna in its place. Each of the parties to this arrangement supposed himself the gainer—the king by being made the head of the Church in France, and the pope by being enabled to collect annats or imposts in France, which had been denied by the Pragmatic Sanction. The pope exchanged a share of the spiritual right claimed by his predecessors for this temporal advantage.

But France was not as easily reconciled as the king. The Parliament resisted the Concordat, and adhered to the Pragmatic Sanction. The University of Paris did the same. An appeal to a general council was insisted on—that at Rome not being so considered. The king, becoming incensed at this resistance to his royal will, denounced these proceedings as seditious, and undertook to enforce the Concordat by despotic power.

In the meantime the period fixed for the eleventh session of the Lateran Council had arrived, and the session was held without the attendance of any of the French clergy. Nothing had transpired to give it universality, inasmuch as many parts of the Christian world yet remained unrepresented in it. It still retained its original Italian character, and was, to all intents and purposes, the pope's council, and not that of the Church. And yet it was at this eleventh session of the council that a decree was passed which, it is now claimed, recognizes the pope's infallibility. The foregoing facts show, if such a decree

was passed, that it was not binding on the Church as a part of its faith; and the fact that it was not so considered by the Church is fully established by subsequent events.

But no such decree was, in point of fact, passed by the Fifth Lateran Council. The facts are these: the pope issued a bull abrogating the Pragmatic Sanction, affirming the Concordat, and declaring that he had authority above councils, and full power to call, remove, or dissolve them at will. He also renewed the bull of Boniface VIII called *Unam Sanctam*, which asserted the supremacy of the pope over the world, both in spirituals and temporals. When this bull was read in the council, it was “approved by all the bishops” except one, says Du Pin. (Du Pin, vol. xiii., pp. 22-25; Jervis, vol. i., pp. 107, 108; Maclaine’s “Mosheim’s Church History,” vol. ii., p. 9.)

There was no freedom either of discussion or of will. It was simply a strong man, as Leo X. was, commanding and exacting obedience by the superiority of his own will. There was no decree about it—nothing but the simple approval of the pope’s bull. And, consequently, this is to be taken merely as the assent to it by those prelates who were present; which was in no way binding upon those who were not present. The Church, as such, was not represented in the council, and consequently did not assent to its action, whatever it may have been. The French Christians resisted the whole thing, continued to adhere to the Pragmatic Sanction, and to resist the Concordat. And therefore the defenders of the pope’s infallibility can not, with any propriety whatever, insist that the Fifth Lateran Council made it a part of the law of the Church. What was done by the Ecumenical Council of Trent upon this subject is more readily disposed of; although this was the most important of all the councils, and its various sessions were held from 1545 to 1563. In its decree for general reformation it is provided that “they will be obedient to the constitutions of the pope, and of councils, determining that all constitutions of general councils, and of the Apostolic See, in favor of ecclesiastical persons and liberty, shall be observed by all.”

In another decree, which was held back until the final session, and was “never mentioned in any congregation,” it was provided that in all the decrees of reformation made in the council, under the three previous popes, “the authority of the Apostolic See is excepted and preserved.” (“History of the Council of Trent,” by Sarpi, pp. 756, 757.) That this council intended to enlarge the power of the papacy to the utmost extent there is no sort of doubt.

Its final action was mainly controlled by Italian bishops from Rome—the tools of the pope; and they would listen to nothing that limited his power. The French ambassador present, writing to the king, said, “They will give ear to nothing that may hinder the profit and authority of the Court of Rome. Besides, the pope is so much master of this council, that his pensioners, whatsoever the emperor’s ambassadors or we do remonstrate unto them, will do but what they list.” (*Ibid.*, p. 783.)

But it will be observed that neither of these decrees asserts the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility. The most they do is to assert that the Church is to be governed by the constitutions of the popes and the canons of councils. They do not decide, nor did the Council of Trent at any other time decide, which of the two should prevail when the constitutions of the popes and the canons of councils came in conflict. The general terms employed embrace all the councils. And as one canon of the Council of Constance declared that the pope was inferior to a council, and no ecumenical council, as we have seen, has repealed that canon, therefore it is included in the decree of the Council of Trent. Besides, it is said that

the faith never changes—that it never can change. This being true, the canon of Constance was a part of the faith after that council had adjourned; and must have continued so up to the Council of Trent, and could not be changed by it. Therefore, the Council of Trent, while it went as far as it dared to go to give supremacy to the pope, must be considered as denying his infallibility, because they did not affirm it. If they had intended to affirm it, they would have required obedience to him alone, as the late Lateran Council has done, and not to him and the canons of councils conjointly. Requiring the faithful to look to the constitutions of popes and the canon of councils is almost an express denial of the pope's infallibility.

Yet it is true that the Council of Trent did not expressly place any limitation upon the power of the pope. It left it as it found it, but somewhat augmented in strength by the failure to place a curb upon it. While it conceded to the pope the power to interpret its canons, and thereby gave him great control over the faith, yet it did not give him the power to set aside existing canons, or to make new ones. Therefore it stopped short of declaring him infallible. And so Pius IV. understood it when, in 1564, he promulgated the creed, founded upon existing canons, which has been since re-proclaimed by Pius IX. and remained as the faith of the Church up to the late Lateran Council.

That creed requires that interpretation of the Scriptures to be accepted which has “the unanimous consent of the fathers;” and, while it enjoins “true obedience to the Roman pontiff,” it does not concede to him the power to set aside this “unanimous consent” and substitute his own interpretation for it. That remained for the late council, which has so changed the creed as to require it now to mean that the “true obedience to the Roman pontiff” which is now enjoined is to accept that interpretation of Scripture which he, and not the fathers, shall give! Does not this change the old faith, and substitute a new one for it?

Now, it is undoubtedly true that those who, by this change of faith, have elevated the pope above the fathers and all the great councils of the Church, by assigning to him equality with God on earth, have done so because they hope thereby to be able to bring the world back again into that condition in which it was when the popes did exercise the utmost plenitude of power by usurpations they were strong enough to maintain. Every intelligent reader knows what that condition was; but it is nowhere more graphically portrayed, in so far as the popes were concerned, than by the greatest of Italian historians, who was a personal observer of the passing events just preceding the Council of Trent. After enumerating some of the usurpations by which the popes had obtained their ascendancy over princes and peoples, he says:

“Being raised by these steps unto earthly power, they laid aside by little and little the care of souls and of divine precepts: so that setting their affections wholly upon earthly greatness, and using their spiritual authority only as an instrument of their temporal, they seemed rather to be secular princes than priests. After this their care and business was no more sanctity of life, increase of religion, love, and charity toward their neighbor, but armies, and wars against Christians, handling the sacrifices even with bloody hands; but heaping up wealth; but new laws, new arts, new snares to scrape money from all parts. For this end they used their spiritual weapons without respect, and sold things, both sacred and profane, without any shame at all. The popes and the court thus abounding with wealth, there followed pomp, riot, dishonesty, lust, and abominable pleasures: no care of posterity, no thought of maintaining the perpetual dignity of the papacy; but in place hereof succeeded ambitious and pestiferous desires to

exalt their sons, nephews, and kindred, not only to immoderate riches, but to principalities and to kingdoms; bestowing their dignities and benefices not upon virtuous and well—deserving men, but either selling them to those who would give most, or misplacing them upon ambitious, covetous, and impudently voluptuous persons.” (Francis Guicciardini, from the fourth book of his “History;” *apud* Sarpi, pp. 781, 782.)

Chapter XXII. The Papacy Always Exclusive

The Laity and the Church.—They once aid in Election of Popes.—Gregory VII. takes away this Power, and vests it in the College of Cardinals.—His Object is Universal Dominion.—The Papacy necessarily Intolerant.—Never satisfied with Freedom of Conscience.—Condemned in Syllabus of Pius IX.—Denounced when introduced in Austria.—He excommunicates all Heretics.—Magna Carta.—Religious Toleration in Maryland.—The Colony Part of Virginia.—English Supremacy established by Law in Virginia.—The Law extended over Maryland.—Lord Baltimore in Virginia.—He cannot take the Oath as a Roman Catholic.—Obtains Grant from Charles I.—It provides for Religious Toleration in the New Colony.—This is a Necessity to Lord Baltimore.—He cannot settle a Roman Catholic Colony without it.—Charles I. favors the Papists.—Roman Catholic Emigrants to Maryland.—Make War on Virginians found there.—They suppress the Protestants.—Efforts to establish the Royal Authority of Lord Baltimore.—Oath of Allegiance to him.—Offices filled by Roman Catholics.—All Writs run in his Name.—Those who refuse Fidelity to him forfeit their Property.—Their Lands to be seized.—Colonists under Control of Jesuit Priests.—Their Claim of Church Immunities.—Opposition to English Law.—Jesuits never in Favor of Religious Toleration.—The Condition of the Papacy at that Time.—Completely allied with the Jesuits.—Gregory XV.—His Persecutions.—His Influence over Louis XIII. of France.—Urban VIII.—Terrible Persecutions under his Reign.—Cardinal Richelieu and Olivarez.—Persecution of Galileo.—Bank Debt collected by Bull of the Pope.—All the Teachings of the Church opposed to Religious Toleration.—The Legislation in Maryland is only in Obedience to the Charter.—May have had the Assent of Laymen, but not of the Priests or the Church.—Could not have the Assent of Pope Pius IX. now.

IT has abundantly appeared in the preceding chapters that the theory upon which the papal system has been constructed requires *all Roman Catholics to be exclusive, intolerant, and aggressive*. To say that they are not all so, is only to say what everybody knows; but it is no answer to the allegation against the system itself. Those who constitute these commendable and praiseworthy examples are mostly single individuals; but sometimes communities as is frequently found to be the case in the United States. They are, however, generally influenced by their special surroundings, and have never acquired sufficient prominence to impress their sentiments upon those who mold the principles and direct the course of the papacy. The popes have never been influenced by them in any degree since the papal power reached its culmination; but, on the contrary have simply borne with them on account of their general acceptance of the fundamentals of the Roman Catholic faith, and their habit of nonresistance.

For a number of centuries the laity had a voice in the election of the popes, (“Antiquities of the Christian Church,” by Bingham, vol. i., p. 132.) which, of course, made those elected, or desiring to be elected, somewhat circumspect in their conduct toward them. This did not give the people any direct influence over the faith, but rather indirect, by means of that representative feature in the Church constitution which provided for general councils. There was no change in this mode of procedure until the emperors and kings of France, Spain, and Germany, from political motives only, arrogantly asserted the imperial right to select popes obedient to themselves, and to dispossess such as were not so. And when, after severe and long—continued struggles, the popes were enabled to wrench this usurped power from the hands of royalty, they felt themselves under no obligation to restore the ancient authority of the people; because, by that time they had become so inoculated with the sentiments of imperialism themselves, that they did not consider the people as having any rights whatever in matters of so much importance. Insisting that the episcopal order was established by direct appointment of Christ, they claimed for it the power of self—perpetuation; and therefore it became an established

principle of the papacy that, even when the people aided in the election of a pope, they had no right to assume that he derived any authority from them. (“Universal Church History,” by Alzog, pp. 396, 397, 659, etc.)

From this principle it was easy for so ambitious and talented a man as Gregory VII., surrounded by the prevailing superstition of the eleventh century, to deduce others which have since become necessary to the life of the papacy. Engaged as he was in consolidating a vast spiritual despotism, he was sagacious enough to know that his success would be in proportion to the removal of its power and authority from the people. Therefore, he employed his vigorous mind, not only while the confidential adviser of four popes, but more especially after he became pope himself, “to render all authority, civil and religious, dependent on the fiat of the Holy See; to place thrones and miters alike at the papal disposal; and to realize what had long floated dimly before the eyes of preceding pontiffs, an object of desire rather than of hope, the scepter of the universe swayed by the successor of St. Peter as viceroy of the Almighty.” (“Church History,” by Baxter, p. 211.)

Chiefest among the means of consummating this object was the removal of all popular influences from the election of the pope, so that the ecclesiastical constitution should provide for a pure theocracy, with imperial powers. This he accomplished by vesting it exclusively in the college of cardinals, designated and appointed by the pope; by compelling all prelates and laymen to bind themselves, under the most solemn obligations, to the See of Rome; and visiting them with curses, anathemas, and excommunications in the event of their disobedience. So powerful was the influence he exercised upon his age, and so indelibly did he impress his principles upon the constitution of the papacy, that those of his successors who have imitated his usurpations have sheltered themselves behind his great name. And this has been done so frequently, with the apparent acquiescence of the laity, that at last what was originally the conception of overweening ambition has come to be considered as the infallible teaching of God—as an essential part of his eternal truth.

If some of these successors did impair the strength of the system he had constructed by vices which outraged the Christian sentiment of the world, the present pope (Pius IX.), by his exemplary life and piety, has been enabled, in some measure, to will back their losses. He has, at least, done so to the extent of being enabled to turn all his papal artillery upon the liberalizing and tolerant opinions of the nineteenth century, and of finding multitudes of followers who agree with him in the pretense that Hildebrand, no less than himself, was the infallible representative of Christ on earth.

We must no longer look, then, to the laity of the Roman Church for its faith or discipline. They have nothing to do with either, except to obey whatsoever is prescribed to them. And this obedience is required to be so comprehensive and unlimited as to include all that has been in the past, now is in the present, and may hereafter be in the future. Their whole duty is involved in the simple act of submission. Consequently, if there are here and there some of them, or even many, who are liberal and tolerant, and therefore not aggressive, they either hush up these sentiments in their own breasts, or, if they express them, have not authority sufficient to make them felt, if even known, at Rome. The papacy is reached only through the hierarchy, and they are sworn to obey the pope implicitly, and to preserve and extend his royalties. He imparts a portion of his infallibility to them in the execution of their theocratic functions, and through them to the laity in the single act of obedience. The strength of the papacy is by these means left unimpaired, and, in so far as the claim of universal supremacy is

concerned, it is set forth as boldly and defiantly as when Gregory VII. hurled his thunders of excommunication and anathema at the head of the German emperor.

What government has ever existed which has recognized freedom of religious belief and worship while submissive to the authority of the papacy? In all history there is no account of any such. Wheresoever it has been done, the popes have considered it an act of disobedience to them, and dealt with it accordingly. In all the forms of bulls and briefs they have condemned and denounced it as heresy. Pius IX. has done so in his Syllabus and other official papers. When the Austrian Government, in 1855, abolished the Concordat, allowing liberty for all opinions—liberty of the press, of faith, and of instruction in the schools—he characterized the act as inimical to the Church, as “in flagrant contradiction with the doctrines of the Catholic religion;” and, by virtue of power which he claimed to have derived directly from Christ, he declared all the acts and decrees in that respect “null and powerless in themselves and in their effect, both as regards the present and the future.” And he threatened all engaged in their execution with the censures of the Church and with excommunication. *

* See the pope’s allocution, delivered June 2d, 1855, in consistory at Rome, Appletons’ “Annual Cyclopaedia” for 1868, pp. 675, 676.

These threats have been executed by the proclamation of excommunication, in 1869, of all heretics, “whatever their name, and to what sect soever belonging, and those who believe in them, and their receivers, promoters, and defenders;” (*Ibid.*, for 1869, p. 619.) so that the pontifical curse is now resting upon all the institutions of Protestantism, and upon all liberal and tolerant opinions, wheresoever they are to be found in the world.

When, therefore, we talk about what the Church of Rome teaches and allows in reference to freedom of religion, of the press, and of speech, such as is secured by the Constitution of the United States, we must look, not to what is done and said by exceptional individuals, or even by communities of liberal tendencies, but to the pope alone. He is the Church, and absorbs in himself whatsoever power it possesses, in all its height, depth, length, And breadth. The pen of inspiration has instructed us that “God is not a man,” but the pope tells us that *he*, of all the earth, possesses the attributes of God, and must, therefore, prescribe the faith, reward the faithful, and punish the disobedient.

There are two memorable events in history which are sometimes referred to by defenders of the papacy to show that such accusations as the foregoing are unjust and unmerited: the granting of Magna Carta; and the introduction of religious liberty into the Colony of Maryland. If this defense were designed only to show that there had been, and yet existed, numbers of Roman Catholics who approved the principles involved in these great measures, it would be perfectly legitimate, and nobody could object, for that is an undoubted fact. But it is not so limited. On the other hand, it is placed to the credit of the papacy, which is not in any sense entitled to it.

As to Magna Carta, we have seen that the barons of England incurred the displeasure of Pope Innocent III. for extorting it from King John, and that he excommunicated them for doing so; and that he released the king from his sworn obligation to observe it, as he also did several of his successors. We have seen, too, the direct conflict between the principles it expressed and those which pertain to the papal system. The other inquiry—whether the papacy is entitled to any credit for religious toleration in

Maryland—comes more directly home to the people of the United States; which makes the investigation of it of more immediate concern to us.

The Colony of Virginia was settled under several royal charters. That which erected it into “a corporation and body politic” was dated May 23d, 1609, and was granted by James I. The district of country included within the colonial limits extended “from sea to sea, west and northwest,” and included all of what afterward became the Colony, and is now the State, of Maryland. One of the purposes expressed in this charter was “the conversion and reduction of the people in those parts unto the true worship of God and Christian religion.” And inasmuch as the true worship was at that time in England considered to be that provided by the Established Church, in opposition to that of Rome, King James further said,

“We should be loath that any person should be permitted to pass that we suspected to affect the superstitions of the Church of Rome.”

It required also that the English oath of supremacy should be taken by all the colonists. By these provisions of the charter, therefore, Roman Catholics were positively prohibited from settling in any part of the colony. Other and subsequent provisions were designed to enforce this exclusion. By royal instructions issued to the governor in 1621, the colony was required “to keep up the religion of the Church of England as near as may be.” In obedience to these instructions, the General Assembly of Virginia—the first that ever met in the United States—enacted a law providing

“that there be uniformity in our church as neere as may be to the canons in England, both in substance and circumstance; and that all persons yield readie obedience unto them under paine of censure.” (Old spelling of some words.)

This was also repeated in 1629 and 1631, before the charter to colonize Maryland had been granted to Lord Baltimore. (“Henning’s [Virginia] Statutes at Large,” vol. i., pp. 97, 98, 114, 123, 149, 155.)

The condition of things existing in the Colony of Virginia was not at all satisfactory to the king. The first legislative assembly had met at Jamestown in 1619, each borough sending a representative. The impulse given to popular freedom by this means excited his apprehension that the monarchical principles he desired to plant in the New World might be endangered. He manifestly feared that if the right of representation in the Colonial Legislature were granted to the people, it would, in the end, result in organizing a formidable opposition to his own authority. And being a monarchist in the strictest sense, he therefore resolved at once to bring the colonists into complete subjugation. For this purpose he resorted to several wrongful and oppressive measures. He commanded that a number of felons, unfit to remain in England, should be transported to the colony; and also made the most grinding exactions upon the people in order to draw off their wealth, and thereby to supply his own treasury. This injustice, which violated the chartered rights of the colonists, they could not endure without remonstrance; and when they did undertake to set forth their grievances, and to appeal to the settled principles of the law of England for protection, they were regarded as seditious.

This furnished a pretext, in 1622, for an attempt to destroy the charter. The first step to this end was to establish in England the entire governing power of the colony, and thus deprive the people of all agency in making their own laws and managing their own affairs, which was secured to them in the charter as

pertaining to “the privileges, franchises, liberties, and immunities” which belonged to all Englishmen. This scheme of government, as a substitute for the charter, was laid before the colonists, who were told that if they did not accept it, they would be crushed by the power of the king. Not at all intimidated by this threat, they rejected the proposition with indignation, being resolved to cling to their chartered rights. The king, therefore, found it necessary to resort to a more direct measure. He caused a writ of *quo warranto* (Latin meaning, “by what warrant?”) to be issued from the Court of King’s Bench in England to declare the charter forfeited. The colonists could not, of course, make any successful defense to this, for the king could easily find the means, in those days, to bring the judges over to the royal side if they were otherwise inclined.

The English law gave the court no jurisdiction over the whole body of colonists, and they rightfully decided to treat whatever judgment should be pronounced against them as null and void. The judgment of forfeiture was arbitrarily rendered in 1625, just before the death of King James, but no steps were taken toward its execution before that event. Charles I., who succeeded him, took up the matter where his father had left it, and in one of his proclamations assigned all the misfortunes in the colony to what he called “corporate democracy.” His principal effort, therefore, was to destroy entirely the representative form of government inaugurated in 1619. To this end he appointed a governor and council with powers as royal as he himself possessed. But the people were determined not to give up their General Assembly, and it continued to meet at regular periods, passing such laws as we have seen, in strict conformity to those of England. They cherished the rights of Englishmen too fervently to surrender them at the mere dictation of the royal power, or in obedience to the illegal judgment of a court subservient to it.

In 1628, Lord Baltimore visited Virginia. This nobleman was a monarchist both from inclination and education. He was so devoted to the interests of the king as to have become a special favorite of both James I. and Charles I. He had many excellent and ennobling qualities, which made him exceedingly popular. In 1624—only four years before—he had become a Roman Catholic. When he reached Virginia he found the English Episcopal Church established by law, and also a legal requirement that, in becoming a citizen, he should take the English oath of supremacy. This he could not do consistently with his new religious convictions. He was willing, as all the papists in England were, to take the oath of allegiance, which involved merely the support of the kingly prerogative, but not that of supremacy, which denied the authority of the pope. Consequently he did not unite himself with the colonists. But being delighted with the climate, soil, and scenery about the Chesapeake Bay and Potomac River, he formed the design of obtaining a charter from King Charles authorizing him to make a settlement there, in entire disregard of the rights of the Virginia colony. Upon that question, being a monarchist, he, of course, took sides with the king—both having an equal disregard for the rights of the people when they came in conflict with the prerogatives of royalty. He relied manifestly upon his well-known devotion to these principles for his success with the king. And in this he was not disappointed; for Charles was not only disposed to oblige him personally, but was resolved upon punishing the seditious colonists of Virginia, notwithstanding they rigidly maintained the religious worship established by the laws of England.

The charter to Lord Baltimore was granted in 1632; but in consequence of his death it was transferred to his son, who took his title. It granted the tract of country lying on both sides of the Chesapeake Bay

and north of the Potomac, up to the fortieth parallel of latitude—the whole of which was within the limits of the Virginia colony. *

* “History of Virginia,” by Howvison, vol. i., p. 270; “History of the United States,” by Bancroft, vol. i., pp. 238-241.

This charter contained the celebrated provision that while Christianity was made the law of the colony, yet no preference should be given “to any sect,” but “equality in religious rights, not less than in civil freedom,” was secured. (Bancroft, p. 243.) This constitutes the groundwork of the Roman Catholic claim of toleration in the United States. A critical examination of it will demonstrate not only that this claim is groundless, but also what was understood by Charles I. and the elder Lord Baltimore by giving security to civil freedom in Maryland—in other words, by granting the right of legislation to those Roman Catholics who should emigrate to the colony.

The English oath of supremacy had been established one hundred years before the date of this charter. This oath required that every subject should recognize the king as the supreme head of the Church of England; that the Pope of Rome had no more jurisdiction than any other bishop; and that obedience to him should be renounced. (“History of England,” by Rapin, vol. vii., p. 480.) This was not only the law in England, but it was also the law in the Colony of Virginia. It was because of this that Lord Baltimore could not become a citizen of the latter colony. Now when this, and the further fact that the territory granted to him was within the limits of the Virginia colony, are observed, it will be seen that he could have accomplished no possible object designed by him without a provision for religious toleration in his charter. He was about to undertake a settlement in a region of the New World where there was an existing form of religion established by law, which, in his conscience, he entirely repudiated—which he had renounced only four years before as contrary to the law of God, and which, if he remained true to his religious convictions and papal obedience, he would feel it his duty not merely to oppose, but to exterminate. Like other papists of that day, and the advocates of the pope’s infallibility now, he favored religious toleration in a Protestant country that is, such toleration as would enable him to maintain the cause of the papacy in the midst of Protestantism as the means of rooting out the Protestant religion, and securing the establishment of the Roman Catholic by law. His only means of getting rid of the oath of supremacy in the Colony of Virginia was to get the king so far to set it aside, without authority of law and by his royal will alone, as to allow him to colonize part of the territory with Roman Catholics—this being, at that time, the only possible means of introducing that class of population into the colonies. Hence, the provision for religious toleration was a matter of necessity, not choice, with Lord Baltimore.

On the part of the king there was one principal object to be attained by the establishment of the new colony. As Lord Baltimore was a thorough monarchist, it was expected of him that he would check the tendency among the Virginia colonists toward popular liberty, and so employ the right of legislation granted to the Maryland colonists as to preserve the monarchical principle; which Charles well understood to be an established feature of the papal system. This object was so near the heart of Charles that he was quite willing that the established religion should be sacrificed, if it could be done in no other way. Although he had no power by the law of England to set aside the oath of supremacy, yet he

could even venture to defy the authority of Parliament in order to punish the Virginia colonists for daring to assert their just rights as Englishmen.

He may, indeed, have had, and possibly did have, another motive beyond this: the subversion of the English Church in the colonies and the establishment of the Roman Catholic by law. It is very well known to the readers of English history that both Charles I. and his father, James I., while professedly Protestants, were inclined to favor the papists as far as they dared to go. During the reign of Charles the laws were not executed against them, and they were allowed to go unpunished for refusing to take the oath of supremacy, whenever they consented to swear allegiance to him. (Rapin, vol. xi., p. 89.) By this latter oath they assured themselves of his royal favor to such an extent that they contributed greatly toward the general policy of his administration. They were allowed publicly to celebrate mass at Somerset- house, especially under the royal protection.

A papal nuncio resided in London, and his house was their general rendezvous. The queen was an acknowledged and fanatical papist. It is, therefore, quite certain that they materially aided the convocation and Archbishop Laud in implanting in the mind of Charles an intense hatred of the Presbyterians and Puritans. *

* Ibid., vol. x., p. 435; "History of the Rebellion," by the Earl of Clarendon, Oxford ed., vol. i., p. 243.

And as the influence of the latter was beginning, about that time, to create a sentiment in the Plymouth colony, like that in Virginia, in favor of the principles of popular government, it was probably an easy matter for Lord Baltimore to obtain from Charles the charter of 1632. Both of them thought alike upon the political questions likely to be involved in the settlement of the new colony; and these were considered by—Charles as of more consequence than the religious worship established by the English law.

Thus, when all these facts are taken into account, the conclusion is a natural if not unavoidable one—that the insertion of the provision in favor of religious toleration in the Maryland charter was alone for the objects and purposes already suggested. So far as Lord Baltimore himself was concerned, it was undoubtedly a necessity with him. He did not take it in that form because he favored religious toleration in a broad and liberal sense, even if he did so favor it, but because it was the only mode by which he could maintain Roman Catholicism in opposition to the existing law of the Virginia colony. By precisely the same process of reasoning as may have influenced him, Pope Pius IX. is in favor of religious toleration in the United States, but not at Rome; and so with his hierarchy all over the world.

The second Lord Baltimore did not accompany his colonists to America. They were placed under the care of Leonard Calvert, his brother, who arrived in Virginia with two hundred Roman Catholics in 1634. They visited Jamestown, where they were notified by the governor and council that their grant was considered as an encroachment upon the rights of Virginia. (Howison, vol. i., p. 270.) They then sailed up the Chesapeake, and established a colony which they called Maryland, in honor of Henrietta Maria, the Roman Catholic queen of Charles I. Upon Kent's Island, near the present city of Annapolis, they found a settlement of Virginians, already made under the authority of the Virginia charter. They demanded of these that their jurisdiction and authority at Kent's Island should be immediately

recognized. The Virginians not consenting to this, which they considered an invasion of their colonial rights, hostilities were commenced. Their leader was seized by Calvert and his party, tried, and convicted of sedition and other crimes, and would doubtless have been executed if he had not succeeded in making his escape to Jamestown, where he demanded the protection of the governor, who was then Sir John Harvey. No effective steps were taken by him; and he was suspected of favoring the views of the king, and of Calvert also. On this account he became so odious to the Virginia colonists that he was removed by the General Assembly, and sent back to England. But he was restored by the king, who was not disposed to listen to any popular complaints, or to do anything to protect the Virginians. (Howison, vol. i., p. 273.)

The facts thus far stated may be found in the general histories of those times; but any careful student of them will readily perceive that many things are omitted which are necessary to a perfect understanding of the early history of the Maryland colony, especially in so far as religious toleration was concerned. One reason for this is found in the fact that hitherto it has been deemed expedient by Protestants to permit the claim of Roman Catholic toleration to go unchallenged, as there was nothing to be gained by controverting it, and its evident tendency was to keep alive that sentiment in the minds of the multitude of Roman Catholic laymen to whom it is most acceptable. But now, when this claim is set up with such apparent candor, and so much is demanded on account of it, it has become necessary that it shall be more particularly examined and accurately understood. And it is fortunate that we are not entirely without the means of doing so.

In 1655, soon after these events occurred, there was published in Westminster Hall, London, an account of the settlement of the Maryland colony, wherein it was shown, by facts and arguments which could not be easily overthrown, that the patent of Lord Baltimore was illegal, and that under it the younger Lord Baltimore had usurped royal jurisdiction and prerogatives in violation of the laws and liberties of the English nation, and of the just rights of the Virginia colonists. In order to demonstrate this, a relation was given of the leading incidents connected with the rebellion of the Roman Catholic colonists against the existing government organized under the Virginia charter. Some years ago, this account, along with many others connected with our colonial history, was put in an accessible form by a gentleman who, during his life, was greatly esteemed for his erudition as well as for his painstaking in collecting together the materials of our early history. From this source the facts now to be related have been obtained. *

* "Historical Tracts," collected and printed by Peter Force, Washington City, 1838. See tract entitled "Virginia and Maryland; or, The Lord Baltimore's Case Uncased and Answered," etc., vol. ii.

After speaking of the seizure and confiscation of vessels belonging to the Virginians who had been trading with the natives of Maryland for a number of years, under proper and legal authority derived from their Colonial Government, and the invalidity of the Maryland charter, which it was alleged Lord Baltimore had obtained by falsely representing the country as unsettled, it thus speaks of the Roman Catholic colonists:

"And professing an establishment of the Romish religion only, they suppressed the poor Protestants among them, and carried on the whole frame of their Government in the Lord Proprietaries name; all

their Proceedings, Judicature, Trials, and Warrants, in his name, Power and Dignity, and from him only; not the least mention of the Sovereign Authority of England in all their Government; to that purpose, forceably imposing Oaths (judged illegal in a Report made by a Committee of the Council of State, 1652), to maintain his royal Jurisdictions, Prerogatives, and Dominions, as absolute Lord and Proprietary, to protect chiefly the Roman Catholic religion in the free exercise thereof; and all done by yearly Instructions from him out of England, as if he had been absolute Prince and King.” (*Ibid.*, p. 5.)

There is no difficulty in seeing the object and precise nature of the oaths prescribed by Lord Baltimore for all officers and citizens, when it is considered that both by the laws of England and those existing in the colony at the time of his settlement, the English Episcopal was the established Church. And while the practice of religious toleration was compulsory, being provided for in the charter, it is undoubtedly true that these oaths were specially designed to give undue preference to the Roman Catholic colonists—a preference destructive of the equality which the charter was designed to establish. This is one of the requirements:

“And I do further swear I will not by myself, nor any other person directly, trouble, molest, or discountenance any person whatsoever in the said province professing to believe in Jesus Christ, and in particular no Roman Catholic, for or in respect of his or her Religion, nor his or her free exercise thereof within the said province, so as they be not unfaithful to his said Lordship or molest or conspire against the civil Government established under him.” (“Historical Tracts,” collected and printed by Peter Force, Washington City, 1838, pp. 23, 24, 26.)

We must necessarily look to the character of the civil government established by Lord Baltimore, in order to ascertain the obligations imposed by this oath. The oath of fidelity to him required that he should be acknowledged “to be the true and absolute Lord and Proprietary” of the colony; that “true faith” should be rendered to him and his heirs, and that his and their “Right, Title, Interest, Privileges, Royal Jurisdiction, Prerogative, Propriety and Dominion over” the colony should be maintained. (*Ibid.*, p. 25.)

Here was a manifest attempt to substitute his own royal power for that of the king,, to whom all the original colonists were ready and willing to pay obedience. But the same is further shown by the commissions, writs, and processes that were issued. The law of England required all these to issue in the name of the “Keepers of the Liberty of England;” but, in disobedience of this requirement, they were issued in his name—a clear usurpation of royal jurisdiction and dominion. (*Ibid.*, p. 10.)

The plan of government constructed by means of these usurped powers and prerogatives became such that the Protestant inhabitants of the colony who were loyal to England could not conscientiously take this oath, because it imposed the obligation of violating the law of the mother country. Whether that law was right or wrong is not now necessary to be inquired into; it was in accordance with the spirit of that, though not of the present age. It prescribed the line of duty for all English citizens, whether at home or in the colonies, and these Maryland colonists by violating it would have been subjected to prosecutions for sedition and treason. All this Lord Baltimore knew perfectly well, and therefore he prescribed an oath of fidelity to himself of such a nature that a loyal Protestant could not take it, being well assured, at the same time, that the Roman Catholics would all do so. And to show the little favor he was disposed to exhibit toward those who should refuse—if, indeed, he did not design to drive out

the Protestants entirely—he caused a proclamation to be issued to the effect “that all such persons so refusing shall be forever debarred from any Right or claim to the Lands they now enjoy and live on;” that is, their property should be confiscated; and “his Lordship’s Governor” was instructed “to cause the said lands to be entered, and seized upon to his Lordship’s use.” (“Historical Tracts,” collected and printed by Peter Force, Washington City, 1838, p. 35.)

As might well be supposed, the results were just what Lord Baltimore designed they should be, and are fully set forth in this tract. “Papists and Priests and Jesuits” flocked into the colony. “Papist Governors and Counselors, dedicated to St. Ignatius,” filled the offices. The Protestants were “miserably disturbed in the Exercise of their Religion.” A number of “illegal Executions and Murders” occurred. There were “Imprisonments, Confiscations of many men’s Estates, and of widows’ and orphans’, to the destruction of many Families.” Those who would not take the oath were disarmed and plundered. “Popish Officers” were appointed, “outing those” who were previously in office. “Lands and Plantations” were seized and confiscated. And it cannot fail to arrest attention that all these persecutions were visited upon Protestants, while not one Roman Catholic suffered from them! (*Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13, 16, 30, 31.) As for these, they were so favored that if one of them was called “Papish Priest, Jesuit, Jesuited Papist,” etc., the offender forfeited a penalty of “ten pounds!” (*Ibid.*, p. 27.)

The inferior position occupied by laymen in those days should relieve them from any responsibility for these measures. The civil authority of the colony was entirely in the hands of those appointed by Lord Baltimore, who, as it appears, selected Roman Catholic agents exclusively. At that time, in England, the papists were chiefly under the influence of the *Jesuits*, whose vigilance was too sleepless to permit this opportunity of planting their society in the New World to escape them. How far they had the sympathy and support of Lord Baltimore is, of course, not known; but it is undoubtedly true that they were the authors of all these measures in the Maryland Colony, and that they had pretty much their own way there. This appears from a narrative preserved in the Jesuit college at Rome, which is also found among the “Historical Tracts” above referred to. It was prepared by the Jesuit fathers appointed by the superior general of the order at Rome, to superintend the first emigration of Roman Catholic colonists who left England in the fall of 1633.

They went, as it is declared, to “carry the light of the Gospel and of truth where it has been found out that hitherto no knowledge of the true God has shone”—that is, where neither the pope nor popery had been heard of. History has amply shown the kind of light they throw upon the pathway of nations as well as individuals, and the events in the Maryland Colony show that they acted there, as everywhere else, under instructions from Rome. “Bulls, letters, etc., from the pope and Rome”—that is, from the pope and the general of the Jesuits— became familiar to the colonists. (Historical Tracts,” collected and printed by Peter Force, Washington City, 1838, p. 12.)

By means of these the Jesuits became omnipotent in the colony; and in the tract last named they show how successfully they exercised their power. Then, as now, the first object of the order was the acquisition of wealth, with the right to govern and control their property without any reference or obedience to the laws of the country in which they reside. On this subject Father White, one of these Jesuits, reports that when they set tip this claim in Maryland, they were met by those who insisted that the laws of England, which bound the colony, forbade it; and he speaks of them as those “who, too intent upon their own affairs, have not feared to violate the immunities of the Church by using their

endeavors that laws of this kind formerly passed in England, and unjustly observed there, may obtain like force here, to wit: that it shall not be lawful for any person or community, even ecclesiastical, in any wise, even by gift, to acquire or possess any land unless the permission of the civil magistrate first be obtained.

Which thing, when our people declared it to be repugnant to the laws of the Church, two priests were sent from England who might teach the contrary.” And then, in order to show his superior what admirable success he had in resisting this unjust English law, and how all—powerful the order had already become in America, he continues:

“But the reverse of what was expected happened; for our reasons being heard, and the thing itself being more clearly understood, they easily fell in with *our opinion*, and the laity in like manner generally.” *

* “A Relation of the Colony of the Lord Baron of Baltimore,” by Father Andrew White, “copied from the Archives of the Jesuit College at Rome by the late Rev. William M’Sherry, of Georgetown College,” etc.; “Historical Tracts,” by Peter Force, vol. iv., last tract, p. 42.

And thus the Jesuits won their first triumph in the United States. The two priests sent over from England to demonstrate the necessity of obeying the English law were easily converted; the laity were unresisting; the law was trampled under their feet; and they were allowed to acquire, hold, and govern their own property with impunity, and without any responsibility to the civil power. This is precisely the claim now set up by the American hierarchy at the Second National Council at Baltimore, who have again revived, and upon the same soil, the old Jesuit demand of nearly two centuries and a half ago.

If the simple narration of the foregoing facts were not sufficient of itself to prove that the Jesuits in Maryland were only in favor of religious toleration as a means of extirpating Protestantism—which is acknowledged to have been the chief object of their organization—the game they were then playing throughout Europe sufficiently removes all doubt upon the subject.

Those were the days of Popes Gregory XV. and Urban VIII., both of whom strove hard to establish papal omnipotence. Gregory XV. canonized Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits. He organized missions to every country in the world. He founded the society of the Propaganda. He formed an alliance with Roman Catholic sovereigns for the extirpation of the Lutherans and Calvinists. He sent into Bohemia “cohorts of Dominicans, Augustines, Franciscans, Carmelites, and Jesuits,” under Cardinal Caraffa, with a subsidy of two hundred thousand crowns, who attacked and murdered Protestants wherever they found them; who “burned the farm—houses, murdered the farmers, violated girls, polluted young children, sparing those only who called themselves Catholics.

“He sent Cardinal Stein to Moravia, with like cruel and rapacious soldiers, who drove fifteen thousand Moravian brothers from their homes. His Jesuit missionaries, in Bavaria and Saxony, terrified twenty thousand people with the axe of the executioner, until they renounced Protestantism. He prohibited Protestant worship in the Palatinate, and forced the inhabitants to submit to the Church of Rome. His emissaries penetrated to Upper Baden, to Bamberg, Fulda, Eichsfeld, Paderborn, Halberstadt, Magdeburg, Altona, and threatened Denmark and Norway. He made Duke Maximilian of Bavaria Elector of the Palatine, as a reward for his heartless persecutions, which, he said, filled his heart “with a

torrent of delight,” because it gave him assurance that “soon will all the enemies of the throne of the apostle be reduced to dust.” He stimulated Louis XIII. of France to make war upon the Huguenots. Everywhere they went, his legions of Jesuits, Franciscans, and Capuchins preached the extinction of heresy. With the heartlessness of a fiend he wrote thus to Louis XIII., on account of his cruelties to the Calvinists:

“My dear son, the ornament of the universe, the glory of our age, march on steadily in your holy path; cause the power of your arm to be felt by those who know not God; be pitiless toward the heretics; and merit to be seated one day on the right hand of Christ, by offering to him as a holocaust all the children of perdition who infest your kingdom.”

He wrote to the King of Spain “to have no pity on the heretics; to order his governors to establish the Catholic religion by force in the provinces dependent on his crown; to light up the stake; and to leave the Calvinists no alternative but the mass or death.”

Dreading the power of the English people, he changed his tactics in that country, and sought to win James I. by flattery, and by favoring the marriage of his son Charles to the daughter of the King of Spain. He conceived the idea of bringing the whole world into dependence upon Rome by the instruments he was then employing, and of sending these desolating missionaries to the Indies, China, Japan, all Asia, and Africa. It was his fertile and inventive brain which first conceived the thought, just before the Maryland charter was granted to Lord Baltimore, of planting Roman Catholicism in North America by means of Jesuit missionaries. (Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 295, 297.) And to notify the world how it would be governed if he had the power, this infallible pope issued a bull, *Contra Haereticos in locis Italioe*, whereby he ordained that no heretic, under any pretense whatever, should reside in Italy, or the islands adjacent. (“Religion and Policy,” by Clarendon, Vol. ii., p. 530.)

Urban VIII. was a fit successor to Gregory XV. in some respects, while in others he was not. The condition into which Europe was thrown by the violent measures and remorseless persecutions of Gregory was one of convulsion and uncertainty. The Protestants were everywhere seeking places of refuge; and the princes who were obedient to Rome were emulous (ambitious to equal or surpass) of each other in the adoption of measures to extirpate them.

There was no valley in the Alps or the Pyrenees so remote as to furnish them a hiding—place. Spain had almost worn out its strength during the forty odd years of the tyranny of Philip II. by the expulsion of more than a million and a half of Jews and Moors, and the murder of untold numbers of Protestants. Ferdinand II. of Germany had swept over the Protestant settlements of Bohemia as with a besom of destruction. The bloody and unrelenting Alva had desolated the Netherlands. The fires of the Thirty Years’ War were blazing all over Germany. Lutheranism was forbidden in Austria. Hungary was subdued, impoverished, and paralyzed. The indomitable but treacherous Wallenstein was crushing out the spirit of civil and religious liberty with his mighty army. The tramp of soldiery was heard everywhere. James I. and Charles I. were concerting plans, under the dictation of Buckingham and Laud, to turn over England to the papacy. The minor princes everywhere were intimidated.

Nowhere, in all Europe, was there to be found a single conspicuous Roman Catholic, except the great Richelieu, who dared to defy the thunders of Rome; and even he was so impressed with the teachings of the queen-mother, Mary of Medici, that he was as remorseless as his royal master, Louis XIII., could

desire, in spreading consternation and dismay throughout the ranks of the Protestants. He used their swords to further his ambition, but punished them for their heresy. He added them to his armies in order to strike terror into the mind of Urban VIII., and then struck them down to keep within the pale of the Church. He would brook no rival to the king in France, and with his strong arm snapped every cord with which the infallible pope tried to bind him. Olivarez of Spain was a puppet in his hands. He played with kings as with toys. As there was no check to his ambition, so there was no limit to his power. His mighty genius displayed itself in the grandest measures of state policy; and finding that the greatness and glory of France lay through fields of blood, his cardinal robes were not sacred enough in his eyes to cause him an instant's pause in the task of achieving them.

Surrounded by men and events like these, Urban VIII. would have had an insignificant existence had he not possessed the papacy. This position required him, not alone to carry on the persecutions against the Protestants, but to mix himself up with the contests of the princes. Spain was trying to hold Portugal with one hand, and to keep France in check with the other. Urban, afraid to offend either, courted both. He dreaded the perfidy of Olivarez as much as he did the power of Richelieu. Necessity, therefore, not choice, kept him from reaching out the papal arm over the nations as boldly as his immediate predecessor had done; but, nevertheless, he quietly left at work, whenever he was not prevented, all the instruments of papal vengeance which Gregory XV. had sent out. Italy was the only place where his infallibility was recognized, and there it was conceded only from dread of his power. It having been charged against him that he reached the pontificate only by causing some of the cardinals who had opposed him to be poisoned, (Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 299.) and by intimidating others, the Italians were kept in silence by fears of his cruelty.

Hence, in this limited field of ecclesiastical jurisdiction—where his mastery was undisputed, he felt authorized to show, to the fullest extent, what an infallible pope could do when undisturbed in the exercise of his power. The first measure by which he distinguished his pontificate was to set aside a bull of Sixtus V. by inaugurating a shameless system of nepotism, in making cardinals of his brother and two of his nephews, and in rewarding his own family with gifts of money and power. He caused Galileo to be thrown into prison and persecuted because he violated the faith of the Church in teaching the earth's revolution, according to the theory of the heretic Copernicus. He disgracefully converted the papal power into an instrument for extorting money from an orthodox prince, to oblige his nephew, Cardinal Francisco.

The Duke of Parma was largely indebted to the Monte, or Bank, of Rome, as security for which the revenues of the Duchy of Castro were pledged. Cardinal Francisco, desiring to obtain possession of Castro, prevailed upon the pope to summon the duke before him and command the payment of the debt to the bank. The duke was notified that if he did not appear within a fixed time, he would be excommunicated, and the revenues of Castro be sequestered for that purpose. The notice was disregarded, and the duke, knowing the character of Cardinal Francisco and his great influence over the pope, commenced the erection of fortifications to defend his territory in the event of forcible invasion. This the pope held to be an offense amounting to "*crimen laese majestatis*," because it was done without his consent, and he proceeded to pronounce a solemn judgment against the duke. This consisted in fulminating a formal bull, excommunicating him, forfeiting all his dominions, and

absolving all his subjects from their oaths of fidelity. (“Religion and Policy,” by Clarendon, vol. ii., pp. 548-550.)

In this act Urban VIII. went a bow-shot beyond any of his predecessors. With them the practice of excommunicating heretics, releasing their subjects, and taking away their dominions was familiar enough as the exercise of their divine power; but Urban was the first pontiff who employed this extraordinary power to compel an orthodox prince, as faithful to the Church as himself, to pay a debt to a banking corporation! What other than an *infallible* genius could have originated the idea of converting an ecclesiastical bull of excommunication into a *capias ad satisfaciendum*?

When forced, at last, to experience the mortification of defeat in consummating this nefarious scheme, in consequence of the combination of princes to protect the Duke of Parma, he gnashed his teeth in anger, like a madman, and died a miserable and ignominious death; “blaspheming the name of God, and confounding in the same curses the Doge of Venice, the Dukes of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, the French and Spaniards, Protestants and Catholics.” (Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 317.)

The events heretofore related, immediately preceding and connected with the colonization of Maryland, occurred during the pontificates of these two popes; and there is nothing more certain than that neither of them did anything up to that time to counteract the influence of the Jesuits, or to check their career of conquest. Suarez, and Sanchez, and Emanuel Sa, and Bellarmin, and other fathers, had just died, leaving immense volumes of defense as a legacy to the order. Neither the “Augustinus” of Jansen nor the “Provincial Letters” of Pascal had yet been published. The heavy artillery of Port-Royal had not yet been opened upon them. They were holding “high carnival” among the nations; crowding around the courts of kings to subjugate them by their intrigues, bending popes to their will through such generals as Acquaviva, and lighting the torch wheresoever there were victims to be found.

But a few years before, the accursed and infernal Inquisition had been declared “holy” and “universal” by Pope Sixtus V., and no monarch had yet been powerful enough to succeed in mitigating its cruelties. John IV. of Portugal was the only one among the Roman Catholic sovereigns who, at that time, dared to incur the pontifical displeasure by denouncing its ferocities and seeking to destroy it.

Under all these circumstances, it is absurd—the very height of absurdity—to suppose that these Jesuit fathers, White, and Altham, and Brock, and others, who accompanied the first Roman Catholic colonists to Maryland, came over with the purpose in their minds to plant religious toleration and freedom of conscience in the New World. The idea is preposterous; and he who is credulous enough to believe it, is also ready to believe that Gregory VII., and Adrian IV., and Alexander III., and Innocent III., and Boniface VIII., made the service of God the sole motive of their lives, and undertook no efforts to seize upon the temporal scepters of kings.

Whatsoever, then, was done in the Colony of Maryland in favor of religious toleration was done only in obedience to the charter, and against the known and steady policy both of the Church of Rome and the Jesuits. Nobody can justify the intolerance of the Episcopalians of Virginia or the Puritans of New England; and while we may now congratulate ourselves that counteracting influences were planted in Maryland, it should not be forgotten that those who brought them accepted toleration from compulsion, and employed all the arts and cunning of Jesuitism to get rid of it.

Intolerance, it is true, accorded with the spirit of that age, and some allowance—but no apology—is to be made for it on that account. But the first influences that set in against it were Protestant exclusively, not Roman Catholic. Nowhere in the Roman Catholic world could religious toleration obtain a foot—hold. Although great men and laymen of the Church gave it their support, Rome would not permit it, and her fiat was the law of the Church: “when Rome has spoken,” said Augustine,” that is the end of the matter.”

The first legislation in Maryland in favor of freedom of conscience was in 1649, fifteen years after the colony had been planted. Earlier assemblies had enacted laws, but they were not approved by Lord Baltimore, and were, therefore, lost. It was necessary in passing all these that the colonists, while preserving the legal rights of the Proprietary, should, at the same time, be careful to express their allegiance to the English monarch. They had the example of Virginia before them to teach them how necessary it was that their legislation should conform to their charter, in order to avoid a forfeiture. This conformity to the charter was the expression of their allegiance. Without it Lord Baltimore could not legally have approved of their legislation, and the displeasure of the king would have been incurred.

In any aspect of the question, then, the legislation of 1649 was a necessary duty imposed by their fundamental law, and was almost in the language of the charter. It was an act of legal obedience, nothing more. If, apart from this, it had the hearty assent of the Roman Catholic laymen of the colony, that only goes to show, what has often appeared elsewhere, that liberal-minded men of that Church have had courage enough to defy the papacy, in their advocacy of the inalienable natural rights of mankind. To these, if such were the fact, all possible honor is due, and we should not be slow to render it. And even now, in the present aspect of affairs, it may well be left unchallenged; for neither then nor now could religious toleration obtain the sanction and approval of the papacy. It could not have done so then, because Innocent X. was pope, and he, in a pontifical bull, *ex cathedra*, denounced the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War by restoring peace to Germany, and placed every religious sect on an equal footing; declaring it to be “prejudicial to the Catholic religion, to divine worship, to the safety of souls, to the Apostolic See,” and “null, vain, iniquitous.” (“History of Germany,” by Menzel, vol. ii., p. 395; Cormanin, vol. ii., p. 321.)

It could not be done now, because Pius IX. has announced, in his Syllabus of 1864 and elsewhere, that it is in violation of God’s law and the faith of the Church; that Innocent X. and all other intolerant popes were infallible; and that unqualified and unresisting obedience is due both to the doctrines set forth by them, as well as to those which have been set forth by him.

If the Roman Catholic laymen of Maryland, in 1649, were so far removed from the immediate influence of Innocent X. that they dared to give expression to their honest sentiments in favor of toleration, let us cherish their memory with affection. But the immediate question which concerns us now, and which is practical in all its bearings, is this: Are the Roman Catholic laymen of the United States at this time sufficiently removed from the immediate influence of Pius IX. to stand firmly by the honest sentiments of their own hearts, and defend religious toleration at the hazard of incurring excommunication and anathema? If they are—if our free institutions have given growth and strength to their natural love of liberty, and they cherish the hope that they may be preserved as an asylum where Protestants and Roman Catholics may mingle together in harmony, and enjoy whatsoever forms of religious belief their consciences shall approve, then to them also should appropriate honors be given.

And this is the great question to which all our inquiries tend. How it is to be decided, and what shall be the character of the struggle through which a decision shall be reached, is known only to the Searcher of all hearts. The head of the pope no longer wears a crown, but he will tolerate no subjects whose submissive obedience is not the same as if he did. With him there can be no religion without this obedience; there can be no service of God without serving him. If this is to be the religion of the Roman Catholic population of the United States, then the obligation of self-protection will require measures of defense against it. What these shall be it would be premature to discuss until this preliminary question shall have been decided. And this cannot be put off much longer. It is crowding upon us every day, and each demand from Rome increases its proportions.

Chapter XXIII. The Papal Theory of Government

The Papal Theory of Government.—The Kind of Christian State it requires.—The Laws of Theodosius and Justinian.—The Ordinances in France in the Times of her Kings most in Favor at Rome.—No Other Religion than the Roman Catholic allowed.—Heresy made a Crime against the State.—Modes of punishing Heretics.—These Laws required by the Church. The State Heretical without them.—The Protestant System.—Separates the Church and the State.—Is in Obedience to the Example of Christ and the Apostles.—The Harmony they established between the Spiritual and Temporal Powers disturbed by the Popes.—The Consequences of disturbing this Harmony.—Papal Doctrines in the United States.—They subject the State to the Government of the Pope.—How far they do this.—In All Temporals which concern the Faith or Morality.—The Government cannot stand if this Doctrine prevail.—The Extent to which it is carried. It is based upon the Bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII.—“Temporal Monarchy” claimed as Necessary for the World.—Harmonious Condition of the First Christians.—Churches planted in Asia before those in Europe.—The Work well done by the Apostles.—Jerusalem the “Mother Church.”—No Necessity for Another at Rome.—The Consequences of Opposition to the Apostolic Plan.—They lead to the Reformation.—Effect of the Reformation.—Present Efforts of the Papacy to turn the World back.—The Contest in the United States.—Conclusion.

PROTESTANT no less than Roman Catholic Christians assign to the spiritual and temporal powers a common foundation in the order and appointment of God. But they differ with them essentially in the application of this general principle to the civil affairs of government.

The papal theory of government, taking this principle as the starting—point, reaches the following results: that the Church and the State, having this common origin, are bound to extend mutual aid to each other; that the Church, belonging to the spiritual or higher order, is bound to see that both the State and individuals conform, in their laws and conduct, to the law of God; and that, as the two powers are thus united in the common end of obtaining order and holding society together, they should also be so united in their action that the Church, as the superior, may always be in a condition to command obedience from the State, as the inferior. As it regards all those things which do not concern the law of God or the moral well-being of society, the State is left to deal with its citizens, collectively and individually, without any interference from the Church. This is its separate and independent sphere of action. But whenever questions arise which involve conformity to the law of God or of morality, then the Church is bound to interfere and prescribe the rule of conduct both to the State and the individual. This is called the separate and independent sphere of the Church. Correlative obligations arise out of these relations. The chiefest of these is, that when the Church commands what the law of God and morality require, the State is bound to obey, just as each individual is. And if it does not obey, it, like the individual, is subject to whatsoever penalty the Church may prescribe for disobedience. *

* “Politics, or the science which treats of the State, its rights, duties, and relations, presents from its ethical character many points of contact with revealed truth. The principles on which it is based flow from the natural law. They can never, therefore, be in real contradiction with the precepts of the divine and positive law. Hence the State, if it only remains true to its fundamental principles, must ever be in the completest harmony with the Church and revelation. Now, so long as this harmony continues, the Church has neither call nor right to interfere with the State, for earthly politics do not fall within her direct jurisdiction. *The moment, however, the State becomes unfaithful to its principles, and contravenes the divine and positive law, that moment it is the Church’s right and duty, as guardian of revealed truth, to interfere, and to proclaim to the State the truths which it has ignored, and to condemn the erroneous maxims which it has adopted.*”—*When does the Church speak Infallibly?* by Thomas Francis Knox, of the London Oratory, London ed., pp. 70, 71.

In looking through the history of such governments as have been constructed upon the papal plan, we find many illustrations of the manner in which these principles have been practically applied, especially in reference to the infliction of such penalties as the Church has from time to time imposed for the violation of its laws. The codes of the emperors Theodosius and Justinian contain many laws relating to religion, enacted only in obedience to the command of the Church; merely, says Domat, in his great work on the Civil Law, “to enforce the observance of the laws which the Church herself, and the spiritual powers to whom God has committed the care of her, have established, and to protect and maintain the execution of those laws.”

Referring further to these emperors, thus obedient to the Church, and to those kings of France under whose reigns ordinances on religious subjects were passed of the same nature, this same author says, “They add to the authority of the laws of the Church that which God has put in their hands; enjoining, as to what concerns the articles of faith, their subjects to submit themselves to the doctrine of the Church, prohibiting all persons to preach or to teach anything contrary thereto, and enacting punishments against heretics.” (“The Civil Law,” etc., by Domat, London ed., 1737, vol. ii., p. 507.)

These are not called laws of the Church, and, strictly speaking, they are not, because they are not enacted by the spiritual, but by the temporal, authority. They are passed, however, because the Church obliges the State to enact them as a necessary protection to its religion and what it calls its “free exercise,” and holds the State to be heretical if it does not do so. If the laws are passed according to its dictation, then the civil power, being Christian, must be obeyed; but if they are not, then the Church releases all citizens from the obligation of obedience to it, because it is sinful to obey an heretical power. And this is called rendering “unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”

In France, when the papal power was sufficiently predominant to exact obedience to the laws of the Church, it caused the temporal power to be so employed in matters relating to the Church, that sundry laws were enacted which exhibit, in a strong light, the real spirit of the papal system of government. Domat, in defining the policy which prompted them, says it requires “that Catholic princes prohibit within their dominions divisions touching matters of religion, schisms, and the exercise of any other religion except the Catholic alone, and exclude all heretics from it, by inflicting penalties against them as there is occasion.” (*Ibid.*, p. 515.)

Again, speaking of the obligation resting upon the civil magistrate, he says: “It is likewise his duty to employ his authority for enforcing the observance of the laws of the Church, in so far as they contain rules about manners which may regard the public order.” (“The Civil Law,” etc., by Domat, London ed., 1737, vol. ii., p. 516.)

And the same obligation is said to rest upon princes. (*Ibid.*, p. 517.) And then, as a consequence necessarily resulting from this superiority of the Church and inferiority of the State, he says “that no person has a right to revenge the encroachments which the ministers of the Church may make on the rights of temporal princes;” (*Ibid.*, p. 519.) thus exempting the pope, in administering the affairs of the

papacy, from responsibility to any earthly power, and extending or limiting his jurisdiction only as his own discretion shall dictate.

One of these ordinances was in these words: “Heresy is a crime of high treason against the Divine Majesty, whereof one is guilty when he abandons the true Catholic faith, and obstinately maintains an error which the Universal Church hath condemned.” (*Ibid.*, p. 524.)

And another: “They who will not hearken to the Church, which is the pillar of truth, and against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, ought to be treated as heathens and publicans.” (*Ibid.*, p. 625.)

The following modes whereby the progress of heresy was required to be hindered are particularly pointed out: take from heretics the places where they assemble for worship; forbid them from assembling in private houses; remove their ministers into distant parts; “take care that the children of heretics be educated in the schools of the orthodox;” prevent heretics from holding any public office or any honorable employment, or from exercising reputable professions, such as advocates, physicians, or professors in colleges; subject them to corporal punishment; and, finally, put them to death. (*Ibid.*, pp. 625, 626.)

And those guilty of blasphemy were thus dealt with: they were fined for the first offense, but, in the event of frequent relapses, “their lips are pierced with a hot iron, their tongue is cut out, and they are condemned to the pillory, to banishment, or to the galleys,” and, at last, “even to death itself.” (*Ibid.*, p. 627.)

These ordinances were enacted in France during the reigns of those kings who are held in the highest estimation by the papacy, as the most beloved and honored sons of the Church, on account of their obedience to its commands and their devotion to the cause of religion. By means of them, and others of like nature, they caused themselves to be esteemed in Rome as foremost among Christian princes, and placed France in the very front rank of Christian states.

The nation presented to the world a model form of government, according to the papal plan. If it had not passed these laws in obedience to the dictation of the Church, it would have been heretical, and not Christian. And if those who exercised the temporal power had not caused them to be vigorously executed, they would have subjected themselves to the anathemas of the Church. Thus we see the nature and character of the civil institutions for which we are now asked to exchange our own—in other words, what the papacy and its defenders mean by a *Christian* state!

Why are Roman Catholic states required to exhibit their obedience to the Church by enacting such laws as these? Manifestly, because they concern the faith, and the principles involved in them are considered necessary to be believed as a part of it. They are laws for the advancement and protection of religion—rules prescribed by the Church to the State, whereby the State and its citizens are to be held in the line of religious duty, and thus maintain their Christian character. The obligation of obedience on the part of both is the same—the measure of punishment differing from necessity. As the above-named ordinances cannot reach the State, which has no corporeal body to be punished or soul to be damned, it becomes equally heretical with the individual by its act of disobedience, and thereby forfeits its right to exist as a state—because the Church considers it as much a violation of the laws of God for a state to commit heresy, as it does for an individual to commit it. And those who administer its affairs forfeit their right

to do so, because they are guilty of treason against God. Consequently, the Church—that is, the pope—releases the citizens of the heretical State from any further obligation to obey its laws or its heretical governors, and supplies it with such other laws and governors as shall put it back again upon the Christian path!

The Protestant system of government draws a marked and palpable line of distinction between religion and civil policy—between the Church and the State; and while recognizing also their common foundation in the order and appointment of God, it so separates them in their respective spheres of action that neither shall trench upon the jurisdiction of the other, and therefore leaves no question of submission by the temporal to the spiritual authority, and, consequently, none about punishment of the State for disobedience to the laws of the Church. It leaves religion to its influence upon the hearts of individuals, so as to form good dispositions within each one, in order that society may be influenced by the love of justice and right, and the government be enabled, under these influences, to secure the public tranquility.

In this it follows, with strict exactitude, the example of Christ Himself. Before His appearing, the Jewish commonwealth consisted in a union of Church and State the subjection of the temporal to the spiritual power. But He came upon earth to undo this old order of things, and to establish His spiritual kingdom. In order to do this so that it should stand out prominently before the world as something distinct from what had ever existed before, He expressly abstained from exercising His own spiritual power over temporal things, or over any of the affairs of existing governments. So far from doing so, whatever He did was directly opposite to the grandeur and power of a temporal kingdom—of such a kingdom as the papacy afterward built up at Rome. He did not take a single mark of temporal power. He exercised no single function of it. On the contrary, when appealed to by one brother to cause another to divide the inheritance with him, He refused to act the part of judge. (Luke xii., 13, 14.)

To show that it was necessary to His spiritual kingdom that it should exist apart from the temporal power—be separated entirely from it—He left the temporal princes to exercise the latter, and He himself paid strict obedience to them. As God, He caused his earthly parents, Joseph and Mary, to go up to Bethlehem, to be taxed, under a decree from Caesar Augustus; (Luke ii., 1—5.) thereby making even His birth to depend on His obedience to a law of a heathen prince. In order to demonstrate the absolute necessity of disuniting His own spiritual kingdom from the temporal kingdoms of princes, He taught his disciples to render unto the temporal power what belonged to it; and exhibited the manner of doing this by requiring Peter to pay tribute—money at Capernaum, when none was due, and by working a miracle for that purpose. (Matthew xvii., 24—27.) He pointed out the distinction between his spiritual kingdom and the temporal power of princes, by declaring, “My kingdom is not of this world.” (John xviii., 36.)

When He was delivered up to be crucified, He told Pilate that He could have had no temporal power at all against Him, except it were given him from God, (John xix., 11.) and yet did not employ His own supernatural power to release Himself from His enemies and persecutors. When He made His disciples the ministers of His spiritual kingdom, He prescribed to them rules for the government of their conduct, and defined the boundaries of the power He entrusted to them, He did not give them a single iota of power over temporal affairs. And they, obedient to His commands, neither claimed nor exercised any temporal power. On the contrary, they obeyed it, as He had done.

And although the temporal princes opposed them in their ministry, and persecuted them under temporal laws, they practiced obedience themselves and taught it to their followers, performing all the duties of their sacred ministry, without attempting, in any single instance, to break down the authority of the temporal power or to subject it to the spiritual power which Christ had given them. “Taken from among men,” and “ordained for men in things pertaining to God,” (Hebrews v., 1.) they exercised their ministry in spiritual things, without intruding themselves upon temporals, inculcating at the same time, on the part of those who exercised the temporal power, the necessity of their not encroaching upon spirituals. And thus, while they recognized both powers as established by the hand of God, the harmony between them consisted in the performance by each of its own distinctive functions; the spiritual purifying the heart of man and fitting him for all the duties of life, and the temporal conforming to his wants and necessities arising out of the discharge of those duties.

There would have been no disturbance of this harmony but for the establishment and introduction of the canon law of Rome. Nor would even this have done it, had its operations been confined to the temporal things within the territories known as “the States of the Church” of Rome. When, however, the provisions of this law were carried beyond these territories by those kings who held their crowns from the popes and their governments to be “fiefs of the See of Rome,” collisions between the two powers immediately began, and did not end until ignorance and superstition became almost universal, as in the Middle Ages, and the temporal power was subjugated by the spiritual. The same spirit of ambition which incited these popes to stretch out their arms beyond the limits of their Italian possessions influenced them to the effort of making the world a grand “Holy Empire,” with themselves its rulers; and when they so far succeeded as to cause governments to be framed according to the papal (or what they called the Christian) plan, mankind became subject to such laws as we have seen embodied in the ordinances of France, when, under their dictation, that Government was held up as a model for all Christian states!

Thus we see the radical and irreconcilable difference between these two opposing systems of government—the Protestant and the papal. And it is impossible to escape the conviction that the substitution of the former for the latter was not only accordant to the principles recognized by Christ and the apostles, but absolutely necessary to elevate and improve the condition of mankind. So long as but one form of religious faith was tolerated, and all else was regarded as treason against God, popes and princes kept mankind in degrading servitude, by the infliction of the most terrible punishments. *Charity, love, and the mild Christian virtues, so beautifully exemplified in the lives of Christ and the apostles, were dethroned by hatred and revenge.*

And now, when the established, fully developed, and tolerant Protestantism of the United States has carried us forward to the very front rank of the nations, we have those among us who impudently tell us that every step of our prosperity is marked by treason to God, and that they are the chosen and selected vicegerents of the Almighty to bring us back to the obligations of Christian duty. If we rebuke them ever so mildly for their insolence, and protest against their destroying the work of our fathers, they call it persecution, because it denies to them the liberty of striking down whatsoever the pope shall command to be destroyed. If we insist that they shall obey our Constitution in consideration of the protection they receive from it, they tell us that the pope is, to them, a domestic prince, who steps in

between them and it, bids defiance to its injunctions, and sets aside its obligations whensoever he shall deem it necessary to the ends and aims of the papacy to do so.

Even if there were no principle in the Constitution the pope might desire to set aside, the assertion of the right and power to do so should command our most serious attention. But when he fixes his pontifical curse upon the very fundamentals of our Government, and marshals his forces to assail them, it is as much our duty to resist him as it is to defend our lives.

We have sufficiently indicated, in the previous chapters, wherein he has done so, and there is no authority in the Church—whether hierarchical or lay—entitled to gainsay what he has declared. There is no single man in the United States, no matter how high his position in the Church, who has authority to define the principles or declare the purposes of the papacy. He may avow what would seem best to him, under any given state of circumstances; but in doing so he speaks for himself alone. Whenever he speaks for the Church, his individual opinions are of no value, since by the dogma of the pope's infallibility he is required to surrender his will and conscience into the keeping of the pope. The pope is the sole exponent and interpreter of the law of the Church, which he may abrogate or change at his pleasure; and however much he may tolerate, for a time and from prudential motives, the expression of individual opinions contrary to those set forth in the Encyclical and Syllabus of 1864, and other pontifical briefs, from these alone can we derive a just and accurate understanding of the faith and doctrines of the Church. Let us take a single illustration out of the many which are exhibited almost every day.

A late number of *The Catholic World* contains an eloquent article on "Religion and State in our Republic," evidently from the pen of the learned and distinguished editor. Referring to the time when, by possibility, the Roman Catholic population of the United States may "become an overwhelming majority," and endeavoring to remove any cause of alarm among Protestants on that account, he says, "They will never seek to tyrannize over their fellow—citizens, to establish their religion by force, or to compel any one to do those things which are required only by the Catholic conscience." (*The Catholic World*, February, 1875, vol. xx., pp. 624, 625.)

Such assertions as these are not worth the value of a rush—light in showing what the pope would require to be done in the United States if he had an obedient majority to control the Government. Whatever the author of them may think for himself, and however hearty the response they may meet in the minds of intelligent laymen, they utterly fail of any other effect than to delude those laymen and such Protestants as accept them. Measured by the papal standard, they are heretical. By the constitutions of popes, the decrees of councils, the repeated action of Roman Catholic governments, and by the avowals of the present pope, the law of the Church is held to enjoin upon its authorities the duty to extirpate heresy, to destroy every other form of religion than the Roman Catholic, to compel obedience to it, in faith and morals, and to do all this by force, by uniting the Church and the State together, and requiring the State, as in the case of France under her obedient kings, to pass such statutes as shall bring these results about. *And it can only mislead the incautious and unwary to pretend that different results would be sought after in this country*, if the policy of the Government were directed by the pope. The form of Government which the papacy dictated when it had the power to enforce obedience, and none other, would, if it had that power in the United States, spring up upon the ruins of

our Protestant institutions. What was a Christian government in France, acceptable to popes, would furnish the model for the construction of the new government here.

And this writer, perhaps unwittingly, concedes as much in the very next sentence, when he says that “the difficulty lies chiefly in respect to those laws which forbid certain things as contrary to the divine law.” (*The Catholic World*, February, 1875, vol. xx., p. 625.)

Certainly, the difficulty lies just there; because out of it grows the whole controversy about the spiritual and the temporal powers. At that point exists the radical disagreement between the Protestant and the papal systems of government; between the United States Government and that of France when it was a Christian state after the papal model. This difference has been pointed out sufficiently to show wherein the principles of our Government are “contrary to the divine law,” as the pope interprets it; and he must be exceedingly ignorant who does not see that if these were destroyed the Government would fall. All the talk about the necessity of giving to the law an ethical standard is a mere pretext for keeping governments as well as individuals within the circle of moral duty which the pope may choose, from time to time, to mark out.

When he shall prescribe that duty in anything, whether it concerns civil policy or the intercourse of individuals with each other, whatsoever is done to the contrary, by the Government or the individual, becomes heretical, and therefore sinful. In such a case, to which command—that of the Government or the pope—does the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility require the papist to render obedience? This writer in *The Catholic World* answers just as all other ultramontanes do. Setting aside, with entire frankness, all mere “private versions or modifications of Catholicity” as counting for nothing, and going directly to the pope as the fountain—head of all authority in the Church, he says:

“For ourselves, we are purely and simply Catholic, and profess an unreserved allegiance to the Church which takes precedence of, and gives the rule to, our allegiance to the State. If allegiance to the Church demanded of us opposition to political principles adopted by our civil government, or disobedience to any laws which were impious and immoral, we should not hesitate to obey the Church and God. We should either keep silence and avoid all discussion of the subject, or else speak out frankly in condemnation of our laws and institutions, if we believed them to be anti—Christian, or, which is the same thing, anti—Catholic, in their principles.” (*The Catholic World*, February, 1875, vol. xx., p. 621.)

The reader need not be again reminded of the many important principles of our Government, already pointed out, whereby our civil institutions have become, in the view of the papacy, “anti—Christian” and “anti—Catholic.” The avowal here is distinct and emphatic, that to none of these does the papist owe allegiance. If he acquiesces in them for the time being, it is only that strength enough may be acquired, by prudential and cautious movements, to aim effective blows at them when the open battle shall begin.

Dr. Brownson again brings his powerful pen to the support of this theory, and expresses himself with his accustomed boldness and indifference to consequences. Binding us all to an acceptance of the law of God, as the infallible pope shall announce it, he says:

“Under this supreme law the State holds, and this law is the ground and limit of this authority, or of its rights and its obligations. This law is, therefore, the ground and limit of civil allegiance. The civil

power holds all its authority from this supreme law, and, consequently, it has no authority to do or command anything that it forbids, or that is contrary to it. Hence it follows that, if the civil power commands anything contrary to the law of God, its commands do not bind the subject or citizen, and are not only not obligatory, but are to be treated as null and void from the beginning, simply because the civil power has no right to issue them, and the law of God forbids them. Here is the limit of civil obedience, or my allegiance to the civil powers.” *

* *Brownson's Quarterly Review*;" apud *New York Tablet*, January 23d, 1875, p.546. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Savannah, Georgia, has thought fit to throw his official influence against Mr. Gladstone's late pamphlet. His letter to J. G. Bennett, Esq., which appeared in the *New York Herald* of December 20th, 1874, is, to say the least of it, a curious production. Starting out with the wonderfully profound principle of constitutional law, that "our own Federal constitution" declares "unconstitutional any law infringing on the consciences of the people!" he lays down the papal rule to be that, as "in questions concerning conscience" the Church is always present "to tell her children how far Caesar [the State] may go without usurping to himself the things that are God's," therefore the Roman Catholic citizen of the United States owes no allegiance to any principle of the Government which is condemned by the Church or the pope! If, according to him, the courts were to pass upon a law involving a question of conscience, the pope would furnish the only proper rule of decision!—*New York Tablet*, December 26th, 1874, p. 485.

There is abundant evidence to show, besides what has been embodied in the preceding chapters, that these are the doctrines of religious faith set forth by the recognized authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, both in the United States and in Europe. A single additional reference, however, must now suffice, leaving the inquiring reader to search out others, if he desires them, for himself.

A work, considered exhaustive, has recently appeared in reply to "Janus;" the main object of which is to support and justify the claim of the present pope of power over the government of civil society. He quotes from a letter of Pius IX. to show that the Church "requires of those clothed with political power that they should conform to those laws [of morality], and, indeed, such as she proclaims them. Were she to abandon this postulate, she would then renounce her very mission." ("Anti-Janus," by Hergenrother, p. 37.)

He justifies the doctrines set forth by the Syllabus of 1864, in a whole chapter; and thus denounces that principle of our Government which treats all churches with an equal degree of respect: "To prescribe an equal respect for another religious community [not, observe, for the persons of its members] is to require that the doctrines of the true Church should be placed on the same level with the opinions of other religious bodies." (*Ibid.*, pp. 39, 40.) He says, "The pope can do nothing against the divine law." (*Ibid.*, p. 42.) He insists upon a union of Church and State. (*Ibid.*, p.44.) He admits that the powers of the pope have heretofore been enlarged by "forgeries," and yet asserts them to exist to the same extent as those forgeries were designed to stretch them. ("Anti-Janus," by Hergenrother, ch. iv., p. 144.) But these are comparatively immaterial by the side of his justification of the bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII., the doctrines of which have been already shown to be the necessary consequence of papal supremacy.

The distinctive principles proclaimed by this bull, and now a part of the canon law of the Church, he sets down as follows: first, "it is necessary to salvation that every man should submit to the Roman pontiff;" second, "this is a necessary consequence of the dogma of the papal supremacy;" third, "it

condemns the assertion by the State of any power over ‘church property;” fourth, “the temporal power of Christian princes does not exempt them from obedience to the head of the Church;” fifth, “the material sword is drawn for the Church, the spiritual by the Church;” sixth, “the material sword must co—operate with the spiritual and assist it;” seventh, “the secular power should be guided by the spiritual as the higher’;” eighth, “the spiritual has the preeminence over the material;” ninth, “the temporal power is subordinated to the ecclesiastical, as to the higher;” tenth, “the temporal power, if it is not good, is judged by the spiritual;” eleventh, “to the ecclesiastical authority” (that is, to the pope and his hierarchy) “the words of the prophet Jeremiah apply, ‘Lo! I have set thee this day over the nations and over kingdoms to root up, and to pull down, and to waste, and to destroy, and to build, and to plant;” twelfth, when “the temporal power goes astray, it is judged by the spiritual;” thirteenth, “for obtaining eternal happiness, each one is required to submit to the pope;” fourteenth, “the supremacy of the pope, even in temporal things;” and, fifteenth, the popes “recognize human authorities in their proper place, till they lift up their will against God.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 203-209.)

This book has upon it the imprint of “The Catholic Publishing Society,” of New York, and is extensively circulated in the United States, for the enlightenment and instruction of the faithful. Its general character is recommended by an “Introduction,” wherein it is said that “the spiritual royalty of Christ’s vicar will ultimately tend to consolidate anew temporal monarchy, and all its concomitant institutions.” (“Anti-Janus,” by Hergenrother, Introduction, p. xl.) And the preference entertained by papists for a monarchical over a popular or democratic form of government is thus unequivocally avowed, “The Church, it is truly said, needs not kings and emperors; but civil society in great states needs them; and this is especially true under the Christian dispensation, which, by the abolition of slavery, has indefinitely multiplied popular suffrages, and therefore aggravated the difficulties of popular government.” *

* *Ibid.*, p. 47, note e. Reference is not here made to the abolition of slavery in the United States, but to the elevation of the masses of the people in Europe.

We have here the deliberate sentiments and purposes of the papacy, that is, of the only legitimate authority of the Church. No individual opinions weigh a feather’s weight in the scale against them, although uttered by one or a thousand prelates or laymen. Every man who has any connection whatever with the Church must accept them without change or modification as a necessary part of the faith. If he shall accept them, and is intelligent enough to understand them, he must be regarded as prepared to take all the consequences which must necessarily follow if they are pressed, as now seems inevitable, to their legitimate results. But if, like the “Old Catholics” of Europe, the Roman Catholic population of the United States shall sternly and manfully rebuke these politico—religious teachings of the papacy, they will yet retain the power to save their honored and venerable Church from open antagonism with the Government which shields them so effectually from harm, and carry her back to those smooth and pleasant paths of peace and quiet and Christian concord, where she once stood so proudly, and where they, side by side with other Christians, may dispense the cheerful and benignant influences of pure, tolerant, and apostolic Christianity.

How beautifully and harmoniously were unity and diversity blended in the churches of the early Christians—diversity in discipline and economy—unity centering in Christ as the rock upon which it was built. Then, the bishops of Jerusalem, of Antioch, of Alexandria, of Corinth, of Rome, and elsewhere, presided over the clergy and people of their respective churches and provinces, with the internal policy and economy of each so conducted as should best promote the advancement of Christianity, leaving its external policy under the superintendence of the whole Church, not as it concerned discipline and government, but only the prime and essential part of religion, the preservation of the Christian faith. (“Antiquities of the Christian Church,” by Bingham, vol. i., bk. ii., ch. v., p. 33.)

Neither Christ nor his apostles made provision for any form of church imperialism. He did all things perfectly. He established this simple plan of a perfect Church, leaving the apostles to rear the superstructure. They, with inspired wisdom, built the churches at Jerusalem and Antioch, and other cities of Asia, before a Christian was ever known to be at Rome, and their work was also well and perfectly done, so well and perfectly that it was scarcely needed to be repeated at Rome in order to establish the true Church of Christ.

There was everything to recommend this plan of the Master and the apostles. The city of Jerusalem, in the midst of the fallen columns of “the temple of God,” and near Calvary and Gethsemane and Bethlehem, and where Christ had first disputed with the learned doctors of the Jewish law, and whose streets had been trodden by his feet; this “Holy City” was a far more fitting place for planting the first Christian Church than the old pagan and imperial city of the Caesars, where God’s providence had been defied for centuries; where the name of Christ was cast out with derision and reproach; where Christianity was held to be a pernicious and dangerous superstition; (Tacitus, bk. xv., xlv. “*Exitiabilis superstitio*” are the words of Tacitus.) where the demon of persecution first held his bloody orgies; and where vice and corruption were consuming all its pagan glories, and leaving it, wrapped in clouds of life—consuming miasmna (toxic air), to become the place where the curse of God would surely rest, as it had once rested upon the old Babylon of the Euphrates.

As the first churches of Asia were established, under the express commission of Christ before the Church of Rome, it was manifestly against the divine plan for the latter Church to set up the false claim that she was the “mother and mistress” of all the churches. Besides the presumption and vanity of the assumption, it was untrue in point of fact—for the Church at Jerusalem is conceded on all hands to have been the “mother Church.” On this account the apostles assembled there to settle the differences which had arisen among the Christians at Antioch. *

* Acts xv. Roman Catholics claim that at this “first council” of the apostles the primacy of Peter over the other apostles was recognized—in other words, that he was then regarded as “the prince of the apostles.” This is not warranted by the recorded facts. Peter, on account, probably, of his advanced age and great wisdom, was the first whose speech is recorded; but it must be observed that he uttered no opinion or decision to bind the others. On the contrary, he merely opened the discussion, and was followed by Barnabas and Paul. And after them, James, who was Bishop of Jerusalem, spoke, manifestly with the authority of a superior position. He desired all present to “hearken” unto what he said. And when he had set forth his views, he said, “Wherefore *my sentence* is,” etc. (ver. 19). This shows that if there was any precedence, it belonged to James, who must have presided. In the Douay Bible this verse reads: “Wherefore *I judge*,” etc., following the Latin Vulgate, *ego judico*. But the word *judico* does not mean a mere individual opinion. It means a judgment, sentence, or decision, announced by authority. Hence, the conclusion that James possessed official superiority in this council cannot be escaped.

The Roman Church was, therefore, the *daughter* of the older Asiatic churches—not the mother. They preceded her in the order of time so far that Christianity was planted by means of them, before she had a beginning—or before it had reached any part of Europe. These Asiatic churches possessed, undoubtedly, all the external authority which Christ designed should be conferred upon his Church; for, being presided over by the apostles and specially cared for by them, it is an impeachment of them to say that, in this or in any other respect, they failed in obeying the divine injunction to establish the Church rightfully. While the system they organized continued, everything worked well and harmoniously. If there were differences, they were adjusted by conference, as at Jerusalem; and nothing occurred to plant discord among them until the Church at Rome endeavored to bring them all to her feet.

At every step she took in that direction, she struck fatal blows at this original system of church organization, and never rested from her work of demolition until the columns of all the ancient churches had fallen to the ground. To add to the efficacy of her measures, she snatched from the State the imperialism of temporal power, which she employed as the means of achieving her universal dominion; and thus, *by uniting Church and State, she has afflicted both herself and the world with incalculable calamities*. As usurpation and imposture have their reward, as well as virtue, these have been visited upon her in terrible abundance, since she sought to place the triple crown upon the brows of her bishops, and to gild her papal palaces with gold.

Ever since the time of Constantine and the Nicene Council, she has been dealing in various modes of compulsion, with multitudes of her rebellious and heretical children—born within her fold and nurtured upon her bosom. The most formidable resistance she has encountered has been invited by the vacillations of her faith, or has been produced by the tyranny and persecutions of the papacy. The hardest blows under which she has reeled and staggered—and under which she is now reeling and staggering—have been struck by those who have been compelled to strike them, in order to assert and vindicate their manhood by breaking the fetters with which she had manacled their limbs.

Before the Reformation, the Roman Church had some good popes, many bad ones, and some who were almost monsters of impiety and vice. The seventy years of papal residence in France had created a rivalry in crime and prostitution between the two pontifical cities, Rome and Avignon; and whenever the one excelled the other, it was only because of the larger number of cardinals and priests, and of the courtesans who followed them. Of course, reformers grew up in formidable numbers—for there were many good men in the Church, belonging to every class—but anti—reformers existed in greater force, composed of those who held the chief authority in the Church. Of the first, there were those who believed, in all Christian sincerity, that the Church could be reformed within herself, and thus her life and purity be preserved. Of the latter, there were those who either supposed that corruption had done its work so thoroughly that the disease was beyond the reach of remedy, or preferred the wealth and power which her vast revenues produced, and the ambition it gratified, to the preservation of her purity.

And when the great Council of Trent placed the Church in a condition to become an engine of mischievous power and bad ambition in the hands of the Jesuits, it made Protestantism an absolute necessity for the world—because, without it, the terrible pressure under which both Church and State

were rapidly sinking into a common grave could never have been removed. Protestantism, therefore, finds both its truth and its philosophy in the history of those times. God was its author. He did not design it to exterminate, but to preserve; to support the cause of truth, and to resist error. There was yet good enough in the Roman Catholic Church to have secured the complete triumph of divine truth, but for the perverseness of those who seemed to defy all the providences of God. It needed only the winnowing process of reform to separate the good from the bad—the genuine grain from the chaff—so that this venerable Church could drift back again into the calm and placid current along which it had moved so beautifully and majestically in the days of her primitive purity.

The Reformation was not the result of impulse and passion. Preceding events had convinced the leading nations of the necessity of taking care of their own affairs, which it was evident they could not do without resisting the aggressions of the papacy. These aggressions had become so repeated and flagrant that some of the governments were entirely subordinated to Rome. With the imperialism of princes and of popes, the people were almost crushed, as it were, between the upper and the nether millstone. The necessity of self—protection and self—existence compelled them to seek out other paths.

France was the foremost in the movement of resistance (“History of the Popes,” by Ranke, Introduction, p. xxvi.)—as we have seen how soon as a Christian nation, according to the papal standard, her very life would have been crushed out. Germany followed, and then England; and finally the United States rose up in the New World, clothed in fresh robes, to prove how benignant are the influences which spring from popular government and Protestant toleration. These influences are now reacting upon the older nations, and one by one they are moving into the same paths. As the light from each increases more and more—just as it is almost ready to break out in meridian brightness—the papal sword is unsheathed, and they are commanded, under the impious pretense that God has spoken through the voice of an infallible pope, to turn back into darkness and slavery and imbecility again.

There are many Roman Catholic laymen in the United States, who, if they could be prevailed upon to investigate these matters for themselves, and to abate somewhat their unbounded confidence in their ecclesiastical superiors, would see—as many of their brethren in Europe have done—that there is a broad and manifest distinction between their Church as it existed in its original purity in the days of the early fathers, and that enormous papal structure into which ambitious and designing men have since converted it, with power to domineer over princes and tyrannize over peoples. It would be impossible for them not to know that, in order to restore and maintain the pretensions now set up in behalf of the papacy, its emissaries would be guilty of infractions upon the rights of all existing governments, especially those where the people are the rulers; and that their own continued acquiescence in these excessive demands of the pope and his priesthood must, in the end, lead them into opposition to the most essential principles of our own Government, and especially to that which makes the people themselves included—the true and legitimate source of all civil authority. It is impossible to suppose that they desire to forget the sacrifices many of them have made for the cause of popular government, or that they can become willingly insensible to the precious interests they have wrapped up in its continuance.

Whatsoever they may decide, however—whether they shall resolve to become the guardians of their own civil rights, or leave them to the guardianship of an army of papal hierarchs, irresponsible to all

human authority and above all human laws—the American people, as a whole, will not be likely to remain passive and unresisting under these continued threatenings. And when they shall be brought to realize—a point they are rapidly reaching—that their popular form of government is actually and insolently threatened; that opposition to some of the most highly prized features of their civil institutions is already inaugurated, with the view of substituting the power of the papacy for their own constitutional authority, and of subordinating their fundamental laws to the decrees of the pope, as a foreign king and despot—when the great body of the American people shall become fully apprised of all these things, they will then understand what remedy to apply, and how to apply it.

They will not find this remedy in the violation of any of the cherished principles of their Government; by the abandonment of its liberal or tolerant spirit; or by any act unworthy a Protestant nation pledged to maintain free thought, free speech, and a free press. They will not find it in any form of wrong or oppression; either by withdrawing from the Roman Catholic religion any part of that protection they give to Protestantism, or by excluding any who think proper to profess that religion from the shelter of their civil institutions. They will not find it by imitating the example set them by those Roman Catholic governments that have allowed coercive measures to be employed to prohibit every form of religion but that of Rome. But they will find it by maintaining at every hazard, and in the face of all consequences, their right to enact their own laws, to preserve their own constitutions, and to regulate their own affairs according to their own sovereign will, and without foreign dictation; by perpetuating their popular form of government as the rightful inheritance of their children; by resisting to the last the “divine right” of kings or popes to rule over them; by firmly refusing to permit the canon laws of the Roman Catholic, or of any other church, to take the place of those of their own enacting; and by teaching the Roman hierarchy and all others who shall willingly become subservient to the schemes of the pope, that, while citizens of the United States, they can enjoy unimpaired all the rights of citizenship secured to themselves; but that, in order to this, they must render the same obedience to all existing laws which others are required to render; and that they call enjoy no exclusive privileges, whether civil or ecclesiastical, which shall put it in their power to violate the principles of American liberty—to impose unwilling restraint upon a single conscience—or to endanger the existence of a single fundamental principle upon which they have erected their civil and religious freedom.

Appendix

A. BISHOP'S OATH.

THE following is the oath of allegiance to the pope, taken by every archbishop and bishop, and by all who are elevated to positions of official dignity by the pope. It is copied by Dr. Dowling from the treatise on the papal supremacy by Dr. Barrow (vol. i., p. 553), who copied it from "The Roman Pontificate, set out by order of Pope Clement VIII.," Antwerp, 1626, p. 59, etc.

I, N., elect of the Church of N., from henceforward will be *faithful* and *obedient* to St. Peter the Apostle, and to the Holy Roman Church, and to our Lord, the Lord N., Pope N., and to his successors canonically entering. I will neither advise, consent, nor do anything that they may lose life or member, or that their persons may be seized, or hands in anywise laid upon them, or any injuries offered to them, under any pretense whatsoever. The counsel with which they shall entrust me by themselves, their messengers, or letters, I will not knowingly reveal to any to their prejudice. I will help them to defend and keep the Roman *papacy*, and THE ROYALTIES OF ST. PETER, saving my order, against all men. The legate of the Apostolic See, going and coming, I will honorably treat and help in his necessities. The rights, honors, privileges, and authority of the Holy Roman Church, of *our Lord the Pope*, and his aforesaid successors, I will endeavor to preserve, defend, increase, and advance. I will not be in any counsel, action, or treaty in which shall be plotted against our said Lord, and the said Roman Church, anything to the hurt or prejudice of their persons, right, honor, state, or power; and if I shall know any such thing to be treated or agitated by any whatsoever, I will hinder it to my utmost, and, as soon as I can, will signify it to our said Lord, or to some other, by whom it may come to his knowledge. The rules of the holy Fathers, the apostolic decrees, ordinances, or disposals, reservations, provisions, and mandates, I will observe with all my might, and cause to be observed by others.

Heretics, schismatics, and rebels to our said Lord, or his aforesaid successors, I will to my utmost persecute and oppose. [Hsereticos, schismaticos, et rebelles eidem Domino nostro vel successoribus proedictis pro posse persequar et oppugnabo.] I will come to a council when I am called, unless I be hindered by a canonical impediment. I will, by myself in person, visit the threshold of the Apostles every three years; and give an account to our Lord and his foresaid successors of all my pastoral office, and of all things anywise belonging to the state of my Church, to the discipline of my clergy and people, and lastly to the salvation of souls committed to my trust; and will in like manner humbly receive and diligently *execute the apostolic commands*. And if I be detained by a lawful impediment, I will perform all the things aforesaid by a certain messenger hereto specially empowered, a member of my chapter, or some other in ecclesiastical dignity, or else having a parsonage; or in default of those, by a priest of the diocese; or in default of one of the clergy of the diocese, by some other secular or regular priest of approved integrity and religion, fully instructed in all things above mentioned. And such impediment I will make out by lawful proofs to be transmitted by the foresaid messenger to the cardinal proponent of the Holy Roman Church in the Congregation of the Sacred Council. The possessions belonging to my table I will neither sell, nor give away, nor mortgage, nor grant anew in fee, nor anywise alienate, not even with the consent of the chapter of my Church, without consulting the Roman Pontiff. And if I shall make any alienation, I will thereby incur the penalties contained in a

certain constitution put forth about this matter. So help me God and these Holy Gospels of God.—DOWLING'S *History of Romanism*, pp. 615, 616; *Debate between Rev. Alexander Campbell and Archbishop Purcell*, pp. 280-317.

B.

The pastoral letter of the Second National Council of Baltimore contained thirteen articles. The third concerns the "Relations of the Church to the State," and is as follows:

The enemies of the Church fail not to represent her claims as incompatible with the independence of the civil power, and her action as impeding the exertions of the State to promote the well-being of society. So far from these charges being founded in fact, the authority and influence of the Church will be found to be the most efficacious support of the temporal authority by which society is governed. The Church, indeed, does not proclaim the absolute and entire independence of the civil power, because it teaches with the apostles that "all power is of God;" that the temporal magistrate is His minister; and that the power of the sword he wields is a delegated exercise of authority committed to him from on high. For the children of the Church, obedience to the civil power is not a submission to force which may not be resisted, nor merely the compliance with a condition for peace and security; but a religious duty founded on obedience to God, by whose authority the civil magistrate exercises his power. This power, however, as subordinate and delegated, *must always be exercised agreeably to God's law*. In prescribing anything contrary to that law, *the civil power transcends its authority, and has no claim on the obedience of the citizen*. Never can it be lawful to disobey God, as the apostles Peter and John so explicitly declared before the tribunal which sat in judgment on them, "If it be just in the sight of God to hear you rather than God, judge ye." This undeniable principle does not, however, entail the same consequences in the Catholic system as in those of the sects. In these the individual is the ultimate judge of what the law of God commands or forbids, and is consequently liable to claim the sanction of the higher law, for what, after all, may be, and often is, but the suggestions of an undisciplined mind or an overheated imagination. Nor can the civil government be expected to recognize an authority which has no warrant for its character as divine, and no limits in its application, without exposing the State to disorder and anarchy. The Catholic has a guide in the Church, as a divine institution, which enables him to discriminate between what the law of God forbids or allows; and this authority the State is bound to recognize as supreme in its sphere, of moral no less than dogmatic teaching. There may, indeed, be instances in which individual Catholics will make a misapplication of the principle; or in which, while the principle of obedience to civil authority is recognized as of divine obligation, the seat of that authority may be a matter of doubt, by reason of the clashing opinions that prevail in regard to this important fact. The Church does not assume to decide such matters in the temporal order, as she is not the judge of civil controversies, although she always, when invited to do so, has endeavored to remove the misconceptions from which disputes so often arise, and to consult for every interest while maintaining the peace of society and the rights of justice.

While cheerfully recognizing the fact, that hitherto the General and State Governments of our country, except in some brief intervals of excitement and delusion, have not interfered with our ecclesiastical organization or civil rights, we still have to lament that in many of the States we are not as yet permitted legally to make those arrangements for the security of church property which are in

accordance with the canons and discipline of the Catholic Church. In some of the States we gratefully acknowledge that all is granted in this regard that we could reasonably ask for. The right of the Church to possess property, whether churches, residences for the clergy, cemeteries or school-houses, asylums, etc., cannot be denied without depriving her of a necessary means of promoting the end for which she has been established. We are aware of the alleged grounds for this refusal to recognize the Church in her corporate capacity, unless on the condition that in the matter of the tenure of ecclesiastical property she conform to the general laws providing for this object. These laws, however, are for the most part based on principles which she cannot accept without departing from her practice from the beginning, as soon as she was permitted to enjoy liberty of worship. They are the expression of a distrust of ecclesiastical power, as such; and are the fruit of the misrepresentations which have been made of the action of the Church in past ages. As well might the civil power prescribe to her the doctrines she is to teach, and the worship with which she is to honor God, as to impose on her a system of holding her temporalities which is alien to her principles, and which is borrowed from those who have rejected her authority. Instead of seeking to disprove the various reasons alleged for this denial of the Church's rights in some of the States, we content ourselves with the formal protest we hereby enter against it; and briefly remark, that even in the supposition, which we by no means admit, that such denial was the result of legitimate motives, the denial itself is incompatible with the full measure of ecclesiastical or religious liberty which we are supposed to enjoy.

Nor is this an unimportant matter, or one which has not practical results of a most embarrassing character. Not only are we obliged to place church property in conditions of extreme hazard, because not permitted to manage our church temporalities on Catholic principles, but in at least one of these United States (Missouri) laws have been passed by which all church property, not held by corporations, is subjected to taxation; and the avowed object of this discriminating legislation is hostility to the Catholic Church. In concluding these remarks, we merely refer to the attempt made in that State to make the exercise of the ecclesiastical ministry depend on a condition laid down by the civil power.

The bishops of the council sent to the pope the following dispatch, through the Atlantic cable:

Seven archbishops and forty bishops, met in council, unanimously salute your holiness, wishing you long life, with the preservation of all the ancient and sacred rights of the Holy See.

To which the following answer was received:

Rome, from the Propaganda, October 24th, 1866.

To the Most Reverend MARTIN JOHN SPALDING, Archbishop of Baltimore:

The telegram which the bishops of the States of the American Union assembled in council had the happy thought to address to the Holy Father proved to be of great comfort and consolation to his holiness, and so highly did he appreciate its spirit that he ordered it to be immediately published in the official journals at Rome, for the edification of his Roman people and the faithful at large. His holiness looks with interest for the acts and decrees of the Plenary Council, which he expects to receive in due time, and from which he hopes a new impulse and continued increase to religion in the United States will result. He has, however, directed me to express directly to your amplitude, and through you to all your colleagues, his great pleasure, and to request you to thank them for the interest they have taken, and still take, *in defending the Holy See and in vindicating its contested rights*. Moreover, his holiness

has learned with satisfaction that the papal loan is succeeding also, through the cooperation of the American episcopate. He thanks them particularly for this, and nourishes the hope that such cooperation will not cease, and that thence a prosperous result may be obtained. In the mean time, I pray the Lord that he long preserve and prosper you.

ALEXANDER CARDINAL BARNABO, *Secretary*.

C.

THE ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE PIUS IX.

To Our Venerable Brothers the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Universal Church having Grace and Communion of the Apostolic See.

PIUS PP. IX.

Health and Apostolic Benediction.

It is well known unto all men, and especially to You, Venerable Brothers, with what great care and pastoral vigilance Our Predecessors, the Roman Pontiffs, have discharged the Office entrusted by Christ Our Lord to them in the person of the Most Blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and have unremittingly discharged the duty of feeding the lambs and sheep, and have diligently nourished the Lord's entire flock with the words of faith, imbued it with salutary doctrine, and guarded it from poisoned pastures. And those Our Predecessors, who were the assertors and champions of the august Catholic Religion, truth, and justice, being, as they were, chiefly solicitous for the salvation of souls, held nothing to be of so great importance as the duty of exposing and condemning, in their most wise Letters and Constitutions, all heresies and errors which are hostile to moral honesty and to the eternal salvation of mankind, and which have frequently stirred up terrible commotions, and have damaged both the Christian and civil commonwealths in a disastrous manner.

Wherefore those Our Predecessors have with apostolic fortitude continually resisted the nefarious attempts of unjust men, of those who, like raging waves of the sea, foaming forth their own confusion and promising liberty whilst they are the slaves of corruption, endeavored by their false opinions and most pernicious writings to overthrow the foundations of the Catholic religion and of civil society, to abolish all virtue and justice, to deprave the souls and minds of all men, and—especially to pervert inexperienced youth from uprightness of morals, to corrupt them miserably, to lead them into snares of error, and finally to tear them from the bosom of the Catholic Church.

And now, Venerable Brothers, as is also very well known to you, scarcely had We (by the secret dispensation of Divine Providence, certainly by no merit of Our own) been called to this Chair of Peter when We, to the extreme grief of Our soul, beheld a horrible tempest stirred up by so many erroneous opinions, and the dreadful and never—enough—to—be—lamented mischiefs which redound to Christian people from such errors: and We then, in discharge of Our Apostolic Ministerial Office, imitating the example of Our illustrious Predecessors, raised Our voice, and in several published Encyclical Letters, and in Allocutions delivered in Consistory, and in other Apostolical Letters, We condemned the prominent, most grievous errors of the age, and We stirred up Your excellent episcopal vigilance, and again and again did We admonish and exhort all the sons of the Catholic Church, who are most dear to Us, that they should abhor and shun all the said errors as they would the contagion of a

fatal pestilence. Especially in Our first Encyclical Letter, written to you on the 9th of November, anno 1846, and in two Allocutions, one of which was delivered by Us in Consistory on the 9th of December, anno 1854, and the other on the 9th of June, anno 1862, We condemned the monstrous and portentous opinions which prevail especially in the present age, to the very great loss of souls, and even to the detriment of civil society, and which are in the highest degree hostile not only to the Catholic Church, and to her salutary doctrine and venerable laws, but also to the everlasting law of nature engraven by God upon the hearts of all men, and to right reason; and out of which almost all other errors originate.

Now, although hitherto We have not omitted to denounce and reprove the chief errors of this kind, yet the cause of the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls committed to Us by God, and even the interests of human society absolutely demand, that once again We should stir up Your pastoral solicitude to drive away other erroneous opinions which flow from those errors above specified, as their source.

These false and perverse opinions are so much the more detestable by how much they have chiefly for their object to hinder and banish that salutary influence which the Catholic Church, by the institution and command of her Divine Author, ought freely to exercise, even to the consummation of the world, not only over individual men, but nations, peoples, and sovereigns—and to abolish that mutual co—operation and agreement of counsels between the Priesthood and Governments which has always been propitious and conducive to the welfare both of Church and State (Gregory XVI., Encyclical, 13th August, 1832). You are well aware that at this time there are not a few who apply to civil society the impious and absurd principle of naturalism, as they term it, and dare to teach that “the welfare of the State and political and social progress require that human society should be constituted and governed irrespective of religion, which is to be treated just as if it did not exist, or as if no real difference existed between true and false religions.”

Contrary to the teaching of the Holy Scriptures, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, these persons do not hesitate to assert that “the best condition of human society is that wherein no duty is recognized by the Government of correcting by enacted penalties the violators of the Catholic Religion, except when the maintenance of the public peace requires it.” From this totally false notion of social government they fear not to uphold that erroneous opinion most pernicious to the Catholic Church, and to the salvation of souls, which was called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI. [lately quoted], the insanity (Encycl., 13th August, 1832) [deliramentum], namely, that “liberty of conscience and of worship is the right of every man; and that this right ought, in every well-governed State, to be proclaimed and asserted by the law; and that the citizens possess the right of being unrestrained in the exercise of every kind of liberty, by any law, ecclesiastical or civil, so that they are authorized to publish and put forward openly all their ideas whatsoever, either by speaking, in print, or by any other method.” But whilst these men make these rash assertions, they do not reflect or consider that they preach the liberty of perdition (St. Augustine, epistle 105, al. 166), and that “if it is always free to human arguments to discuss, men will never be wanting who will dare to resist the truth, and to rely upon the loquacity of human wisdom, when we know from the command of our Lord Jesus Christ how faith and Christian wisdom ought to avoid this most mischievous vanity” (St. Leo, epistle 164, al. 133, sec. 2, Boll. ed.).

And since religion has been banished from civil government—since the teaching and authority of Divine revelation have been repudiated—the idea inseparable therefrom of justice and human right is obscured by darkness, and lost; and in place of true justice and legitimate right, material force is substituted; whence it appears why some, entirely neglecting and slighting the most certain principles of sound reason, dare to proclaim “that the will of the people, manifested by public opinion (as they call it), or by other means, constitutes a supreme law independent of all Divine and human right; and that, in the political order, accomplished facts, by the mere fact of their having been accomplished, have the force of right.” But who does not plainly see and understand that human society, released from the ties of religion and true justice, can have no other purpose than to compass its own ends, and to amass riches, and can follow no other law in its actions than the indomitable wickedness of a heart given up to the service of its selfish pleasures and interests?

For this reason also these same men persecute with such bitter hatred the Religious Orders who have deserved so well of religion, civil society, and letters; they loudly declare that the Orders have no right to exist, and, in so doing, make common cause with the falsehoods of the heretics. For, as was most wisely taught by Our Predecessor of illustrious memory, Pius VI., “the abolition of Religious Orders injures the state of public profession of the Evangelical counsels; injures a mode of life recommended by the Church as in conformity with Apostolical doctrine; does wrong to the illustrious founders whom we venerate upon our altars, and who constituted these societies under the inspiration of God” (Epistle to Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld, March 10th, 1791). And these same persons also impiously pretend that citizens should be deprived of the liberty of publicly bestowing on the Church their alms for the sake of Christian charity, and that the law forbidding “servile labor on account of Divine worship” upon certain fixed days should be abolished, upon the most fallacious pretext that such liberty and such law are contrary to the principles of political economy. Not content with abolishing religion in public society, they desire, further, to banish it from families and private life. Teaching and professing those most fatal errors of Socialism and Communism, they declare that “domestic society, or the family, derives all its reason of existence solely from civil law, whence it is to be concluded that from civil law descend and depend all the rights of parents over their children, and, above all, the right of instructing and educating them.” By such impious opinions and machinations do these most false teachers endeavor to eliminate the salutary teaching and influence of the Catholic Church from the instruction and education of youth, and to miserably infect and deprave by every pernicious error and vice the tender and pliant minds of youth.

All those who endeavor to throw into confusion both religious and political affairs, to destroy the good order of society, and to annihilate all Divine and human rights, have always exerted all their criminal schemes, attention, and efforts upon the manner in which they might, above all, deprave and delude unthinking youth, as We have already shown: it is upon the corruption of youth that they place all their hopes. Thus, they never cease to attack by every method the Clergy, both secular and regular, from whom, as testify to us in so conspicuous a manner the most certain records of history, such considerable benefits have been bestowed in abundance upon Christian and Civil society, and upon the republic of letters; asserting of the clergy in general that they are the enemies of the useful sciences, of progress, and of civilization, and that they ought to be deprived of all participation in the work of teaching and training the young.

Others, reviving the depraving fictions of innovators, errors many times condemned, presume, with extraordinary impudence, to subordinate the authority of the Church and of this Apostolic See, conferred upon it by Christ Our Lord, to the judgment of civil authority, and to deny all the rights of this same Church and this See with regard to those things which appertain to the secular order. For these persons do not blush to affirm “that the laws of the Church do not bind the conscience if they are not promulgated by the civil power; that the acts and decrees of the Roman Pontiffs concerning religion and the Church require the sanction and approbation, or at least, the assent of the civil powers; and that the Apostolic Constitutions (Clement XII., Benedict XIV., Pius VII., Leo XII.) condemning secret societies, whether these exact or do not exact an oath of secrecy, and branding with anathema their followers and partisans, have no force in those countries of the world where such associations are tolerated by the civil government.”

It is likewise affirmed “that the excommunications launched by the Council of Trent and the Roman Pontiffs against those who invade and usurp the possessions of the Church and its rights, strive, by confounding the spiritual and temporal orders, to attain solely a mere earthly end; that the Church can decide nothing which may bind the consciences of the faithful in the temporal order of things; that the right of the Church is not competent to restrain with temporal penalties the violators of her laws; and that it is in accordance with the principles of theology and of public law for the Civil Government to appropriate property possessed by the churches, the Religious Orders, and other pious establishments. And they have no shame in avowing openly and publicly the heretical statement and principle from which has emanated so many errors and perverse opinions, that the ecclesiastical power is not by the law of God made distinct from, and independent of, civil power, and that no distinction, no independence of this kind, can be maintained without the Church invading and usurping the essential rights of the civil power.”

Neither can We pass over in silence the audacity of those who, not enduring sound doctrine, assert that “the judgments and decrees of the Holy See, the object of which is declared to concern the general welfare of the Church, its rights, and its discipline, do not claim acquiescence and obedience under pain of sin and loss of the Catholic profession, if they do not treat of the dogmas of faith and of morals.”

How contrary is this doctrine to the Catholic dogma of the plenary power divinely conferred on the Sovereign Pontiff by Our Lord Jesus Christ, to guide, to supervise, and govern the Universal Church, no one can fail to see and understand clearly and evidently.

Amid so great a perversity of depraved opinions, We, remembering Our Apostolic duty, and solicitous before all things for Our most holy religion, for sound doctrine, for the salvation of the souls confided to Us, and for the welfare of human society itself, have considered the moment opportune to raise anew Our Apostolic voice.

Therefore do We by Our Apostolic authority reprobate, denounce, and condemn generally and particularly all the evil opinions and doctrines specially mentioned in this Letter, and We wish that they may be held as reprobated, denounced, and condemned by all the children of the Catholic Church.

But You know further, Venerable Brothers, that in our time the haters of all truth and justice and violent enemies of our religion have spread abroad other impious doctrines by means of pestilent books, pamphlets, and journals, which, distributed over the surface of the earth, deceive the people and

wickedly lie. You are not ignorant that in our day men are found who, animated and excited by the spirit of Satan, have arrived at that excess of impiety as not to fear to deny Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, and to attack His Divinity with scandalous persistence. And here We cannot abstain from awarding You well—merited praise, Venerable Brothers, for all the care and zeal with which You have raised Your episcopal voice against so great an impiety.

And therefore in this present letter, We speak to You with all affection; to You who, called to partake Our cares, are Our greatest support in the midst of Our very great grief, Our joy and Our consolation, by reason of the excellent piety of which You give proof in maintaining religion, and the marvelous love, faith, and discipline with which, united by the strongest and most affectionate ties to Us and this Apostolic See, You strive valiantly and accurately to fulfill Your most weighty episcopal ministry. We do, then, expect from Your excellent pastoral zeal that, taking the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God, and strengthened by the grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, You will watch with redoubled care, that the faithful committed to Your charge “abstain from evil pasturage, which Jesus Christ doth not till, because His Father hath not planted it” (St. Ignac. M. ad Philadelph. St. Leo, epist. 156, al. 125).

Never cease, then, to inculcate on the faithful that all true happiness for mankind proceeds from our august religion, from its doctrines and practice, and that that people is happy who have the Lord for their God (Psalm 143). Teach them “that kingdoms rest upon the foundation of the Catholic faith (St. Celest., epist. 22, ad Syn. Eph.), and that nothing is so deadly, nothing so certain to engender every ill, nothing so exposed to danger, as for men to believe that they stand in need of nothing else than the free—will which we received at birth, if we ask nothing further from the Lord—that is to say, if, forgetting our Author, we abjure his power to show that we are free.”

And do not omit to teach “that the Royal power has been established not only to exercise the government of the world, but, above all, for the protection of the Church (St. Leo, epist. 156, al. 125), and that there is nothing more profitable and more glorious for the Sovereigns of States and Kings than to leave the Catholic Church to exercise its laws, and not to permit any to curtail its liberty;” as Our most wise and courageous Predecessor, St. Felix, wrote to the Emperor Zeno. “It is certain that it is advantageous for Sovereigns, when the cause of God is in question, to submit their Royal will according to his ordinance to the Priests of Jesus Christ, and not to prefer it before them.” (Pius VII. Epist. Encycl. *Diu satis*, 15th May, 1800.)

And if always, so, especially at present, is it Our duty, Venerable Brothers, in the midst of the numerous calamities of the Church and of civil society, in view of the terrible conspiracy of our adversaries against the Catholic Church and this Apostolic See, and the great accumulation of errors, it is, before all things, necessary to go with faith to the Throne of Grace to obtain mercy and find grace in timely aid.

We have therefore judged it right to excite the piety of all the faithful in order that, with Us and with You all, they may pray without ceasing to the Father of lights and of mercies, supplicating and beseeching Him fervently and humbly, in order also in the plenitude of their faith they may seek refuge in Our Lord Jesus Christ, who has redeemed us to God with His blood, that by their earnest and continual prayers they may obtain from that most dear Heart, victim of burning charity for us, that it would draw all by the bonds of His love, and that all men being inflamed by His holy love may live according to His heart, pleasing God in all things, and being fruitful in all good works.

But, as there is no doubt that the prayers most agreeable to God are those of the men who approach Him with a heart pure from all stain, We have thought it good to open to Christians, with Apostolic liberality, the Heavenly treasures of the Church confided to Our dispensation, so that the faithful, more strongly drawn toward true piety and purified from the stain of their sins by the Sacrament of Penance, may more confidently offer up their prayers to God and obtain His mercy and grace.

By these Letters emanating from Our Apostolic authority, We grant to all and each of the faithful of both sexes throughout the Catholic world a Plenary Indulgence in the manner of a Jubilee during one month up to the end of the coming year, 1865, and not longer, to be carried into effect by You, Venerable Brethren, and the other legitimate local Ordinaries, in the form and manner laid down at the commencement of Our Sovereign Pontificate by Our Apostolical Letters, in form of a Brief, dated the 20th of November, anno 1846, and sent to the whole Episcopate of the world, commencing with the words "*Arcano Divince Providentiae consilio*," and with the faculties given by Us in those same Letters. We desire, however, that all the prescriptions of Our letters shall be observed, saving the exceptions We have declared are to be made. And We have granted this, notwithstanding all which might make to the contrary, even those worthy of special and individual mention and derogation; and in order that every doubt and difficulty may be removed, We have ordered that copies of those Letters should be again forwarded to You.

Let us implore, Venerable Brethren, from our inmost hearts, and with all our Souls, the mercy of God. He has encouraged us so to do, by saying, "I will not withdraw my mercy from them." Let us ask, and we shall receive; and if there is slowness or delay in its reception, because we have grievously offended, let us knock, because to him that knocketh it shall be opened; if our prayers, groans, and tears, in which we must persist and be obstinate, knock at the door; and if our prayer be united, let each one pray to God, not for himself alone, but for all his brethren, as the "Lord hath taught us to pray" (St. Cyprian, epistle ii.). But in order that God may accede more easily to Our and Your prayers, and to those of all His faithful servants, let us employ in all confidence as our Mediatrix with him the Virgin Mary, Mother of God, who "has destroyed all heresies throughout the world, and who, the most loving Mother of us all, is very gracious..... and full of mercy..... allows herself to be entreated by all, shows herself most clement toward all, and takes under her pitying care all our necessities with a most ample affection" (St. Bernard, *Germ. de duodecim perogativis B. M. V. in verbis Apocalyp.*), and who, "sitting as queen upon the right hand of her only begotten Son Our Lord Jesus Christ, in a golden vestment clothed around with various adornments," there is nothing which she cannot obtain from Him. Let us implore also the intervention of the Blessed Peter, Chief of the Apostles, and of his co-Apostle Paul, and of all those Saints of Heaven, who, having already become the friends of God, have been admitted into the celestial kingdom, where they are crowned and bear palms, and who henceforth, certain of their own immortality, are solicitous for our salvation.

In conclusion, We ask of God, from Our inmost soul, the abundance of all his celestial benefits for You, and We bestow upon You, Venerable Brethren, and upon all faithful Clergy and Laity committed to Your care, Our Apostolic Benediction from the most loving depths of Our hearts, in token of Our charity toward You.

Pius PP. IX.

Given at Rome, from St. Peter's, this 8th of December, 1864, the tenth anniversary of the Dogmatic Definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, Mother of God, in the nineteenth Year of Our Pontificate.

**D. THE SYLLABUS OF THE PRINCIPAL ERRORS OF OUR TIME, WHICH ARE
STIGMATIZED IN THE CONSISTORIAL ALLOCUTIONS, ENCYCLICAL, AND OTHER
APOSTOLICAL LETTERS OF OUR MOST HOLY FATHER POPE PIUS IX.**

I. Pantheism, Naturalism, and Absolute Rationalism.

1. There exists no Divine Power, Supreme Being, Wisdom, and Providence distinct from the universe, and God is none other than nature, and is therefore mutable. In effect, God is produced in man and in the world, and all things are God, and have the very substance of God. God is therefore one and the same thing with the world, and thence spirit is the same thing with matter, necessity with liberty, true with false, good with evil, justice with injustice. (Allocution "Maxima quidem," 9th June, 1862.)
2. All action of God upon man and the world is to be denied. (Allocution "Maxima quidem," 9th June, 1862.)
3. Human reason, without any regard to God, is the sole arbiter of truth and falsehood, of good and evil; it is its own law to itself, and suffices by its natural force to secure the welfare of men and of nations. (Allocution "Maxima quidem," 9th June, 1862.)
4. All the truths of religion are derived from the native strength of human reason; whence reason is the master rule by which man can and ought to arrive at the knowledge of all truths of every kind. (Encyclical letters, "Qui pluribus," 9th November, 1846, "Singulari quidem," 17th March, 1856, and the Allocution "Maxima quidem," 9th June, 1862.)
5. Divine revelation is imperfect, and therefore subject to a continual and indefinite progress, which corresponds with the progress of human reason. (Encyclical "Qui pluribus," 9th November, 1846, and the Allocution "Maxima quidem," 9th June, 1862.)
6. Christian faith is in opposition to human reason, and divine revelation not only does not benefit, but even injures, the perfection of man. (Encyclical "Qui pluribus," 9th November, 1846, and the Allocution "Maxima quidem," 9th June, 1862.)
7. The prophecies and miracles, uttered and narrated in the Sacred Scriptures, are the fictions of poets; and the mysteries of the Christian faith, the result of philosophical investigations. In the books of the two Testaments there are contained mythical inventions, and Jesus Christ is Himself a mythical fiction. (Encyclical "Qui pluribus," 9th November, 1846, and the Allocution "Maxima quidem," 9th June, 1862.)

II. Moderate Rationalism.

8. As human reason is placed on a level with Religion, so theological matters must be treated in the same manner as philosophical ones. (Allocution "Singulari quadam perfusi," 9th December, 1854.)
9. All the dogmas of the Christian Religion are, without exception, the object of natural science or philosophy, and human reason, instructed solely by history, is able, by its own natural strength and

principles, to arrive at the true knowledge of even the most abstruse dogmas: *provided* such dogmas be proposed as subject—matter for human reason. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, “Gravissimas,” 11th December, 1862; to the same, “Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

10. As the philosopher is one thing, and philosophy is another, so it is the right and duty of the philosopher to submit himself to the authority which he shall have recognized as true; but philosophy neither can nor ought to submit to any authority. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, “Gravissimas,” 11th December, 1862; to the same, “Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

11. The Church not only ought never to animadvert (to remark or comment critically, usually with strong disapproval or censure) upon philosophy, but ought to tolerate the errors of philosophy, leaving to philosophy the care of their correction. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, 11th December, 1862.)

12. The decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Congregation fetter the free progress of science. (*Id. ibid.*)

13. The method and principles by which the old scholastic Doctors cultivated theology are no longer suitable to the demands of the age and the progress of science. (Ib.” Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

14. Philosophy must be treated of without any account being taken of supernatural revelation. (*Id. ibid.*)

N.B.—To the rationalistic system belong, in great part, the errors of Anthony Gunther, condemned in the letter to the Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne, “Eximiam tuam,” 15th June, 1847; and in that to the Bishop of Breslau, “Dolore haud mediocri,” 30th April, 1860.

III. Indifferentism, Latitudinarianism (tolerance of other people’s religious views).

15. Every man is free to embrace and profess the religion he shall believe true, guided by the light of reason. (Apostolic Letters “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851; Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

16. Men may in any religion find the way of eternal salvation, and obtain eternal salvation. (Encyclical Letter “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; Allocution “Ubi primum,” 17th December, 1847; Encyclical Letter “Singulari quidem,” 17th March, 1856.)

17. We may entertain at least a well-founded hope for the eternal salvation of all those who are in no manner in the true Church of Christ. (Allocution “Singulari quadam,” 9th December, 1854; Encyclical Letter “Quanto conficiamur,” 17th August, 1863.)

18. Protestantism is nothing more than another form of the same true Christian Religion, in which it is possible to be equally pleasing to God as in the Catholic Church. (Encyclical Letter “Noscitis et Nobiscum,” 8th December, 1849.)

IV. Socialism, Communism, Secret Societies, Biblical Societies, Clerico—liberal Societies.

Pests of this description are frequently rebuked in the severest terms in the Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; Allocution “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849; Encyclical “Noscitis et

Nobiscum,” 8th December, 1849; Allocution “Singulari quadam,” 9th December, 1854; Encyclical “QuLanto conficiamur marore,” 10th August, 1863.

V. Errors concerning the Church and her Rights.

19. The Church is not a true, and perfect, and entirely free society, nor does she enjoy peculiar and perpetual rights conferred upon her by her Divine Founder, but it appertains to the civil power to define what are the rights and limits with which the Church may exercise authority. (Allocution “Singulari quadam,” 9th December, 1854; “Multis gravibusque,” 17th December, 1860; “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

20. The ecclesiastical power must not exercise its authority without the permission and assent of the civil Government. (Allocution “Meminit unusquisque,” 30th September, 1861.)

21. The Church has not the power of defining dogmatically that the Religion of the Catholic Church is the only true religion. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

22. The obligation which binds Catholic teachers and authors applies only to those things which are proposed for universal belief as dogmas of the faith, by the infallible judgment of the Church. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, “Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

23. The Roman Pontiffs and Ecumenical Councils have exceeded the limits of their power, have usurped the rights of Princes, and have even committed errors in defining matters of faith and morals. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

24. The Church has not the power of availing herself of force or any direct or indirect temporal power. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolic,” 22d August, 1851.)

25. In addition to the authority inherent in the Episcopate, a further and temporal power is granted to it by the civil authority, either expressly or tacitly, which power is on that account also revocable by the civil authority whenever it pleases. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolica,” 22d August, 1851.)

26. The Church has not the innate and legitimate right of acquisition and possession. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856; Encyclical “Incredibili,” 17th September, 1863.)

27. The ministers of the Church and the Roman Pontiff ought to be absolutely excluded from all charge and dominion over temporal affairs. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

28. Bishops have not the right of promulgating even their Apostolic Letters without the permission of the Government. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

29. Dispensations granted by the Roman Pontiff must be considered null, unless they have been asked for by the civil Government. (*Id. ibid.*)

30. The immunity of the Church and of ecclesiastical persons derives its origin from civil law. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

31. Ecclesiastical Courts for the temporal causes of the clergy, whether civil or criminal, ought by all means to be abolished, even without the concurrence and against the protest of the Holy See. (Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852; and “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

32. The personal immunity exonerating the clergy from military service may be abolished, without violation either of natural right or of equity. Its abolition is called for by civil progress, especially in a community constituted upon principles of Liberal Government. (Letter to the Archbishop of Montreal, “Singularis Nobisque,” 29th September, 1864.)
33. It does not appertain exclusively to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, by any right, proper and inherent, to direct the teaching of theological subjects. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, ” Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)
34. The teaching of those who compare the Sovereign Pontiff to a free Sovereign acting in the Universal Church, is a doctrine which prevailed in the Middle Ages. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolieae,” 22d August, 1851.)
35. There would be no obstacle to the sentence of a General Council, or the act of all the universal peoples, transferring the Pontifical Sovereignty from the Bishop and city of Rome to some other bishopric and some other city. (*Id. ibid.*)
36. The definition of a National Council does not admit of any subsequent discussion, and the civil power can regard as settled an affair decided by such National Council. (*Id. ibid.*)
37. National Churches can be established after being withdrawn and plainly separated from the authority of the Roman Pontiff. (Allocution “Multis gravibusque,” 17th December, 1860; “Jamdudum cernimus,” 18th March, 1861.)
38. Roman Pontiffs have, by their too arbitrary conduct, contributed to the division of the Church into Eastern and Western. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851.)

VI. Errors about Civil Society considered both in itself and in its Relation to the Church.

39. The Republic is the origin and source of all rights, and possesses rights which are not circumscribed by any limits. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)
40. The teaching of the Catholic Church is opposed to the well—being and interests of society. (Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; Allocution “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849.)
41. The civil power, even when exercised by an infidel Sovereign, possesses an indirect and negative power over religious affairs. It therefore possesses not only the right called that of *exequatur*, but that of the (so—called) *apellatio ab abusu*. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostoliae,” 22d August, 1861.)
42. In the case of conflicting laws between the two Powers, the civil law ought to prevail. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851.)
43. The civil power has a light to break, and to declare and render null the conventions (commonly called Concordats) concluded with the Apostolic See, relative to the use of rights appertaining to the ecclesiastical immunity, without the consent of the Holy See, and even contrary to its protest. (Allocution “In Consistoriali,” 1st November, 1850; “Multis gravibusque,” 17th December, 1860.)
44. The civil authority may interfere in matters relating to Religion, morality, and spiritual government. Hence it has control over the instructions for the guidance of consciences issued, conformably with their mission, by the pastors of the Church. Further, it possesses power to decree, in the matter of

administering the Divine Sacraments, as to the dispositions necessary for their reception. (Allocution “In Consistoriali,” 1st November, 1850; Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

45. The entire direction of public schools in which the youth of Christian States are educated, except (to a certain extent) in the case of Episcopal seminaries, may and must appertain to the civil power, and belong to it so far that no other authority whatsoever shall be recognized as having any right to interfere in the discipline of the schools, the arrangement of the studies, the taking of degrees, or the choice and approval of the teachers. (Allocution “In Consistoriali,” 1st November, 1850; Allocution “Quibus luctuosissimis, 5th September, 1851.)

46. Much more, even in Clerical Seminaries, the method of study to be adopted is subject to the civil authority. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

47. The best theory of civil society requires that popular schools, open to the children of all classes, and generally all public institutes intended for instruction in letters and philosophy, and for conducting the education of the young, should be freed from all ecclesiastical authority, government, and interference, and should be fully subjected to the civil and political power, in conformity with the will of rulers and the prevalent opinions of the age. (Letter to the Archbishop of Fribourg, “Quum non Sine,” 14th July, 1864.)

48. This system of instructing youth, which consists in separating it from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and in teaching exclusively, or at least primarily, the knowledge of natural things, and the earthly ends of social life alone, may be approved by Catholics. (*Id. ibid.*)

49. The civil power has the right to prevent ministers of Religion and the faithful from communicating freely and mutually with each other, and with the Roman Pontiff. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

50. The secular authority possesses, as inherent in itself, the right of presenting Bishops, and may require of them that they take possession of their dioceses, before having received canonical institution and the Apostolic Letters from the Holy See. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

51. And, further, the Secular Government has the right of deposing Bishops from their Pastoral functions, and it is not bound to obey the Roman Pontiff in those things which relate to Episcopal Sees and the institution of Bishops. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852.)

52. The Government has of itself the right to alter the age prescribed by the Church for the religious profession both of men and women; and it may enjoin upon all religious establishments to admit no person to take solemn vows without its permission. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

53. The laws for the protection of religious establishments, and securing their rights and duties, ought to be abolished; nay, more, the civil government may lend its assistance to all who desire to quit the religious life they have undertaken, and break their vows. The government may also suppress Religious Orders, collegiate Churches, and simple Benefices, even those belonging to private patronage, and submit their goods and revenues to the administration and disposal of the civil power. (Allocution

“Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852; Allocution “Probe meminertis,” 22d January, 1855; Allocution “Cum saepe,” 26th July, 1855.)

54. Kings and princes are not only exempt from the jurisdiction of the Church, but are superior to the Church, in litigated questions of jurisdiction. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

55. The Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church. (Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852.)

VII. Errors concerning Natural and Christian Ethics.

56. Moral laws do not stand in need of the divine sanction, and there is no necessity that human laws should be conformable to the law of nature, and receive their sanction from God. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

57. Knowledge of Philosophical things and morals, and also civil laws, may and must be independent of divine and ecclesiastical authority. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

58. No other forces are to be recognized than those which reside in matter; and all moral teaching and moral excellence ought to be made to consist in the accumulation and increase of riches by every possible means, and in the enjoyment of pleasure. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862; Encyclical “Quanto conficiamur,” 10th August, 1863.)

59. Right consists in the material fact, and all human duties are but vain words, and all human acts have the force of right. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

60. Authority is nothing else but the result of numerical superiority and material force. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

61. An unjust act, being successful, inflicts no injury upon the sanctity of right. (Allocution “Jamdudum cernimus,” 18th March, 1861.)

62. The principle of non—intervention, as it is called, ought to be proclaimed and adhered to. (Allocution “Novos et ante,” 28th September, 1860.)

63. It is allowable to refuse obedience to legitimate Princes; nay, more, to rise in insurrection against them. (Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; Allocution “Quisque vestrum,” 4th October, 1847; Encyclical “Noscitis et Nobiscum,” 8th December, 1849; Letter Apostolic “Quum Catholica,” 26th March, 1860.)

64. The violation of a solemn oath, even every wicked and flagitious action repugnant to the eternal law, is not only not blamable, but quite lawful, and worthy of the highest praise, when done for the love of country. (Allocution “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849.)

VIII. Errors concerning Christian Marriage.

65. It cannot be by any means tolerated, to maintain that Christ has raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851.)

66. The Sacrament of marriage is only an adjunct of the contract, and separable from it, and the sacrament itself consists in the nuptial benediction alone. (*Id. ibid.*)
67. By the law of nature, the marriage tie is not indissoluble, and in many cases divorce, properly so called, may be pronounced by the civil authority. (*Id. ibid.*; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852.)
68. The Church has not the power of laying down what are diriment (absolute) impediments to marriage. The civil authority does possess such a power, and can do away with existing impediments to marriage. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)
69. The Church only commenced in later ages to bring in diriment impediments, and then availing herself of a right not her own, but borrowed from the civil power. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicæ,” 22d August, 1851.)
70. The canons of the Council of Trent, which pronounce censure of anathema against those who deny to the Church the right of laying down what are diriment impediments, either are not dogmatic, or must be understood as referring only to such borrowed power. (Letter Apostolic, *ibid.*)
71. The form of solemnizing marriage prescribed by the said Council, under penalty of nullity, does not bind in cases where the civil law has appointed another form, and where it decrees that this new form shall effectuate a valid marriage. (*Id. ibid.*)
72. Boniface VIII. is the first who declared that the vow of chastity pronounced at Ordination annuls nuptials. (*Id. ibid.*)
73. A merely civil contract may among Christians constitute a true marriage; and it is false, either that the marriage contract between Christians is always a sacrament, or that the contract is null if the sacrament be excluded. (*Id. ibid.*; Letter to King of Sardinia, 9th Sept., 1852; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th Sept., 1852; “Multis gravibusque,” 17th Dec., 1860.)
74. Matrimonial causes and espousals belong by their very nature to civil jurisdiction. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicæ,” 22d August, 1851; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1862.)
- N.B.—Two other errors may tend in this direction: those upon the abolition of the celibacy of priests, and the preference due to the state of marriage over that of virginity. These have been proscribed; the first in the Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; the second in the Apostolic Letter “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

IX. Errors regarding the Civil Power of the Sovereign Pontiff.

75. The children of the Christian and Catholic Church are not agreed upon the compatibility of the temporal with the spiritual power. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicæ,” 22d August, 1851.)
76. The abolition of the temporal power, of which the Apostolic See is possessed, would contribute in the greatest degree to the liberty and prosperity of the Church. (Allocution “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849.)
- N. B.—Besides these errors, explicitly noted, many others are impliedly rebuked by the proposed and asserted doctrine, which all Catholics are bound most firmly to hold, touching the temporal Sovereignty

of the Roman Pontiff. These doctrines are clearly stated in the Allocutions “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849, and “Si semper antea,” 20th May, 1850; Apostolic Letter “Quum Catholica Ecclesia,” 26th March, 1860; Allocutions—”Novos,” 28th September, 1860; “Jamdudum,” 18th March, 1861; and “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.

X. Errors having Reference to Modern Liberalism.

77. In the present day, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic Religion shall be held as the only Religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other modes of Worship. (Allocution “Nemo vestrum,” 26th July, 1855.)

78. Whence it has been wisely provided by law, in some countries called Catholic, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own worship. (Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852.)

79. Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every mode of worship, and the full power given to all of overtly and publicly manifesting their opinions and their ideas, of all kinds whatsoever, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to the propagation of the pest of indifferentism. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

80. The Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, and civilization as lately introduced. (Allocution “Jamdudum ceruimus,” 18th March, 1861.)—*Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Spalding*, etc., etc.

THE END

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